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ABSTRACT:
This thesis is an attempt to analyse, in legal terms, the theory and implementation in 
practice of an “ethical foreign policy” by the European Union. It focuses on relations 
between the Union and certain developing States. The thesis is primarily composed 
of two distinct substantive parts.
The first substantive part is composed of two chapters. This part firstly investigates 
which international legal rules authorise or oblige the Union, the European 
Community or the Member States to promote certain values in third States or in 
certain circumstances take action. It further examines the legal limits which under 
international law constrain such policies. It then goes on to examine policy and 
practice from a Union/Community law perspective. Here the thesis analyses: the 
relationship between the Union and Community pillars; the instruments available to 
the Union and Community in the pursuance of foreign policy objectives; and the 
scope of the Community and Union’s competence in implementing an ethical foreign 
policy.
The second substantive part of thesis examines practice. It analyses the importance 
attached to ethical values and their relationship with other priorities and objectives. 
Chapter Four examines relations with Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan. Chapter Five 
looks at relations with the Palestinian Authority and Israel in the overall context of 
the Middle East Peace Process. Chapter Six examines the Union’s policy of 
humanitarian and emergency aid.
The thesis finally attempts to draw some conclusions, as to the efficacy of the policies 
and instruments utilised and the approaches adopted in practice. It is argued that the 
Union should concentrate its efforts on certain specific rights and territories and 
abandon the all-encompassing policy it is currently attempting to implement.
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Chapter One
Introduction.
Violations of the legal principles of the sovereign equality of all States and non­
interference in the internal affairs of another are not uncommon where the 
geopolitical or other interests of States are at stake. In their foreign policies States 
have historically, in the main, sought directly to protect only their own interests. 
More recently, however, certain States have increasingly attempted to influence the 
normative framework which regulates the relationship between the State and its 
citizens in a third country.1
During the last thirty years various administrations have formally declared that in 
their foreign policy formulation towards certain third countries, acting either 
individually or collectively, they will take account of human rights and democracy, 
among other ethical values. The EU’s current constitutive treaties expressly refer, for 
example, to the objectives of promoting and protecting human rights and democracy 
in third States. The Council, Presidency, the European Parliament, various 
Commissioners and the Commission have all on numerous occasions declared their 
desire to achieve those objectives and the methodology to be used in their pursuance.
Foreign policies with ethical dimensions to them have often been theoretically 
analysed by International Relations scholars. This work is of interest and value but 
ethical foreign policies also involve many legal questions. Law is therefore, as 
important an analytical tool, as International Relations, of such policies. This thesis 
is an attempt to analyse the European Union’s efforts to this end in legal terms and to 
understand how and on what basis action, if any, is taken and how effective it has 
been or is likely to be. This study will focus on the Union’s relations with a number 
of, primarily developing, States. As a legal analysis of the EU’s ethical foreign 
policies and practice, this thesis does not attempt to engage itself in the International
1 Although the US has selectively promoted democracy in third States since the 19th Century. See 
Light, M., “Exporting Democracy” in Smith, K., and Light, M.(eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy, 
(2001) p.75.
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Relations debates, although it does refer to them where necessary. It is concerned 
with a number of different legal questions.
Chapter Two assesses the Union’s “ethical foreign policy” from a Public International 
Law perspective. It firstly investigates which international legal rules, if any, oblige 
or allow the Union, Community and/or the Member States to promote certain values 
in third States or in certain circumstances take action if they are being violated. It 
further examines the legal constraints on taking such action and whether it may be 
seen as intervention in the internal affairs of a non-Member State.
Chapter Three examines Union policy and practice from a Union/Community law 
perspective. Foreign policy powers are likely, in a nation State, to be among the 
powers exclusively reserved for the central or federal government or an inherent part 
of the royal or executive prerogative. With a system based on the principle of 
conferred powers, however, it must be positively established to what extent the Union 
has competence to act externally, with regard to promoting and protecting certain 
values and interests, and the methods by which it can do so. The aim of Chapter 
Three is to determine the scope of competence, the legitimacy of acting under 
available powers and the extent to which they have been exercised in practice. First, 
it examines the instruments available to the Union and Community in the pursuance 
of foreign policy objectives. The main part of the chapter is concerned with 
Community competence and practice. In particular, it analyses how the Community 
has attempted to use all of its external competences, among others, in development 
cooperation, trade and humanitarian aid to pursue its objectives.
The next three substantive chapters analyse practice. The litmus test for such policies 
lies in their application. Policy statements and legal obligations are one thing, 
implementation quite another. Although a number of general surveys now exist of
9 •conditionality and its use in practice, the aim in Chapters Four and Five is to look at
2 In particular, Fierro, E., The E U ’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, (2002), 
Bulterman, M., Human Rights in the Treaty Relations o f  the European Community: Real Virtues or 
Virtual Reality? (2001) and TomaSevski, K., Responding to Human Rights Violations 1946-1999, 
(2000).
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the multitude of instruments and policies that the EU has used in its relations with 
particular countries. This allows analysis of the circumstances which are taken into 
account when acting and also how priorities are identified and furthered in the 
relationship that exists with those States. It also allows the opportunity to analyse the 
importance attached to ethical values and their relationship with other priorities and 
objectives. Chapter Four examines relations with Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan. 
Chapter Five looks at relations with the Palestinian Authority and Israel in the overall 
context of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Chapter Six examines the 
Union’s policy of humanitarian and emergency aid.
Nigeria, Pakistan and Myanmar have been chosen in Chapter Four as the Union has a 
different legal relationship with each of them. There are, however, similarities 
between some of the domestic problems in each of these countries, in particular, with 
democracy. Nigeria, as an ACP State, has been chosen as it allows for an evaluation 
of the Lome/Cotonou institutions and procedures where “essential elements” of those 
Agreements have been breached. Although there are a number of examples of those 
Agreements being suspended, it was possible to study only one such State within the 
scope of the chapter. Pakistan has been selected as a developing country which is 
covered by the scope of one of the Community’s major development cooperation 
programmes, the Regulation on Financial and Technical Assistance to, and Economic 
Cooperation with, the Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America (the ALA 
Regulation).3 It has a close trading relationship with the Union and its Member States 
and has concluded bilateral treaties with the Community. Two military coups and the 
subsequent suspension and limited reintroduction of the democratic process have 
occurred during the existence of its formal relations with the Community. Myanmar 
has been selected as another developing State, this time within the ASEAN group of 
States, but one which has had all assistance, with the exception of humanitarian aid, 
suspended by the Community. The current military government has annulled 
previous democratic elections and is one of the more repressive regimes currently in 
power. Myanmar has also been selected as it is one of the few examples where it is 
possible to assess the full scope of the Community and Union’s spectrum of measures
3 Council Regulation No. 443/92, Regulation on Financial and Technical Assistance to, and Economic 
Cooperation with, the Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America, OJ L 52, 27/2/1992 p .l.
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against a State, taken in the absence of a sanctions regime imposed by the United 
Nations. Where the UN takes such action, the implementation of measures through 
the CFSP and Community legal order is primarily intended to enable the Member 
States to comply with their obligations under the UN Charter. Myanmar, however, is 
an example of action taken by the EU in the absence of measures being adopted in 
other international fora.
Chapter Five, as noted above, describes the role of the Union in the overall context of 
the MEPP and more specifically its relations with the Palestinian Authority. It is not 
possible, however, to discuss this issue without also examining relations with Israel. 
Although the 1995 Agreement between the Community and Israel is not a classic 
development cooperation based one (the Community has no definitions of 
“developing State” determining which type of trade instrument it utilises), it does 
contain the now standard “essential elements” clause. Israel’s problems with its Arab 
populations both within its internationally recognised boundaries and in the Occupied 
Territories are well documented. Union relations with Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority also, however, provide an ideal case-study to examine the relationship 
between the CFSP and the Community pillar and other fora such as the Barcelona 
Process, to assess the promotion of Union objectives. Despite the fact that the 
Agreement with Israel is a mixed one and does not use Article 181 EC as a legal base, 
it still allows an analysis of the human rights and ethical values dialogue in the 
relationship. It is also of significance, as the coming into force of the Treaty of Nice 
obliges the Community, for the first time, to pursue the objectives of democracy and 
human rights with all third States, not simply developing ones.4 The EC does have a 
“classic” development Agreement with the Palestinian Authority, so comparing 
differences of treatment between Israel and the Palestinian Administered Territories 
also allows consideration of how the EU’s status as a major international donor in 
relation to the latter enables it to influence policy there.
Having attempted to justify the selection of the case-studies in Chapters Four and 
Five, it is equally important to explain why some other States, also worthy of 
discussion, have been excluded. In the context of the ACP, as mentioned above,
4 New Article 181a EC. On this issue see Fierro, The E U ’s Approach, supra note 2, p.285.
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many States could have been discussed. Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Fiji, 
Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Togo and Zimbabwe to name just a few. Nigeria does, 
however, offer the opportunity to look at recent practice and also consider the 
circumstances in which all punitive measures have been withdrawn and full relations 
resumed, something most of the other potential ACP case-studies did not offer.
Myanmar is to some extent unique as it is one of the few States with which the Union 
has suspended almost all relations. It is, however, a part of ASEAN, whose Member 
States have bilateral treaty relations with the Community. It thus poses unique policy 
and strategic problems as to the approach to be adopted. Pakistan is also in many 
cases unique. It possesses one of the most volatile political situations of any of the 
States covered by the ALA Regulation. It has major constitutional and legal 
problems as well as widespread problems with human rights. Military coups, its role 
in the “war on terror” and the resumption of full cooperation with a military regime 
are distinguishing features. Chile, Brazil, Columbia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China 
and India, among others, would have been equally valid case-studies.
In Chapter Five, any of the Maghreb and Mashreq countries could have made suitable 
case-studies, as they are also part of the MEDA programme and the Barcelona 
Process. Similarly, relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-rich Middle 
Eastern States would have offered valid studies for analysis. A central focus of the 
Union’s relationship with many Middle Eastern States, however, is the “Palestinian 
issue” and thus it was the logical choice to examine the relationship between the 
Union and the Palestinian Authority. Furthermore, as noted above, the case-study 
with Israel allows the opportunity to investigate the presence of a “human rights 
dialogue”, where the Community does not have a development cooperation based 
competence and other geopolitical considerations play a role in that dialogue, in 
particular, the MEPP.
The most obvious category of States that have been excluded from the case-studies 
are the Central and Eastern European States as well as the Balkans. As the majority 
of these countries are to be future members of the Union or have a very close 
relationship with the Union, they have by and large been subjected to different legal 
and political criteria by the Union and its Member States compared to other third
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States. For the purposes of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) many of these countries are considered to be “economies in 
transition”, as opposed to developing countries, although they have in financial terms 
been the largest recipients of Community aid since the early 1990s. The Union and 
the Member States included human rights guarantees as a condition for the 
recognition of the statehood of many of the new States which emerged from the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, following the end of the Cold War. These conditions 
went beyond the traditional criteria for statehood. Since then the Copenhagen criteria 
have established the basic requirements for all prospective members.5 The thesis as a 
whole primarily addresses the relationship between the Union and developing 
countries and thus it was not felt necessary to discuss relations with these States 
separately. This also explains the absence of specific discussion of relations with a 
number of other important third States, such as the United States, Russia, Japan and 
the rest of the western developed world, including Canada and Australia.
The final substantive chapter, Chapter Six, looks at the issue of humanitarian aid and 
the practices of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). A study of 
humanitarian aid is important for a number of reasons. In the first instance, the Union 
considers that the humanitarian aid it distributes is clear evidence of its commitment 
to human rights and human dignity and ethical values in third countries. 
Furthermore, the theory of humanitarianism to which the EU now subscribes allows 
no influences, other than need, to dictate its actions and funding programmes. 
Humanitarian aid is, in this context, the ultimate test of the equal application of the 
principles and policies which are the subject of this thesis.
Chapter Seven attempts to draw some conclusions as to the efficacy of the policies 
and instruments used and the approaches adopted in practice. It proposes that the 
Union recasts the manner in which it seeks to protect and promote the ethical values 
to which it claims to be committed.
5 See Chapter Three.
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Chapter Two
Pursuing Ethical Values in Foreign Relations: Policy and 
Legal Issues.
1. Introduction.
Foreign polices with an ethical dimension to them, or more conveniently but less 
accurately “ethical foreign policies”, are closely tied up with ideology and the desire 
to project a particular identity to the wider world.1 The decision to promote such 
policies also stems from a desire, or at least acquiescence, from the domestic 
constituency to engage in such practices. It has been estimated, for example, that 
81% of the EU’s population feels that it should promote human rights abroad.2 
Article 1-3(4) of the Draft Constitution, which defines the objectives of the Union in 
its relations with the wider world, provides that it shall promote and protect values 
such as human rights, peace and security. Spokespersons for the EU have made clear 
on numerous occasions its position on the role of human rights and other ethical 
values in external relations. For example, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative 
for the CFSP, at the 58th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights stated:
..the European Union is determined fully to assume .... international responsibilities .... on 
account o f our size, our wealth, our history and our geography. Our Union is set to play a 
prominent international role in the century to come. Human rights will remain at the heart of
1 For example, Jose Pereira, during the Portuguese Presidency of the Council at a conference entitled 
“The EU and the Central Role o f Human Rights and Democratic Principles in Relations With Third 
Countries” stated “[E]ncouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the centre 
o f the relations between the EU and third countries...it is what we are about”. Available, 
http://www.hrd-euromaster.venis.it/othactiv/index.htm. Also see: Robin Cook, who as Foreign 
Secretary o f the UK, in a speech entitled, “Human Rights into a New Century” on 17/7/1997 stated 
“...human rights are at the heart o f our foreign policy..”; ICJ, Human Rights in United States and 
United Kingdom Foreign Policy: A Colloquium, (1978); and Dutch Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 
Human Rights and Foreign Policy, (1980) 11 NYBIL, 193.
2 Gras, J., The European Union and Human Rights Monitoring, (2000) p .l.
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that role because human rights are at the core o f European integration. ...Ours is a Union of 
values.3
In a similar vein the Council’s Annual Human Rights Report has stated:
Human rights....are the foundations o f freedom, justice and peace in the world [T]he
Union’s headway towards integration is paralleled in the field o f human rights. In a world 
where human rights....continue to be violated daily, the Union’s commitment to human rights is 
continuously being translated into action.4
These statements illustrate, in part, the rationale upon which the EU wishes to 
legitimise its practices in this sphere. The decision to engage in such practices, 
however, has both policy and legal implications. This chapter will deal first with 
some of the policy issues and then with some of the legal considerations, which arise 
under international law, from pursuing and implementing such a policy.
2. Ethical Values and Foreign Policy: Choices and
Implications.
Ethical foreign policies require a State to take into account and be sensitive to the 
interests of individuals in third States. It may sometimes require acting in a manner 
which is detrimental to the interests of one’s own citizens. There is no overriding 
moral consensus requiring that such an approach be adopted. Consequently, as Light 
and Smith note, there is nothing wrong in not doing so.5 The decision by a State or a 
group of States to promote and protect ethical values in third States is replete with 
policy implications. The aim of this section is not to discuss all of them 
comprehensively but to highlight and identify certain issues which will be referred to 
in later parts of the thesis, which examine practice, to provide a yardstick against 
which to measure Union actions.
3 Address in Geneva on 19/3/2002.
4 Council o f the European Union, European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 1999, p. 1.
5 Smith, K., and Light, M., “Introduction” in Smith, K., and Light, M. (eds.), Ethics and Foreign 
Policy, (2001) p.3.
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It is apparent that the decision to pursue an ethical foreign policy is an attempt to give 
further effect to values, which can be considered to be liberal ones, in a global 
political order in which Realism is currently the prevailing ideology.6 A common 
theme throughout the Realist tradition of International Relations is an emphasis upon 
the power and interest equilibrium and the protection of State security and interests.7 
Thus for Morgenthau, for example, principles are subordinate to politics and the 
ultimate skill for any leader is to adapt to changing political configurations to protect
a
the survival of the State. It is not contentious, however, to say that values such as 
human rights are now an entrenched feature of international relations. The issue is 
how to reconcile the interests of the State and the promotion of such values where 
they appear to be incompatible? Some States, such as the Member States of the EU, 
may wish to stand for something other than simply interest and power in their 
international relations. Choosing to do so, however, is not straightforward. There are 
difficult choices to be made concerning priorities and objectives in international 
relations and the relative weight to be attached to them, as well as the methods used 
to further those identified aims.
To take an obvious example, the EU has since the Lisbon European Council sought to 
work towards “sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion”.9 At the same time manufacturing industries have suffered 
significantly in Europe during the transition to knowledge and services based 
economies. A question which must be posed, therefore, is: does a foreign policy’s 
ethical dimension prohibit sales of armaments to a repressive regime, where this may 
be crucial for the economic survival of that part of manufacturing industry? Even if
6 See, Forsythe, D., Human Rights in International Relations, (2000) and Donnelly, J., Realism and 
International Relations, (2000). For discussion of the different types o f Realisms, see Smith, M., 
Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger, (1998) and Haslam, J., No Virtue Like Necessity: Realist 
Thought in International Relations Since Machiavelli, (2002).
7 See Donnelly, Realism, supra note 6 passim. Realists are often referred to as Statists due to their 
emphasis on the pre-eminence of the State.
8 Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations, (1992) passim.
9 Presidency Conclusions, 24/3/2000, para. 5.
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the policy is formulated so as to prohibit arms sales to repressive recipients, will the 
answer be the same if the regime is a crucial ally for security purposes?
Most Realists would consider that even attempting to formulate such a policy is 
naive, as it is ultimately futile. Vincent, for example, has argued that “[t]here is an 
inescapable tension between human rights and foreign policy”.10 Henry Kissinger, in 
the context of US policy, has stated:
I believe it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy o f countries around the world a 
direct objective of...foreign policy....The protection o f basic human rights is a very sensitive 
aspect of the domestic jurisdiction o f... .governments.11
National interest and security are considered the ultimate objectives of foreign policy
and all others will be compromised if they are endangered. The Realist approach also
insists that the morality one expects in relations between the State and its citizens,
need not play a role in relations between States as there is no single shared universal 
1 0morality. States, according to this approach, formulate their policies in moral 
language only when it suits them and to cloak their other interests.13 Most Realist 
studies on ethical foreign policies, however, tend to be dismissive without detailed 
examination of practice.14
Despite the cynicism of ethical foreign policies among Realists, some of them do not 
entirely reject a role for ethical objectives and morality in foreign policy formulation. 
Such values are simply subordinate to other essentials. Kissinger, for example, as a 
leading proponent of that school of thought, notes:
..America should give preference to democratic governments over repressive ones and be 
prepared to pay some price for its moral convictions there is an area o f discretion which
10 Vincent, R., Human Rights and International Relations, (1986) p. 129.
11 Cited by Baehr, P., The Role o f Human Rights in Foreign Policy, (1996) p.85.
12 See Haslam, No Virtue, supra note 6, p.250.
13 Hollis, M., and Smith, S., Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (1990) p.27.
14 See, for example, Kissinger, H., Diplomacy, (1994) and Towards a Diplomacy fo r the Twenty-First 
Century, (2000) and the works in supra note 6.
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should be exercised in favour o f governments....promoting democratic values and human 
rights... The difficulty arises in determining the precise price to be paid and its relationship to 
other essential American priorities...15
The role ethics will play in the creation of a new legal and political order will still be 
marginal. Other schools of thought, however, consider that the role such values play 
in foreign policy formulation should be much more central. Those who advocate this 
approach do so for different reasons. Some adopt a philosophical approach, based on 
natural law, utilitarianism or religious convictions.16 Those who subscribe to the 
Solidarist school of thought, for example, tend to argue that a foreign policy which 
places the defence of human rights at the centre of its ethical code will make an 
important contribution to both protecting national interests and also strengthening the
1 7pillars of an international order.
The Union’s approach to this issue is not dissimilar to the Solidarist perspective. It 
seems to involve an attempt to reconcile national security and other essential interests 
with the creation of a stable international order in which its values are reflected. 
From a long-term perspective, it is possible to argue that the interests of a polity’s 
citizens can be best protected and promoted through a change in international 
thinking and in the behaviour of other States. The promotion of ethical values in 
third States therefore benefits the citizens of all States. As Commissioner Patten 
noted, “human rights make moral, political and economic sense countries which
1 Rrespect human rights make good neighbours and trading partners”. Foreign policies 
with an ethical dimension to them must, if they are to be sustainable, serve the long­
term interests of the promoter. A long-term perspective requires implementation in 
the short-term, however, and a careful balance must be struck between them.
15 Kissinger, Diplomacy, supra note 14, p.811.
16 For a sample o f views see: Forsythe, Human Rights, supra note 6 and Human Rights and World 
Politics, (1983); Baehr, Human Rights in Foreign Policy, supra note 11; Smith and Light, Ethics and 
Foreign Policy, supra note 5; Donnelly, Realism, supra note 6; Dunne, T., and Wheeler, N.(eds.), 
Human Rights in Global Politics, (1996); and Hill, D., and Beddard, R.(eds.), Human Rights and 
Foreign Policy-Principles and Practice, (1989).
17 See, for example, Wheeler, N., Saving Strangers, (2000).
18 Speech by Commissioner Patten, 1/12/1999, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg 1 a/human- 
rights/intro.
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For an ethical foreign policy to be meaningful, it must be clearly formulated and 
some order of priorities of the values and interests being pursued needs to be 
established. Furthermore, there must be some identification of how those objectives 
are to be achieved. By and large positive measures, for example preferential trade 
agreements as a reward for approved and encouraged reforms, are not where the 
conceptual problems tend to lie. The formulation of such mechanisms and standards 
are not, on the whole, problematic. It is with regard to punitive, condemnatory or 
negative action that policy considerations and dilemmas become most apparent. The 
failure to systemise the evaluation process where punitive measures may be taken can 
lead to ad hoc decision making. This runs a greater risk of inconsistency and 
incoherence with other policies and activities. In such circumstances, criticism of 
human rights and a lack of democratic instruments, for example, can be used 
strategically. They become another ideological weapon by which to demonise a 
regime without any cost. Some International Relations scholars argue that foreign 
policy decisions are usually made by utilising “the rational model”.19 According to 
this model, decision makers look for the “cost/benefit analysis” of any action and this 
is done by clarifying the goals in a situation; identifying their relative importance; 
identifying the alternative methods to achieving the goals; investigating the 
consequences and probable and possible outcomes of those alternatives; and then 
choosing the action that produces the best outcome in the situation. Publicly 
identifying in advance and stating the priorities and weight to be attached to State 
objectives, in the above model, runs the risk of an administration being held a hostage 
to fortune. It limits flexibility and the ability to respond to changing international 
events and circumstances. Even where priorities are identified in political speeches, it 
is often difficult to determine the extent to which it is rhetoric and that to which it 
contains concrete legal undertakings.
The pursuit of an ethical foreign policy also requires the utilisation of appropriate 
instruments. In the implementation of such a policy, there is discretion in deciding 
which instruments to use. The effectiveness and impact of differing instruments
19 See, for example, Goldstein, J., International Relations, (1999, 3rd edn.) p. 150.
20 Ibid.
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require careful consideration. The Union and Community have various instruments 
at their disposal by which to promote and protect ethical values in third States. These 
are discussed in the next chapter.
3. Legal Considerations and the Policy of Promoting and 
Protecting Ethical Values in Third States.
The decision to promote ethical values in relations with third States raises numerous 
legal questions. It is clear that there are legal limits to the permissibility of such a 
policy and the manner in which it can be pursued. The Union and Member States 
cannot unilaterally act in any manner they so wish, without due regard to their 
international legal obligations. The principles of the sovereign equality of States and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of another State are central to determining the 
prima facia legality or otherwise, under international law, of a decision to promote 
and protect ethical values in third States. It may also be the case that the Member 
States, and possibly the Community and/or Union, are with regard to some values, 
legally obliged to promote and protect them in third States. This section deals with 
these issues. The discussion initially analyses the relationship between the Union and 
Community and international law. It then discusses more generally the legal limits, 
imposed by international law, upon an ethical foreign policy. The final section of the 
chapter examines the content of those values under international law which, 
according to their constitutive treaties, the Community and Union are obliged to 
promote in third States.
3.1. International Legal Obligations and the Member States, 
Community and Union.
Before defining the content of any relevant international legal obligations, it must 
first of all briefly be determined in what way the Member States, Community and 
Union are recognised as being bound by international law. With regard to the 
Member States the issue is not subject to any difficulties. With regard to the 
Community and Union the issue is more complex. Two issues need to be examined.
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First, the extent to which they possess international legal personality. Secondly, the 
approach of Community/Union law to international law. The discussion on the latter 
point deals primarily with customary international law, as it is this body of law which 
is most relevant to the analysis which follows in later parts of the chapter.21
3.1.1. International Legal Personality and the Community/Union.
In international law, personality is the basic proposition that an entity, whether it is a 
State, intergovernmental organisation or person, has in a specific context some legal 
capacity. Personality is relative. All legally recognised persons do not have identical 
powers and rights. Only States possess the totality of rights and duties.22 Article 281 
EC states that the Community “shall have legal personality”. The conferral of 
international legal personality in Article 281 EC may be contrasted with the conferral 
of capacity in domestic law by Article 282 EC. Article 281 EC does not impose an 
obligation upon those States which are not a party to the Treaty, and for many years 
the Soviet Union and its allies declined to accept the personality of the EC. Article 
310 EC confers express power to conclude treaties with third States and 
organisations. Numerous provisions, such as Articles 133 and 181 EC in the fields of 
the common commercial policy and development cooperation respectively, confer 
competence to conclude agreements in a specific area with third States. If these 
provisions are read in conjunction and by looking at practice,23 it is clear that the EC 
has international legal personality.
21 This is because the Community/Union cannot, as a non-State entity, currently be a party to, for 
example, international human rights treaties. The situation will be different with regard to the 
Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, ETS No. 5, once 
Protocol No. 14 (adopted 13/5/2004) is in force. For discussion o f the impact o f those treaties to which 
it is a party in the Community legal order see the references in the Bibliography.
22 See Advisory Opinion, Reparations fo r Injuries Suffered in the Service o f  the United Nations, (1949) 
ICJ Reports, 174, 179.
23 The Community is now a party to literally hundreds of treaties.
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With regard to the Union the issue is far less clear-cut.24 As is well known, it was 
expressly decided not to include references to the Union’s legal personality in the 
TEU, primarily due to the intransigence of the UK. A lack of express conferment of 
personality does not, however, preclude it. This is especially the case if reference is 
made to the aims and objectives of the entity and personality is deemed necessary to 
fulfil those objectives. Academic commentary on the legal personality of the Union 
has, by and large, argued that full international legal personality may be implied from 
the treaty-making capacity of the EU, but without addressing the implication of this 
conclusion.27 Articles 24 and 38 TEU confer the ability to conclude agreements with 
third States. Many authors who consider the Union to have personality do so because 
they consider it a prerequisite for it to enter into an agreement. Yet this is not the 
case.28 Even after the Nice amendments to Article 24 TEU and in the light of 
subsequent practice, it is still unclear if in these provisions it is the Member States
24 See, among others: Klabbers, J., “Presumptive Personality: The European Union in International 
Law” in Koskenniemi, M.(ed.), International Law Aspects o f  the European Union, (1997) p.231; 
Paasivirita, E., “The European Union: From an Aggregate of States to a Legal Person?” (1997) 2 
Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 37; Neuwahl, N., “Legal Personality o f the European Union- 
International and Institutional Aspects” in Kronenberger, V.(ed.), The European Union and the 
International Legal Order, (2001) p.3 and ibid., “A Partner With a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty 
Making in Matters o f CFSP and JHA After Amsterdam” (1998) 3 EFARev., 177; Wessel, R., “The 
International Legal Status o f the European Union” (1997) 2 EFARev., 109 and Eeckhout, P., External 
Relations o f  the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations, (2004) p. 154.
25 See Eaton, M., “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in O’Keeffe, D., and Twomey, P.(eds.), 
Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, (1994) p.215.
26 See the Reparations case, supra note 22, 179.
27 See the work cited in supra note 24. For a contrary view see, among others, Bulterman, M., Human 
Rights in the Treaty Relations o f  the European Community: Real Virtues or Virtual Reality?(200l) 
p.53 and Denza, E., The Intergovernmental Pillars o f  the European Union, (2002) p. 173.
28 See further Higgins, R., “The Legal Consequences for Member States o f the Non-Fulfilment by 
International Organisations of their Obligations Toward Third Parties” (1995) 66 AIDI, 249, 254 and 
the Reports o f the International Law Association Committee on the Accountability o f International 
Organisations: (2000) Report o f  the 69th ILA Conference, p.875 and (2002) Report o f  the 70lh ILA 
Conference, p.772.
29 See for example, Council Decision 2001/352, Concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement Between 
the European Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Activities o f the European Union 
Monitoring Mission, OJ L 125, 5/5/2001 p.l.
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acting together but using the Council as a negotiating instrument, or if  it is the 
Council acting for the Union. The safer assumption is that the Union does not yet 
have legal personality. In the absence of personality it is the Member States, and not 
the Union, which are jointly responsible for any unfulfilled obligations entered into or 
any acts which violate international law, which are carried out in its name. 
Personality determines where responsibility lies, not whether it exists or not.31 The 
confusion with Union personality and responsibility will for the most part be resolved 
by the Draft Constitution, if it comes into force. The Final Report of Working Group 
III on Legal Personality of the European Convention32 came out strongly in favour of 
the Union having its own explicit single legal personality having absorbed the 
separate legal personalities of the various Communities. This view is reflected in 
Article 1-6 of the Draft Constitution.
3.1.2. The Relationship Between International Law and the Community 
Legal Order.
From an international law perspective, it is clear that the Community is bound in its 
activities to respect custom and the peremptory norms of international law in its 
relations with third States. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in assessing the 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
Egypt, held that international organisations are subjects of international law and are 
bound by general rules of international law, under their constitutions and other
30 See Declaration No.4 to the Amsterdam Treaty on Article 24 TEU. For a contrary view see 
Eeckhout, External Relations, supra note 24, p. 158 and the work cited therein.
31 See Conway, G., “Breaches o f EC Law and the International Responsibility o f Member States” 
(2002) 13 EJIL, 679 and more generally, Hirsch, M., The Responsibility o f  International Organisations 
Towards Third Parties: Some Basic Principles, (1995) and Wellens, K., Remedies Against 
International Organisations, (2002). The real problem is with mixed agreements, entered into by the 
Community and Member States. For discussion see further the Bibliography for references.
32 CONY 306/02 WG III 16.
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international agreements to which they are parties.33 The Community is a party to 
neither the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as it is not a State, nor 
the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International 
Organisations, to which it can become a party.34 Nevertheless, any treaty 
relationships the Community enters into with third States or organisations are 
regulated by the provisions of the Conventions to the extent that they reflect custom. 
Furthermore, Article 103 of the UN Charter, an organisation of which all Member 
States of the Union are also a party, obliges all States to give priority to their 
obligations under the Charter, as opposed to those entered into under other treaties. 
States cannot evade their obligations under the Charter by delegating powers to other 
organisations they establish.
While the above may be obvious, the pertinent question is what is the approach of 
Community law to these issues? The ECJ considers the Community to be a legal
or
order sui generis. As de Witte notes, the ECJ has never stated “in so many words 
that EC law is entirely outside the scope of public international law but some of its
Of
dicta seem to point in that direction.” Article 307 EC does recognise that the legal 
obligations of the Member States, entered into prior to becoming members of the 
Community, should be respected vis-a-vis third parties. This is opposed to relations 
between States which are members of the EC, where Community law supersedes it, in 
the areas it regulates.
The position of international law within the EC legal order can be seen to be 
analogous to the relationship between international law and the national law of a
33 Advisory Opinion, Interpretation o f  the Agreement o f  25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, 
(1980) ICJ Reports, 73, 89. Also see Advisory Opinion, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal 
Process o f  a Special Rapporteur o f the Commission on Human Rights, (1999) ICJ Reports, 62, para.66.
34 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law o f Treaties Between States and International Organisations or Between International 
Organisations, 1986, UN Doc.A/Conf. 129/15 (1986).
35 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Adminstratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, 12.
36 De Witte, B., “Rules o f Change in International Law: How Special is the EC?” (1994) 25 NYIL, 299, 
300.
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State. States can be monist or dualist - both are permissible; international law is 
concerned not with the method but the end result. On the occasions the ECJ has 
looked at the role of custom and its impact in the Community legal order, it has 
tended to be in the context of the ability of individuals to challenge Community acts 
on the basis that they conflict with customary international law. In Racke, Advocate 
General Jacobs explored the relationship between custom and the legal systems of the
- IQ
Member States but came to an ambivalent conclusion. This was of importance in 
the context of custom binding the Community’s actions as general principles of 
Community law resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States. The ECJ has also displayed uncertainty as to the rights custom provides 
individuals and the circumstances in which it can be invoked by them under 
Community law. It did, however, state in Racke that:
It should be noted in that respect that, as is demonstrated by the Court's judgment in Poulsen 
and Diva Navigation..., the European Community must respect international law in the exercise 
o f  its powers. It is therefore required to comply with the rules o f customary international law 
when adopting a regulation suspending the trade concessions granted by, or by virtue of, an 
agreement which it has concluded with a non-member country...40
The exact impact of custom, and the significance of international law more generally, 
in the Community legal order will depend on the circumstances in which it is being 
invoked. Lenearts and De Smijter argue, however, that the views of the ECJ and 
generally understood interpretations of international law do not always coincide.41 
Taking a restrictive view, the Court’s dicta in Racke above can be read to mean that 
an individual would not be able to challenge a treaty which conflicted with customary 
international law through the judicial review procedures of the Community, solely on
37 See Denza, E., “The Relationship Between International and National Law” in Evans, M.(ed.), 
International Law, (2003) p.415, 419.
38 Case C-286/90, Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR 1-6019, Case T-l 15/94 Opel Austria 
[1997] ECR 11-39 and Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollant Mainz [1998] ECR I- 
3655.
39 See para. 89 of his Opinion.
40 Racke, para. 45. Emphasis added. Also see para. 46 et seq.
41 Lenearts, K., and De Smijter, E., “The European Union as an Actor Under International Law” 
(1999/2000) 19 YEL, 95, 122.
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that basis.42 In practical terms, however, notwithstanding the criticism of Lenearts 
and De Smijter, the ECJ does in its jurisprudence take account of the international 
legal obligations which regulate its activities. The dicta from Racke, cited above, 
should be read more broadly as a general recognition of the binding nature of 
customary international law upon the Community in all its activities. The reference 
to the adoption of a regulation, as an exercise of its powers, is simply one example of 
when regard must be had to custom. Where treaty relations are under consideration 
before the ECJ, for example, reference to the terms of the two Vienna Conventions is 
common place and the Court always perceives them to bind the Community on the 
basis that they represent customary international law.43 The Community was created 
by States -  which do not have the power to establish any entity outside the rules of 
the international legal order. Even if the Community is said to be a legal order sui 
generis, there is little doubt that it is bound in its activities to comply with the general 
rules of international law and the ECJ recognises this.
3.2. Legal Limits to Ethical Foreign Policies Under International 
Law.
The principles of the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of another State are central in determining the prima facia legality or 
otherwise, under international law, of the Union’s ethical foreign policy. This section 
is primarily concerned with the legality of the nature of the policy per se, rather than 
the manner in which the Union’s policy is implemented in practice. The latter issue 
will be developed in the next chapter, although some general comments are made in 
the following sections.
42 The point here is that no matter what the status o f the norm violated, unless the individual can rely 
on another rule o f Community law, it cannot be challenged.
43 For example, the ECJ referred to the 1986 VCLTSIO in C -159/91 Levy [1993] ECR 1-4287, para. 19 
and to the 1969 VCLT in Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety [2001] ECR 1-9713, para.24.
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3.2.1. State Sovereignty and the Principle of Non-Interference.
When the Union promotes the values it considers important in third States, it must be 
careful to ensure that it simply exerts its influence in requesting them to adhere to 
certain standards and does not intervene in their internal affairs. In many senses, this 
is the crux of the issue which this section deals with. It is concerned with what Falk 
has referred to, in a narrower context, as the reconciliation between sovereignty and 
human rights.44 There are two different but related issues of concern. First, the 
extent to which international law limits the sovereignty of a State vis-a-vis the nature 
and actual relationship in existence between it and those within its jurisdiction. 
Secondly, the extent to which international law allows, or at least does not forbid, 
third States acting in an attempt to influence that relationship. The principles of State 
sovereignty and the equality of all States prima facia preclude external coercion upon 
a State to adhere to certain values. The internal regulation of relations between a 
State and its citizens is generally speaking within the domaine reserve of that State. 
The complexity of the relationship which exists between sovereignty, non­
intervention in internal affairs and values, such as human rights, is reflected in 
Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, in particular, Article 2, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, Articles 55 and 56 45 The relevance and importance of Article 2(7) 
of the Charter and the principle it encapsulates cannot be overestimated.46 It is 
difficult to find any resolution adopted in any of the United Nations organs or bodies
44 See Falk, R., Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit o f  Justice in a Globalising World, (2000) Ch.4.
45 Article 2(7) UNC is concerned with the UN intervening in the internal affairs o f its members and not 
with relations between them. In the light o f Article 2(1) UNC it does not legitimise intervention by 
others. For detailed discussion, see: Simma, B., et a l, The Charter o f  the United Nations, (1994) 
p. 139; Preuss, L., “Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters o f Domestic 
Jurisdiction” (1949) 74 RDC, 553; Trindade, A., “The Domestic Jurisdiction o f States in the Practice 
of the United Nations and Regional Organisations” (1976) 25 ICLQ, 715; Ermacora, F., “Human 
Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction” (1968) 124 RDC, 371; Henkin, L., The Age O f Rights, (1990) Ch.4; 
Waldock, H., “General Course on Public International Law”(1962) 106 RDC, 5, 173; and Jennings, R., 
and Watts, A.(eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, (1992, 9th edn.) p.427.
46 The principle is one o f customary international law, notwithstanding Article 2(7) UNC. See Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (1986) ICJ Reports, 14, 
paras. 174 and 202. Hereinafter the Nicaragua case.
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which, when dealing with, for example, international cooperation and assistance 
between States in the fields of human rights and democracy, does not refer to Article 
2(7) UNC. The Commission on Human Rights47 and the General Assembly,48 for 
example, annually adopt resolutions concerned with the promotion and protection of 
human rights and democracy, which require cooperation between States. These 
resolutions consistently reiterate that when States cooperate with or assist one 
another, they should respect the provisions of the Charter. Either the principle of 
non-interference or Article 2(7) of the Charter is almost always referred to.
It is possible to argue that international society is now undergoing a paradigmatic 
shift from the era of geopolitics to one of geogovemance, where the broader interests 
of social justice, such as the protection of human rights, take priority over the 
doctrine of non-intervention 49 According to this approach, the human rights treaties 
which have been negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations and subsequent 
State practice have changed the nature and scope of that which is defined as within 
the “domestic affairs” of a State. As Reisman has argued, “no serious scholar still 
supports the contention that internal human rights are ‘essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any State’ and hence insulated from international law”.50 Similarly, 
McGoldrick has argued that the once central issue of domestic jurisdiction is now
47 For example, see the following resolutions: “Promotion o f a Democratic and Equitable International 
Order” - CHR Resolutions 2003/63, 2002/72, 2001/72 and 1999/68; “Enhancement o f International 
Cooperation in the Field o f Human Rights” - CHR Resolutions 2002/86, 2001/67 and 2000/70; “The 
Role o f Good Governance in the Promotion of Human Rights” - CHR Resolution 2003/65; and 
“Further Measures to Promote and Consolidate Democracy” - CHR Resolution 2002/46.
48 For example, see the following resolutions: “Enhancement o f International Cooperation in the Field 
of Human Rights” - A/RES/57/224 and A/RES/55/109; “Promotion o f a Democratic and Equitable 
International Order” - A/RES/57/213, A/RES/56151 and A/RES/55/107: “Strengthening the Rule of  
Law” - A/RES/57/221; and “Promoting and Consolidating Democracy” - A/RES/55/96.
49 See Chinkin, C., “Human Rights and the Politics o f Representation: Is There a Role for International 
Law?” in Byers, M.(ed.), The Role o f Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations 
and International Law, (2000) p. 131.
50 Reisman, M., “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law” (1990) 84 AJIL, 
866, 869.
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largely peripheral.51 Conversely it can be argued, however, that such treaties are only 
elaborating upon, and not transforming, the nature of the relationship between human 
rights and that which is within the “domestic affairs” of a State.52 There is no need, 
however, to perceive the relationship between human rights and other values such as 
democracy, on the one hand, and on the other sovereignty, as a zero-sum game as is 
often contended. Neither is it necessary to define sovereignty to encapsulate 
responsibility for a population.54 The soundest way to examine the relationship 
between sovereignty and values such as human rights is to question what amounts to 
interference and the extent to which such matters are actually within the internal 
affairs of a State. If ethical values are not within the internal affairs of a State or if 
the “interventions” of a third State or organisation do not amount to interference then 
State sovereignty is not an impediment to an ethical foreign policy.55
The views of the Union and its Member States on where the boundaries lie between 
what is and is not within the internal affairs of a State and what amounts to 
interference in such situations have undergone a fundamental shift. During the 
negotiation of Lome I, for example, the ACP States and Commission resisted the 
inclusion of references to human rights precisely because it was felt that it would
51 See McGoldrick, D., Approaches to the Assertion o f International Jurisdiction: The Human Rights 
Committee” in Capps, P., Evans, M., and Konstadinidis, S.(eds.), Asserting Jurisdiction: International 
and European Legal Perspectives, (2003) p. 199, 200 and ibid., “Human Rights and Non-Intervention” 
in Lowe, V., and Warbrick, C.(eds.), The United Nations and the Principles o f  International Law: 
Essays in Memory o f  Michael Akehurst, (1994) p.85.
52 Byers, M., Custom, Power and the Power o f  Rules, (1999) p.43.
53 See Kamminga, M., Inter-State Accountability for Violations o f Human Rights, (1992) p.l; Henkin, 
L., “International Law: Politics, Values and Functions” (1989) 216 RDC, 9, Brownlie, I., Principles o f  
International Law, (2003, 6th edn.) p.294 and McGoldrick, “Human Rights and Non-Intervention” 
supra note 51, p.85.
54 See Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights” supra note 50; Falk, R., “Sovereignty and Human 
Dignity: The Search for Reconciliation” in Deng, F., and Lyons, T.(eds.), African Reckoning: A Quest 
fo r  Good Governance,(1998) p. 14; Bennoune, K.,“ ‘Sovereignty Vs. Suffering’?: Re-Examining 
Sovereignty and Human Rights Through the Lens o f Iraq” (2002) 13 EJIL, 241; and Report o f the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (2001).
55 This is recognised in most of the works cited in the previous two notes, it is just that other 
approaches are also adopted.
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interfere in the internal affairs of the States in question.56 The 1986 Declaration on 
Human Rights of the 12 Member States, however, states quite clearly that, “ ...the 
protection of human rights is the legitimate and continuous duty of the world 
community and of nations individually. Expressions of concern at violations of such
cn
rights cannot be considered interference in the domestic affairs of a State.” More
tfirecently in a statement at the 56 Session of the Commission on Human Rights, the 
Presidency stated:
....human rights....are....about universality. No country should be free to invoke sovereignty 
or interference in internal affairs to prevent people under its jurisdiction from fully enjoying
their human rights. It is the duty o f the international community to call upon those States to
cease those practices and bring the perpetrators to justice.58
The approach the Union has adopted is that it is perfectly legitimate for it to comment 
upon the protection or violation of any rights in any State. An examination of Union 
practice, especially the issuing of declarations and demarches, illustrates that this is 
indeed its practice and view.59 It is worth questioning, however, to what extent the 
approach of the Union is in accordance with international law. In the Nationality 
Decrees cases the PCIJ stated:
...within the domestic jurisdiction seems....to contemplate certain matters which...are not in
principle matters regulated by international law The question whether a certain matter is or
is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon 
the development o f international relations.60
In the later Lotus case61 the approach adopted by the PCIJ was essentially that States 
are free to engage in any act they wish, as it emanates from their own will, so long as
56 See King, T., “Human Rights in the Development Policy o f the EC: Towards a European World 
Order?” (1997) 27 NYIL, 51, 54.
57 “Declaration on Human Rights” 21/7/1986, (1986) 19 Bull EC 7/8, para.2.4.4. Emphasis added.
58 Statement by Mr J. Gama, on behalf o f the Portuguese Presidency, 21/3/2000. Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human rights/doc/uncom56.pdf.
59 See Chapter Three.
60 Advisory Opinion, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, (1923) Series B, No.4, 1, 24.
61 France v. Turkey, PCIJ, (1927) Series A, No. 10, 1.
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another rule of international law does not prohibit it. This position has been repeated 
on numerous occasions. Furthermore, in the Reparations case, it was stated that a 
State is an entity which “possesses the totality of international rights and duties 
recognised by international law”. In each case the fundamental limit of “domestic
jurisdiction” is the extent to which international law, at that time, prohibits the 
activity in question or requires States to act in a particular manner.
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ had to determine the legality of US acts which 
included assisting the contras in Nicaragua and laying mines in Nicaraguan territorial 
waters. The ICJ drew heavily upon the definitions of non-intervention which had 
been formulated in two General Assembly Declarations - On the Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 197064 and On the Inadmissibility 
of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty 1965.65 With regard to non-intervention, in general it 
noted:
..in view o f the generally accepted formulations ( i.e., the two declarations), the principle 
forbids all States or groups o f States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external 
affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle o f State sovereignty, to decide freely.66
Citing examples, the Court noted that “choice of political, economic, social and 
cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy” were all matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a State. Subsequent General Assembly declarations have
/o
also dealt with non-intervention in internal affairs but essentially none of them
62 See Advisory Opinion, Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons, (1996) ICJ Reports, 226 
and the Nicaragua case, supra note 46.
63 Reparations case, supra note 22, 180.
64 GA Resolution 2625 (XXV) 24/10/1970. See the Nicaragua case, supra note 22, para. 191.
65 GA Resolution 2131 (XX) 21/12/1965. See the Nicaragua case, supra note 22, para.203.
66 Ibid., para. 205.
67 Ibid.
68 Most importantly, the Declaration on the Inadmissibility o f Intervention and Interference in the 
Internal Affairs o f States, A/RES/3 6/103.
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actually touch upon the fundamental issue of generally what is and is not within the 
“domestic affairs” of a State. The reason for this is clear; it is not fixed but dependant 
upon the development of international law.
This same fluid approach was also adopted by the Institut De Droit International (IDI) 
in its 1954 declaration “La determination du domaine reserve et ses effets”.69 The 
Institut’s 1989 declaration on “The Protection of Human Rights and the Principles of
7 nNon-Intervention in Internal Affairs of States,” however, indicates where the 
boundaries lie between domestic jurisdiction and international regulation and the 
permissibility of measures which may be taken to persuade third States to uphold and 
protect human rights. Article 1 of the Declaration considers the protection of human 
rights to be an obligation erga omnes. Having attained such a status, they are no 
longer considered matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
State. Articles 2 and 3 of the Declaration deal with the legality of action by third 
States in response to the violation of human rights by another State. Article 3 
contends that diplomatic representations, as well as purely verbal expressions of 
concern or disapproval, regarding any violations of any human rights are lawful in all 
circumstances. Article 2 considers that retorsion, reprisals and other countermeasures 
are legitimate responses to the violation of human rights in a third State, provided 
such measures are permitted under international law and do not involve the use of 
force. The Declaration considers that “such measures cannot be considered an 
unlawful interference in the internal affairs of that State”. Article 2 also draws a 
distinction between non-derogable and derogable rights. In the case of the former, 
violations do not have to be gross or systematic to justify third State action, whereas
71in the case of latter, the implication is that individual violations will not be enough.
Although the Declaration is not legally binding, it does raise a number of issues. In 
the first case it is not concerned with ethical values beyond human rights and thus
69 Session d’Aix-en-Provence 1954. Article 1 states, “le domaine reserve est celui des activitds 
etatiques ou la competence de l’Etat n’est pas li£e par le droit international. L’etendue de ce domaine 
depend du droit international et varie suivant son developpement”.
70 Session o f Santiago de Compostela.
71 See Article 2(3).
51
only considers “interference” by third States permissible when human rights are being 
violated. Unless issues, such as the rule of law, democracy and good governance 
directly impact upon the protection of such rights, then they are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a State. Nor does the Declaration deal with the positive aspect of 
promoting ethical values (which is addressed infra), but simply with action by third 
States in response to the violation of human rights. It considers that responses are 
legitimate, under international law, notwithstanding the existence of procedures under 
various international human rights treaties to deal with their violation. General self- 
help or horizontal mechanisms for the enforcement of international law, in this case 
human rights, have supposedly remained intact. Furthermore, the Declaration does 
not attempt to define the term “human rights”, all of which are considered to be 
obligations erga omnes, although it does draw a distinction in terms of the 
appropriate action in response to violations of different rights. As these issues are 
vital in determining the legality of an ethical foreign policy, under international law, 
they will be examined in turn.
3.2.1.(a). Human Rights and Obligations Erga Omnes.
There are certain international legal norms in whose violation all States have a legal 
interest. These are the obligations erga omnes, as identified by the ICJ in its dictum
79in the Barcelona Traction case. The Court stated:
..an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations o f a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-^-vis another State.... By their very 
nature the former are the concern of all States. In view o f the importance o f the rights involved, 
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes... Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the 
outlawing o f acts o f aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights o f the human person, including protection from slavery and racial
72 See Belgium v. Spain (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited), Second Phase, 
(1970) ICJ Reports, 3.
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discrim ination.73
The Court only gave an illustrative list of such obligations. Section 702, Third 
Restatement o f the Foreign Relations Law o f the United States in this context 
considers that any State “violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it 
practices, encourages, or condones” certain rights. In addition to those rights listed 
by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, Section 702 makes specific reference to 
murder or disappearances; torture other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and a “consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognised human rights”.74 The Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
nc
Rights 1966, has also contributed to this debate. In General Comment 24 it stated 
that all States party to the Covenant are prohibited from entering reservations to key 
provisions, i.e., those which are considered to be peremptory norms. The list of 
rights includes: slavery; torture and other forms of inhuman treatment; executing 
pregnant women; presuming a person guilty until they prove their innocence; 
arbitrarily arresting and detaining persons; and permitting the advocacy of national,
73 Ibid., paras. 33-34. The status o f genocide as an obligation erga omnes has subsequently been 
confirmed, inter alia, in Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime 
o f Genocide, Preliminary Objections, (1996) ICJ Reports, 595, para.31.
74 S.702 Restatement (Third) o f  Foreign Relations Law, (1987). S.702(m) considers that “any State is 
liable under customary law for a consistent pattern o f violation of any such right as State policy.” 
With regard to the rights listed, so long as the violations are State policy, responsibility is invoked. 
The scale is not important. With regard to the other norms referred to in Section 702 (privacy; 
arbitrary arrest and detention; denial o f fair trial; grossly disproportionate punishment; freedom of  
conscience and religion; and invidious racial or religious discrimination) only gross violations invoke 
responsibility. Also see further Comment O on Section 702, which states that “[violations of the rules 
stated in this section are violations of obligations to all other States.”
75 999 UNTS 171. All o f the Member States of the Union are a party to the Covenant.
76 Peremptory norms o f international law or principles jus cogens and obligations erga omnes are not 
synonymous, although in substantive terms there is a significant overlap between them. See further, 
Ragazzi, M., The Concept o f  Obligations Erga Omnes,(1997) p.43, Crawford, J., The International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility,(2002) p.244 and Gaja, G., “Obligations Erga 
Omnes, International Crimes and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis o f Three Related Concepts” in 
Weiler, J., Spinedi, M., and Cassese A.(eds.), International Crimes o f  States: A Critical Analysis o f the 
ILC 's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility, (1989) p. 151.
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77racial or religious hatred. The General Comment is, strictly speaking, only of 
relevance to those States which are a party to the Covenant.
Both General Comment 24 and the Third Restatement take a very expansive approach 
to those rights which, when violated, all States have an interest in. Beyond those 
norms referred to by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, there is disagreement 
over which others can be considered to be obligations erga omnes?% At the very 
least, however, self-determination,79 certain obligations under international
o n  o i
humanitarian law and torture are now also universally accepted as having 
achieved that status. The list does not extend to all human rights as the IDI’s 1989 
declaration implies.
3.2.1.(b). Human Rights Obligations, the Limits of Domestic 
Jurisdiction and the Legality of Horizontal Enforcement.
There is little doubt that those treaties which primarily protect human rights are 
considered to be somewhat different in nature from other international agreements.82 
The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention stated 
that in such Conventions “[contracting States do not have interests of their own; they
77 “Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the 
Optional Protocols” UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.6 (1994) para. 8.
78 See further Ragazzi, Obligations, supra note 76, p. 132.
79 See: Portugal v. Australia (East Timor Case) (1995) ICJ Reports, p.90, para.29 and Advisory 
Opinion, Legal Consequences o f  the Construction o f  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
9/7/2004, para. 155.
80 See Advisory Opinion, Nuclear Weapons, supra note 62, para. 79 and Legal Consequences o f the 
Wall, supra note 79, paras. 157-159.
81 See, for example, R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Magistrate, ex part Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [1999] 
2 W.L.R. 827, 841, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, (1980) 630 F.2d 876 and Al Adsani v. United Kingdom, 
(2002) 34 EHRR 11, para. 151.
82 See, for example, Craven, M., “Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in 
International Law” (2000) 11 EJIL, 489 and Higgins, R., “Introduction” in Gardner, J.(ed.), Human 
Rights as General Norms and a State’s Right to Opt Out, (1997) p.vx. Although see the responses of 
the UK, USA and France to General Comment 24 o f the Human Rights Committee.
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merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely the accomplishment of those 
high purposes which are the raison d ’etre of the Convention.”83 In the Barcelona 
Traction case, although dealing with a somewhat different issue, the Court’s 
sentiment is much the same, as is the approach of the HRC in General Comment 24. 
In this sense it can be argued that all States which are party to a human rights treaty, 
have an interest in compliance with it, even though they are not being directly 
affected by violations of its provisions in a third State. There are, however, two 
considerations which need to be addressed. First, is the State which is the target of 
disapproval violating a legal obligation? Secondly, if there is a legal obligation, 
where does it stem from?
A distinction must be drawn between legal obligations stemming from custom and 
those stemming from treaties. With regard to treaties which protect human rights, 
utilising the approach discussed above, i.e., that of the ICJ in the Genocide opinion 
among others, it can be argued that all States which are party to any such treaty have 
an interest in ensuring its provisions are being complied with by others and beyond 
this a right to act to protect that interest. Issues such as valid reservations will be a 
consideration in determining the extent of that right. Notwithstanding the existence 
of reservations, the ratification of a treaty entails the State’s consent to international 
regulation in such matters. The jurisprudence of international tribunals, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights, has clearly held that once a State becomes a party 
to such a treaty, those matters regulated by it are no longer within the exclusive
• * Rd.preserve of the State’s discretion. In the Belgian Linguistics case, for example, in 
response to Belgium’s argument that its policy on education was within its domestic 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding its obligations under the Convention system, the Court 
noted:
the Convention and the Protocol, which relate to matters normally falling within the domestic
legal order of the Contracting States, are international instruments whose main purpose is to lay
83 Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime 
o f  Genocide, (1951) ICJ Reports, 15, 23. Article 60(5) VCLT also recognises this.
84 Application Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64 Case "Relating to 
Certain Aspects o f  the Laws on the Use o f  Languages in Education in Belgium ” v. Belgium, Judgment 
on Preliminary Objections.
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down certain international standards to be observed by the Contracting States in their relations 
with persons under their jurisdiction.. ,85
It does not automatically follow, however, that because a State has ratified an 
international treaty protecting such rights that other States have a right to comment or 
take other action in response to its violations of that treaty. This is especially the case 
as almost all such conventions have their own specific enforcement mechanisms.86 
The issue, therefore, is to what extent are methods of enforcement, other than those 
provided for in the treaties themselves, legitimate? The answer depends on the treaty 
in question - they take different approaches. The Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the European Convention are exceptional in that they are the only major 
international human rights treaties that specifically refer to this issue. The Covenant, 
in Article 44, states that the “provisions for the implementation of the present 
Covenant....shall not prevent the State Parties to the present Covenant from having 
recourse to other procedures for settling a dispute in accordance with general or 
special international agreements in force between them.” The Convention, however, 
takes the opposite approach. Article 55 requires that parties to it shall “except by 
special agreement,...not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in 
force between them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute 
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Convention to a means of
on
settlement other than those provided for in this Convention.” All other international
OQ
human rights treaties, whether regional or universal, are either silent on this issue or 
do not exclusively reserve the resolution of any disputes to the competent named
*5 Ibid, p. 19.
86 There are notable exceptions, such as: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 606 
UNTS 267; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide, 1948, 78 UNTS 
277; and Slavery Convention, 1926, 60 LNTS 253, as amended by the Protocol to the 1926 Slavery 
Convention, 1953,212 UNTS 17.
87 See further on both provisions Novak, M., U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR 
Commentary (1993) p.617.
88 See: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 UNTS 3; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3; American Convention on Human Rights, 
1969, Pact o f San Jose, Costa Rica, (B -32); and African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981 
(1982)21 ILM 58.
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bodies. As both the Covenant and Convention refer only to dispute settlement 
procedures contained in treaties, it can be concluded that no human rights treaty 
actually prohibits the use of methods, other than those provided for, to encourage or 
persuade States party to them to comply with their obligations.90 The adoption of 
resolutions on cooperation and assistance in human rights in the United Nations, as 
discussed above, is consistent with this understanding. A State bound by certain 
international obligations in the field of human rights is thus entitled to require another 
State, bound by those same obligations, to perform them.91 The procedures provided 
for by a treaty coexist alongside those traditional mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance, in international law, which exist between States.92 Taking action against 
a State for failing to comply with its legal obligations requires no injury in the 
traditional sense.93
It is only the Member States of the Union which are parties to human rights 
conventions, rather than the Community or Union. Thus, where all of the Member 
States are party to a treaty, they have a collective interest, as do all other parties to it, 
to ensure compliance with those legal obligations they have all accepted. The issue 
of reservations by the Member States of the Union will be a consideration. If, in their
89 See: Article 22, International Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 
1966, 660 UNTS 195; Article 29, Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f Discrimination 
Against Women, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13; Article 30, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, 1984, 1464 UNTS 85; Article 92, International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights o f all Migrant Workers and Members o f Their Families, 
1990, General Assembly Resolution 45/158, 18/12/1990; Article 3, Protocol to the African Charter on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998.
90 For a concurring view, see Henkin, Age o f  Rights, supra note 45, p.59. Cassese, A., International 
Law, (2001) p. 235 and Kamminga, Inter-State Accountability, supra note 53, p. 189 consider that the 
European Convention does not allow this. The distinction is that European Court has the exclusive 
right to settle disputes, but not over other methods o f ensuring compliance with Convention rights.
91 See Henkin, L., “Human Rights and State ‘Sovereignty’” (1996) 25 Ga.J.Int’l & Comp.L., 31,43.
92 S.703 o f the Third Restatement, however, considers that the specific treaty-based machinery 
“supplements” traditional remedies.
93 See further Schachter, O., “International Law Implications of US Human Rights Policies” (1978/9) 
2 4 NY.LSch.LR., 63.
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capacity as States parties to a treaty, they choose to speak or act through the Union’s 
institutions, that is their choice.
With regard to human rights obligations which derive from custom, the issue of the 
legality of horizontal enforcement is more straightforward.94 The practice of Charter- 
based bodies and procedures, such as ECOSOC Resolutions 123595 and 15 0 3 96 and 
the work of the Special Rapporteurs, illustrates clearly that States can legitimately 
seek to ensure that others comply with their human rights obligations. Unilateral 
action is not necessarily problematic either, as each State has an interest in 
compliance with those obligations, whether they are directly affected or not. Thus 
measures which seek to ensure compliance with such norms are, subject to 
compliance with other international rules, perfectly legitimate. With regard to the 
content of such norms, it is difficult to contend that they extend beyond those which 
are recognised as obligations erga omnes. By definition all States are bound by them 
and have a right to act when they are breached. The fact that States are selective in 
when they choose to act, does not invalidate their legal right to do so,97 although it 
may detract from their credibility when they do act.
3.2.1.(c). The Violation of International Norms by Third States and 
Community and Member State Obligations.
The Member States and Community also have an obligation (as opposed to a right) to 
respond, in certain circumstances, when third States violate certain norms. Although 
the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (ILCASR) do
94 See Frowein, J., “Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public International 
Law” (1994) 248 (IV) RDC, 349 and Simma, B., “From Bilateralism to Community Interest in 
International Law” (1994) 250 (VI) RDC, 221. For more general discussion see Damrosch, L., 
“Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures” (1997) 269 RDC, 19 and Elagab, O., 
The Legality o f  Non-Forcible Countermeasures in International Law,( 1989).
95 ECOSOC Resolution 1235 (XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967).
96 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), 48 U.N ESCOR (No. 1A) 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.l (1970).
97 Schachter, O., “International Law Implications” supra note 93, 79 argues that a legal right to act 
does not impose an obligation to do so in every case.
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not apply to international organisations, many of the provisions are a reflection of 
custom.98 The principle in Article 16 ILCASR, which prohibits aid or assistance in 
the commission of an “internationally wrongful act”, therefore, also applies to any 
other entity which has legal personality and has the capacity to act in that regard.99 
Article 16 establishes a relatively high threshold before a State or other entity is 
considered to be aiding or assisting in the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act by another.100 The definition of an “internationally wrongful act” in Article 2 is, 
however, broad enough to encompass violations of any legal obligation by a State.101 
If entities with legal personality are considered to be aiding or assisting a third State 
in the violation, for example, of its human rights obligations, then they are 
internationally responsible for their actions and obliged to stop doing so.102 Due to 
the manner in which the relevant articles of the ILCASR are drafted, aiding or 
assisting, for example, an isolated incident of torture will be enough to invoke
I
responsibility. Accordingly, the Member States and Community must cease any 
activities which aid or assist in the commission of such acts. The question of whether 
the Community and its Member States are obliged to act, where they are not aiding or 
assisting in the commission of an internationally wrongful act, is somewhat different.
Chapter III of Part Two of the ILCASR contains Articles 40 and 41, which deal with 
breaches of peremptory norms of international law104 and the consequent
98 See Articles 55 and 57. The ILC has now included the topic “Responsibility o f International 
Organisations” in its programme of work. See, ILC, Report on the Work o f  its 54th Session, GAOR, 
57/10, p.228.
99 The ICJ in Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences o f  the Wall, supra note 79, para. 159 refers to a 
number o f principles which can be found in the ILCASR, including Article 16, but does not expressly 
mention them.
100 For discussion o f the conditions see Crawford, State Responsibility, supra note 76, p. 148.
101 Article 2 states that “[t]here is an internationally wrongful act o f a State when conduct o f an action 
or omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State.”
102 See Article 30 ILCASR.
103 Also see Article 40(2) ILCASR, which deals with aiding and assisting violations o f peremptory 
norms.
104 Article 26 ILCASR also refers to peremptory norms. It is concerned, however, with the 
circumstances precluding the wrongfulness o f an internationally wrongful act.
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responsibility of States. Article 40 applies to the “international responsibility (of a 
State) entailed by a serious breach...of an obligation arising under a peremptory 
norm of...international law.”105 Article 41 details the obligations of other States in 
response to serious violations of peremptory norms by another. States must cooperate 
to bring to an end through lawful means the violation and not recognise as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of Article 40.106 The general 
nature of a State’s obligations in such circumstances is relatively clear, even if the 
actual content of the obligation may not be.107 Whether these obligations also extend 
to the Community is more complex.
The commentary on Article 40 of the ILC Articles refers back to Article 53 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.108 This provision considers a 
peremptory norm of general international law to be one recognised “by the 
international community of States as a whole”. Palchetti implies that this excludes 
the Community acting in such circumstances.109 It is questionable on policy grounds, 
however, whether the “international community of States” should be read so 
restrictively, as to exclude international organisations in the obligations they may 
owe, to ensure that such norms are not violated. States may still have the monopoly 
in recognising such principles110 but that is not to say that the entities they create 
cannot act in that regard. Article 41 of the ILC Articles provides a possible solution.
105 Emphasis added.
106 This principle was also used by the ICJ in Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences o f  the Wall, 
supra note 79, para. 159, but without referring to the ILCASR.
107 See further infra and more generally Klein, P., “Responsibility for Serious Breaches o f Obligations 
Deriving from Peremptory Norms o f International Law and United Nations Law” (2002) 13 EJ1L, 
1241.
108 Crawford, State Responsibility, supra note 76, p.245.
109 Palchetti, P. “Reactions By The European Union to Breaches of Erga Omnes Obligations” in 
Cannizzaro, E.(ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations,(2002) p.219, 221. 
Klabbers, J., “Comment on Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollant Mainz” (1999) 36 
CMLRev., 179 considers that Racke presented the ECJ with the opportunity to make pronouncements 
on the Community’s duties vis-^-vis obligations erga omnes, as opposed to peremptory norms, but 
chose not to take it.
110 Simma, “From Bilateralism” supra note 94, 243 has referred to this as “the foxes guarding the 
chickens”.
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Article 41(1), as noted above, obliges States to cooperate together to bring to an end,
through lawful means, serious breaches of peremptory norms.111 The provision does
not prescribe the action to be taken and it is clear that where the Member States have
transferred competence to the Community, then under Community law, action must
be taken by it. How that action is taken or through which forum is not relevant for
the purposes of State responsibility. The obligation upon States is to act. Whether an
obligation exists on the Community independently of the Member States is unclear.
There is no reason, in principle, why it should not where the Member States have
transferred their competence to it. Palchetti argues in this regard that the Community
acts on behalf of the Member States and is not obliged to act independently of 
112them. Yet the bestowment and recognition of legal personality arguably means 
that, within its competence, the Community is obliged to act even if that obligation is 
ultimately owed by the Member States. If the action required is outside the scope of 
Community competence and the Member States choose to act through the CFSP or 
independently, that is their prerogative. In practical terms, in such circumstances, 
whether an obligation is owed by the Community, Member States or by both makes 
little difference. Action ultimately by a State is being taken in response to the 
systematic breach of peremptory norms and that is what is legally required. There is 
nothing to stop the EU Member States acting through whichever forum their other 
legal obligations require. In this limited respect, therefore, there is an obligation, as 
opposed to right, upon the Community to respond to violations of such norms. 
Similarly, the Member States may wish to utilise Union instruments through which to 
act. That is within their discretion.
On the basis of the preceding discussions, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Those norms which are recognised as obligations erga omnes are no longer within a 
State’s domestic jurisdiction. This is also the case with regard to those obligations a 
State has accepted by becoming party to a human rights treaty. With regard to
111 J0rgensen, N., The Responsibility o f  States for International Crim esf2000) p.215 argues, however, 
that the role o f third States in such circumstances is limited to assisting and enforcing any decisions 
made by a determining body (probably the Security Council) as to whether such obligations have been 
violated or not.
112 Palchetti, “Reactions by the Union” supra note 109, p.228.
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obligations erga omnes all States have an interest in their compliance and a right to 
act when they are violated by a third State. Where all of the Union’s Member States 
are party to a human rights treaty, they have a legitimate interest in ensuring that 
other States comply with their obligations under it. They also have a right to act if 
the treaty is violated by a third State, so long as they all have also accepted the 
obligation in question. All other issues are within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. 
The Community and its Member States, as is the case with all other States, must not 
aid or assist in the commission of any internationally wrongful acts by another State. 
Furthermore, where there are serious breaches of peremptory norms of international 
law, the Community and its Member States must cooperate together with others to 
bring to an end, through lawful means, such violations. Regardless of whether there 
is a right to act or an obligation, the responses must be lawful. The next section 
deals, in part, with this issue.
3.2.2. Legal Limits on the Implementation of Policy.
Ethical foreign policies are both positive and negative in nature and the values which 
they seek to promote and protect extend beyond the relatively narrow ambit of certain 
human rights. Thus, as regards positive measures, programmes are often funded by 
donors to help raise awareness of particular rights and issues, where an identified 
problem is seen to exist. The Union, for example, has consistently funded seminars 
in third States which attempt to ensure that journalists are aware of the international
j n
rules protecting freedom of expression. Furthermore, the Union routinely provides
food aid for distribution.114 Positive rewards for compliance with certain norms, such 
as through the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme as implemented by 
the Community, are in principle perfectly lawful under international law. In most 
cases, positive measures cannot function without the consent of the third State. Such 
policies are, however, legally limited to encouraging and persuading other States to 
comply with those standards without intervening, in the sense of acting without or 
beyond the consent granted, in the internal affairs of the recipient State. Thus the
113 See the Council’s Annual Report on Human Rights for examples o f such activities.
114 See the discussion infra.
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Community can provide assistance and any other help requested or agreed upon with 
the consent of all parties involved. Positive measures tend to pose few legal 
problems.
Legal problems do exist when States, or in our case the Community and its Member 
States, in objecting to the policies and practices of a third State, take punitive action, 
such as withdrawing preferential trade arrangements. Such acts may be part of the 
objecting donor’s prerogative but they are not completely unregulated by 
international law. In a 1994 Communication the Commission stated that in response 
to human rights violations in a third State the EU may issue confidential or public 
demarches; change the content of cooperation programmes or the channels used; 
defer signature or the decisions needed to implement a cooperation Agreement; 
reduce cultural, scientific or technical cooperation; defer the holding of joint 
committee meetings; suspend all bilateral contact; postpone new projects; refuse to 
act on new initiatives; impose trade embargoes; or suspend all cooperation.115 A 
number of such actions, which straddle retorsion and reprisals, have legal 
consequences. The legal issues involved will depend, among other things, on the 
exact factual circumstances, the legal provisions regulating relations between the 
parties and the nature of the violation. A more detailed analysis of the legal limits of 
the instruments used by the Union is undertaken in the next chapter. We are here 
concerned more generally with the legal limits of implementing an ethical foreign 
policy.
In the first instance States, through some means or other, must be aware of a situation 
in a third State of which they disapprove. Chris Patten has noted that human rights 
promotion by the Union is a pre-emptive measure as there is no “droit de regard? on 
the part of foreign governments.116 Simma and Alston have argued, however, that
1 1 *7such a right has evolved and is also broadly accepted. This view is almost 
certainly the correct one. All States observe and gather information, through various
115 COM (1994) 42, p .l l .
116 Special Seminar With NGOS, 14/7/2003. Speech by Commissioner Patten, DN: Speech 03/364.
117 Simma, B., and Alston, P., “The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General 
Principles” (1992) 27 AYBIL, 82, 98.
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means, on compliance by others with legal obligations in which they have an interest. 
In the case of human rights, that would entail violations of all human rights protected 
by a treaty to which both States are a party or those protected by custom. Despite 
Patten’s comment, this does not pose a legal problem. Supervising a third State’s 
compliance with its legal obligations is not prohibited so long as it does not amount to 
intervention in its internal affairs.
Intervention has traditionally been defined in the literature as “dictatorial
110
interference”. Accordingly any interference that is not dictatorial does not amount 
to intervention. The IDI’s 1989 Resolution and the Union, as noted above, now 
consider that purely verbal expressions of concern are lawful in all situations. Such 
expressions of concern, whether or not the issue is considered to be a part of the 
State’s domestic jurisdiction, are legitimate according to this approach, because they 
do not satisfy the threshold to amount to intervention. As the Reporter’s Notes to the 
Third Restatement state, “virtually every State has criticised some other for its human 
rights practices, both directly and by statement or vote in international bodies.”119 
The approach to intervention adopted by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case supports this. 
The Court relied heavily upon the 1965 and 1970 General Assembly Declarations, 
discussed above, both of which adopt a similar formula. The 1970 Declaration 
considers that:
No State or group o f States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, fo r any reason, 
whatever, in the international or external affairs o f another State. Consequently ...all... forms o f
interference are in violation o f international law. No State may use or encourage the use of
economic, political or any other type of measure to coerce another State in order to obtain from 
it subordination o f the exercise o f its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages o f any 
kind.120
118 This definition probably originates from Lauterpacht, H., “The International Protection o f Human 
Rights” (1947) 62 RDC, 1, 19. On its background and usage see Preuss, “Article 2, Paragraph 7” 
supra note 45, 605. It is still widely used in the literature, see Oppenheim, supra note 45, p.430, 
Henkin, Age o f  Rights, supra note 45, p.55 and Damrosch, L. et al., International Law: Cases and 
Materials, (4th edn., 2001) p.951.
119 Third Restatement, supra note 74, Reporter’s Notes (9).
120 Emphasis added.
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The Court stated:
....A s regards the content o f non-intervention...the principle forbids all States or groups of 
States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs o f other States. A 
prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is
permitted... to decide freely Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods o f coercion in
regard to such choices, which must remain free ones.121
On the basis of the Nicaragua case it is clear that the Union, whether it is dealing 
with a legally binding obligation or not, may publicly unilaterally criticise any 
situation in a third State of which it disapproves. The issues of domestic jurisdiction 
or sovereignty are not an impediment, as verbal expressions of concern are not 
coercive and thus do not amount to intervention. The is further supported by the 
Court in the Nicaragua case, which also considered that action on the economic plane 
against Nicaragua by the US, namely the cessation of economic aid, the reduction of 
sugar quotas and trade embargos, despite their economic consequences did not
199amount to intervention. In this case it does not amount to intervention in the affairs 
of a third State, if a donor changes its trade policies, as a response to behaviour it 
disapproves of, because it is within its discretion to afford those facilities to a third 
State. Foreign policy formulation is a part of the State’s prerogative.123 Section 703 
of the Third Restatement goes further, however, in considering that “a State does not 
violate international law when it shapes its trade, aid or other national policies to 
influence a State to abide by recognised human rights standards”. Such acts have 
traditionally been considered to be retorsion and thus legal.124 It can be questioned, 
however, whether they are always legal. When donating aid, it is possible for States 
to undertake unilateral obligations which are legally binding and thus they may be
19c
estopped from rescinding from them. In the alternative suspension of a
121 Nicaragua case, supra note 46, para.205.
122 Ibid., para.245.
123 Ibid., para.205.
124 See Damrosch, L., “Politics Across Borders: Non-intervention and Non-forcible Influence Over 
Domestic Affairs” (1989) 83 AJIL, 1, 54, Cassese, International Law, supra note 90, p.244, Crawford, 
State Responsibility, supra note 76, p.281.
125 For the general principle see the Nuclear Tests Case, {Australia and New Zealand v. France) (1974) 
ICJ Reports, 253, para 43 et seq.
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development cooperation treaty with a third State, in the absence of an “essential 
elements” clause, will only be a lawful response if one of the situations identified in 
Articles 54-64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties exists. This is the 
case even if the donor is, of its own volition, granting to a third State preferential 
access to its markets. Furthermore, Article 60(5) VCLT is relevant, if the treaty in 
question is poverty-orientated, and individuals are perceived to be the identified 
beneficiaries. Suspension or termination not only of a treaty but also other bilateral 
aid, can also potentially lead to the legal responsibility, of the former donor, for 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights in the target State.126
In the absence of treaty relations, States often resort to countermeasures, including 
sanctions, retorsion and non-forcible reprisals, in an attempt to convince/coerce 
another State to act in a manner which is deemed appropriate. While this area of law 
is not well-regulated, it is not entirely without rules. Again such measures should not
177amount to coercion. The debate as to where the boundaries lie between economic 
coercion, for example, and lawful responses to the violation of human rights is 
annually played out in the General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights.128 
Such measures can be considered to be coercion if the target State is not violating a 
legally binding obligation or the issue is within the scope of its discretion. In the 
Nicaragua case, the ICJ considered that choices as to “political, economic, social and 
cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy” are entirely within the 
discretion of the State. Thus the implementation of broad ranging sanctions to
126 See General Comment 8 of the Committee o f Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
E/C. 12/1997/8, para. 11.
127 If they are simply symbolic that poses no problem, although if they are punitive in nature the 
considerations are the same as for those which are coercive. See Craven, M., “Humanitarianism and 
the Quest for Smarter Sanctions” (2002) 13 EJIL, 43, 47. Also see Abi-Saab, G., “The Concept of 
Sanction in International Law” in Gowlland-Debbas, V.(ed.), United Nations Sanctions and 
International Law,(2001) p.29, 32.
128 See the various Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights 
entitled “Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures” and “Unilateral Economic Measures as a 
Means o f Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries”. A/Res/57/222, 
A/RES/56/148, A/RES/55/110, A/RES/54/172, A/RES/53/141, A/RES/52/120, CHR Resolution 
2002/22, CHR Resolution 2001/26 and A/RES/56/179, A/RES/54/200, A/RES/52/181 respectively.
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express disapproval of a non-democratic or corrupt regime, for example, may amount 
to coercion.
If the issue is not within the domestic jurisdiction of a State, for example it is 
engaging in violations of obligations erga omnes, then although an objecting State 
has a right to respond, any countermeasures taken must still be proportionate.129 
Article 48(1) ILCA.SR notes, in this context, that a State may invoke the 
responsibility of a wrongdoing State if the obligation breached is “owed to a group of 
States, including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective 
interest of the group.” Commenting on Article 54 ILCASR, which permits “lawful 
measures” by States other than those who are injured, Crawford considers that 
currently international law “on countermeasures taken in the general or collective
interest is uncertain At present there appears to be no clearly recognised
entitlement of States.. .to take countermeasures in the collective interest.”130 That fact 
that there is no “clearly recognised entitlement” to act does not mean that States 
cannot do so; they simply must ensure that in doing so they respect other principles of 
international law. Article 54 ILCASR very pointedly uses the language of “lawful 
measures”. Simma and Alston have argued that where there are gross and persistent 
abuses of obligations erga omnes, countermeasures are lawful in the absence of treaty
i - j i
relations. The use of “lawful measures” in Article 54 ILCASR implies that, 
notwithstanding the seriousness of any such breach, countermeasures will not always 
be lawful; it depends on their nature. In the case of values which have not attained 
that normative status and may not even be legally binding upon the target State, there
129 See Article 51 ILCASR and Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Reports, p.3, para.87 “in the view o f the Court, an important 
consideration is that the effects o f a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, 
taking account o f the rights in question”. Reprisals must also be proportionate. The classic authority 
is Portugal v. Germany (the Naulilaa Case), (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 1012, 1026. See further Cannizzaro, 
E., “The Role o f Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures” (2001) 12 EJIL, 889.
130 Crawford, State Responsibility, supra note 76, p.305.
131 Simma and Alston, “Sources” supra note 117, 98.
67
are significant constraints on the responses which are legitimately available to third 
States.132
3.3. Legal Obligations to Promote Ethical Values in the Treaty 
Framework.
The objective in this section is to determine which values the Community and Union 
are legally obliged to promote and protect and the content of those values in 
international law. Reference is made only to the constitutive treaties. The secondary 
legislation that has been adopted, practice and the treaties entered into with third 
States and organisations which aim, in part, to give effect to these obligations are 
discussed in Chapter Three.
The starting point for this discussion is Title XX of the EC Treaty which contains 
Articles 177-181, dealing with development cooperation. Article 177(1) refers to the 
fact that the Community shall foster the campaign “against poverty in the developing 
countries” and in Article 177(2) that this policy "'’shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that 
of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Furthermore, Article 
177(3)EC obliges the Community and its Member States to comply with “the 
commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of 
the United Nations and other competent organisations.” Article 177(3) does not, 
however, contain a general obligation vis-a-vis all commitments undertaken in the 
UN but solely those relating to development cooperation. Article 177 is further 
supplemented by the TEU,
There is reference in the preamble of the TEU to the Union’s attachment to the 
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as well as the social rights contained in the European Social Charter 1961
132 For more general discussion see White, N., and Abass, A., “Countermeasures and Sanctions” in 
Evans, M. (ed.), International Law, (2003) p. 505 and Gowlland-Debbas, United Nations Sanctions, 
supra note 127.
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and the 1989 Community Charter on Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 
However, it is not specified whether this attachment is limited to the “internal sphere” 
of the Union or also applies to the Union’s external relations. Beyond this the 
relationship between human rights and democracy, among other principles, in 
external relations and the objectives of the Common Provisions is weak. Article 11 
of the TEU, which established the CFSP, specifically states that the Union shall 
“develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms,” but this is not a free-standing obligation for the Union 
but one of the objectives of the CFSP. Richardson has argued that this provision is 
evidence of the EU’s commitment to safeguarding the values of the Union in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. He states it is evidence of a 
“ . . .foreignpolicy clearly based on principles and not on realpolitik”n31
Article 2 TEU, which establishes the Union’s objectives as a whole, only implicitly 
refers to such questions with, for example, the creation of Union citizenship. The link 
between these objectives and the promotion of human rights in external relations is 
not apparent. Article 6 TEU does, however, give a hint on issues of cultural 
relativity. Article 6, which reaffirms that the Union is founded on principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, states in its second 
paragraph that:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection o f Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ...and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles o f Community 
law.
The listed sources of fundamental rights upon which the Union is said to be founded 
all advocate a “European standard” of human rights protection. Implicitly this means 
that this is the standard which the Union as a whole should promote both in the CFSP 
and in the Community’s development cooperation policies. This seems to be the case
133 Richardson, J., “The European Union in the World-A Community o f Values” (2002) 26 Fordham 
ILJ, 12. For a contrary view, see Duquette, E., “Human Rights in the European Union: Internal Versus 
External Objectives” (2001) 34 Cornell Int'l. L.J., 363, 378, who argues that the Union acts on the 
basis o f power, not morality.
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even though “European standards” may not be applicable or relevant to third States, 
which are either committed to other international treaties or consider that they have a 
different set of cultural values.134 There is thus a desire to impose or at least achieve 
“our standards” elsewhere, due to an inherent belief in the superiority of those 
values, without necessarily realising or seriously considering that they may not be 
appropriate or applicable outside of a particular social and historical context. The 
principles advocated by the EU are far from universal. While human rights are not a 
Western idea, there is significant force in the argument that the current and specific 
philosophy on which the current universal regime is based is Western in essence. As 
Mutua notes:
..that Africa merely needs a liberal democratic, rule of law State to be freed from despotism is
mistaken. The transplantation of the narrow formulation o f Western liberalism cannot
adequately respond to the historical reality and the political and social needs o f Africa The
supremacy of the jurisprudence o f individual rights is not a natural...or universal
136phenomena, applicable to all societies, without regard to time and place.
Yet in a recent Communication, the Commission noted that its actions in the field of 
external relations will be guided by compliance with the rights and principles 
contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as opposed to the European 
Convention on Human Rights to which the TEU refers, as this will promote
1^7coherence between internal and external approaches.
Beyond these references, there is nothing else in the constitutive treaties, as they 
currently exist, which creates an obligation to eradicate poverty or promote human 
rights and the rule of law in third States. Nor is there any articulation of what is 
meant by these principles or why it is they have been identified as global goals to be 
pursued. In the Draft Constitution, Chapter I of Title V (the Union’s External Action) 
again refers to these principles, as well as expressly for the first time: preserving
134 In practice, however, the approach is sometimes subtly different. See further Chapter Four.
135 See Robin Cook, supra note 1 for very express reference to this idea.
136 Mutua, M., “The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the 
Language o f Duties” (1995) 35 Virginia JIL, 339, 341.
137 COM(2001)252, p.3.
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peace and preventing conflicts; preserving and improving the quality of the 
environment; assisting populations confronting man-made and natural disasters; and 
promoting an international system based upon multilateral cooperation and good
too
global governance. There is no discussion in the treaties as they currently stand, or 
in the Draft Constitution, of the weight to be attached to these principles in relation to 
other policies or their content.
The legal obligations imposed by the Treaties vis-a-vis the promotion of ethical 
values are, as one would expect, extremely flexible. They do not expressly articulate, 
for example, that there is a general obligation upon the Community to take account of 
poverty reduction policies vis-a-vis the Common Commercial Policy, this only exists 
with regard to development cooperation. Article 3 of the TEU, however, in imposing 
an obligation on the institutions to ensure consistency and continuity of all activities, 
should prevent the Community, for example, in the WTO from adopting a position 
which would undermine its own development programmes in developing States.
3.3.1. The Obligation to Promote and Protect Human Rights in Third 
States.
In the context of the CFSP, the Union is obliged to contribute to the global 
development and consolidation of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Much of the Union’s external activities in the context of the promotion of 
human rights and other ethical values takes place in the more specific context of 
development cooperation and the relationship between development, human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. This is dealt with in the following sections. It is 
initially worth addressing, however, to what extent the Member States of the Union 
are generally obliged to protect and promote human rights in third States by their 
human rights treaty obligations. This is as opposed to the protection of norms in
138 This is further supplemented by Article III-213 on development co-operation which is not 
substantively very different from the current provisions and Article III-218 on humanitarian aid, which 
is a recognition of the de facto  situation.
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which they have an interest and the limits of responding to breaches of such norms, 
which were discussed above.
3.3.1.(a) The Member States and Treaty Obligations to Promote and 
Protect Human Rights in Third States.
The issue we are concerned with here is the “territorial applicability” of human rights 
treaties and whether those treaties generally oblige States to protect and promote such
1 TQrights outside of their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the fact that a number of 
treaties contain similar language, there is no overall consistency in relation to this 
issue. The two 1966 Covenants, for example, take differing approaches. The 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights makes no specific reference to its 
jurisdictional application.140 Article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
on the other hand, obliges each State to “undertake to respect and ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant”. Most other treaties do not expressly limit their applicability to 
the territory of a State and require that effect be given by the Contracting State to the 
rights protected to “all within their jurisdiction”, although that term is understandably 
never defined.141
By looking at the practice of the tribunals established to interpret these treaties and 
the background to some of them, it is clear that there was (and is) no general intention
139 More specific obligations are discussed infra.
140 This is also the case in CEDAW, although the Optional Protocol o f 1999 in Article 2 refers to the 
communications submitted by “..individuals, under the jurisdiction o f a State Party..”. Similarly, the 
African Charter does not have such a clause.
141 The following relevant treaties take this approach: Article 6, CERD; Article 2, CRC; and Article 1, 
ECHR. The approach o f the European Social Charter, 1961, ETSNo.35, is different. Article 34 o f the 
1961 Charter applies to “metropolitan territory” although a State can extend it to non-metropolitan 
territories under Article 34(2). Article 10(1) o f the 1988 Additional Protocol, ETSNo. 128 and Article 
L (1) of the Revised European Social Charter, ETSNo. 163 are substantively identical. For discussion 
on the scope o f “jurisdiction” in general see Capps, Evans and Konstadinidis, Asserting Jurisdiction, 
supra note 51.
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to impose an obligation upon States to protect human rights in third States. For 
example, examination of the drafting history of Article 2 of the ICCPR makes it clear 
that the term “jurisdiction” was added to ensure that States would be responsible for 
the acts of their agents outside of the State’s geographical territory. As Nowak notes, 
however, the discussions on these issues reveal that the intention of the final wording 
was to avoid obligating State parties to protect persons under their jurisdictional 
authority but outside their sovereign territory.142 Despite generally taking a very 
expansive approach to asserting its jurisdiction,143 in the light of the travuax 
preparatories the Human Rights Committee has not obliged any State parties to 
protect Covenant rights outside of their jurisdiction, where their agents are not 
involved.
The Strasbourg organs of the European Convention of Human Rights have on a 
number of occasions determined the applicability of the Convention outside of the 
physical territory of the Contracting States and their respective responsibilities. In the 
Cyprus v. Turkey cases of 1975, for example, it was held that a Contracting State may 
be responsible for the acts of its authorised agents outside of its territory.144 The 
Court has subsequently further defined the “extra-territorial” application of the 
Convention on numerous occasions,145 most recently and for our purposes 
importantly in Bankovic.146 It is clear from the Court’s jurisprudence that it does not 
oblige State parties to protect or promote Convention rights outside of their 
jurisdiction. As is the case with the Covenant, a State may, however, be responsible 
for the acts of its agents outside of its territory.147 As far as is known, on no occasion,
142 Novak, U.N. Covenant, supra note 87, p.41. Also see Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences o f  
the Wall, supra note 79, paras. 109-111.
143 For more general discussion see McGoldrick, “Approaches to the Assertion o f International 
Jurisdiction” supra note 51.
144 Applications 6780/74 and 6950/75 (First and Second Applications) Cyprus v. Turkey (1976) 4 
EHRR 482.
145 See for example, Soering v. UK, Series A., 161, (1989) 11 EHRR 439, Loizidou v. Turkey (1996) 23 
EHRR 513 and Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) (1995) 20 EHRR 99.
146 Application No.52207/99 Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other States, Decision o f  
12/ 12/2001.
147 See, in particular, Bankovic, paras. 57-73.
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under any of the major human rights treaties to which the Union Member States are a 
party, has a tribunal considered that State parties generally have an obligation to 
promote and protect human rights in third States. This does not mean, however, that 
obligations vis-a-vis third States do not exist with regard to specific issues, 
particularly in the context of development.
3.3.1(b) Development Cooperation, Human Rights and the Legal 
Obligations of Third States.
The relationship between development and human rights is a complex and multi-
148faceted one. The right to development has been recognised on a number of 
occasions in declaratory documents, but always with a substantial dissenting or 
abstaining minority.149 Arguments for the recognition of such a right are partly based 
on the principle, articulated in the UN Charter, that all States have an obligation to 
work together in an attempt to achieve global welfare.150 Furthermore, Article 28 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right of everyone to a 
“social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realised” although reference to this provision is notable by its 
absence from the international discourse.151 In the same vein the two 1966 Covenants
148 See, among many others, Kumado, K., “An Analysis o f the Policy of Linking Development Aid to 
the Implementation o f Human Rights Standards” (1993) 50 The Review-The ICJ, 23, Madsen, H., 
“Development Assistance and Human Rights Concerns” (1994) 61/62 Nordic JIL, 129, O’Manique, J., 
“Development, Human Rights and Law” (1992) 14 HRQ, 383 and “Human Rights and Development” 
(1992) 14 HRQ, 78, Donnelly, J., “Human Rights, Democracy and Development” (1999) 21 HRQ, 608 
and Paul, J., “The Human Right to Development: Its Meaning and Importance” in Slinn, P.(ed.), Third 
World Legal Studies, (1992) p l7  and references in the Bibliography.
149 The Commission on Human Rights expressly recognised the human right to development in 1977 
see, U.N.Doc.E/CN.4/SR.1389, p. 1392. More important is the 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development, GA Resolution 41/128, GAOR, 41st Session Supp.53, p i86. For references to the 
literature on development and international law in general see the Bibliography.
150 In particular, Articles 1, 55 and 56 o f the Charter. See further Franck, T., Fairness in International 
Law and Institutions, (1995) Chs. 13 and 14.
151 The Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA.Res. 3281(xxix), UNGAOR, 29th Sess., 
Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50 is an exception.
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refer to the idea that the human rights recognised in those documents can only be 
achieved “if conditions are created where everyone may enjoy his civil and political 
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights”.152 These declarations and 
provisions do not in themselves impose legal obligations upon States to assist others. 
The 1986 Declaration on Development has caused the relationship between human 
rights and development to become increasingly intertwined. The Rio Declaration of 
1992,153 as well as the reports of the Independent Expert on the Right to 
Development, appointed by the Commission on Human Rights, consider that the 
relationship between human rights and development has now gained universal 
acceptance.154 What is in all probability legally recognised, is “..the right to 
development.. .as a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental 
human rights.”155 What its exact content is and the obligations it imposes upon all 
States, however, is more difficult to determine. Development can be seen as a 
process, which aims to eliminate poverty and also allows other rights to be 
protected.156 It also has other dimensions and implications and there are a number of 
conceptual aspects to the issue, which are of relevance to the discussion. First, why 
in the development discourse has poverty been so specifically highlighted, not only at 
the international level but also by the Union? Second, what is the actual role and 
place of human rights in the development process? Third, are there possible 
obligations not to hinder the development of others? Finally, do legal obligations to 
provide some form of assistance exist?
The trend towards identifying poverty as a primary objective of development 
cooperation policies began with the World Bank’s 1990 World Development Report 
This signalled recognition of the importance of a focus on the poor, to ensure that
152 See the Preambles to the 1966 Covenants.
153 (1992) 31 ILM, 874.
154 “Report o f the Independent Expert on Development” 11/09/2000, E/CN.4/2000/WG.18/CRP.1, 
para.5. See further Sengupta, A., “On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development” (2002) 24 
HRQ, 837.
155 See the Vienna Declaration and Programme o f Action 1993, A/CONF. 157/23, reprinted (1993) 32 
ILM  1667 para. 10. For a contrary view see Broding, G., “The World Bank and Human Rights: 
Mission Impossible?” Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy, Working Paper T-01-05 p. 13.
156 Sengupta, “Theory and Practice” supra note 154, 848.
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they were not excluded from the benefits of development. The OECD now considers 
that the commitment of all development agencies to poverty reduction is “most 
tangibly reflected by their across the board support for the international development
1 57targets.” This was established in the context of several UN Conferences and 
Summits.158 Poverty is not perceived to be a high priority simply for the sake of 
relieving suffering. The Human Development Report 2000, 159 for example, argues 
that human rights are not a reward of development but they are critical to achieving it. 
One in five of the global population lives on less than one US$ a day.160 It is for this 
reason argued that poverty eradication is not only a development goal but the central 
challenge for human rights in the 21st Century.161 Those living in extreme poverty are 
clearly, in practice, not benefiting from many of the rights which States have 
committed themselves to protecting and promoting. It is now considered that poverty 
can only be eradicated as part of the development process. The collateral respect for 
certain human rights this entails, as part of the more general relationship between 
development and human rights, is obvious.
The role of human rights in the development process is relevant in two different 
respects. First, there is the relationship between human rights and the recognition of 
a right to development and what this entails. Second, there is the relationship 
between the protection of human rights and the economic development of the State in 
question. It has been argued that the right to development centres primarily upon the
• 1A 7 •  •individual. It has, in the alternative, also been argued that the right to development 
is actually nothing other than the recognition, that in the development process, the 
State should take account of and protect the already existing rights of those
157 DAC, Shaping the 21st Century: Scoping Study, Donor Poverty Reduction and Practices, (1996) 
p.vii.
158 In particular, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995.
159 Human Development Report 2000, (2000).
160 This is a widely accepted statistic which is regularly cited in World Bank and OECD reports.
161 Human Development Report 2000, p.8.' >
162 Article 2, 1986 Declaration.
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individuals who are affected by its development policies.163 It is certainly without 
doubt that a large number of “development” projects cause and create legally 
prohibited harms to some categories of project-affected persons.164 The argument 
that the development process is focused upon the individual now seems to be the 
more widely accepted formulation and is the approach which the Community has 
adopted in its policies.165 There is no reason, though, why the right to development 
does not also encompass the differing approaches mentioned above. They are not 
necessarily incompatible; it is a question of where the emphasis lies. The individual, 
not the State, is seen as the main beneficiary of the development process and is its 
focus. This requires that in the development process his or her legally protected or 
defined rights are not violated. It can also mean that as the State develops 
economically and politically, individual rights are increasingly realised, promoted and 
protected.
What these principles entail for the Community and its Member States is that when 
providing assistance and, in particular, funding for specific projects, these should not 
have an adverse impact upon the legally recognised rights of individuals in that State. 
It is difficult to think of a situation likely to arise in practice, however, in which the 
Community and or Member States could be held responsible for the role they have 
played in development projects they have funded, if any recognised rights have been 
violated as a part of that process. The recipient State, in conjunction with whom such 
projects are initiated and usually completed, is responsible and accountable before 
national and or international mechanisms, to which it is a party, for any possible 
breaches of its obligations.
The question, however, is to what extent does an obligation to assist, in this context 
exist? In 1969 the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD agreed a 
target for developed countries to donate 0.7 % of their gross national product for
163 See, Stewart, F., “Basic Needs Strategies, Human Rights and the Right to Development” (1989) 11 
HRQ, 347, Nayar, M., “Human Rights and Economic Development; the Legal Foundations” (1980) 2 
Universal Human Rights, 55 and Shihata, I., “Democracy and Development” (1997) 4 6 ICLQ, 635.
164 Paul, J., “The Human Right to Development: Its Meaning and Importance” (1992) Third World 
Legal Studies, 17,20.
165 See, for example, Article 9 of the Cotonou Convention and discussion in Chapter Three.
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overseas development assistance. This commitment has been reaffirmed on a number 
of occasions since.166 The provision of assistance to States, in this context, was 
described by Addo, writing in 1990, as nothing more than soft law.167 Subsequently 
the Vienna Declaration of 1993 has noted that “...States should cooperate with each 
other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development,” as have 
other documents which have been adopted at major international conferences.168 
Such commitments and statements cannot and do not, however, amount to unilateral 
statements in the sense required for the formation of a legally binding obligation to 
provide assistance.169 Most, if not all, developed States provide some assistance. 
They do not, however, consider that are obliged to do so, unless they have entered 
into a specific treaty agreement to do so. The recognition and acceptance by 
consensus at Vienna in 1993 of the right to development as “a universal and 
inalienable right and an integral part of fundamental human rights” does not mean 
that States feel legally obliged to provide a certain amount of development assistance. 
The requisite opinio juris and practice for the purposes of custom is absent.170
A legal obligation, which has now arguably been accepted in the development 
process, is that a State or group of States should not hinder the development of others. 
This is because development is perceived to be the best manner in which human
171rights and democracy can be protected. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter read in 
conjunction with the Vienna Declaration and the 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development impose obligations upon States to cooperate and take action to work
166 Most importantly the Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly, A/RES/55/2. See further 
Chapter Three.
167 Addo, M., “Some Issues in European Community Aid Policy and Human Rights” (1988) LIE! , 55, 
62
168 See para. 10 o f the Vienna Declaration. Also see the Declarations o f the Cairo World Population 
and Development Summit, 1994, the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development, 1995 and 
the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women, 1995.
169 See the Nuclear Tests Case, supra note 125, para.45.
170 The lack o f a legal obligation is recognised most importantly by Sengupta in his capacity as the 
Independent Expert on the Right to Development. With the exception o f the Scandinavian States, no 
developed countries have donated 0.7% of their GNP.
171 See further infra.
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towards development for all States.172 What the potentially “obstructive States” must 
not do, however, is unclear. It is difficult to define a core obligation that the principle 
entails. A developing State would not be able to hold a group of developed States 
responsible for not removing trade barriers for example, if it considers its 
development is being hindered, unless there is a breach of a specific treaty obligation. 
There is a well established practice for developing States to be treated in a different or 
preferential manner in certain international treaties.173 The obligation not to hinder or 
to provide assistance in practical terms, however, means little outside of such a treaty.
The content of the obligations discussed above and the responsibilities and duties of 
States are both unquantified. More precise legal obligations, however, do exist upon 
developed States. These are in the context of providing assistance in certain 
circumstances to developing States.
3.3.1(c) Development Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance and the 
Obligation to Assist.
In a more limited context, it is arguable that developed States are under a legal 
obligation to provide humanitarian aid, in certain circumstances, to third States. With 
regard to human rights, States are obliged, as noted above, to protect the rights only 
of those under their jurisdiction. Humanitarian assistance is concerned with 
providing assistance to those in another jurisdiction. Here the State, if it still exists, is 
unable or unwilling to provide its population with protection from a situation which 
threatens their very existence. There is thus an overwhelming necessity for other 
States, agencies or organisations to act to alleviate the suffering of those affected.
Humanitarian assistance is usually considered to be a component of development 
assistance. There is in practice a continuum between the two. The provision of
172 See para. 10 of the Vienna Declaration.
173 See Slinn, P., “The Implementation o f International Obligations Towards Developing Countries: 
Equality or Preferential Treatment?” in Butler, W.(ed.), Control Over Compliance With International 
Law, (1991) p.165.
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emergency relief can be substantially reduced if development projects, as understood 
in the strict sense, establish an infrastructure which lessens the long-term dependency 
on emergency aid in the eventuality of a disaster. Conversely humanitarian assistance 
can be concerned with the rehabilitation of affected populations, as well as alleviating 
immediate danger, and thus merge into development cooperation. It is also usually 
only in the developing world that a natural or man-made disaster will put a population 
in a situation where the State does not have the resources to alleviate their suffering. 
It is the overwhelming necessity to assist in the alleviation of that suffering that 
compels others to take action to assist the affected State in its efforts, if there are any. 
The two can be conceptually and legally distinguished, although the boundaries 
between them are sometimes unclear. Humanitarian assistance is seen to be subject 
to a different set of principles. Development cooperation is an inherently long-term 
and political activity. Humanitarian assistance is an altruistic and short-term one, the 
defining principles of which are urgency, neutrality and impartiality. Assistance is to 
be provided on the basis of need and nothing else. In the suspension of development 
cooperation, for whatever reason, an exception is always made for humanitarian 
assistance.
Although distinguishable from development cooperation, there is still a relationship 
between international human rights and humanitarian assistance. They are related in 
the sense that a humanitarian emergency, natural or man-made, will interfere with the 
enjoyment of rights such as those to health, food and shelter. While a lack of 
development can also interfere with such rights, the threat posed in a humanitarian 
situation is more urgent than would normally be the case in the context of economic, 
social and cultural rights.174
Numerous declarations and resolutions currently exist which urge States to contribute 
and assist those in desperate and urgent need but they do not currently impose a
174 The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, has in General Comment 3, 12/12/90 
CESCR noted at para.l that the Covenant does impose immediate obligations but also allows for 
progressive realisation acknowledging the constraints due to limits o f available resources.
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legally binding obligation to do so.175 The Millennium Declaration of the United 
Nations General Assembly, for example, recognises that each State has a separate as 
well as collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity equality 
and equity at the global level.176 It does not, however, encompass a specific 
obligation to assist. Similar commitments have also been made in the Rome 
Declaration on World Food Security 1996177 and the World Food Summit Plan of 
Action.178 The earlier General Assembly Resolution 45/102179 encouraged the 
international community to contribute substantially and regularly to international 
humanitarian activities and stressed the importance of further developing 
international cooperation in the humanitarian field to better facilitate understanding, 
mutual respect, confidence and tolerance among the planet’s countries and peoples. 
Again no legally binding obligation to assist exists. In two resolutions, however, the 
General Assembly does seem to recognise a very limited right to assistance. This is 
where there is a starving population involved, although the resolutions do not
f on
elaborate upon whom the duty is placed.
This is not to state, however, that there is no rights discourse in the humanitarian 
assistance field. General Assembly Resolution 43/131 on Humanitarian Assistance to 
Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situations, considers that a right 
exists for those providing assistance to demand access to victims of natural disasters 
and other emergency situations, although the nature of the obligation on those
101
hindering access is not elaborated upon. If such a right were accepted, the question 
of whether the consent of the State in question would be required still needs to be
175 For a contrary view see Laurent, P., “Humanitarian Assistance is a Right” in Pirotte, C., Husson, B. 
and Grunewald, F.(eds.), Responding to Emergencies and Fostering Development, (1999) p. 122.
176 Para. 2, Millennium Declaration.
177 Adopted under the auspices o f the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation, 
http ://w w w. fao. org/docrep/003/w3 613 e/w3 613 eOO .htm.
178 Objective 7.4 o f the Plan o f Action, http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.htm.
179 Promotion o f International Cooperation in the Humanitarian Field, A/RES/45/102.
180 “Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situations” 
A/RES/45/100 and “Strengthening o f the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance o f the 
United Nations” A/RES/46/182.
181 General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/43/131.
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resolved. The position reflected in treaties concerned with this area of law would
1 COcertainly answer this in the affirmative. Generally, however, consent can be 
implied. There are relatively few examples of States making clear that they do not
1 C^wish for outside assistance.
Article 11 of the ICESCR can be said, however, to contain legal undertakings which 
may be relevant in imposing an obligation upon the Member States of the Union to 
provide assistance in the context of the right to adequate food and the right to be free 
from hunger. Article 2 of the ICESCR which establishes the general nature of a 
State’s obligations under the Covenant seems to imply, when read in conjunction with 
Article 11, that in times of crisis, for example famine, a State is obliged to seek
1 Ciinternational assistance. The exact nature and extent of the legal obligation this 
imposes on Contracting States is not easy to ascertain. General Comment 3 of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), in referring to 
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter, recognises that the obligation to assist is 
“particularly incumbent upon those States in a position to assist others in this 
regard.” Shelton, in particular, has argued that general principles of law and 
human rights treaties impose a duty on States to provide famine assistance.186 The
1 87Limburg Principles, however, note that international cooperation and assistance
182 The Four Geneva Conventions o f 1949 as well as the 1977 Protocols all require the consent of the 
State be granted. In the Nicaragua case, supra note 46, paras.242-243, the ICJ held that there was no 
doubt that the provision o f strictly humanitarian aid cannot amount to unlawful intervention or be 
contrary to international law, so long as such aid was without discrimination o f any sort. Whether this 
position is an evolution of the Protocols and Conventions is unclear.
183 For example, North Korea in the past.
184 See Alston, P., “International Law and the Human Right to Food” in Alston, P., and TomaSevski, 
T.(eds.), The Right to Food, (1984) p.9, 43. This is very much in line with para.26 o f the Limburg 
Principles, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17. Also see Craven, M., The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development, (1998) p. 144 and Eide, A., “The Right 
to an Adequate Standard of Living Including the Right to Food” in Eide, A., Krause, C., and Rosas, A., 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, (2001) p. 133.
185 General Comment 3 of the CESCR, para. 14.
186 Shelton, D., “The Duty to Assist Famine Victims,” (1984-5) 70 Iowa Law Review, 1279. This view 
is now substantiated by para.38, General Comment 12 on Article 11, ICESCR, E/C. 12/1995/5 CESCR.
187 The Limburg Principles are not legally binding, although they are highly persuasive
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1 ftftmust be based on the sovereign equality of States, and Article 11 ICESCR refers to 
the fact that the realisation of rights and international cooperation should be based 
upon “free consent.” The CESCR in its General Comment 12 on Article 11, on the 
other hand, notes that State parties should take steps to protect the right to food in
1 SOother countries, and to provide the necessary aid when required. States must also 
ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to need.190 Alston 
has argued that these obligations can be interpreted to mean that States have a duty to 
avoid international policies which deprive other States of their means of subsistence 
or which promote an inequitable distribution of food supplies. It also implies a duty 
to mitigate national policies which promote inequality and to ensure that international 
trade works towards an equitable distribution of food.191 It can further be argued that 
States have a joint and individual responsibility to cooperate in providing disaster and 
humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including to refugees, although each
1Q9State is only obliged to contribute to this task in accordance with its ability. States 
in need are entitled to ask for assistance; developed States, however, are not 
individually obliged to make up the short-fall but must attempt to meet the assessed 
need, to the extent they can.
Many of these obligations have now been expressly recognised by the Committee on
1 Q'XEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights in a sui generis statement. The Committee 
considers that those in a position to provide “international assistance and cooperation, 
especially economic and technical” to enable developing countries to fulfil their core 
obligations (under the Covenant) must do so. Such core obligations give rise to 
national responsibilities for all States party to the Covenant, and international 
responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are “in a position to
188 Ibid., para. 33.
189 General Comment 12, para. 36.
190 Article 1 l(2)(b), ICESCR.
191 See Alston, “Human Right to Food” supra note 184, p.9.
192 Limburg Principles, para.38.
193 CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation o f  the ICESCR: Poverty and the ICESCR, 
UN Doc E/C. 12/2001/10, (2002) 9 IHRR 889. It is not a General Comment and there are no other 
statements similar to it.
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assist”.194 Core obligations are considered by the Committee to have a crucial role to 
play in international development policies. As it notes, “it is particularly incumbent 
upon those who can assist, to help developing countries to respect this international
minimum threshold [I]f an international anti-poverty strategy does not reflect this
minimum threshold, it is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State 
parties.”195
Although the exact legal significance of this statement is uncertain, it is in many 
senses an express consolidation and elaboration of the Covenant’s provisions and the 
Committee’s earlier General Comments. The Member States of the Union, therefore, 
as State parties to the Covenant, individually have a legal obligation to provide 
assistance under it to developing States and are obliged to work together and with 
others to avoid policies which lead to an inequitable global distribution of food. The 
fact that they may coordinate their action in response to such obligations through 
ECHO or the Commission is perfectly compatible with their obligations under the 
ICESCR. Despite the existence of these obligations, it is clear that while the 
Commission and ECHO consistently refer to the human rights nature of their work 
with regard to humanitarian aid, there is no reference to these legal obligations.196 
With regard to development, the right to food and humanitarian assistance, the 
Covenant is the clearest relevant set of legal obligations requiring the Member States 
of the Union to provide assistance to third States. The content of these obligations is 
not particularly clear.
3.3.2. The Obligation to Promote and Protect Democracy and the Rule 
of Law in Third States.
3.3.2 (a) Democracy.
194 Ibid., para. 16.
195 Ibid., para. 17.
196 See Chapter Six,
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The development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law are objectives 
shared by both the CFSP and the Community’s development cooperation policy. As 
far as its own Member States are concerned, the Union has, since the Copenhagen 
Declaration on Democracy of 1978, insisted that “respect for and maintenance of 
representative democracy and human rights in each Member State are essential 
elements of membership of the European Community.”197 In more recent years, 
significant amounts of capital and energy have been invested by the Union in 
ensuring the existence of liberal democratic States on its eastern and southern
1 OSborders. If one accepts Slaughter’s argument that liberal democracies (compared to 
non-liberal ones): do not tend to engage in armed conflicts with one another; obey 
their international obligations; enforce agreements; are respected; and take the 
unpredictability factor out of international development projects and investment by 
multinationals, then the logic of such an approach is apparent.199 A similar argument 
has also been forwarded by King who argues that the Union is convinced that liberal 
democracies will prove to be the most peaceful neighbours.200 As the Union and its 
Member States have contributed the most assistance to these States201 and accounted 
for the vast bulk of trade, they had little choice but to accept conditions on the 
recognition of their statehood, which clearly added criteria which were then not 
broadly or generally accepted as prerequisites for statehood in customary 
international law.202
197 (1978) 3 Bull EEC 5. The position for new prospective Member States is laid down in the 
Copenhagen Criteria, o f the Copenhagen European Council o f June 1993, (1993) 6 Bull EC 1.13. See 
further Novak, M., “Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry to, and Full Participation in, 
the EU” in Alston, P., Bustelo, M., and Heenan, J.(eds.), The EU and Human Rights, (1999) p.687 and 
Verhoeven, A., “How Democratic Need European Union Members Be? Some Thoughts After 
Amsterdam” (1998) 23 ELRev., 217.
198 Slaughter, A., “International Law in a World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 EJIL, 503.
199 Crawford, J. “Democracy and the Body o f International Law” (1993) 44 BYBIL, 113, note 1, 
comments, that while this may be broadly true for war it is not the case for covert action. See Marks,
S., “International Law, Democracy and the End of History” in Fox, G., and Roth, B. (eds.), Democratic 
Governance and International Law, (2000) p.532 for an excellent critique o f Slaughter.
200 King, T., “The European Community and Human Rights in Eastern Europe” (1996) LIEI, 93.
201 See further Chapter Three.
202 The traditional criteria for statehood do not include democratic institutions or respect for human 
rights or minority groups. See Warbrick, C., “Recognition o f States-Part 2” (1993) 43 ICLQ, 433 and
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As Tomasevski notes, whereas States have traditionally engaged in relations with one 
another on the basis of their ability to satisfy the criteria of statehood, some States are 
now increasingly passing judgment on whether they consider a particular regime to 
be legitimate or not. Whether a right to democratic governance currently exists or 
not and what its contents are, is controversial.204 Academic commentary can be 
found in support of rereading Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, in certain 
circumstances, to allow the unilateral use of force to restore democracy.205 Yet as 
Crawford notes, the invasions in Panama and Nicaragua were routinely condemned in 
the UN and OAS206 and as the ICJ noted in the Nicaragua case, there is no right for 
one State “to intervene”, in the affairs of another, simply because it has chosen a
907particular ideology or political system. Intervention and the use of force to restore 
democracy are only permissible where they are authorised by the Security Council, as 
in the case of Haiti208
Discussion of the role and status of democracy in international law can be approached 
from whether such a right now exists and what its contents are or how international 
law should develop and respond to democracy as a norm? Claims for a right to 
democratic entitlement require that international rules judge the legitimacy of regimes
Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 27, p.49 on how the Community and the Member States, 
in terms o f competence, ensured “an immaculate fudge” by not distinguishing who proposed the new 
criteria.
203 TomaSevski, K., Development A id and Human Rights Revisited, (1993) p.123. Also see Murphy,
S., “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition o f States and Governments” (1999) 48 ICLQ, 545.
204 The seminal article is Franck, T., “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992) 86 
AJIL, p.46. Fox and Roth, Democratic Governance, supra note 199, contains an excellent collection of  
essays, many o f which are critical o f Frank’s argument.
205 See for differing views, D ’Amato, A., “The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to 
Tyranny” (1990) 84 AJIL, 37, Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights” supra note 50 and Byers, 
M., and Chesterman, S., “You the People: Pro Democratic Intervention in International Law” in Fox 
and Roth, Democratic Governance, supra note 199, p.259.
206 Crawford, J., “Democracy and the Body of International Law” in Fox and Roth, Democratic 
Governance, supra note 199, p. 106.
207 Nicaragua case, supra note 46, paras. 102-110 and 265.
208 Security Council Resolution 940 o f 1994.
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and that democracy is essential in domestic law.209 Relations between those States 
which are most keen on the promulgation of a right to democratic governance and
• o i nnon-democratic regimes, however, are far from consistent. The Union Member 
States, for example, have friendly relations with, among others, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Singapore, China and Musharaff s regime in Pakistan; illustrating 
that democracy, or the lack of it, is sometimes an ideological weapon in inter-State 
relations. For many States, democracy or its absence in other States plays little or no 
real role in determining relations between them, as it is perceived as being part and 
parcel of a State’s internal affairs. The inconsistent practice of some States does not, 
however, necessarily undermine the evolution of a norm at the international level. 
For example, the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1999 adopted a “Resolution 
on the Promotion of Democracy” by 51 votes to 0 which reaffirmed that democracy is 
important for the protection of other rights, although it made no reference to a “right
911to democratic governance” itself.
The traditional view in international law has clearly been that it has no business with 
domestic constitutional issues and the formation of government. Fox and Roth note, 
however, that since the events of 1989-1991, international law has begun to address 
the issue.212 There clearly has been a major shift in practice, for example, self- 
determination now plays a more significant role in questions of recognition than was
91*}the case in the past. Not only have international tribunals dealing with human 
rights issues begun to stress the importance of democracy for the protection of human 
rights214 but international declarations have continually affirmed that “democracy
209 Marks, “International Law” supra note 199, p.546.
210 For EU practice see Chapter 4 and more generally Youngs, R., The European Union and the 
Promotion o f  Democracy, (2001).
211 CHR 1999/57, “The Promotion o f the Right to Democracy”. For discussion see Fox, G. and Roth, 
B., “Introduction” in Fox and Roth, Democratic Governance, supra note 199, p .l, 3.
2n Ibid., p. l .
213 See further Crawford, J., “Democracy in International Law-A Reprise” in Fox and Roth, 
Democratic Governance, supra note 199, p.l 14.
214 See for example the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 25, 12/07/96 and also the 
decision o f the European Court of Human Rights in United Communist Party o f  Turkey v. Turkey, 
(1998) 26 EHRR 121, para.45.
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fosters the full realisation of all human rights and vice versa”.215 The Commission on 
Human Rights, for example, has urged the:
“continuation and expansion o f activities carried out by the United Nations system, other 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations and Member States to promote and 
consolidate democracy within the framework o f international cooperation and build a 
democratic political culture through the observance o f human rights, mobilisation o f civil 
society and other appropriate measures in support o f democratic governance.”216
The General Assembly has also adopted a number of different resolutions concerning 
democracy and electoral assistance. One of the first of these resolutions is entitled 
“Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and Non-Interference in the 
Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral Process” which declares very clearly that:
“any...attempt, directly or indirectly, to interfere in the free development o f national electoral 
processes, in particular in the developing countries, violates the spirit and letter o f the principles 
enshrined in the Charter and in the Declaration on the Principles o f International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Corporation Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations”.217
Another resolution entitled “Strengthening the Role of the United Nations in 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections and 
the Promotion of Democratisation” commends the assistance that has been provided 
to States and requests that further post-election assistance be provided to requesting
I o
States in order to sustain the electoral process. The basic sentiment of the 
resolutions is that States or international organisations may provide assistance for the 
electoral process, if they are so requested, but must not interfere in the development 
of that process, in particular, in developing countries.
Democracy can be seen as being compatible with respecting all five types of rights: 
economic, social, cultural, civil and political. The implementation of democratic
215 CHR 1999/57.
216 Ibid., para.4.
217 A/RES/52/119.
218 A/RES/52/129.
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institutions is in itself also an exercise of various rights. The holding of fair elections, 
for example, is seen to contribute to the fulfilment of the right to political
0 1Qparticipation as found in Article 25 of the ICCPR. While democracy may be 
conducive to the protection of human rights it is not essential or indeed sufficient. 
Questions concerning the arbitrary exercise of power or even majority rule, in 
particular, where political parties are defined along ethnic or religious lines, would 
still need to be addressed. In majoritarian democracies, for example, discrimination
0 0  f)may be rife. The existence of democratic institutions and the protection of human 
rights are not necessarily synonymous.
The EC Treaty and the CFSP, as stated above, also set as a policy objective the
promotion and consolidation of democracy in dealings with all States. The perceived
importance of the role of democracy in the development context is, however, more
advanced than its evolution as a general normative value. Various international
organisations, such as the UN and European Union, have emphasised the importance
of democracy not only as a condition for the respect for human rights, as discussed
above, but also because it is conducive to the development of the State in question as
00  1opposed to a right per se. The European Commission has noted on numerous
occasions that “developing States can only develop and reduce poverty where
000functioning democracies and accountable governments are in power. The OECD
has also placed a great deal of stress on the fact that democracy and good governance
00%are central to the achievements of the development goals of the 21st century. A 
lack of democracy is thus seen to be fatal to the development process. Conflicts 
between ethnic groups, for example, arguably often break out due to a lack of
219 Article 3 o f the First Protocol to the ECHR and Article 13 o f the African Charter are narrower in 
scope.
220 Israel is a classic example of this. See for example, the Concluding Observations o f CERD 
CERD/C/52/Misc.29 and further Chapter Five.
221 Although see the regular resolutions adopted by the Commission on Human Rights which seem to 
emphasise all aspects o f democracy, for example CHR 2002/46 “Further Measures to Promote and 
Consolidate Democracy”.
222 COM (2001)252, p.4.
223 See OECD, Final Report o f  the A d Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good 
Governance, (1997).
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democratic representation within domestic institutions. Thus if States and 
organisations are to assist others in the development process, it is on the basis that 
democratic institutions exist and the mechanisms are in place to ensure that 
grievances of such a nature can be redressed. Clark, for example, has argued that 
what has happened in Eastern Europe and in Latin America is the realisation that 
human rights and democracy are not luxuries, nor are they the result of being 
developed or wealthy, but conditions which make wealth develop.224
It can be appreciated that liberal democracies may prefer to deal with other
99  cdemocratic States, as opposed to totalitarian ones. However, the basis for the 
connection between democracy and development, and this is limited only to the 
Community’s development cooperation policy, is the argument that democracy 
assists the development process and thus benefits the population. The perception 
seems to be that human rights will be respected and this will also lead, over a period 
of time, to wealth creation within the State itself. Democratic States are also seen as 
being less prone to civil strife and are less likely to slide into civil conflict.226 While 
this approach may have an intrinsic appeal, it is questionable whether it is correct. A 
number of Asian States, such as Malaysia, Singapore and China have developed 
rapidly without the presence of democratic institutions but due to the implementation 
of sound economic policies. Political credibility, as opposed to democratically held 
elections, is certainly a factor in how a State develops. Multinational corporations are 
far more likely to invest, as economic studies show, in countries which implement 
sound fiscal policies and where institutions have credibility as opposed to those 
which are democratic and lack such credibility or where corruption at all levels is rife. 
As investment from multinational corporations outweighs development assistance by 
a ratio of approximately five to one, it is these factors which are far more important
997for the economic development of the State than democracy itself.
224 Clark, J., “Human Rights and Democratic Development” in Mahoney, K., and Mahoney, P. (eds.), 
Human Rights in the Twenty First Century, (1993) p.683.
225 It is always worth noting the distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian States.
226 See Chapter Three.
227 See, for example, Bomer, S., Bunetti, A., and Weder, B., Political Credibility and Economic 
Development, (1995) p.62.
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As noted above, democratic States may ideologically prefer to cooperate with other 
democracies but in practice they have no hesitation in dealing with non-democratic 
regimes, or seeing election results set aside, when they perceive it to be in their 
interests. Events in Algeria are a classic example of this. In the context of the thesis, 
Denza has noted that the Union lacks any international legal basis for imposing 
democracy on non-Member States. States may assist each other in the 
development and consolidation of democracy but it is essential that this must not 
amount to interference within their internal affairs. Democracy as a right per se is not 
yet established in international law at most it is lex ferenda. Democracy as a right, as 
protected in multilateral treaties, is only a procedural one. For it to be substantively 
effective it must be accompanied by the rule of law. Without it, procedural 
democracy in real terms means little to the average person. It is probably for this 
reason that both the EC and EU treaties refer to the consolidation and development of 
both democracy and the rule of law.
3.3.2 (b) The Rule of Law.
As with democracy, the rule of law is seen as being of most importance, in its 
promotion, in developing States. The World Development Report as published 
annually by the World Bank, for example, has consistently recognised and affirmed 
that establishing the rule of law is one of the five “fundamental tasks” which
99Qgovernments must perform in the pursuit of development. The reports emphasise a 
number of functions which governments must fulfil in order to support the rule of 
law: providing a set of rules which are known in advance and which are actually 
implemented as opposed to simply existing on the statute book; the equal and 
consistent application of those legal rules; a judicial system which is reasonably 
effective and impartial in the resolving of disputes between parties; and a clear
9 - 7  A
process by which rules and procedures are amended to avoid abuse. Many of these
228 Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 27, p.89.
229 World Bank, World Development Report, (1997) p.4. Also see Kennedy, D., “Laws and 
Developments” in Hatchard, J., and Perry-Kessaris, A., Law and Development, (2003) p. 17.
230 For the link between poor laws and law enforcement see Sherwood, R., Shephard, G., and Marcos 
de Sousa, C., “Judicial Systems and Economic Performance” Special Issue (1994) 34 Quarterly
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criteria also overlap with the concept of “good governance” which is a “fundamental 
element” of the Cotonou Agreement.231 Good governance is perceived to include 
support for the rule of law by providing: assistance to improve and reinforce the legal, 
judicial and enforcement systems; strengthening public sector management; 
controlling corruption; reducing excessive military expenditure; and promoting and 
defending human rights by adherence to internationally agreed principles 232 The 
OECD, like the World Bank, now places a great deal of stress on the fact that 
democracy, good governance and the rule of law are central to the achievements of 
the development goals of the 21st Century.233 Invoking and ensuring respect for the 
rule of law as well as implementing policies concerned with good governance, are 
undeniably among the most difficult aspects of reform which any State can undertake. 
As noted above, it is a widely held belief in development circles that the rule of law 
will help to eradicate corruption and this is of benefit to the development process.234 
It is controversial, however, how beneficial, in development terms, it actually is to
' j ' l c
eradicate corruption.
The essential question we are concerned with, however, is the extent to which 
international legal rights or obligations exist, requiring States to not only respect the 
rule of law but also to promote it. The rule of law is essential to the protection of 
other rights. Furthermore, as noted above, democracy in the procedural sense is only 
meaningful if it is accompanied by the rule of law. If it is part and parcel of
Review o f  Economics and Finance, 101. A lack o f effective institutions can also hamper economic 
development see, De Soto, H., The Other Path, (1989) and The Mystery o f  Capital, (2000).
231 In the context o f developing countries see further, Faundez, J.(ed.), Good Government and Law: 
Legal and Institutional Reform in Developing Countries, (1997).
232 See Ginther, K., Denters, E., and de Waart, P.(eds.), Sustainable Development and Good 
Governance, (1995) p.20 for more on the notion of good governance in the context o f development 
cooperation. The list here is based upon regularly cited features o f good governance derived from the 
reports in, supra notes 223 and 229.
233 See OECD, Report o f  the Working Group, supra note, 223.
234 See Kennedy, “Laws as Development” supra note 229, p.23
235 Ibid
236 Article 8, ACHR; Article 7, Banjul Charter; Article 6, ECHR; and Article 14, ICCPR, to the extent 
that they cover the rule of law, do not impose obligations for the promotion of the concept in third 
States.
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democracy, then the rule of law should be seen as a component of it. If it is seen as 
separate but probably related to democracy, it is difficult to see States being obliged 
to comply with the rule of law outside of the treaty obligations they have undertaken. 
There is certainly no general legal obligation for it to be promoted in third States.
4. Conclusions.
The promotion of certain ethical values in foreign policy requires serious 
consideration of numerous issues if it to be pursued in a meaningful manner. It 
requires the balancing of different, at times competing, interests. The promoters of 
such values are in a stronger moral position if they themselves comply with the 
standards they espouse for others. In a recent Commission Communication, for 
example, it was argued that the European Union’s moral and political authority to 
engage in such practices stemmed from the fact that “the EU and all its Member 
States are democracies espousing the same policies both internally and externally”. 
Ethical policies are a part of “enlightened self-interest” and worth pursuing but 
without consistency and uniform application have little credibility in third States.
In terms of legal obligations, it is clear that international law does give rights and 
impose obligations upon States, and in some instances the organisations they have 
established, to act in certain limited circumstances. There are also legal limits as to 
how those values should be promoted in third States. Most of the law in this field, 
however, is uncertain or controversial. It is difficult to determine, in specific cases 
what is required or prohibited. The law is, however, evolving so as to limit the 
“protection” provided by the principle of “domestic jurisdiction” and strengthen the 
possibilities of international support for the enforcement of certain norms. 
International society is undergoing a paradigmatic shift, where interests such as 
human rights and democracy will further limit State sovereignty, but it has almost 
certainly not yet reached its destination.
237 COM (2001)252.
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Chapter Three
Ethical Values and the International Relations of the Union 
and Community: Competence and Practice.
1. Introduction.
This chapter aims to assess the competence of the Community and Union to promote 
human rights, democracy and other ethical values in third States.1 As systems based 
upon the conferral of powers, the Community and Union are only competent to act 
where powers have been transferred to them. The first part of the chapter examines 
the relationship between the Union and Community and the instruments through 
which they pursue their foreign policy objectives. The remainder of the chapter 
adopts a thematic approach to competence and examines how it has been used in 
practice. The discussion is focused on those aspects of practice which are most 
relevant to relations between the Union and developing States.
1 The discussion does not deal with the relationship between the Community/Union and international 
organisations.
2 Articles 5 EC and TEU. This principle can be found in Article 1-9, 1-11,1-12 and 1-13 o f the Draft 
Constitution (DC). As Macleod, I., Hendry, I., and Hyett, S., The External Relations o f  the European 
Communities, (1996) p.38 state, the legally correct question is actually “...whether one o f the 
objectives o f the Treaties would be attained by the measures proposed, and whether adoption o f such 
measures would be consistent with the procedures envisaged in the Treaty, in conformity with any 
conditions imposed by the Treaties... and with other principles o f Community law.”
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2. The Relationship Between the Union and Community and 
the Instruments Available for Implementing an Ethical Foreign 
Policy.
2.1. The Relationship Between the Component Parts of the Union.3
Article 1 TEU states that the Union is founded on the European Communities. The 
Union is built upon the foundations laid by the Communities but it is not confined to 
them. Whether the structure of the Union is considered to be a Greek temple, a 
cathedral or a layered organisation,4 it is clear that there is a significant overlap 
between the objectives of the Communities in relation to third States and those of the 
CFSP; which are defined in broader and less precise terms. In public international 
law, in such circumstances, the more specialised body should carry out its functions 
and not cede its powers to the more general institution of which it is a part.5 The 
CFSP’s objective of international cooperation, for example, can encompass or at least 
encroach upon the development cooperation competence of the Community.6 Neither
3 See more generally, among others, Denza, E., The Intergovernmental Pillars o f  the European Union,
(2002), Isaac, G., “Le ‘Pilier’ Communautaire de Turnon Europe, Un ‘Pilier’ Pas Comme Les Autres” 
(2001) 37 CDE, 45, Baratta, R., “Overlaps Between European Community Competence and European 
Union Foreign Policy Activity” in Cannizzaro, E.(ed.), The European Union as an Actor in 
International Relations, (2002) p.51 and Cremona, M., “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of 
the European Union and the External Relations Powers o f the European Community” in O’Keeffe, D., 
and Twomey, P.(eds.), Legal Issues o f  the Maastricht Treaty, (1994) p.247.
4 See, among others, de Witte, B., “The Pillar Structure and the Nature o f the European Union: Greek 
Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?” in Heukels, T., Blokker N,, and Brus, M.(eds.), The European 
Union After Amsterdam, (1998) p.51, von Bogdandy, A., and Netteshein, M., “Ex Pluribus Unum: 
Fusion o f the European Communities into the European Union” (1996) 2 ELJ, 267, Wessel, R., “The 
Constitutional Relationship Between the European Union and the European Community: 
Consequences for the Relationship with the Member States” Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03, 
Schroeder, W., “European Union and European Communities” Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03 and 
Curtin, D., and Dekker, I., “The EU as a “Layered” International Organisation: Institutional Unity in 
Disguise” in Craig, P., and de Burca, G.(eds.), The Evolution ofE U  Law, (1999) p.84.
5 See, for example, Advisory Opinion, Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, (1996) ICJ 
Reports, 226, para.29.
6 Article 11 TEU.
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the TEU nor EC Treaty, however, provides much clear guidance on the nature of the 
relationship between the Union’s constituent parts, although the TEU does require 
consistency between their activities.
Article 2 TEU requires the Union to assert its identity on the international scene, in 
particular, through the CFSP. Article 11 TEU furthermore states that the CFSP, “will 
cover all aspects of foreign and security policy”. If Community competence is to 
remain intact, as Article 47 TEU states, then the differing character and nature of 
cooperation requires that the powers being exercised under the different legal orders 
should be defined as such. Where the Community is exercising its development 
cooperation competence this needs to be distinguished from action taken under the 
CFSP more generally. All external competences are not exclusively within the scope 
of the latter, even though the Council when acting under the second pillar and 
defining policies with regard to a particular country has on occasion defined all areas
n
of foreign policy. It is not necessary to take the approach forwarded by Wessel, 
however, who considers that any indistinctiveness in cases of overlap should be 
resolved to the benefit of the Community.9 It is simply the case that a distinction 
should be maintained which is based upon the purpose and function of the legal base 
to determine its scope. Competence under the CFSP is different in nature from that 
under the Community. The different instruments, for example, reflect the different 
scope and objectives of the acts. The manner in which some actions are financed in 
practice, however, does add to the fusion between the CFSP and the external relations 
of the Community. Foreign policy while remaining largely intergovernmental in 
nature is increasingly being financed through the first pillar.10 This still does not 
justify a failure to distinguish between the sources of competence.
Some of the difficulty in defining the relationship between the CFSP and Community 
results from the failure of the Intergovernmental Conferences to provide the ECJ with 
jurisdiction over decisions taken by the European Council/Council where they do not
7 Article 3 TEU.
8 See infra.
9 Wessel, R., The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective, 
(1999) p.14.
10 Election monitoring is a typical example, see infra.
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utilise Community procedures.11 The ECJ has, however, ensured that Community 
procedures and institutions are not circumvented. In the Airport Transit Visas case12 
the Court held that it did have jurisdiction to determine the scope of a measure 
adopted under what were then the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) provisions of the 
TEU. This was not because it had jurisdiction over such acts but so that it could 
determine whether a provision of the EC Treaty should have formed the legal basis 
instead.13 Although Articles 230 and 234 EC grant the Court jurisdiction only over 
acts adopted under the EC Treaty,14 the Court may state that a Community legal base 
should have been used, which is a de facto declaration of illegality. It is only in 
instances in which the Community has exclusive competence that the Council must 
not encroach upon its powers. If the Member States enjoy shared competence, the 
choice is theirs as to how they exercise it. In the context of development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid, for example, it is perfectly possible for both the Community 
and the Member States, unilaterally or through the CFSP, to exercise their 
competence.15
What the Court did not address in the Airport Transit Visas case, however, was the 
question of whether the boundaries between the pillars are movable and the role that 
subsidiarity could play in that determination? Denmark essentially raised this 
argument in its submissions to the Court. The Advocate General dealt with it but
11 For discussion o f the approach adopted by the DC and some o f the problems associated with it see, 
House o f Lords European Union Committee, The Future Role o f  the European Court o f  Justice, 6th 
Report, (2004) p.30.
12 Case C-170/96, Commission o f  the European Communities v. Council o f  the European Union [1998] 
ECR1-2763.
13 See paras.[16]-[17].
14 For confirmation o f this see, Case C-167/94, Criminal Proceedings Against Juan Carlos Grau 
Gomis and Others, [1995] ECR 1-1023, para. 6.
15 See Cases C -l81/1991 and 248/1991, European Parliament v. Council o f  the European 
Communities and Commission o f  the European Communities, [1993] ECR 1-3685 (the Bangladesh 
case) and Case C-316/1991, European Parliament v. Council o f  the European Union, [1994] ECR I- 
625 (the EDF case). Eeckhout, P., External Relations o f  the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations, (2004) p. 151, however, argues that the CFSP should only cover those 
aspects o f foreign policy in which the Community does not have competence.
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dismissed the issue without providing clear reasoning.16 The Court and the Advocate 
General probably did not feel that this matter was central to the case before them. 
There is in principle no reason, however, why some of the non-exclusive powers 
currently exercised by the Community cannot, at some stage, also be exercised by the 
Member States under the CFSP.
The Airport Transit Visas case confirms that the Court may determine if acts adopted 
by the Council outside of the Community Treaty should have been based on EC 
powers and polices the boundaries of its jurisdiction. The Court has ensured that the 
Member States do not circumvent the Community by resorting to other aspects of the 
Union. A great temptation for the Member States to rely on the CFSP, instead of on 
the Community, is the fact that they will have more control over any action taken. 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that the relationship between the CFSP and 
Community cannot be precisely described even though the Union has been in 
existence for over a decade.
2.2. Union and Community instruments Relevant to the Pursuit of 
Ethical Values in Third Countries.
2.2.1. Union Instruments.
2.2.1.(a). Common Strategies.
The aim of common strategies is to enhance the coherence of the Union’s 
international action. Such measures should be adopted by the European Council 
where the Member States have important interests in common.17 Common strategies 
do not have to develop a new approach to a particular country or region but may build 
upon pre-existing arrangements and coherently present in one document the
16 See para. [9] o f his Opinion.
17 Article 13 TEU.
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objectives, interests and priorities of the Union and Member States.18 Common 
strategies are decided upon unanimously by the European Council and though they 
are usually implemented by joint actions and common positions, they may require 
action to be taken under any of the pillars or by the Member States. As Dehousse 
notes, however, even if a common strategy is adopted, this does not guarantee a 
smooth process of implementation. Member States may contest that proposed joint 
actions and common positions do not fall within the framework of the common 
strategy or that they relate to another topic.19 The Court does not have jurisdiction to 
settle such disputes. The common strategies adopted by the Cologne European 
Council on Russia,20 the Helsinki European Council on the Ukraine21 and the Feira 
European Council on the Mediterranean22 all illustrate that the promotion of human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and democracy will form part of the 
Union’s strategy towards those countries or regions. The common strategies 
commit the Union to respect the separation of powers between the CFSP and 
Community.24 They do nothing, however, to help demarcate that separation of 
powers. One of the problems with these strategies is that there is some doubt as to 
the exact nature of the legal obligations they impose.25 In practice, however, 
common strategies contain few, if any, precise commitments; which are rather found 
in the joint actions and common positions adopted to implement such strategies.
18 See, for example, para. 4, 2000/458/CFSP, Common Strategy o f the European Council o f 19 June 
2000 on the Mediterranean Region, OJ L 183, 22/6/2000 p.5.
19 Dehousse, F., “After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy o f the 
European Union” (1998) 9 EJIL, 525.
20 1999/414/CFSP, Common Strategy o f the European Union o f 4 June 1999 on Russia, OJ L 157, 
24/6/1999 p .l.
21 1999/887/CFSP, European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine, OJ L 331, 
23/12/1999 p .l.
22 Supra note 18.
23 Mediterranean Common Strategy, para. 14; Ukrainian Common Strategy, para. 10; and Russian 
Common Strategy, para. 1.
24 Para. 24 o f the Mediterranean Common Strategy, for example, states: “[t]his Common Strategy shall 
be implemented by the EU institutions and bodies, each acting within the powers attributed to them by 
the Treaties, and in accordance with the applicable procedures under those Treaties.”
25 For discussion see Pagani, F., “A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration o f the Petersburg 
Tasks in the Treaty on European Union” (1998) 9 EJIL, 737 and Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, 
supra note 3, p. 140.
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2.2.1 .(b). Common Positions and Joint Actions.
According to Article 12 TEU, common positions and joint actions are the only 
instruments that can be adopted under the CFSP to give effect to common strategies. 
In practice, the Council has also occasionally adopted “decisions” as referred to in 
Article 13(3) TEU. Joint actions, common positions and decisions can also be used 
independently of a common strategy to introduce, implement or amend policy vis-a- 
vis a third country, a group of countries or region. All such measures impose a legal 
obligation upon the Member States to comply with them.26 Articles 14 and 15 TEU, 
which provide for the adoption of joint actions and common positions respectively, 
do not provide for any hierarchy between them. The Treaty adopted at Maastricht did 
not explain when one should be used in preference to the other. Article 14 TEU now 
states that, “[jJoint actions shall address specific situations where operational action 
by the Union is deemed to be required.” Common positions are the more general 
measure which define, “the approach of the Union to a particular matter of
77geographical or thematic nature.” The choice as to whether a joint action or 
common position should be adopted is, generally speaking, within the discretion of 
the Council and it has not always followed the guidelines in Articles 14 and 15
7RTEU. Common positions, for example, have routinely been used to reduce 
economic and financial relations with third countries or, for example, to impose arms
70embargos. They have also, on occasion, been partly used as an instrument by which 
to condemn a third State.
26 See, in particular, Articles 14(3) and 15 TEU.
27 Article 15 TEU.
28 See Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 3, p.151.
29 For examples, see the regularly updated list issued by the Council entitled “Liste des mesures 
negatives appliqu^es par 1’union a l’6gard de pays tiers”.
30 See, for example, 95/515/CFSP, Common Position on Nigeria, OJ L 298, 11/12/1995 p.l which is 
very notable in this respect.
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Joint actions have, on the whole, been more specific in their content and concentrated
*2 1
on operational issues. On numerous occasions, as noted above, however, the 
Council has also used decisions - usually to implement, amend or give further effect 
to the detail of a common position or a joint action already adopted.32 The Council, 
after the Amsterdam amendments, also has a specific power under Article 18(5) TEU 
to appoint a Special Representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy 
issues. This provision reflects pre-existing practice. Such representatives have 
usually been appointed by joint actions but have, on occasion, had their mandate 
terminated by decisions.33 The work of the Special Representatives is primarily of a 
diplomatic nature.34
A potential problem in preparing legally binding measures to implement the CFSP is 
finding common ground between the Member States. The need for negotiation and 
compromise between the Member States may also slow the decision-making process 
down. In terms of an ethical foreign policy, what is especially problematic is the fact 
that the Member States have differing approaches to the promotion and protection of 
ethical values in third States. The strategic, security, material and economic interests, 
historical allegiances and animosities as well as the priorities of the Member States 
differ. Finding an approach which is acceptable to all and as effective as possible in 
the circumstances will rarely be straightforward.
Joint actions, common positions and decisions, however, also have their advantages. 
An agreed position and policy by 25 States is potentially far more effective than 
unilateral measures by a solitary one. Heavyweight foreign policy players, such as 
France, Germany and the UK often have substantial influence in their relations with
31 See Eeckhout, External Relations, supra note 15, p.401 for examples.
32 See, for example, Council Decision 1999/75/CFSP, OJ L 23, 30/1/1999 p.5 and more generally 
Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 3, p. 151.
33 The seven current Special Representatives have all been appointed by Joint Actions. Ten former 
Special Representatives were also appointed by Joint Actions except Panagoitis Roumeliotis, who was 
appointed by Council Decision 1999/361 /CFSP, OJ L 141, 4/6/1999 p .l. The mandate o f Felipe 
Gonz&lez was extended by Council Decision 1999/75/CFSP, OJ L 23, 30/1/1999 p.5 although it was 
terminated by a Joint Action, 1999/665/CFSP OJ L 264,12/10/1999 p.2.
34 See the discussion in Chapter Five.
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third States and the value of collective action by them, along with others, in 
persuading States to amend their behaviour is substantial. A joint approach is also 
useful if such action is unpopular in the third country or region targeted, as the burden 
of any retaliatory action will be shared by all of the Union’s Member States.
2.2.1 .(c). Diplomatic and Other Non-Legally Binding Measures.
In some cases legally binding measures are either not appropriate or cannot be 
adopted. For these reasons the Union also uses classic instruments of diplomacy, 
such as declarations, statements and demarches. Demarches are usually carried out 
by the Presidency or by the Troika. Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly how 
many demarches are delivered annually, their frequency indicates that they are 
considered to be an invaluable tool. Approximately 100 demarches were delivered in 
1986. The number is now substantially higher. Demarches take a number of 
forms. They can be either: completely confidential; confidential in part; initially 
confidential in part or full and then later published; or published in full when the 
demarche is made. The advantage of confidential demarches is that a particular case 
or situation can be discussed at the appropriate level with the State in question, with 
no public loss of face. Confidential demarches are made if there is a danger that 
publicity will damage or harm the interests of a particular individual. Public 
demarches concerned with an individual are very sensitive and relatively rare, usually 
only being issued in instances involving high profile individuals.37 Demarches which 
are concerned with a particular situation tend to be public, as there is usually no direct 
individual interest and often public interest in the Union taking action. States rarely, 
if ever, respond to demarches dealing with human rights issued by the Union. In
35 See OJ C 86, 2/11/1986 p. 137.
36 The 1998 Annual Report o f the CFSP, (1999) npg, refers to 138 being made. In the 2002 Report, no 
number is given but each demarche which is not completely confidential is listed, there are 
approximately 200, 2002 Annual Report o f  the CFSP, (2003) p.78.
37 For example, the initiation of proceedings by Malaysia against UN Special Rapporteur 
Cumaraswamy, led to named demarches being delivered by the Union, demarche of 11/8/1999 cited in 
1998 Annual Report o f  the CFSP, npg.
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terms of their content, demarches mostly deal with civil and political rights issues and 
there is only occasionally reference to the legal obligations a State may have 
breached.38
The Presidency on behalf of the Union and the European Council also routinely 
issues declarations and statements, either unilaterally or in multilateral fora, on 
notable events in many third States. Declarations and statements are usually used to 
condemn certain practices and situations or to commend developments. The wording 
of statements and declarations is a product of compromise and negotiation. As a 
consequence of the unanimity rule, declarations and statements require formulation of 
a form of wording acceptable to all of the Member States. In multilateral fora, 
whether declarations or statements can be issued is often determined by the agreed 
agenda. In the annual sessions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 
where only a relatively brief opportunity exists, the EU is now compiling an annual 
volume of its views on the human rights situation in third States to supplement its oral 
statements.40 Whereas the Presidency or Council may be tempered by diplomatic 
constraints, in particular, when criticising third States, the European Parliament which 
adopts many resolutions on third States, tends to be much more forthright in its 
criticism.
The implementation of an ethical foreign policy requires that issues such as human 
rights, the rule of law and democracy are introduced into the political dialogue that 
exists with third States. Political dialogue takes place in a number of different fora. 
An Agreement between the Community and a third State usually establishes an
38 Kamminga, M., Inter-State Accountability fo r Violations o f Human Rights, (1992) p.29 argues that 
as far as demarches on human rights are concerned little reference is made to law, as the obligations in 
question are usually uncertain and thus it is more credible to refer to morality. With regard to 
demarches on other issues, reference to the law is much more common.
39 Statements and declarations differentiate between who is issuing them. In 2002, a total o f 204 
declarations and statements were issued, see 2002 Annual Report o f  the CFSP, (2003) p.77.
40 This can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/human rights/doc/uncom58.pdf 
for 2002. The Union and its Member States also regularly make statements in the relevant Committees 
of the General Assembly and other bodies, such as ECOSOC, concerning human rights and the 
political situation in third States.
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institutional framework for such discussion.41 This is especially the case if it contains 
an “essential elements” clause, which gives legitimacy and focus to such discourse.42 
Dialogue also takes place between the Union and third States in the absence of formal 
treaty relations or outside any institutional framework. Although they are not entitled 
to perform the full range of diplomatic functions, the Communities have established 
over 140 Commission delegations in third States.43 It is also common practice for the 
majority of third States to send ambassadors to the Union and establish diplomatic 
missions in Brussels.44 Diplomatic relations between the Union and third States are 
well established in practice and can be used to commence a political dialogue on, 
among other things, ethical values. The Council can also appoint Special 
Representatives to be a part of such dialogues.45 The fora can be multilateral or 
bilateral in nature 46 An example of the former is the Union’s participation in the 
Middle East Peace Process as a member of the Quartet.47 The Union’s political 
dialogue with Iran and China is bilateral in nature. The EU has no contractual 
relations with Iran. Further to the Commission’s Communication of 2001,48 relations 
between the parties have improved and a trade and cooperation Agreement may be 
concluded at some stage in the future. The political dialogue, an integral part of this 
improvement in relations, has concentrated on: terrorism; nuclear proliferation; 
reform of the political process including progress towards democracy; and protection 
of human rights.49 The dialogue with China, on the other hand, was initiated in 1996,
41 See further the discussions in Chapters Four and Five on political dialogue in practice.
42 See, infra.
43 Article 20 TEU does not confer any competence in this regard. See the External Services Directory 
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/repdel/index rep en.cfim and further Denza, 
Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 3, p. 164 and Macleod, Hendry and Hyett, External Relations, 
supra note 2, p.208.
44 Ibid.
45 Article 18(5) TEU.
46 With mixed Agreements, one side will be composed o f the Community and its Member States.
47 See further Chapter Five.
48 COM (2001)071.
49 The conclusions o f the General Affairs and External Relations Council on Iran, since the adoption of  
the 2001 Communication have consistently referred to these issues, although it is difficult to know 
what emphasis has been placed upon them in the actual political dialogue. See
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in the absence of existing or envisaged treaty relations establishing an institutional 
framework for discussion of human rights.50 It forms part of a more general strategy 
towards closer relations.51
Until the end of 2001, however, there were no guidelines as to when ethical issues 
should be raised in political dialogue or in which fora. The Council addressed this 
by adopting the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogue in December 2001,53 
seeking to integrate human rights and democracy into all aspects of relations with a 
third country. The Guidelines state that a specific human rights dialogue can be 
initiated for any issue of concern.54 Torture and the death penalty, however, are a part 
of all dialogues and have their own separate guidelines.55 The general obligation to 
initiate a human rights dialogue in the 2001 Guidelines is extremely vague and based 
upon political expediency, rather than consistency. Any human rights dialogue must 
define the practical aims to be achieved as well as the added value to be gained. A 
“degree of pragmatism and flexibility” is an inherent part of the process.56 While the 
assessment and any decision to initiate such a dialogue requires the agreement of the 
Council Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM), the final decision to initiate it 
lies with the Council of Ministers.57 The objectives to be pursued and the issues to be 
covered will vary from one dialogue to the next and will be defined on a case by case
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/iran/intro/gac.htm#iran 130502 for extracts o f the 
Council debates and Conclusions.
50 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and 
the People’s Republic o f China, OJ L 250, 19/9/1985 p .l. This Agreement was complemented in 1994 
and 2002 by an exchange o f letters, establishing a broad EU-China political dialogue. See further, 
Fierro, E., The E U ’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, (2003) p. 191.
51 See COMs (1995)279, (1998)191, (2001)265 and (2003)533.
52 Although right-specific dialogues did exist on the death penalty. See infra.
53 EU Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogue, issued by the Council, 13/12/2001.
54 Ibid., para. 3.
55 Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, 3/6/1998; Guidelines to EU 
Policy Towards Third Countries on Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 9/4/2001; and 
Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf o f the EU on the Implementation o f the Guidelines on Efforts 
to Prevent and Eradicate Torture, 11/12/2002.
56 Guidelines on Human Rights, para. 3.
57 Ibid., para. 6. COHOM must work with geographical working parties, CODEV and the Committee 
on Measures for the Development and Consolidation o f Democracy and the Rule o f Law.
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fO
basis. This built in flexibility is to be expected, to accommodate the different basis 
and nature of relationships with third countries. It is noticeable though that on the 
numerous occasions on which the Union has committed itself to consistency and 
coherence of action between institutions and policies, it has never explained how to 
achieve it between all third States.59
The guidelines on torture and the death penalty mentioned in the previous paragraph 
are noteworthy because of their differing approach to legal obligations and 
competence. The torture guidelines expressly state that they only apply to the 
CFSP.60 Yet, it is difficult to see why they cannot be part of the Community 
dimension as well. There is no obvious reason why the death penalty can be raised 
within Community competence but not torture. This is, in particular, the case as the 
prohibition on torture is an obligation erga omnes. The torture guidelines refer to 
numerous legal obligations which already bind the Member States61 whereas the 
death penalty guidelines refer to the fact that they are aiming to work “towards the 
progressive development of human rights”.62 In both instances, however, the notions 
of flexibility and pragmatism are built in.
2.2.2. Community Instruments.
The Community also has at its disposal a number of instruments to promote and 
protect ethical values in third States. In terms of external relations, one of the most 
important powers at its disposal is the ability to negotiate new Agreements or become 
a party to existing ones with States or international organisations. Article 281 EC
58 Ibid., paras. 4-5.
59 See COM 2000 (212) for one example, from many.
60 Guidelines on Torture, para.l. The others do not differentiate between the Community or CFSP 
dimension.
61 The Commission in 2002 also proposed a Regulation Concerning Trade in Certain Equipment and 
Products Which Can be Used for Capital Punishment, Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment. See COM (2002) 770. It has not yet been adopted.
62 Ibid.
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expressly confers legal personality upon the Community.63 The Community is now a 
party to a wide variety of Agreements with third States and organisations. Their 
scope and whether or not they are mixed in nature, is determined by the Community’s 
competence. Any Community Agreement must be based upon both the relevant 
paragraphs of Article 300 EC, which sets out the procedural steps to be followed, and 
those Treaty articles which confer substantive competence to act. Numerous Treaty 
provisions, such as Articles 133, 149, 151, 174, 181, 181a, 308 and 310 EC provide 
that competence. The Community is a party to treaties which can be broadly 
classified as Association, Cooperation and Sectoral Agreements.64 The Community 
can also adopt unilateral measures which assist in its pursuance of foreign policy 
objectives and have legal consequences for third States and/or their nationals. The 
two 1999 Human Rights Regulations,65 and those which aim to provide financial 
assistance to third States66 are examples.
These powers enable the Community to pursue its political objectives in different 
ways. Agreements and regulations provide a legal basis for a broad scope of 
Community activities, ranging from assisting a third State with infrastructure projects 
to funding the promotion of certain values, such as democracy or freedom of 
expression. The Community can, in the context of a regulation, change the content of
63 Article 184 o f the EURATOM Treaty and Article 6 o f the now expired ECSC Treaty are in identical 
terms.
64 See further the thematic discussion infra.
65 Council Regulation No. 975/1999, Laying Down the Requirements for the Implementation o f  
Development Cooperation Operations Which Contribute to the General Objective o f Developing and 
Consolidating Democracy, and the Rule of Law and to that o f Respecting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, OJ L 120, 8/5/1999, p.l and Council Regulation No. 976/1999, Laying Down 
the Requirements for the Implementation o f Community Operations, Other Than Those o f  
Development Cooperation, Which Within the Framework o f Community Cooperation Policy, 
Contribute to the General Objective o f Developing and Consolidating Democracy, and the Rule o f  
Law and to that o f Respecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Third Countries, OJ L 
120, 8/5/1999 p.8. COM (2003)250 proposes amendments to both Regulations. It has not yet been 
adopted.
66 For example, Council Regulation No. 443/92, Financial and Technical Assistance To And Economic 
Cooperation With The Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America, OJ L 52, 27/2/1992 p .l. (The 
ALA Regulation).
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cooperation programmes or the channels used; reduce cultural, scientific or technical 
cooperation; refuse to act on new initiatives or postpone new projects. In the case of 
an Agreement which has been negotiated, it can defer signature or its
A7implementation and, in the case of one already in force, defer holding joint 
committee meetings. It is further open to the Community to suspend all cooperation, 
suspend all bilateral contact or impose trade embargoes against a third State.68
The utility of the instruments at the disposal of the Community/Union will depend 
upon the scope of the measures which are actually adopted. This is ultimately limited 
by the competence actually enjoyed and the political will to adopt such measures. It 
is to this issue the discussion now turns.
3. The Exercise of Competence and the Pursuit of Ethical 
Foreign Policy Objectives.
3.1. Development Cooperation.
3.1.1. Introduction.
The Community’s main commitment in international development terms has always 
been to the group of countries now known as the ACP States.69 The relationship 
between these countries, the Community and its Member States is currently regulated
7 0  71by the Cotonou Convention. This Convention like the earlier ones is mixed in
67 Agreements have been delayed over human rights concerns with Russia (1995), Croatia (1995), 
Algeria (1998) and Pakistan (1999). See OJ C 280 E, 21/11/2003 p.63.
68 See COM (1994) 42, p.l 1 and the discussion in Chapter Two.
69 Originally known as the Associated African States and Madagascar.
70 Partnership Agreement Between the Members o f the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group o f States 
o f the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States, o f the Other Part, OJ L 317, 
15/12/2000 p.3.
71 Yaounde I and II, Convention dissociation entre la Communaut6 6conomique europdenne et les 
Etats africains et malgache assoctes k cette Communaut£, OJ L 93, 11/06/1964 p. 1431 and OJ L 282, 
28/12/1970 p.2 respectively; and the four Lomd Conventions, ACP-EEC Convention o f Lom6, OJ L 
25, 30/1/1976, p.2, Second ACP-EEC Convention, OJ L 347, 22/12/1980 p .l, Third ACP-EEC
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77nature. In the vast majority of the Community’s other Agreements with developing 
countries the Member States are not also a party. The Community’s development 
cooperation policy originally had a limited focus and was concentrated on the then 
colonies of the Member States - the first of them soon to be given independence. It 
now has a global reach and substantively addresses issues, such as armed conflict,73 
sustainable development, climate change, debt relief, tourism, poverty
•70 *7Q
reduction and migration.
The relationship between the violation of human rights and development assistance 
has been extensively discussed since the first Lome Convention and the situation in
OA
Uganda under Idi Amin. The provisions and mechanisms which have been inserted 
into the subsequent Lome/Cotonou Conventions,81 to deal with such eventualities, 
however, are still unclear as to whether it is the Member States, the Community or 
both who are exercising their competence in such matters. The Agreement amending 
the Fourth Lome Convention, for example, ensured that a commitment to human 
rights became an “essential element” of the Convention and that its provisions could
Convention, OJ L 86, 31/3/1986 p.3, Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, OJ L 229, 17/8/1991 p.3 and the 
Agreement Amending the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention OJ L 156, 29/5/1998 p.3. For the legal 
literature on the Conventions see references in the Bibliography.
72 See Article 1 o f the respective Conventions.
73 See SEC (96) 332, the Common Position adopted by the Development Ministers, 2/6/1997 and 
COM (1999) 240. See further Smith, K., European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World,
(2003) p. 145.
74 COM (1999)499.
75 Commission Working Paper C (99)3532, 3/11/1999 and Development Ministers’ Conclusions, 
11/11/1999.
76 COM (1999) 518.
77 COM (1998) 563.
78 COM (2000)212.
79 See the Conclusions o f the Development Ministers, 28/5/1996.
80 See the statement issued by the Council on 21/6/1977 with regard to Uganda, (1977) 6 Bull EEC 77.
81 For the voluminous literature on this issue see further the Bibliography but, in particular, Arts, K., 
Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case o f  the Lome Conventions, (1999) 
p. 167 and Bulterman, M., Human Rights in the Treaty Relations o f the European Community, (2001) 
p. 151.
82 Article 5.
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be suspended if fundamental and systematic abuses of those values occurred. The 
amended Article 366a of the Convention provided a clear legal base for the 
suspension or termination of the Agreement, if either party considered that the other 
had failed to fulfil an obligation to respect the “essential elements” referred to in 
Article 5.83 In Council Decision 1999/214/EC, which adopted a procedure in case of 
violations of Article 366a by an ACP State, the question of competence between the 
Member States and the Community vis-a-vis such violations was unresolved.84 This 
is still the case under Articles 9 and 96 of the Cotonou Convention, as Decision
Of
1999/214 continues to apply. The failure to clarify where competence lies in this
Of
respect is not reflected in the Community’s development cooperation Agreements to 
which the Member States are not also a party. Before discussing the competence 
granted by the development cooperation provisions of the EC Treaty, which provide 
one of the legal bases for such Agreements, it is necessary to discuss the November 
1991 Resolution of the Council and the Member States Meeting Within the Council
R7on Human Rights, Democracy and Development. This Resolution is a watershed in 
the Community’s perception of the relationship between development cooperation 
and ethical values and objectives.
83 Article 366a is further elaborated upon in Annex LXXXIII to the Fourth Lom6 Convention.
84 Council Decision 1999/214/EC, on the Procedure for Implementing Article 366a o f the Fourth ACP- 
EC Convention, OJ L 75, 20/3/1999, p. 32.
85 The Community does now have competence under Article 300 (2)/(3) EC to speed up the suspension 
o f Agreements, although it is not clear to what extent this would apply to the Cotonou Convention due 
to its mixed nature.
86 The final paragraph of the preamble to Council Decision 1999/214/EC states: “Whereas in fields 
covered by the Convention and falling within the competence o f Member States, the representatives of 
the governments o f the Member States meeting within the Council may authorise in parallel the 
Council, if  need be, also to cover these fields in adopting decisions pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 o f this 
decision”.
87 Reprinted (1991) 11 Bull EEC 122. The Resolution developed an earlier Communication, SEC 
(1991)61.
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3.1.2. The 1991 Resolution of the Development Council and the Member 
States.
In a resolution adopted by the General Affairs Council (GAC) of 29 June 1991, it was 
stated that respect for human rights, the rule of law and the existence of political 
institutions which are effective, accountable and enjoy democratic legitimacy are the
OQ
basis for equitable development. The later Development Council Resolution of 
November 1991 had as one of its primary objectives the improvement of the cohesion 
and consistency of initiatives taken both by the Community and by its Member States 
in the promotion of human rights and democracy in relations with developing 
countries. It very clearly recognised the central place of the individual in the 
development process which should be designed to promote economic and social 
rights as well as civil and political liberties through representative democracy. A 
high priority was also given to a positive approach that stimulates respect for human 
rights and encourages democracy. Examples of such positive measures included 
assistance in the holding of elections, promoting the role of non-governmental
O Q
organisations and ensuring equal opportunities for all. While priority would be 
given to such measures, negative measures would also be used, in appropriate 
circumstances, taking account of the gravity of the breach and guided by objective 
and equitable criteria. The most important aspects of the relationship between the 
Community and other States, however, would be the Community’s emphasis on: 
sensible economic and social policies; democratic decision-making; adequate 
governmental transparency and financial accountability; the creation of a market 
friendly environment for development; measures to combat corruption; and respect 
for the rule of law, human rights, freedom of the press and expression in third 
States.90 The Council also attached a great deal of importance to the question of 
military spending in developing countries. It was considered that since donor 
countries were engaged in a process whereby their military spending was being 
reduced, it would be difficult to justify if recipients of aid did not adopt the same 
policy.91
88 Resolution o f the Luxembourg European Council (1991) 6 Bull EEC 14.
89 Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and Development, supra note 87, para.4.
90 Ibid., para.5.
91 Ibid., para.9.
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This final aspect of the Resolution has not been elaborated upon by the Commission 
in the various Communications it has since adopted. Otherwise, the Resolution has 
acted as a catalyst for the integration of its various different aspects into the 
Community’s relations with the ACP States and other developing countries, as well 
as the Central and Eastern European States.
The 1991 Resolution signified a major shift in approach for the Community’s 
development cooperation policy and the promotion of ethical values. Prior to the 
coming into force of the TEU, which expressly makes reference to these issues for the 
first time in the Treaties, the Resolution firmly placed human rights and other ethical 
values on the Community’s agenda in its relations with third States. Although the 
Resolution is a joint one and thus does not clarify the issue of competence, it implies 
that the Community can take action in the fields addressed by the Resolution either 
solely or jointly with the Member States.
The Resolution’s addition of new objectives and conditions to the Community’s 
development cooperation policy is in line with the general policy being pursued by all 
donors, in the last ten to fifteen years. The number of development success stories is 
relatively few and far between, so donors seek to condition their schemes, in an 
attempt to make them more effective. Although recipient States have an interest in 
the number of objectives expanding, as it provides them with alternative sources of 
funding for projects, most conditions have been added at the insistence of donors,
09including the Community. At the same time nothing seems to be removed from the 
list of objectives and criteria and there is no identification of the relationship between 
them.93
The majority of recipient States have little or no real choice in the imposition of 
conditionality. But conditionality is often pursued by donors without assessing its 
effectiveness and the burdens it imposes upon recipient States. A number of
92 See Arts, Integrating Human Rights, supra note 81, p. 167.
93 Pollit, C. and O’Neil, H., An Evaluation o f  the Process o f  Evaluation o f  EC External Aid  
Programmes, (1999) p. 17.
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programmes funded by different bodies all requiring the satisfaction of various 
conditions can create a huge administrative burden for a developing State. For 
example, in one year alone there were 405 projects in Mozambique’s health sector 
which had differing reporting requirements for various donors.94 In the Community 
context therefore, coordination between it and the Member States becomes 
exceptionally important as a way to reduce that burden. There is usually little 
systematic relationship between conditionality and policy changes, unless 
conditionality supports reforming groups and there is some domestic will to reform in 
general.95 The adjustments required to satisfy conditionality criteria can be very 
difficult to implement. Yet, the relationship between the implementation of policies 
stipulated by the Community and the continued flow of funding to help with reform is 
weak.96 States therefore may lose the incentive to implement reform policies as not 
only are the promised benefits not being realised but they cannot be afforded either.
Where the Community takes or threatens to take negative measures under the 1991 
Resolution, it is worth questioning which standards are being applied in the 
determination of “equitable and objective factors”. The Resolution says the 
Community will avoid penalising the population for governmental actions. Thus it 
may have to adjust activity with a view to ensuring that development aid benefits 
more directly the poorest sections of the population. The adjustment of such 
programmes may not always be possible with the new focus in mind, and the 
relationship with other foreign policy objectives will also be relevant.
3.1.3. Competence Under Articles 177-181 EC.
94 World Bank, World Development Report, (2000) p. 193.
95 See, Alberto, A., and Dollar, D., “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why” NBER Working 
Paper 6612 cited in World Development Report, supra note 94, p .193.
96 See further, Court o f Auditors, Special Report 12/2000, The Management by the Commission o f  the 
European Union on Support for the Development o f Human Rights and Democracy in Third Countries, 
OJ C 230, 10/08/2000 p.l.
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Article 177 EC establishes the general objectives to be pursued by the Community in 
development cooperation but does not clarify the relationship between them. Article 
177 EC aims to make Community policy consistent with Member States policies and 
expressly states that Community competence will be complementary to that of the 
Member States. Some of the uncertainties inherent in that provision were addressed 
by the Court in Portugal v. Council?1 Here Portugal sought the annulment of 
Council Decision 94/587/EC concerning the conclusion of the Cooperation 
Agreement on Partnership and Development between the EC and India.98 The 
decision was based upon Articles 133, 181 and 300 EC.99 The Agreement dealt with 
a variety of issues, such as energy, intellectual property, tourism and drug abuse.100 
Article 1(1) of the Agreement provided that, “[r]espect for human rights and 
democratic principles is the basis for the cooperation between the Contracting Parties 
and for the provisions of this Agreement, and it constitutes an essential element of the 
Agreement.” “Essential elements” clauses are now standard practice of the 
Community.101 Article 1(2) of the Agreement with India provided its principal 
objective; to enhance and develop through dialogue and partnership cooperation 
between the parties in order to achieve a closer and upgraded relationship.
Portugal challenged the Agreement, in particular, arguing that the legal bases used 
did not confer on the Community the necessary powers to include the “essential 
elements” clause or the provisions on tourism and energy. On the “essential 
elements” clause, Portugal argued that Article 308 EC should have been included. 
This Article provided the Community with an appropriate legal basis for such 
commitments prior to the TEU. In addition, Portugal argued that while observance of
97 Case C-268/94, Portuguese Republic v. Council o f  the European Union, [1996] ECR1-6177.
98 94/578/EC, OJ L 223,27/08/1994 p. 23.
99 At the time, the Articles were 113, 130y, 228(2) and 228(3) EC. For our purposes, the Amsterdam 
and Nice amendments have not changed the substantive scope o f the provisions in question.
100 Articles 7, 10, 13 and 19 o f the Agreement.
101 The policy was formally adopted in the November 1991 Development Council Resolution at 
para. 10 and further developed in COM (1995)216. For discussion o f the policy in general see 
Cremona, M., “Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC’s Trade Agreements” in Emiliou, N., 
and O’Keeffe, D. (eds.), The European Union and World Trade Law-After the GATT Uruguay Round, 
(1996) p.62 and Reidel, E. and Will, M., “Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements o f the EC” in 
Alston, P., Bustelo, M., and Heenan, J.(eds.), The EU and Human Rights, (1999) p.723.
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human rights may be mandatory in the Community legal order, this did not provide a 
competence to act in that sphere in either internal or external matters.102 Article 
177(2) EC was considered merely to define a general objective and not to confer a 
competence to include such provisions in an Agreement.
The Court held that while Article 308 EC had been used prior to the coming into 
force of the TEU, as the basis for such measures, it could only be used in the absence 
of more specific provisions granting that power. As Article 177 EC declared that, 
“Community policy ....shall contribute to the general objective of developing and 
consolidating the rule of law .. .respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” 
the decision should have referred to Article 308 EC only if the terms of the 
Agreement extended beyond the competence granted by that provision.103 It further 
stated:
“The mere fact that Article 1(1) o f the Agreement provides that respect for human rights and 
democratic principles ‘constitutes an essential element’ o f the Agreement does not justify the 
conclusion that the provision goes beyond the objective stated in Article 130u(2) o f the Treaty.
The very wording o f the latter provision demonstrates the importance to be attached to respect 
for human rights and democratic principles, so that, amongst other things, development 
cooperation policy must be adapted to the requirement o f  respect fo r those rights and 
principles .”104
This paragraph of the Court’s judgment can be read in two different ways. The first 
is that in its formulation, the Community’s development policy must take account of 
other conditions and objectives, such as human rights and democracy. There is no 
hierarchy between the different objectives and principles, development policy must 
simply take account of other relevant principles. The alternative reading, which is 
supported by paragraph 26 of the judgment, is that development policy is subordinate 
to the objective of protecting human rights and democratic principles and must be 
conditioned towards that aim.105 The Court did not elaborate on whether Article 177
102 Portugal v. Council, paras. 1-16.
103 Ibid., paras. 17-23.
104 Ibid., para. 24. Emphasis added.
105 Para. 26 states, “[w]ith regard, more particularly, to the argument o f the Portuguese Government 
that the characterisation o f respect for human rights as an essential element in cooperation presupposes
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EC could lawfully form the basis of an Agreement in which the protection of human 
rights was a specific field of cooperation? It would seem, however, that the legal 
base was valid precisely because, in the Agreement with India, the observance of 
human rights and democratic principles were not specific fields of cooperation. If 
human rights were included as a field of cooperation this would possibly go beyond 
the relationship between human rights and development cooperation established by 
the Court. This view is further supported by paragraph 39 of the Court’s judgment 
where, referring to Opinion l/78,m  the Court declared that clauses dealing with 
specific matters should not impose such extensive obligations that they de facto 
constitute distinct objectives. While this approach is consistent with the Court’s 
earlier case law on this issue and also, in this context, a literal reading of Article 
177(2) EC, the relationship developed between development policy and human rights 
in paragraphs 24-26 of the judgment goes beyond it.
It was Advocate General La Pergola, not the Court, however, who addressed one of 
the most important matters raised by the case. The inclusion of an “essential 
elements” clause is necessary if the Community wishes to invoke violation of its 
terms to legitimately suspend or terminate, under international law, an Agreement
107between itself and a third State. Articles 60-62 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1969, codified the customary law on the suspension or termination 
of a treaty, as a consequence of its provisions being breached.108 The requirement in
specific means o f action, it must first be stated that to adapt cooperation policy to respect for human 
rights necessarily entails establishing a certain connection between those matters whereby one o f them 
is made subordinate to the other.”
106 Opinion 1/78, [1979] ECR 741.
107 Portugal v. Council, para. 28 o f his Opinion. The “essential elements” clause in the Agreement 
with India is different in nature from the clause in Cotonou Agreement. There is no one “essential 
elements” clause as the content tends to differ depending upon the third State(s) with whom the 
Community is concluding the Agreement. For analysis o f the different clauses see Bulterman, Treaty 
Relations, supra note 81, p. 167 and Fierro, Human Rights Conditionality, supra note 50, p .213. While 
the content o f the clauses may differ, in bilateral treaties at least, the suspension mechanisms usually 
do not.
108 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. For an early confirmation o f the 
status o f these principles as customary rules see the ICJ in Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences for  
States o f  the Continued Presence o f  South Africa in Namibia, (1971) ICJ Reports, p. 16, para.87.
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Article 60(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention for the suspension of an Agreement is that 
a provision which is, “essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of 
the treaty”, must have been breached. A narrow reading of Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention could mean that the “essential elements” clause cannot form the basis for 
suspension or termination of the Agreement. This is precisely because cooperation in 
human rights is not provided for. The basic objective of the Agreement, set out in 
Article 1(2), is to enhance and develop the relationship between the parties. The 
Court’s reading of the relationship between the “essential elements” clause and 
Article 1(2) of the Agreement in the Portugal case is that human rights and 
democracy are the foremost objectives with the broader notion of development 
subservient to them, although this is far from clear in the Agreement itself. 
Protecting or promoting human rights is not an objective in Article 16, which deals 
expressly only with development cooperation. The observance of human rights and 
democratic principles by both the Community and India, however, is the basic 
condition for its continuing application.
The travaux preparatories of the 1969 Convention suggest, however, that Article 60 
has a broader application. Paragraph 9 of the International Law Commission’s 1966 
commentary on Article 60(3) states:
“.. .The Commission ... was unanimous that the right to terminate or suspend must be limited to 
cases where the breach is o f a serious character. It preferred the term “material” to 
“fundamental” to express the kind o f breach... “fundamental” might be understood as meaning 
that only the violation of the provision directly touching the central purposes o f the treaty can 
ever justify the other party in terminating the treaty. But other provisions considered by a party 
to be essential to the effective execution of the treaty may have been very material in inducing it 
to enter into the treaty at all, even although these provisions may be o f an ancillary nature.”109
The inclusion of provisions defining human rights and democratic principles as 
“essential elements” should therefore allow suspension or termination in accordance 
with Article 60 of the Convention.110 Although the application of Article 60 must be
109 (1966) YBILC, II (Part Two) p.255 cited by Rosenne, S., Breach o f  Treaty, (1985) p.21.
110 See COM(1995)216, p.8, for example, o f a confident assertion that suspension or termination would 
be legally permissible under Article 60, Vienna Convention.
117
determined by the facts of the case itself, the travaux preparatoires and terms of the 
provision make it clear that the breach must be a serious or “material” one. The 
suspension or termination of such an Agreement would only be lawful therefore, in 
response to new and systematic breaches of human rights or the dismantling of 
democratic institutions. Furthermore, an “essential elements” clause cannot be 
invoked by the Community for human rights violations which were ongoing at the 
time an Agreement was concluded and where the Community was aware of them.111 
The clause is designed to ensure that human rights do not seriously deteriorate within 
those States, not to improve them. That must be achieved through other mechanisms.
There is also a further possible limitation to an “essential elements” clause. Article
60(5) of the Vienna Convention prohibits the suspension of “provisions relating to the
protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character”.
This is arguably drafted broadly enough to refer to any treaty which creates rights
intended to protect the individual, whether or not it is primarily humanitarian, so long
110as it has a substantial humanitarian element to it. Bulterman has argued that the 
principle in Article 60(5) is not applicable in the context of Community Agreements 
as the “essential elements” clause serves no purpose, if the values it aims to protect
1 1 o
are violated. She further argues that such provisions are ancillary in nature and 
thus not central to the objective of the treaty.114 The extent to which this is correct, 
for all the Agreements to which the Community is a party and which have such a 
clause, must be questioned. In the Portugal case the Court held that development 
cooperation should work towards the protection of certain values, such as, human 
rights and democracy. The discussion below stresses that poverty reduction and its 
eradication, which should focus on the individual, is now the central and primary aim 
of the Community’s development cooperation policy.115 Due to the conceptual 
approach the Community has adopted towards the relationship between human rights 
and democracy, on the one hand, and poverty reduction and development
111 See Article 45, Vienna Convention.
112 See, for example, Aust, A., Modem Treaty Law and Practice, (2000) p.238 who argues that Article 
60(5) applies to a treaty which creates “rights intended to protect individuals”.
113 Bulterman, Treaty Relations, supra note 81, p.223.
114 Ibid.
115 See COM (2000)212, p.5.
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cooperation, on the other, the relevance of Article 60(5) of the Vienna Convention 
cannot be dismissed. Whether it precludes relying on an “essential elements” clause 
must be determined in the light of the actual content of an Agreement with a third 
State and the programmes the Community has initiated under it.
The suspension or termination by the Community of an Agreement for violation of an 
“essential elements” clause by a third State has moreover no bearing upon the legal 
obligations owed under international law, by that State. The ILC’s Articles on State 
Responsibility and the Vienna Convention on Treaties create two distinct legal 
regimes.116 The Community is thus still free to use other methods, as discussed in 
Chapter Two, to pursue its objectives in its relations with the State in question.
After the Portugal case it is clear that the development cooperation provisions of the 
EC Treaty grant the Community competence to include “essential elements” clauses 
in its development cooperation Agreements. This will now also be the case on the 
basis of Article 181a in relations with all third States. The Court in the Portugal case 
did not, however, address the issue of subsidiarity. Article 177(1) EC makes clear 
that the Community’s competence in this area is complementary to the policies 
pursued by the Member States - it is not superior to Member State competence nor 
inferior. As new policies develop the coming into existence of common rules in the 
AETR sense cannot be ruled out and thus the eventual pre-emption of Member State
117 1 1 Rcompetence is a possibility. Advocate General Jacobs in the EDF case and the 
Court in the Bangladesh!19 case have highlighted, however, that until such rules 
develop (if they develop) Member States retain their competence to engage in 
development cooperation activities both outside the Community system as well as in
116 See Article 56 ILCASR and Article 43 VCLT and further the discussion in the Third Report on 
State Responsibility, A/CN.4/507/Add.3 para.324.
117 Declaration 10 attached to the TEU illustrates that the possibility o f common rules, in the AETR 
sense, was envisaged in development cooperation.
118 Case C-316/1991, European Parliament v. Council o f  the European Union, [1994] ECR 1-625, 
para. 42-47 o f his Opinion.
119 Cases C-181/1991 and 248/1991, European Parliament v. Council and Commission o f  the 
European Communities, [1993] ECR 1-3685, para. 16.
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190cooperation with it. Even though it is a non-exclusive competence, subsidiarity is 
unlikely to be a major obstacle in its exercise. The underlying approach of the Court 
in the Portugal, EDF and Bangladesh cases almost certainly means that the Member 
States are not going to be deprived of their competence to act.
3.1.3.(a) Poverty Reduction and Development Cooperation.
One express objective of Article 177(1) EC is the “campaign against poverty in
developing countries”. Poverty reduction is now the overriding focus of Community
191development cooperation policy as well as that of all major development
• 199 •agencies. The Community has affirmed its commitment to help reduce the number 
of persons living in absolute poverty by one half by 2015 and for developed States to 
donate 0.7 percent of their gross national product for overseas development
191assistance. The Commission has also issued a number of Communications dealing 
with debt relief for the most highly indebted countries.124 An effectively
implemented poverty reduction policy is without doubt the most important
contribution the Community can make to promoting human rights and other ethical 
values in its relations with third States.
Defining poverty or how to tackle it is not straightforward. OECD guidelines 
emphasise that its causes differ and thus each State needs to be looked at
120 See COMs (1995)160 and (1999)218 on this issue.
121 See COM(2000) 212, p.5. This Communication has been approved by the Development Council, 
Press Release, Number 8571/00.
122 See World Bank, Building Poverty Reduction Strategies in Developing Countries, (1999) and in the 
context o f the OECD, J. Wolfenssohn, J., A Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework, 
(1999) and Chapter Two.
123 See, for examples: the Monterrey Consensus adopted by the International Conference on Financing
for Development, March 2002; the Conclusions o f the Barcelona European Council 15-16/3/2002 at 
para. 13 where Member States agree to aim for 0.39% of GNP by 2006 with a long-term commitment 
to 0.7%; COM(2000) 212, p.5 and the Preamble to the Cotonou Agreement.
124 COM( 1996) 153. Also see Council Decision 94/453/EC, 6/7/98 on Exceptional Assistance for 
Heavily Indebted ACP Countries and infra.
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individually. It has also been argued that to be successful each development
1project needs to emphasise not only poverty but also participation and partnership. 
Poverty reduction is deemed to require ownership of the development process by 
those most in need and an increased focus on the social dimension of growth and
177development. According to the Community, to achieve their objectives poverty
reduction policies must exist in a context in which democracy, good governance, 
human rights and the rale of law are respected. These are all cross-cutting principles 
- to be integrated into the implementation of development policies which support 
economic growth and focus on poverty reduction.
The Community’s approach to poverty reduction suffers from a number of problems. 
One of the most notable is the definition of poverty. An early Communication on this 
issue, from 1993, only really noted that poverty and its causes were multi-
1 70dimensional. A later Communication (from 2000) suggests that the deprivation of 
basic capabilities and a lack of access to education, health, natural resources and
1 7ftpolitical participation, as well as a lack of income, are all relevant. Yet poverty can 
be defined in a number of other ways including consumption, level of assets, lack of 
dignity or autonomy, social exclusion, equality in terms of gender and race, political 
freedom and security and deprivation of a long and healthy life. The 2000 
Communication, however, in no way elaborates upon the relevance of factors other 
than income in its definition. It does stress though that an integrated approach to
1 "77institutional support and capacity building is required. In the past this has been one 
of the criticisms of the Community’s policies. Audits of such policies had 
highlighted that if the Community focused greater attention upon institutions and
125 DAC, Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, (2001) p. 10.
126 Pollit and O’Neil, Evaluation, supra note 93, p.21.
127 DAC, Guidelines, supra note 125, p. 10.
128 COM(2000) 212, p.27.
129 COM (1993) 518.
130 COM (2000)212, p. 16.
131 These approaches to poverty are an amalgamation o f differing factors utilised in UNDP, Human
Development Report 2000 (2000) p. 17 and DAC, Shaping the 21st Century, Scoping Study, Donor
Poverty Reduction and Practices, (1996) p. 12.
132 COM(2000)212, p. 16.
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policies within the ACP States, then its impact on poverty reduction would be 
significantly greater.133 The political responsibility of governments for macro- 
economic reforms, gender issues, social policies such as health, food security 
education and training, and the sustainable management of natural resources are also 
of the utmost importance.
The Community has identified three ways in its which a poverty focus can be 
implemented.134 First, by concentrating on the least developed countries. Secondly 
by implementing a more poverty focussed cooperation program with those middle 
income countries where more than twenty percent of the population live on or under 
USS 1 per day. Thirdly by improving the focus on poverty reduction in cooperation
n r
programmes with all other developing countries. There are a number of theoretical 
and practical problems with this approach.
One of the methods by which the Community has attempted to implement its poverty 
reduction strategies has been through the identification of “poor groups”. Yet the 
identification and targeting of the poor by donors often adopts a “broad-brush 
approach” and treats target groups as homogeneous socio-economic groups. 
Studies have shown that the Community has often adopted this “one approach fits all”
117perspective. It is also the case that, in the past, not all Directorate Generals in the
133 See ACP Synthesis Report, (1999) p. 13. Also see Court of Auditors, Special Report 8/2003, 
Concerning the Execution o f  Infrastructure Work Financed by the EDF, Together With Commission 
Replies, OJ C 181, 31/7/2003 p .l, para.35 which notes that the EDF can make a significant and 
relevant contribution to national infrastructure development strategies but all too often the end results, 
costs and time were very different from the initial terms o f the contract.
134 COM(2000) 212, p.20.
135 Ibid.
136 See DAC Guidelines, supra note 125, p.xiii.
137 See Loquai, C. Hove, K., and Bossuyt, J., “The European Community’s Approach Towards Poverty 
Reduction in Developing Countries” ODI Working Paper 111, p.78. Also see Carlsson, J., 
Chibbamullilo, P., Orjueal, C., and Saasa, O., “Poverty and European Aid in Zambia” ODI Working 
Paper 138. The Court o f Auditors, Special Report 10/2003, Effectiveness o f  the Commission’s 
Management o f  Development Assistance to India in Targeting the Poor and Ensuring Sustainable 
Benefits, OJ C 211, 5/9/2003 p.21 paras. 11-37, notes that the Community had been reasonably
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Commission received training in poverty reduction. In the Development Directorate 
which deals with the ACP States, for example, there is a general set of guidelines on 
poverty reduction. But there was no emphasis on poverty reduction in DG IB which 
dealt with the Asian and Latin American countries as well as the MEDA countries 
and is now part of the External Relations DG.138 Even though the Community has 
now introduced Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) as part of its approach, a 
study by Oxfam has argued that, where they actually exist, they are only implemented
1 3Qin 1 out of 6 States. An emphasis on poverty reduction has also had the 
consequence of all aspects of development cooperation being portrayed as being 
poverty oriented, even when a programme has little apparent connection with it.140
The Community’s emphasis on poverty is not focussed on the dignity of the 
individual and their autonomy but is seen as a means to ensure the general integration 
of developing countries into the world economy. It is for this reason that economic 
growth and trade are seen as being important. It is argued that a focus on such an 
approach will not only help to reduce poverty levels but will also ensure developed 
countries integrate into the global economy.141 For the Community this means that 
the objective is to create a sustainable economic development process, which can then 
benefit the poor through a trickle-down process. This perspective, however, may 
conflict with its approach to the more general relationship between development and 
human rights, which is based on a grass-roots approach.142 Of crucial importance 
therefore, is that the overall balance of policy towards a State takes account of the 
aims and objectives identified in development policy. Yet, this is not the case, 
especially when the Community’s poverty reduction and development cooperation 
policies compete with its more general foreign policy objectives. For example, in 
recent policy papers there is a discemable shift in emphasis from poverty reduction 
towards other political objectives, especially the fight against international
successful in targeting and identifying poor groups although systematic attention to these issues 
throughout the project would have improved its results.
138 DAC, Shaping the 21st Century, supra note 121, p.xviii.
139 Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards, (2002) p.5.
140 See, for example, COM (2002) 116.
141 COM(2000) 212, p.20.
142 See Chapter Two and infra.
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terrorism.143 As the World Development Report for 2003 notes, effective policies 
aimed at eradicating poverty should, in any case, contribute to a safer world.144
The tension between development cooperation and general foreign policy objectives 
has also been apparent in the relationship between the General Affairs and 
Development Councils. The situation in Liberia in 2000 is a good example. The 
Development Council was trying to adjust programmes to ensure that those in power 
would not benefit from Community aid. It found, however, that the General Affairs 
Council took action to suspend all aid to that country in pursuit of its more general 
foreign policy objectives, although the aid suspended was directly earmarked for 
poverty reduction programmes.145 The danger of short-term priorities consistently 
prevailing over long-term objectives is now particularly acute following the 
absorption of the Development Council into the General Affairs Council. Although a 
single Council can balance competing objectives, the General Affairs Council has 
stated that development priorities should be integrated into more general foreign 
policy ones.146 It has further approved Javier Solana’s strategy paper, “A Secure 
Europe in a Better World”147 which envisages external assistance supporting a future 
security strategy.” The pre-eminence of general foreign policy objectives may 
relegate poverty reduction to an ancillary status. The Commission, in particular, has 
argued very strongly that development objectives should not be subordinated to 
foreign policy ones, especially action under the CFSP.149
143 See, in particular, COM 2003/299/4 (the new Communication on relations with ASEAN States), 
COM (2002) 340 (the proposal for the new ALA Regulation, especially Article 2(d) ). Also see 
Article 15, Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member 
States, o f the one part, and the Republic of Chile, o f the Other Part, OJ L 352, 30/12/2002 p.3.
144 World Bank, World Development Report 2003, (2003) p .l.
145 Cited by Mr. Rowe and Clare Short in Minutes o f Evidence to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on International Development, Ninth Report: The Effectiveness o f EC Development Aid, 
(2001) question 43.
146 General Affairs Council o f 18/19/02, Doc. 6266/02.
147 Solana, J., A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12/12/2003.
148 See further, House of Lords European Union Committee, Twelfth Report: EU Development Aid in 
Transition, (2004) p.28.
149 See COM(1996) 70, p.20
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As noted above, poverty should be defined by reference to more than just income. 
The Community has given priority to income in its definition, yet the allocation of EC 
aid to developing countries is not focused on the most deprived in terms of income. It 
has been described by the International Development Select Committee of the House 
of Commons as giving “more to the better off and less to the poor.”150 The World 
Development Report 1999 highlighted that if abject poverty is defined as those living 
on US$ 1 per day, five percent of the population of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
live in abject poverty. The corresponding figures for South Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa are 42.3 per cent and 48.5 per cent respectively. If the level of abject poverty 
is drawn at US$ 2 per day the figures for Asia and Africa rise by fifty percent.151 
There is no such corresponding increase for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The 
Community’s allocation of aid commitments would have to undergo a fundamental 
shift if poverty reduction were indeed to become a central objective. Between 1990 
and 2000 the top ten recipients of EC development assistance were: Yugoslavia, 
Morocco, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslavia, Egypt, Tunisia, South
1 S9Africa, Turkey, Albania and Macedonia. None of these are classified as low- 
income countries by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. 
Between 1980 and 1998 of the (then) ACP States, only Ethiopia ranked among the 
top beneficiaries of EC aid. That list was again dominated by the former Yugoslavia, 
Poland, the Russian Federation and other central and eastern European States.153 The 
fact that over half of the world’s poor, who are in Asia, remain outside the scope of 
the Development DG and receive minimal assistance to relieve poverty is clearly 
contrary to the Community’s proclaimed objectives.154 The justification for the 
allocation of aid to middle income countries is that poverty is also present in these
150 Select Committee, Ninth Report, supra note 145, para.4.
151 World Bank, World Development Report 1999, (1999) p.25.
152 Select Committee, Ninth Report, supra note 145, para. 19.
153 For a long-term breakdown see, Cox, A., and Chapman, J., The European Community External 
Cooperation Programmes: Policies, Management and Distribution, (1999) p. 129. Poland alone has 
received more aid than all o f Asia together. See Ninth Report, supra note 145, para.24.
154 Even where such projects are, relatively speaking, well designed in Asia, their impact has been 
described by the Court o f Auditors as “modest at best”. Court of Auditors, Special Report 12/2000, 
The Management by the Commission o f  the European Union on Support fo r the Development o f  
Human Rights and Democracy in Third Countries, OJ C 230, 10/08/2000 p.l.
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States.155 This is somewhat disingenuous as it underplays the strategic and political 
importance of most of the countries benefiting. It cannot be denied that aid targeted 
towards middle income countries which promote growth and have sound economic 
policies and institutions, can be extremely effective. It is, however, still difficult to 
defend the Community’s actions in the light of its proclaimed priorities and 
objectives.
It is also difficult to defend the approach taken by the Community towards the 
relationship between poverty reduction and trade. Trade is perceived by the 
Community to be crucial in assisting the integration of developing countries into the 
world economy. The Community has on numerous occasions adopted policy papers 
to help developing countries to benefit from trade.156 As an instrument to alleviate 
poverty, trade has far greater potential than aid.157 World Bank figures show that 
developing countries earn $322 per capita through exports as opposed to $10 from 
aid.158 Even a modest increase in exports can far outweigh the impact of all aid 
initiatives, although donors such as the Community will have little or no control over 
its distribution. Trade is the most powerful instrument available to alleviate global 
poverty. As opposed to other initiatives and instruments, however, it can also directly 
affect the commercial and economic interests of donor States. The Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) as part of the WTO Ministerial Conference, alongside 
the commitments undertaken in Johannesburg at the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) and Monterrey in the International Conference on Financing 
for Development (ICFD) now form the basis for initiatives and action to be taken by
155 Select Committee, Ninth Report, supra note 145, para. 19.
156 See COM (2002) 82 and 513. Also see the 2003 Commission Report, Making Trade Work for  
Development: Putting Theory Into Practice, (no further reference given) available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/reports/making trade work 2003 en.pdf.
157 See OECD, The Development Dimension o f  Trade, (2002) and Strengthening Trade Capacity for  
Development (2002).
158 World Bank, World Development Indicators, (2001). Also see Oxfam, Rigged Rules, supra note 
139.
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the Community in this regard.159 The approach adopted by the Community towards 
developing countries is, however, protectionist and detrimental to their interests.160 
An economic analysis of the Community’s position in the WTO has stated:
“..contrary to official declarations, analysis demonstrates that the EU is a not a staunch defender 
of developing countries in the WTO ... [m]ost of the African Group actually has a large 
negative correlation with EU positions ...[t]he relatively protectionist policies.... are in
opposition to the declared interest o f most developing countries...although the EU believe
themselves to be more friendly to the developing countries than the rest o f the world. 
...T hey.... are isolated in strong opposition to the developing countries in the WTO.”161
The Community considers the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative162 to be its 
major contribution to alleviating poverty through trade. The Commission has argued 
that it has fully opened its internal market to all products, expect weapons, from the 
49 least developed countries. Yet tariffs on sensitive goods such as bananas, sugar 
and rice are only gradually being removed.164 The Commission has argued that the 
GSP and EBA are part of its attempt to “ensure that the concerns of developing 
countries are at the heart of the discussions under the DDA.”165 Most of the extreme 
poor in the developing world, however, work in agriculture and labour intensive
159 The Seville European Council, 21-22/6/2002 at para. 40 o f its conclusions confirmed the 
commitment to Doha and Monterrey, as a means to sustainable development. Also see COM (2002) 
513 and COM (2004) 150 which proposes how to “translate the Monterrey Consensus into practice”.
160 See for example, Bjomskov, C., and Lind, K., “Where Do Developing Countries Go After Doha? 
An Analysis o f WTO Positions and Potential Alliances” (2002) 36 JWT, 543; Oxfam, Rigged Rules, 
supra note 139 and the rebuttal, European Commission, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, 
Globalisation and the Fight Against Poverty-Comments From the Commission, issued 17/4/02; and 
Global Issues, Free Trade and Globalisation-The WTO Meeting in Doha, Qatar, at 
http://www.globalissues.org/traderelated/freetrade/doha.asp.
161 Bjomskov and Lind, “Developing Countries''' supra note 160, 547 and 560-562.
162 Council Regulation No. 416/2001, OJ L 60,1/3/2001, p.43.
163 European Commission, Rigged Rules, supra note 160.
164 See Regulation No. 1401/2002 Laying Down Detailed Rules of the Opening and Administration of 
the Tariff Quotas for Rice, Originating in the Least Developed Countries, OJ L 203, 1/8/2002 p.42 and 
Regulation No. 1381/2002 Laying Down Detailed Rules o f the Opening and Administration o f the 
Tariff Quotas for Raw Sugar Cane, Originating in the Least Developed Countries, OJ L 200, 
30/7/2002, p. 14.
165 European Commission, Rigged Rules, supra note 160, p .l.
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industries where the EU’s tariffs are possibly the highest in the developed world. 
Oxfam in an analysis of trade rules showed that the tariffs applied to such goods by 
the Community are double that of the US and can be significantly higher than that of 
almost all other States.166 Other audits paint a slightly different picture.167
Notwithstanding these differences of view, the level of protection from competition 
given to EU producers is unlikely dramatically to change. While reform of the CAP 
is complex, politically contentious and beyond the scope of this discussion, Hans 
Schmidt the Danish Environmental Minister, at the WSSD considered reductions in 
EU agricultural subsidies (to its producers) so as to benefit developing countries, to 
be “unrealistic”.168 The agricultural subsidies awarded to farmers by States in the 
developed world are still about six times greater than the development assistance they 
grant.169
The EBA will only be of benefit to the least developed countries (LDCs), if they have 
the capacity to respond to the further opening up of European markets and if there is a 
demand for products for which they can meet the supply. In many cases, non­
sensitive goods are already subject to duty-free access. The danger though is not to 
Community producers but to producers in States not classified as LDCs. The EBA 
benefits producers in the LDCs at the expense of those elsewhere, who are only 
entitled to take advantage of the general GSP scheme. Where the goods they export 
to the EU are in competition with those exported by the LDCs, those producers and 
their economies will suffer. This will particularly be the case with sugar.170
166 Oxfam, Rigged Rules, supra note 139, p.99.
167 See European Commission, Rigged Rules, supra note 160 and Gallezot,J., Real Access to the E U ’s 
Agricultural Market, (2003) - http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/iu1v/tradoc 113490 and the 
literature cited therein.
168 Speech to the WSSD on 7/10/02 - http://www.iisd.ca/wssd/porta1.html. See further the statements 
issued by the OECD and Oxfam on the CAP reforms, both o f which were very critical. OECD, 
Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: A Positive Reform Agenda,
COM/AGR/TD/WP(2002) 19/FINAL and Oxfam, Press Release, 27/6/2003.
169 World Bank, World Bank Development Report, (2003) p. 12.
170 See the studies available at http://www.acpsugar.org/ and Stevens, C., and Kennan, J., The Impact 
o f  the E U ’s Everything But Arms Proposal: A Report to Oxfam, (2001). Brazil and Thailand (neither
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The inability of the Community practically to prioritise poverty reduction and 
concentrate its efforts where they are most needed can also be seen with regard to the 
policy of debt relief for highly indebted countries. By the end of 2000, 22 countries 
had been identified as being eligible for debt relief by the Community.171 Yet almost 
all of the money earmarked for this purpose is simply being transferred from 
elsewhere. In the 1999 Communication on this issue,172 it is clear that there is to be a 
simple reallocation of funds already budgeted.173 A later Communication discussed 
the allocation of €1 billion for the same purpose174 - almost all already budgeted for 
development projects and now being reallocated.
There are other aspects, however, of poverty reduction policies and development 
cooperation generally where the Community is trying to improve its record. Of 
particular importance is the attempt to eradicate the practice of tied aid. Action Aid 
considers that in some EU States 90% of aid projects are tied to home companies.175 
It has been estimated that over 66% of all grants awarded to African countries are
1 7 Arecycled back to EU States. The OECD and a number of aid agencies have long
1 77been campaigning to bring it to an end. The Commission is attempting to tackle
1 7fithis, but aid donations are sometimes only agreeable to donor States on the basis 
that they also assist the home economy. Denmark, for example, in 2003 cancelled a
o f whom is a LDC) have both submitted challenges to the EC’s tariff regime on sugar under the WTO 
dispute resolution mechanism. See WT/DS266/21 and WT/DS283/2.
171 Communication o f 26/10/1999 (no number given) on Community Participation in the Debt Relief 
Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).
172 See Council Decision, 6/7/1998, On a Debt Relief Debt Relief Initiative for Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries, annexed to the Commission Communication, 26/10/1999.
173 82% was from the EDF and the rest from the Community budget, see p.7 o f the Communication 
and the annexes for the sources o f funding.
174 COM (2001)210.
175 Cited by Action Aid on its webpage at http://www.actionaid.org. accessed 10/7/2003.
176 See the Annex to Select Committee, Ninth Report, supra note 145.
177 See DAC, Recommendations on Untying ODA to the LDC, (2001) and Action Aid’s campaign at 
http://www.actionaid.org.
178 See COM (2002) 639.
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€45 million aid package to Bangladesh as non-Danish contractors were to be used.179 
The Commission and Council have now identified the untying of aid to least 
developed countries as one of eight priorities in the context of the Monterrey 
Consensus.180
Effective poverty reduction requires a refocusing of approach and the Member States 
must sacrifice some of their own interests. Despite its rhetoric with regard to poverty 
reduction the Community has been much more active in protecting and promoting 
ethical values through other mechanisms, such as funding projects. This has been 
easier for the Community as it does not require it fundamentally to reassess its 
relationships with all third States.
3.1.3.(b). Funding the Pursuance of Ethical Values and Practice.
3.1.3.(b)(i). The General Legal Basis for Funding Projects Pursuing Ethical 
Values.
EC development aid is primarily funded through a number of different sources; the
EDF in the case of the Lome/Cotonou Conventions and Category 4 of the Budget for
10|
external action in general. Despite the rhetorical priority the Community has given 
to measures concerning issues such as human rights and democracy, as opposed to 
aid in the strict sense, it should be noted that in actual terms such allocations amount
179 Supra note 175.
i8° Monterrey Consensus and the European Union” MEMO/04/05 of 11/03/04. Nine o f the 
existing 15 Member States had already legislated to untie their aid. The problem has become more 
acute after expansion.
181 Although the general budget is also used in ACP States. For general analysis o f external aid 
budgets see: Cox and Chapman, External Cooperation Programmes, supra note 153; Chang, H., Fell, 
A., and Laird, M., A Comparison o f  Management Systems for Development Cooperation in 
OECD/DAC Members, (1999); Staff Working Document D (2001)32947, Report on the 
Implementation o f  the European Commission External Assistance; Select Committee, Ninth Report, 
supra note 145; and House o f Lords Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 148. The discussion does 
not extend to the work o f the European Investment Bank.
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to no more than a few percent of the external relations budget lines. This 
expenditure is dwarfed by other categories of assistance, such as, Programme Aid, 
Food Aid, Humanitarian Assistance and Project Aid.183
The European Parliament originally instigated an initiative to move all budget lines 
relating to the promotion of human rights and democratic principles together into a 
single chapter of the budget called the “European Initiative in Support of Democracy 
and the Protection of Human Rights”.184 This is the budget heading which funds 
many projects whose express aims include the promotion of democracy, the rule of
I O C
law and human rights. Despite the consolidation of many budget lines the 
expansion of budget lines concerned with aspects of human rights and democracy has 
continued. A reason for this is the introduction of ad hoc budget lines by the 
Parliament, where it considers the general allocation to be deficient. The 
Commission has also stressed the need for the various financial instruments used to 
promote ethical values to be flexible, so as to ensure compatibility with their specific 
objectives and to guarantee the availability of financial resources at a minimum of
x ' 186notice.
Community expenditure, however, is only legitimate if it has both a budgetary 
appropriation and is also authorised by the adoption of a basic act which provides the 
appropriate legal base. The ECJ’s decision in United Kingdom v. European 
Commission (Payments to Combat Social Exclusion),187 which reaffirmed this, led to 
one hundred budget headings, equating to one percent of the Union's budget for 1998,
182 Approximately €100 million has been allocated per year since 2001. Cox and Chapman, External 
Cooperation Programmes, supra note 153, p.xviii o f the 1997 version o f their report give a figure o f  
two percent o f the external relations budget.
183 Ibid., p.28.
184 Resolution on a European Democracy Initiative [1992] OJ C 150, 15/6/1992 p.281. Now referred 
to as the EIDHR.
185 B7-70, until 1995 it was B7-52.
186 See COM(1995)567 section 2(b) Financial Resources. Court of Auditors, Special Report 12/2000, 
supra note 154, para.75 urged the Commission to simplify the number o f budget heads to allow 
evaluation o f them, which in its response the Commission refused to do.
187 Case C -106/96, United Kingdom v. European Commission (Payments to Combat Social Exclusion) 
[1998] 2 CMLR, 981.
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being suspended for non-compliance.188 As the Financial Report for 1998 notes, a 
number of different budget heads concerned with the promotion of democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights had to be suspended. The earmarked funds were 
eventually released under the terms of an ad hoc agreement between the
189institutions.
In the light of the Social Funds Case it is clear that many projects promoting ethical 
values were not lawful where there was significant expenditure without an 
appropriate legal base. Some projects, however, were based on an appropriate 
unilateral instrument. Article 6 of the ALA Regulation,190 for example, specifically 
refers to the fact that financial and technical assistance is to be extended, in particular, 
with regard to the spread of democracy and human rights.191
The fact that the Commission and the other institutions understood beforehand the 
weakness of the legal basis for some of the human rights and democracy based 
projects can be ascertained from a 1997 Communication. This proposed a “human 
rights regulation” to provide the various different headings for such projects with a
1QO 107 ___clear legal basis, but the Council rejected the proposal. The decision of the 
Court, however, in the Social Funds Case made it necessary to ensure the legality of 
such funding.
The original proposal for a “human rights regulation” was based exclusively on 
Article 179 EC. This was clearly inadequate for countries with which the
188 European Communities Financial Report 1998, (1999) p.53.
189 Ibid., p.54.
190 Council Regulation 443/92, supra note 60.
191 See, for example, the report issued by the Commission on the implementation o f the Regulation 
which was published as COM (1998) 40.
192 COM (1997) 357.
193 Although the Opinion o f the Legal Service o f the Council’s was confidential, Weiler, J., and Fries, 
S., “A Human Rights Policy for the European Community and Union: The Question o f Competences” 
in Alston, The EU and Human Rights, supra note 101, p. 147, claim it was widely leaked in the press 
and led to an agreement where the Council would turn a blind eye to the Commission’s practices, if  the 
Commission expunged any official reference to a Community human rights policy relating to any 
activity in and by the Member States.
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Community has relations outside of the development cooperation context. It was for 
this reason that the proposed regulation was then split into two, with one regulation 
relying upon Article 179 EC and the other Article 308 EC. In substantive terms the 
proposals were identical.194
Article 308 EC, however, unlike Articles 177-179 EC makes no reference to human 
rights or other principles such as democracy. The practice of the Community prior to 
the TEU was to use Article 308 EC to fund all such projects, and the specific 
competence was derived from Article 2 EC. Now that Article 179 EC provides a 
more specific legal base it must be used with regard to developing countries. Article 
308 EC would only continue to be needed for other States. Although the Court did 
not address this issue directly in the Portugal case, this approach was upheld in 
rejecting Portugal’s arguments on Article 308 EC in the Agreement with India. A 
similar conclusion can be drawn from Opinion 2/94.195 There the Court did not, as 
such, reject the use of Article 308 EC as a provision granting competence to the 
Community to undertake or pursue human rights objectives in its external relations. 
It only rejected the use of Article 308 EC when it amounted to a de facto 
circumvention of the procedure for treaty amendment.196 Its use for measures pursing 
such objectives in third States, in the absence constitutional implications, was not 
questioned. As the Court noted in Opinion 2/94, Article 308 EC,
“is designed to fill the gap where no specific provisions o f the Treaty confer on the Community 
institutions express or implied powers to act, if such powers appear none the less to be 
necessary to enable the Community to carry out its functions with a view to attaining one o f  the 
objectives laid down by the Treaty.”197
194 The Commission also presented an earlier amended proposal for the regulation in COM(1999)13. 
The following discussion however, is based upon the re-examined proposals for the regulations in 
COMs (1999) 206 and (1999) 207.
195 Opinion 2/94, [1996] ECR1-1759.
196 See further Gaga, G., “Opinion 2/94” (1996) 33 CMLRev., 973, Mathieu, S., “L’adhdsion de la 
communaut£ k la CEDH” (1998) 414 RMUE, 31 and Cremona, M., “The EU and the External 
Dimension o f Human Rights Policy” in Konstadinidis, S. (ed.), A People’s Europe: Tuning a Concept 
into Content, (1999) p. 155.
197 Opinion 2/94, para. 29. Emphasis added. Also see Opinion 2/92, [1995] ECR 1-521, para.36.
133
Article 308 EC must respect limits in its text and scope as defined by the Court. The 
use of Article 308 EC to pursue ethical values in non-developing third States is not 
without problems, however, even though it has been extensively used for that 
purpose. Article 181a EC, after the Nice amendments, grants external competence 
for Agreements but not for other instruments which must still rely upon Article 308 
EC.
The Court had the opportunity in Opinion 2/94 to declare whether the protection of 
human rights was one of the Community’s general objectives, a question of 
disagreement among the Member States.198 It avoided addressing it. Before the 
Court five Member States argued that the protection of human rights was not a 
Community objective and neither the Community nor Union had specific powers in 
the field. They relied upon the fact that it was not mentioned in either Articles 2 or 3 
of the EC Treaty. It is clear, however that the “activities” listed in Article 3 of the 
Treaty are not exhaustive. Article 2 EC sets out the Community’s tasks with Article 
3 stipulating the activities of the Community which “shall include” but are not limited 
to the list in that provision. The task of “raising.. ..the standard of living and quality 
of life” as found in Article 2 can be seen as having a human rights objective. 
Furthermore, the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that 
the protection of human rights leads to the promotion of social progress and “better 
standards of life”. The means may be different but the objectives are ultimately much 
the same. A number of commentators attach importance to the fact that the Court did 
not declare that the Community does not have a human rights objective.199 Others 
have argued that the protection of human rights is a transverse objective.200
198 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden, the Commission and the 
European Parliament all considered the protection o f human rights to be Community objective. 
France, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom all opposed the idea.
199 Alston, P., and Weiler, J., “An Ever Closer Union in Need o f a Human Rights Policy: The EU and 
Human Rights” in Alston, The EU and Human Rights, supra note 101, p.3, 24 and Amull, A., in The 
Human Rights Opinion o f  the European Court o f  Justice and Its Constitutional Implications, (1996) 
p.7.
200 Brandtner, B., and Rosas, A., “Human Rights and the External Relations o f the European 
Community: An Analysis o f Doctrine and Practice” (1998) 9 EJIL, 468, 472 and the Commission in
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The objectives in the Community Treaty are expressly supplemented, by the 
Common Provisions of the TEU which apply to all aspects of the Union. Article 6(1) 
TEU which affirms that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law201 is 
relevant here. Article 6(4) TEU further provides that the “Union shall provide itself 
with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.” 
Article 6(4) TEU also makes an appearance in the Protocol on the Application of the 
Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality which was attached to the Community 
Treaty at Amsterdam. Paragraph 2 of the Protocol specifically notes that reference 
should be had to Article 6(4) TEU in the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. This reinforces the argument that those objectives of the Union 
which are found in the Common Provisions can be pursued through the Community 
pillar. If the provisions in both the TEU and the EC Treaty are considered in 
conjunction, then Article 308 EC within the confines of the scope of the EC Treaty 
can provide a basis to achieve those objectives. Any measures taken on the basis of 
Article 308 EC, however, still have to satisfy the link with the functioning of the 
common market and be necessary.
In the past these criteria have been ignored if the political will exists for measures to 
be adopted. Although Opinion 2/94 was in a different context, before the Court no 
Member State challenged Community competence to accede to the Convention on the 
basis that it was not connected to the functioning of the common market. Dashwood 
considers that the Court did not address the issue as there obviously is no such link.203 
An alternative view is that there seems to have been a general acceptance that there
Opinion 2/94, supra note 195, p. 1773. A number of Member States in their submissions considered 
the protection o f human rights to be a horizontal principle as opposed to an objective.
201 A use o f language which draws heavily not only from the Court’s own jurisprudence but also the 
Preamble to the UDHR.
202 For detailed historical analysis on the use o f Article 308 EC see Weiler, J., “The Transformation o f  
Europe” (1991) 100 YLJ, 2403 and for a more recent perspective Schiitze, R., “Organized Change 
Towards an ‘Ever Closer Union’: Article 308 EC and the Limits to the Community’s Legislative 
Competence” (2003) 22 YEL, 79.
203 Dashwood, A., in Human Rights Opinion, supra note 199, p.24.
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was such a link and the Court did not address it for that reason. In the case of the 
proposed regulation on funding for human rights projects in non-developing third 
States, Article 308 EC was used because there was eventual political agreement 
between the Member States to use it and the need for a link with the functioning of 
the common market and being necessary, in the sense the provision refers, to were set 
to one side. The proposed measures were adopted as Council Regulations 975 and 
976 of 1999.204
In terms of substantive competence there are problems, however, with regard to 
Regulation 976/1999 on funding for human rights projects in non-developing third 
States, which uses Article 308 EC as its legal base. In the preamble to both the 
regulations the principle of the indivisibility of rights, as proclaimed in the Vienna 
Declaration, is seen as a principle that “underpins the international system for the 
protection of human rights” and therefore “constitutes the very foundation of 
European integration”. Regulation 976/1999 also provides a basis to fund projects 
aimed at giving effect to many other related principles and concepts. This is 
questionable as far as non-developing States are concerned. Article 6 of the TEU 
refers to the respect of “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention....on Human Rights... and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law”. 
This is significantly narrower than the ambit encompassed by the regulation. Article 
11 TEU does refer more generally to the development and consolidation of 
“democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” but is limited to the CFSP and is not one of the Common Provisions. 
Regulation 975/1999 which uses Article 179 EC as a legal base is less susceptible to 
criticism on this basis.
Neither of the regulations, however, defines what is meant by terms such as “human 
rights” nor do they provide an exhaustive list of those operations for which the 
Community shall provide technical and financial aid. Particular emphasis has also
204 Supra note 65.
205 This lack o f clarity is a common feature of all Community documents which address issues, such as, 
human rights although in COM( 1998) 146 in the context o f the Community’s relationship with the
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been placed in the regulations on measures to support and promote human rights and 
democracy by preventing conflict between States. This approach gives practical 
implementation to the Communication on Conflict Prevention in ACP States.206 In 
the context of the regulations it is not geographically limited and is therefore 
applicable to all States which enjoy a relationship with the Community.
The express protection of Member State competence in the Treaty under the 
development cooperation provisions and the need for unanimity under Article 308 EC 
seems to be the reason why such an expansive approach towards Community 
competence is evolving. It would be inconceivable, for example, for the Court to 
have taken the approach it did with regard to the relationship between human rights 
and development cooperation in the Portugal case, if the realistic possibility existed 
of the Community’s actions pre-empting the Member States’ competence. The Social 
Funds case, although not concerned with development cooperation as such, implicitly 
reaches the same conclusion. The fact that Regulations 975 and 976 of 1999 on the 
basis of Articles 179 and 308 EC successfully passed through all stages, while 
granting an exceptionally broad ambit for action, shows that they are very unlikely to 
hinder the ability of the individual Member States to fund similar or indeed different 
projects.
3.1.3.(b)(ii) Funding and Promoting Democracy.
In its activities in promoting and protecting certain values in its relations with third 
States, the Union has placed very considerable emphasis on the promotion of 
democracy. A link is seen to exist between development, human rights and 
democracy. Human rights are necessary for the full development of the individual,
907whereas democracy is a necessary condition for the exercise of those rights. This
ACP States the Commission does provide examples and some broad definitions o f other concepts, such 
as the rule o f law, democratic principles and good governance.
206 COM( 1999)240. This aims to ensure that Community funds are not used for belligerent purposes 
as well as establishing procedures for punitive measures.
207 See, for example, COM (1995)567 and Chapter Two.
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approach is expressed in the 1991 Resolution on Human Rights, Democracy and 
Development.208 It is similar to that in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development which recognises man as the main beneficiary of the right to 
development, as opposed to the text of the EC Treaty which is more concerned with 
the integration of developing economies into the world economy.209 The earlier 
Luxembourg European Council Resolution on Human Rights had stated that respect 
for human rights and democracy was part of the economic development process and 
without it economic growth would not occur.210 The concept of development has 
thus metamorphosised from one concerned with the economic development of States 
as stated in Article 177 EC, to one that primarily promotes human rights and 
democracy.
The Court of Auditors has argued, however, that the Community’s purpose in 
combining democracy, development and human rights, was to promote them as a 
political good which would improve the lives of citizens by bringing more freedom,
• • • • • ' 7 1 1political representation and accountability. In this respect combining the concepts 
is an essential part of the process of furthering sustainable social and economic 
development. It should create economic wealth which will eventually benefit all.212
Supporting democracy in third States can take a number of different forms. One of 
the Union’s primary practical contributions to democracy, following the 1991 
Resolution, is through the sponsoring and observation of elections in developing or 
transitional countries. Election observance as an activity is relatively cheap, it is only 
for a limited period of time and requires only a small number of observers. The 
holding of elections and their monitoring is also likely to obtain some media
208 Supra note 87, para.3.
209 Declaration on the Right to Development GA Resolution 41/128, GAOR, 41st Session Supp. 53, 
pi 86.
210 Supra note 88.
211 Court o f Auditors, Special Report 12/2000, supra note 154, p.3.
212 See further King, T., “Human Rights in the Development Policy o f the European Community: 
Towards a European World Order?” (1997) NYB1L, 51, 61-76 and Simma, B., Aschenbrenner, J., and 
Schultze, C., Human Rights Consideration in Development Cooperation Activities o f the EC” in 
Alston, The EU and Human Rights, supra note 101, p.571.
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coverage. Election observance therefore, provides an opportunity to display to the 
international community a commitment to democracy and reform.213
The Union has extensively developed its involvement in the observation of multi­
party parliamentary elections from the early 1990s. Since then it has observed and 
assisted in numerous elections, including those held in Russia, South Africa, 
Palestine, Bosnia, Indonesia, Nigeria, Cambodia, Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Togo.214 
The competence for such involvement is dependent upon the geographical region in 
question. The basis for the expenditure incurred has been unsystematic and 
dependent on whether the Community has engaged in election assistance or the 
Union engaged in election observance under the second pillar.215 Competence for the 
Community is derived from Articles 179, 308 or 310 EC, depending upon the region 
in question. In the context of the ACP States the Lome/Cotonou Conventions have 
provided the legal basis. With regard to other countries the specific basis for election 
assistance has sometimes been the partnership or cooperation Agreement with the 
country in question or the regulation, for example the ALA Regulation,216 governing 
relations between the Community and country in which elections were taking place. 
The Community’s support for the election process is also funded from the electoral 
processes budget heads.
Electoral assistance as a form of aid has been considered to be within the Community 
pillar, whereas election observance has been funded either through the first or second 
pillar or both. The primary reason for this approach is to ensure adequacy of 
funding. The Communication on election observance noted that whereas second
2,3 Although paradoxically the Member States and European Parliament have criticised the Union’s 
lack o f visibility in monitoring elections, see COM(2000)191, p.9.
214 COM(2000)191 see Annex 1. In the period between 1992 and 1994, for example, the Community 
provided such assistance to 41 countries. See COM(l995)567.
215 Articles 6(1) and Article 11 TEU. Although it is all referred to as Union activity. See for example, 
with regard to South Africa where Decision 93/678/CFSP, OJ L 316, 17/12/1993 p.45 established the 
principle for the EU’s support in the election process but where the funding came from Community 
Budget-Line B7-5070.
216 Article 5, ALA Regulation, supra note 60.
217 COM(2000)191, p.l 1.
218 See ibid., for examples o f where this has happened.
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pillar joint actions have been used to observe elections, funds have never been 
sufficient to cover all of the expenses of EU involvement and have therefore, been 
combined with complementary Community action.219 A specific budget line does 
exist, in Chapter B7-70 covering “Support for the Democratic Transition and the 
Supervision of the Electoral Processes”, which clearly encompasses observation. The 
strategy now is for all observation and assistance to be based upon the competence 
granted by paragraph (f) of Articles 2.2 and 3.2 of Regulations 975/99 and 976/99 
respectively. This still does not clarify the source of funding for such initiatives.
While supporting the electoral process displays the Community’s commitment to 
reform and democratic rule, it is not the end of its involvement. In transitional 
countries, in particular, democratic institutions need to be consolidated and supported. 
A democratically elected government may dismantle institutions or remove obstacles 
which limit its exercise of power.221 For this reason the Community has also 
undertaken measures to support pluralism, good governance and the rule of law.
3.1.3.(b)(iii) Good Governance, the Rule of Law and Civil Society.
In its 1991 Resolution on Human Rights and Democracy the Council stressed the 
importance of good governance and the rule of law. While recognising that sovereign 
States have the right to institute their own administrative structures and establish their 
own constitutional arrangements, the Council stressed that equitable development 
could only be achieved effectively and sustainably if a number of general principles 
were followed. Those are: sensible economic and social policies; adequate 
government transparency and financial accountability; creation of a market friendly 
environment; democratic decision-making; measures to combat corruption; as well as 
respect for the rule of law, human rights and freedom of the press and expression. 
The Community and the Member States considered that these principles would be 
central in both existing and new relationships with other States.
219 Ibid, p. 14.
220 Ibid, p. 11.
221 For discussion in the context o f Pakistan, see, Maluka, Z., The Myth o f  Constitutionalism, (1996).
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The rule of law and good governance are now considered to be areas of common 
interest, fundamental to the dialogue between the parties and central to the 
achievement of development goals.222 The OECD and World Bank adopt a similar 
approach.223 The Community has recently provided some guidance as to what it 
means by the rule of law and good governance. While there is substantial overlap 
with the approaches adopted by the World Bank and OECD, they are not identical.224 
For the Community, the rule of law entails: effective implementation of legal rules; 
the separation of powers; institutional arrangements for participation in decision­
making at all levels; political and institutional pluralism and transparency; and the 
integrity of institutions. Furthermore, the legislature and an independent judiciary 
must respect and give effect to human rights and fundamental freedoms and there 
must be equality before the law.225 With regard to good governance: equity and the 
primacy of the law in the management and allocation of resources; the institutional 
capacity to manage resources effectively in the interests of economic and social 
development; accountability and measures aimed at preventing and combating 
corruption; and public participation in the decision-making process, are all seen as 
vital. In its most recent Communication on this issue, the Commission stated, 
“governance refers to the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are 
articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised”.227
Both principles, in particular good governance, are defined in a fluid manner and it is 
questionable to what extent the definitions provided are meaningful. The advantage 
in stressing good governance and the rule of law in relations with third States is that
222 COM (1998) 146, p.2 and COM (2003) 615, p.3.
223 See OECD, Final Report o f  the A d Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good 
Governance, (1997) passim  and World Bank, World Development Report (1997) p.4. See further, 
Faundez, J.(ed.), Good Government and Law: Legal and Institutional Reform in Developing Countries, 
(1997) and Ginther, K., Denters, E., and de Waart, P. (eds.), Sustainable Development and Good  
Governance, (1995) p.20 for more on good governance in this context.
224 In part, because there are no internationally agreed definitions. See COM(2003)615, p.3.
225 COM(1998)146, p.6.
226 Ibid  and Article 9(3) Cotonou Convention.
227 COM(2003)615, p.3.
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they are more pragmatic than and not as culturally loaded as human rights. Both 
concepts must be introduced or improved by States which are recipients of 
Community aid. What is apparent, however, is that the Community is demanding 
very high standards from third States, especially developing countries. For example, 
for the rule of law as defined to be implemented in a society where in the past it has 
not been respected requires a fundamental redistribution of power -  which is 
exceptionally difficult to achieve or impose. Good governance is also difficult to 
achieve and, in practice, projects dealing with public procurement and tackling 
corruption seem to attract the most funding from the Community.
Although the Community, along with the World Bank and OECD, argues that these 
concepts are indispensable to development, it is not clear to what extent it considers 
the appropriateness of their application. In April 2000 the Commission on Human 
Rights of the United Nations adopted a resolution entitled “The Role of Good 
Governance in the Promotion of Human Rights” where it noted that good 
governance necessarily varies according to the particular circumstances and needs of 
different States. The Resolution further notes that the responsibility for determining 
and implementing such practices, based on transparency and accountability and 
which aim to create and maintain an environment conducive to the protection and 
promotion of human rights, rests with the State concerned. It is difficult to know, 
however, how the Community applies these concepts in its relations with third States? 
Togo and Cote d’Ivoire, for example, have had aid suspended or delayed over 
accusations of corruption but this seems to have been more to with the 
misappropriation of donor funds than shortcomings in good governance in general. 
The real concern lies not in the unwillingness or inability of third States to adopt and 
implement appropriate policies but in the scope of the Community’s ambition. The 
Community’s initiative to promote its objectives through funding is not only 
ambitious but also stretches the Community’s budget lines over a vast geographic
22*Ibid.
229 House o f Lords Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 148, p.67.
230 E/CN.4/RES/2000/64, 2/4/2000.
231 See House o f Lords Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 148, p.74.
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region and a vast area of reforms; so that it is not able to give effective support to a 
reform process that it may have instigated.
Since the adoption of the 1991 Resolution, the Commission reports on it illustrate 
the great diversity of Community assisted projects concerned with good governance 
and the rule of law. For example, in 1994 alone the Community funded projects 
which included the development of institutions and representative organisations, the 
transparency of public administration, legal assistance in the drafting of constitutions 
and legislation, the reinforcement of the judicial system including the administration 
of justice, police and prison reform, and support for an independent or pluralistic and 
responsible media.
The striking breadth of the measures which the Community has funded, mainly in the 
absence of strategic plans,234 has obviously contributed to the fact that the 
Community’s project portfolio has been spread far too thinly over different areas, 
resulting in the dilution of their impact. The Court of Auditors, for example, has 
noted that the Commission in funding projects has rarely addressed their continuity. 
Valuable and worthy projects which have not been able to attract funding other than 
from the Commission, have stopped functioning when Community funding has dried 
up.235 The lack of a strategic plan, which includes continuity of Community funding, 
has ensured that the Community has had a limited impact when it could have 
achieved significantly more.
The funds committed by the Community would have had a far greater impact if they 
were part of a coherent overall strategy which assessed needs and aimed to address 
particular issues identified as needing support within the context of policy towards a 
third State. Such an approach would not only focus the Community’s effort but 
would also lead to more tangible benefits for the citizens and the State in question.
232 COMs(1994)42, (1995)191, (1996)672, (2000)726 and the more recent EIDHR Compendiums.
233 This list is not exhaustive and derived from Annex 3 to COM( 1995)191. In every other year the 
scope has been equally broad.
234 Although Country Strategy Papers are being introduced by the Development and External Relations 
DGs.
235 Court o f Auditors, Special Report 12/2000, supra note 154, paras.33 and 47.
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While this may be laborious and difficult to undertake, it would provide real benefits. 
It is true, however, that such efforts can usually only tinker with the edges. This is 
especially true in Asian and Latin American States, where the ratio between 
populations and funding is most stark.
3.2. Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid.
3.2.1. Community Competence in Humanitarian Aid
The Community has, like most other donors, considered humanitarian aid within the 
development cooperation context. The Union Treaties still do not establish a 
humanitarian aid policy. Historically, practice was conducted on an ad hoc basis 
using a variety of legal bases. The Yaounde/Lome Conventions, for example, 
contained provisions which allowed the Community and the Member States to 
provide emergency assistance to ACP States, funded out of the EDF, the general 
budget or both. In non-ACP States the Community either relied upon a provision in a 
framework regulation or, where there was none, funds were allocated on the basis 
afforded by the general budget procedure.236 Prior to the TEU, Article 308 EC was 
used for such action with the addition of Article 37 EC where food aid was involved.
The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was eventually set up in 
1992, partly in response to the humanitarian crises resulting from the conflict in the 
Balkans and Persian Gulf in the early 1990s. The aspiration for the Union to become
7^ 7an international actor arose when the end of the Cold War left a power vacuum. 
Humanitarian aid was perceived to be one means towards that end. The creation of 
ECHO streamlined the procedural aspects of the Community's activities in this field. 
It brought within its scope activities carried out by several services within the 
Commission structure, such as humanitarian aid, emergency food aid and prevention
236 See, for example, Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid 1993, p. 10.
237 Holland, ML, The European Union and the Third World, (2002) p. 100.
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and disaster preparation activities. It did nothing though to clarify the scope of the
■^50
Community’s competence in this field.
Eventually a 1995 Communication, which became the 1996 Council Regulation on 
Humanitarian Aid,240 attempted to establish objectives and to set out the general 
criteria for the humanitarian aid provided by the Community. It also addressed the 
issue of competence and the scope of activity. The legal base for the regulation is 
Article 179 EC, but it has been used for a global humanitarian aid policy. The logic 
behind splitting the proposal for the regulation on human rights and democracy into 
two, as explained above, was because development cooperation provisions can only 
lawfully extend to developing countries. Article 308 EC had to be used for non­
developing countries. The Humanitarian Aid Regulation, however, is careful not to 
limit its application to developing countries. Article 1 states:
“[t]he Community’s humanitarian aid shall compromise assistance to help people in third
countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, and as a priority those in developing 
countries, victims o f natural disasters, man-made crises....or exceptional situations or 
circumstances.”
Assistance can thus be provided to any third country. It is not clear that assistance to 
those in developing countries must be due to a humanitarian incident -  it must simply 
aim to alleviate suffering of the most vulnerable in such countries. A distinction 
between developing and non-developing countries can be seen to lie within the 
regulation. Assistance can be provided to a developing country, regardless of an 
emergency, to alleviate suffering but to non-developing countries only if an 
emergency situation of some sort exists. In practice, however, it does not seem that 
this distinction is in any way observed. The Commission considers that Article 179
238 Mandate from the Commission to ECHO, 6/11/1991. Also see, Annual Report on Humanitarian 
Aid 1993, (1994) p.2 where ECHO’S raison d ’etre, is explained and Court o f Auditors, Special Report 
2/1997, Concerning Humanitarian Aid From the European Union Between 1992 and 1995, OJ C 143, 
12/05/1997, p.l which deals with the background to the administrative shake-up.
239 COM( 1995)201.
240 Regulation No. 1257/96, Concerning Humanitarian Aid, OJ L 163, 2/07/1996 p .l.
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EC is a perfectly adequate legal base for the Community’s activities.241 Its approach 
was approved by the Development Council and it seems unlikely that the 
Humanitarian Aid Regulation will be amended with a view to splitting it on the lines 
of the 1999 Human Rights Regulations.242
The objectives and general principles of humanitarian aid in the regulation are broad 
in nature and provide the Community with competence beyond what can be strictly 
considered to be of a humanitarian nature. The principle objectives in the regulation 
are: to save and preserve life during emergencies and their immediate aftermath; to 
provide the necessary assistance and relief to people affected by longer lasting crises; 
and to take steps to carry out short term rehabilitation and reconstruction work with a 
view to facilitating the arrival of aid.243 The regulation also grants powers for 
operations to prepare for or prevent disasters or comparable emergencies.244 This 
aspect of its work now accounts for approximately eighty percent of ECHO’S 
expenditure.245 With regard to its preparatory work, the Community’s humanitarian 
activities merge into development cooperation.
The demarcation between development, rehabilitation and humanitarian aid has been 
further muddied by two more regulations -  the 1997 Regulation on Operations to Aid 
Uprooted People in Asian and Latin American Developing Countries and the 1996 
Regulation on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Operations in Developing 
Countries.246 The latter stems directly from the 1996 Communication entitled 
“Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development” (LRRD).247 The practice of linking
241 See COM( 1999)468.
242 Development Council Conclusions, 18/5/2000, Press Release Number 8571/00.
243 Article 2, Regulation 1257/96.
244 Article 1, Regulation 1257/96.
245 See the Annual Reports for a breakdown o f figures.
246 Council Regulation No. 443/1997, On Operations to Aid Uprooted People in Asian and Latin 
American Developing Countries OJ L 68, 8/03/1997 p.l and Council Regulation No. 2258/96, On 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Operations In Developing Countries, OJ L 306, 28/11/1996, p .l.
247 COM( 1996) 153.
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such aid was widespread prior to the 1996 (LRRD) Regulation coming into force.248 
This regulation, which is based upon Article 179 EC, provides the Community with 
an express competence to fund projects which overlap with both emergency 
humanitarian assistance as well as infrastructure projects, which would normally 
come within the ambit of development cooperation. Projects designed to help re­
establish a working economy and the institutional capacity, needed to restore social 
and political stability, can all be funded 249 The distinction between the scope of the 
1996 (LRRD) Regulation and that concerned with humanitarian aid is that the former 
is clearly limited to developing countries.
Operations under the LRRD Regulation are seen as forming part of a continuum 
between humanitarian action and development aid. These operations must, in 
particular, permit refugees and other internally displaced persons to return home and 
must assist the entire population to resume normal civilian life.250 These operations 
are not to be implemented by ECHO, however, but by the Commission.251 The 
adoption of these different measures has led to a situation where some forms of 
rehabilitation assistance to non-developing countries are based upon the 
Humanitarian Aid Regulation and implemented by ECHO, but the Commission 
(through EuropeAid) is responsible for the implementation of rehabilitation aid in 
developing countries. ECHO, however, has a far clearer idea of where such funding 
is most needed.
The distinction between humanitarian and rehabilitation aid is further muddied by the 
aforementioned Regulation on Operations to Aid Uprooted People in Asian and Latin
248 See, for example, Articles 255 and 257 Lom6 IV. Also see COM (1993) 204 and Court o f Auditors, 
Special Report 4/2000, On Rehabilitation Action for ACP Countries as an Instrument to Prepare for  
Normal Development Aid, OJ C 113, 19/4/2000 p .l, 3.
249 See Article 1.
250 Article 1, Council Regulation 2258/96. See further infra.
251 See Article 7, Council Regulation 2258/96.
252 EuropeAid was established in 2001 with the aim o f creating a single department to coordinate non­
humanitarian aid destined for all third countries. Some aid agencies still have reservations about its 
effectiveness. See KnowEurope 9/2/02 “Jury Still Out as Aid Agency Steps Up Spending Reforms”. 
The House o f Lords Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 148, p.8 however, considers that it has 
helped to improve the quality and delivery of European Aid.
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American Developing Countries. This is distinct from assistance under Article 1 of 
the LRRD Regulation which also covers such persons. The purpose of a separate 
regulation is to provide support and assistance for uprooted persons which is not 
covered by the Humanitarian or LRRD Regulation and is thus distinguishable from 
them both. Whereas rehabilitation under the LRRD Regulation would provide for 
assistance to such persons it does not lawfully permit the extent of funding provided 
by the Uprooted Persons Regulation. Article 1 of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation 
can, however, extend to such assistance.253 The Community’s competence and 
activities are becoming less demarcated between its different component parts. From 
a practical perspective this has a number of benefits as it still allows the Commission 
and ECHO flexibility to implement and fund projects in accordance with their 
assessment of priorities and needs on the ground.
3.2.2. Community Competence in Food Aid.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has meant that a policy on food aid has been 
in existence since July 1968 when the Community joined the Food Aid Convention 
(FAC) of the International Wheat Agreement and the European Food Aid programme 
was established.254 European Food Aid programmes started as a means of using 
surplus agricultural commodities for the purposes of economic development and 
emergency relief in developing countries. Such programmes have evolved over 
time to accommodate changing international circumstances, as well as the 
Community’s evolving competence and approach. It is, for example, only twenty 
years since a Communication on such assistance stated that one of the reasons for the 
Community providing food aid was to help pull it out of recession.
253 Although it does have a separate budget head and thus a protected source o f funds.
254 Food Aid Convention o f 1967, OJ L 305, 19/12/1968 p .l.
255 See OJ C 170, 28/7/1975 p.28 where the Commission provides a summary o f all Community food 
programmes between 1969 and 1975. More recent surveys of Community food aid programmes can 
be found in the ECHO, Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid.
256 See COM (1982)640.
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The inherently differing objectives of agricultural and development policy ensured 
that while dual legal bases were being used, the Community’s actions with regard to 
food shortages were driven less by concern for the alleviation of hunger than by the 
objectives of Article 33 EC.257 It is for this reason, among others, that Snyder 
described food aid as “one of the most visible, most frequently praised, yet also most 
vociferously criticised facets” of the relationship between the developed and 
developing world. Cathie maintains, however, that the Community has never 
argued the case for food as a form of aid on the grounds of the interests of its own 
producers.259 This is highly questionable. The legal basis for the Community to 
become party to the Food Aid Conventions and for the early regulations concerned 
with food aid matters was Articles 42 and 43 of the EC Treaty.260 Where the 
Community’s agricultural competence was relied on, it is difficult to argue that 
development cooperation was the primary aim. Article 235 EC (now 308 EC) would 
have allowed for a development based approach, if the political will had existed. It 
did not.261
With Regulation 3331/82, a discernible shift from previous practice can be detected. 
This regulation followed shortly after the November 1981 Resolution of the Council 
on Aid to Agricultural Products and Food Aid, which stated that the Community had 
a responsibility to ensure that the aid it supplied was used effectively to relieve 
hunger and improve the self-reliance of the targeted countries. The regulation
257 See further Macalister-Smith, P., “The EEC and International Humanitarian Assistance” (1981) 
LIEI89, 98.
258 Snyder, F., “The European Community’s New Food Aid Legislation: Towards a New Development 
Policy?” in Snyder, F., and Slinn, P.(eds.), International Law o f  Development: Comparative 
Perspectives, (1987) p.271.
259 Cathie, J., European Food Aid Policy, (1997) p.6.
260 See, for example, Regulation No. 2721/72, OJ L 291, 28/12/1972 p.28 and Regulation No. 
2727/1975, OJ L 281, 1/11/1975 p .l. Regulations strictly concerned with food aid used the then 
Articles 42 and 43 EC. Other measures concerned with cereals and food which may have been used as 
aid also relied upon the now Articles 133 and 300 EC.
261 See further COM (1974)300 as an early example o f the Commission’s approach to questions of 
food policy and aid.
262 Reproduced in, Compilation o f  Texts Adopted by the Council January 1981-December 1988, (1989) 
p. 13.
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used the same double legal base and did not take the full step towards humanitarian 
objectives. As Snyder notes, the use of the two bases meant it was a mixture of 
“ideology, strategy, technology and surpluses.”
The Community’s policy vis-a-vis food aid is now based on the development 
cooperation provisions of the Community Treaty.264 The 1996 Regulation on Food 
Aid Policy and Management shows how the Community’s approach has evolved.265 
It highlights the objectives of Community food aid policy, which are no longer solely 
or even largely driven by the welfare of the Community’s own agricultural producers. 
The basic aim is to provide food aid in situations in which food insecurity exists, 
whatever its basic cause, and to increase food security in developing countries 266 
The Community’s broadly defined competence to act is not limited to emergency 
situations although such emergencies are also covered by the objective. The 
Community can respond in different ways to promote food security, in particular, it 
can act to raise the nutritional level of the recipient population or promote the 
availability of foodstuffs to the public.
The Community also has powers to act with longer term solutions in mind -  for 
example, to act to support the efforts of recipient countries to improve their own food 
production and thus reduce their dependence on food aid. This involves financial 
support for domestic structural reform as opposed to the more short-term measures, 
noted above, which would primarily involve sending food aid. The Community may
263 Snyder, “The European Community’s Food Aid Legislation” supra note 258, p.281 quoting R. 
Talbot, “The European Community’s Food Aid Programme: An Integration o f Ideology, Strategy, 
Technology and Surpluses” Food Aid  (November 1979) p. 269. Also see Snyder, F., “European 
Community Law and Third World Food Entitlements” (1989) 32 GYIL, 87 and more generally 
McMahon, J., “International Agricultural Trade Reform and Developing Countries: The Case o f the 
European Community” (1998) 4 7 ICLQ, 632.
264 See in particular the preamble to Regulation No. 1292/96, On Food Aid Policy and Food Aid 
Management and Special Operation in Support of Food Security, OJ L 166, 5/07/1996 p .l, which is the 
current framework regulation on food aid policy.
265 COM (1995)283 provides further background to the Food Aid Regulation.
266 Article 1(1), Regulation 1292/96.
267 Article 1(3), Regulation 1292/96.
268 Ibid., fifth, sixth and seventh indents.
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Ifi 0also assist developing States develop their agricultural sectors. This again involves 
more than humanitarian or emergency aid. The Community, in particular in post­
emergency situations, can back up the recipient country’s policies on poverty 
reduction, nutrition and rehabilitation. Agricultural development, however, has to fit 
within the overall context of the Community’s development policy and this raises the 
importance of the coherence between the Community’s differing sectoral 
competences described above.
The Community’s extensive general competence in development cooperation covers 
almost all conceivable situations concerning food security and aid. But it can only 
achieve its objectives if adequate resources are committed. In financial terms the 
amount of European food aid distributed is impressive. In 1998 it accounted for 
approximately eight percent of the Community’s external budget.270 It is 
questionable, however, to what extent the Community assists any State in achieving 
food security. The Community’s practice in the past has been to globally distribute 
its food aid. With the exception of the smallest of States, in terms of population, the 
Community does not satisfy the food requirements of any recipient State. It would in 
any case, be undesirable for the Community to create a dependency between itself 
and a State or group of States in this regard. In distributing food aid the Community 
is obliged to take account of the per capita income of its recipients and the balance of
971payments situation of the recipient country. Consequently there is a lack of 
assistance to those living in extreme poverty in middle income countries.
The Community’s competence in terms of food aid, as with development cooperation, 
does not, in practice, encroach upon the competence of the Member States to act in 
parallel. It now reflects the reorientation of food aid from the purpose of disposal of 
the Community’s surplus agricultural produce to that of the Community’s 
development cooperation policy.
269 Article 1(4), Regulation 1292/96.
270 Cox and Chapman, External Cooperation Programmes, supra note 153, p.35.
271 Article 2(2), Regulation 1292/96.
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3.3. Competence in Trade and the Pursuit of Ethical Values.
3.3.1. Introduction.
The final area of substantive competence to be discussed is that of trade. 
International trade is considered in the context of development cooperation provisions 
to be a tool by which developing States can be brought into the global economy. 
Trade is also crucial, as discussed above, to the Community’s efforts to help eradicate 
and reduce poverty in third States. The demarcation between competence in trade 
and development cooperation is, however, at times very unclear. The Community’s 
role in trade is also relevant to the pursuit of ethical values in third States in other 
ways. Some of these are tangentially related, others more directly so. The 
globalisation of trade, in which the Community has played a substantial role, has 
arguably resulted in an increase in the rule of law in international economic 
relations. As a commitment to the rule of law is considered imperative for 
economic development, as well as the establishment of democracy and protection of 
human rights, trade has in this way contributed to the Community’s development 
cooperation objectives.
Trade with and possibly assistance from the Union and its Member States are among 
the most important considerations for third States when they seek to establish or 
consolidate links. The pursuit of ethical values in third States and a trade based 
relationship are, however, not always compatible. Trade relies on economic 
efficiency which can interfere with the enjoyment of certain human rights, for
• • 970 #example, minimum labour standards. The enforcement of minimum labour 
standards is, however, sometimes perceived to be driven by protectionism.274 There
272 See Garcia, F., “The Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights 
Principle” (1999) 25 Brook J. Int'l L, 51, 53 and De Waart, P., “Quality o f Life at the Mercy of WTO 
Panels: GATT’s Article XX: An Empty Shell?” in De Waart, P., and Weiss, F. (eds.), International 
Economic Law With a Human Face, (1998) p. 109.
273 See more generally, Compa, L., and Diamond, S. (eds.), Human Rights, Labour Rights and 
International Trade, (1996).
274 See Alston, P., “International Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human Rights Policy” (1982) 4 
HRQ, 155.
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is a difficult balance to be struck. Linking trade to a respect for ethical values does 
provide an enforcement mechanism to those States who are in a position to offer 
concessions or other trade related benefits. Within the Community context the 
relationship between ethical values in third States, primarily human rights, and trade 
arises directly in a number of different contexts. First, there is a relationship between 
the protection of certain rights in third States and the granting or withdrawing of 
benefits under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Secondly, there is the 
imposition of restrictive measures against a third State for the violation of ethical 
values. Thirdly, restrictive measures can be imposed on the export, from the 
Community to third States, of goods which may be used for purposes of which it does 
not approve. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
3.3.2. The GSP Scheme.
In the Community context, the GSP and the removal of all tariffs for the least 
developed countries (LDCs) under the Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA)275 
increasingly blur the distinction between trade and development cooperation. An 
expansive approach to both development and trade makes the demarcation between
the two increasingly difficult. But it is important as the Community’s competence in
trade in external relations is exclusive in nature, while in development cooperation it 
is not.
The Community first established a GSP in 1971 with the regulations which formed 
the scheme either based on Articles 235 (now 308) or 113 (now 133) EC.276 The 
scheme was updated in the 1980s by Regulations 3599/85277 and 3600/85,278 in which 
there was no reference to a legal base. These measures were subsequently challenged
275 Council Regulation No. 416/2001, OJ L 60, 1/3/2001 p.43.
276 RSglement 1314/1971 du Conseil, du 21/06/1971, etablissant, pour certains produits des chapitres 1 
k 24 du tarif douanier commun, un systeme de preferences g&i6ralisees en faveur des pays en voie de 
developpement, OJ L 142, 28/06/1971 p.85, RSglement 1313/1971 du Conseil, du 21/06/1971, portant 
ouverture de preferences tarifaires pour certains produits textiles et des chaussures, originates de pays 
en voie de developpement, OJ L 142 , 28/06/1971 p. 76.
277 OJ L 352, 30/12/1985 p .l.
278 OJ L 352, 30/12/1985 p.107.
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by the Commission to determine whether Article 113 (now 133) EC could extend to 
incorporating development cooperation aims or whether reference to Article 235 EC 
(now 308 EC) was required. Both Advocate General Lenz and the Court held that 
Article 113 EC could be used for development based measures. The rationale was 
that the link between development and trade was progressively stronger and it was 
therefore legitimate for development aims to play a role in international trade 
relations.279 As the Court relying upon Opinion 1/78 280 stated:
“.. .the existence o f a link with development.. .does not cause a measure to be excluded from the 
sphere o f the common commercial policy.... it would no longer be possible to carry on any 
worthwhile common commercial policy if the Community were not in a position to avail itself 
also o f means o f action going beyond instruments intended to have an effect only on the 
traditional aspects o f external trade..”281
The link is now well established in Community law. The Community has 
competence to include development objectives in trade measures and these should be 
based upon Article 133 EC." In the context of the current GSP scheme there are 
two principal dimensions to the relationship with ethical values. These are the 
withdrawal of the preference for the violation of minimum standards and the 
awarding of greater benefits for compliance with specified international instruments.
3.3.2.(a). The GSP Scheme, Labour Standards and the Withdrawal of 
Benefits.
279 Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, [1987] ECR 1493, paras 17-18.
280 Opinion 1/78, [1979] ECR 2871.
281 Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, para. 20.
282 See, for example, Regulation No. 2820/1998, OJ L 357, 30/12/1998 p. 1 and Council Regulation 
No. 602/98, OJ L 80, 18/3/1998 p .l.
283 Council Regulation No. 2501/2001, Applying a Scheme o f Generalised Tariff Preferences for the 
Period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, OJ L 346, 31/12/2001, p.l as subsequently amended by 
Council Regulation No. 2211/2003, Amending Regulation No. 2501/2001 Applying a Scheme of 
Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Period 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 and Extending it to 
31 December 2005, OJ L 332, 19/12/2003 p .l.
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* )Q AThe link between labour standards and trade is not new. Article XX(e) GATT 
1947, for example, allows the banning of goods made by prison labour, although the 
provision has never been invoked by the Community.285 The Commission first made 
the link between trade and labour standards in a 1978 Communication, but this 
highlighted some of the pitfalls. The standards were derived from an
amalgamation of a number of ILO Conventions, to which most of the Community’s
'yon
Member States were not party. Accusations of protectionism in such
circumstances are justifiable. Furthermore, in the past the language used by the 
Commission did nothing to clarify which standards were to be used, as “international 
labour standards” and “fair labour standards” were used interchangeably to mean the 
same thing. The Community now uses the term “core labour standards” in line 
with the approach adopted by the OECD290 as well as the ILO itself, which considers 
eight of its conventions, which protect certain civil rights, to be “core
901conventions”. In Article 50 of the Cotonou Convention, for example, the parties 
now “reaffirm their commitment to the internationally recognised core labour 
standards, as defined by the relevant International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Conventions”. A similar approach has been adopted in the dialogue between the EC
284 See, Compa and Diamond, Human Rights, Labour Rights supra note 273 Wet, E., “Labour 
Standards in the Globalised Economy: The Inclusion o f a Social Clause in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organisation” (1995) 17 HRQ, 443 and Waer, P., “Social Clauses in 
International Trade” (1996) 30 JWT, 25.
285 This is because it is almost impossible for customs authorities to determine the conditions under 
which goods are produced in third countries. See OJ C 251, 8/9/1994 p. 10.
286 COM (1978) 492.
287 For discussion see, Alston, “International Trade” supra note 274.
288 See, for example, COM (1996) 402.
289 See COM (2001)416.
290 OECD, International Trade and Core Labour Standards, (2000).
291 These are: Convention No. 29, Forced Labour Convention, 1930, 39 UNTS 55; Convention No. 87, 
Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, 68 UNTS 17; 
Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, 96 UNTS 257; 
Convention No. 100, Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951, 165 UNTS 304; Convention No. 105, 
Abolition o f Forced Labour Convention, 1957, 320 UNTS 291; Convention No. I l l ,  Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 363 UNTS 31; Convention No. 138, Minimum Age 
Convention, 1973, 1015 UNTS No. 14862; and Convention No. 182, Worst Forms o f Child Labour 
Convention, 1999, 2133 UNTS No. 37245.
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and China regarding China’s failure to sign up to the core ILO conventions.292 By 
using ILO Conventions the Community is not only encouraging their ratification but 
also promoting universally accepted standards.
Under Article 26 of the GSP Regulation the Community can temporarily withdraw, in 
respect of all or certain products, the preferential tariffs enjoyed by a State in 
response to the violation of certain rights. First, if the activities prohibited in the 
1926 Slavery Convention or ILO Convention Nos. 29 and 105 on forced labour are 
practised within its jurisdiction. Secondly, if serious and systematic violations of
the rights protected under any of the other six ILO core conventions are occurring 
within its jurisdiction. The scheme has regard to effective enforcement of the law, 
not to the law in the State in question. Nor is it necessary that the goods produced 
under such conditions are exported to the Community. The approach now adopted by 
the Community towards the norms in question is preferable to that adopted under the 
previous scheme where the rights in some core ILO conventions were considered to 
be worthy of protection and others were not.294
Any Member State, natural or legal person can bring to the attention of the 
Commission, violations of the requisite conventions in the territory of a State 
benefiting under the GSP. The investigative procedure initiated as a result of such
a compliant allows the Commission to obtain information from a broad array of
• • •individuals and organisations. Once the Commission has concluded its
292 See COM(1998)181, Section B l.
293 ILO Convention No. 29 provides a definition o f forced labour and is supplemented by Convention 
No. 105. Article 1, Slavery Convention, 1926, 60 LNTS 253 as amended by the Protocol to Slavery 
Convention, 1953, 212 UNTS 17, provides the basic definition of slavery in international law.
294 See Article 9, Council Regulation No. 3281/1994, Applying a Four-Year Scheme o f Generalised 
Tariff Preferences (1995 to 1998) in Respect of Certain Industrial Products Originating in Developing 
Countries, OJ L 348, 31/12/1994 p.l and Council Regulation No. 1256/1996, Applying Multi-annual 
Schemes o f Generalised Tariff Preferences (1996 to 1999) in Respect o f Certain Agricultural Products 
Originating in Developing Countries, OJ L 160, 29/06/1996 p .l. The only reference was to the Slavery 
and the Forced Labour Conventions.
295 Article 28, Regulation 2501/2001.
296 Ibid.
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investigations in accordance with Articles 28 to 31 of the regulation, if appropriate, 
the preferences can be suspended by the Council.297
The withdrawal of preferences under the GSP is not formally linked with other 
aspects of Community development cooperation. If a State is in breach of core 
ILO Conventions, it is also likely to be in breach of any “essential elements” clause 
of any development Agreement in force between it and the Community. While there 
is no formal link between suspension of the GSP scheme and other measures, for 
reasons of consistency it should follow that withdrawal of benefits under the GSP 
should lead to commensurate action with regard to other assistance.
To date, the Community has suspended preferences on one occasion - in 1997 with 
regard to Myanmar.299 The fact that the authorities in Myanmar did not assist or 
cooperate with the fact-finding mission sent by the Commission seems to have been 
as crucial to the determining of a breach as the practices themselves.300 A complaint 
has also been made about Pakistan but benefits were not withdrawn due to the 
commitment of the authorities to try and tackle the problems highlighted.301 The 
Commission is at the time of writing investigating practices in Belarus.
3.3.2.(b). The GSP Scheme, Labour Standards and the Incentive Scheme.
The GSP Regulation also establishes that additional preferences may be granted to 
States if they can provide evidence that they implement and give effect to domestic 
legislation incorporating “the substance of the standards laid down” in the eight core
297 Ibid., Article 29(4).
298 For confirmation o f the view that the removing of the GSP has no link with other measures see, the 
answer given by Mr Marin at OJ C 21, 22/1/1998 p.75.
299 Council Regulation No. 552/1997, OJ L 85, 27/03/1997 p.8 as subsequently amended and extended. 
The EBA specifically does not apply to Myanmar as a consequence o f this measure.
300 See the Preamble o f the Regulation and Chapter Four.
301 See Chapter Four.
302 See Commission Decision, 29/12/2003, Providing for the Initiation o f an Investigation Pursuant to 
Article 27(2) o f the Council Regulation No. 2501/2001 With Respect to the Violation o f Freedom of 
Association in Belarus, OJ L 5, 9/1/2004 p.90.
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ILO Conventions or they “are engaged in a clear and significant way” in applying 
them. If the applicant State can prove this to the Commission then, depending on 
the product in question, it can gain a greater reduction than that enjoyed under the 
GSP scheme, under the Common Customs Tariff.304 This incentive scheme was one 
of the innovative features of the revised GSP as formulated in the 1994 and 1996 
regulations. The incentive scheme will, however, only be an inducement to 
developing States to adopt the relevant ILO Conventions if the reduction in tariffs is 
generous and the Community is a major importer of such goods from those States. 
Furthermore, the product in question must be a significant foreign currency earner.305 
Where the State in question benefits from the EBA initiative, moreover, it will 
provide little incentive. The scheme is of utility therefore, only for countries not 
classified amongst the least developed. Prior to the amendments to the current 
scheme, the failure of any State to be awarded additional benefits had alerted the 
Commission to the fact that it was very difficult to comply with and provided little 
incentive for change.306 For this reason Article 14(2)(b) was added to the regulation, 
to allow States to benefit from the scheme if they were engaged in applying 
legislation to give effect to the core conventions in a “clear and significant way 
including all appropriate means envisaged in the....ILO Conventions taking the 
utmost account of the assessment of the ...ILO”. This effectively lowers the 
threshold. Shortly after the regulation was amended, Sri Lanka was successful in its 
application for additional benefits.
The procedure is still fairly onerous. Few States are likely to amend their legislation 
solely due to the inducement described. Those States taking advantage of the scheme
303 Article 14(2), Regulation 2501/2001, amended by Article 4, Regulation 2211/2003, supra note 283. 
A similar scheme also exists for effective protection o f the environment under Articles 21-24 and to 
Combat Drug Trafficking under Article 25. See further Chapter Four.
304 Article 8, Regulation 2501/2001.
305 COM (2001) 416, p.6 recognises that the special incentive scheme did not work well.
306 See COM (2003) 634, p.3.
307 Commission Regulation o f 29 December 2003, Granting the Democratic Socialist Republic o f Sri 
Lanka the Benefit o f the Special Incentive Arrangements for the Protection o f Labour Rights, OJ L 
364, 31/12/2003 p.34. China has now applied for additional benefits with regard to the environment, 
Uzbekistan and Russia have applied with regard to labour rights.
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are likely to have already adopted or are in the process of adopting domestic 
legislation giving effect to the core ILO Conventions. Furthermore, they must export 
enough of a non-sensitive product to make it a worthwhile exercise for them to satisfy 
the Commission that they are entitled to a reduction in tariffs.308 The Community, 
however, should not be criticised for this. If it did not apply stringent criteria the 
benefit would become meaningless. The amendments it has made and the successful 
Sri Lankan application suggest that the Community has now struck the right balance.
3.3.3. Restrictive Trade Measures.
A decision to interrupt or reduce economic relations between the Member States and 
a third State, for matters within the scope of its competence, must be given effect by 
the Community, notwithstanding the forum in which such action is agreed. Action 
outside of the Community would encroach on its exclusive competence, and the 
danger exists that, if such measures are enacted by individual Member States, 
distortions of competition may arise. It has long been practice to implement the 
commercial aspects of any such decision through the Community.309
The standard modem practice is for the Council to adopt a common position, which 
outlines the measures to be taken, and for it to be implemented by the requisite actors
Tindepending on the allocation of competence. Some aspects need to be implemented 
by the Member States and the others by the constituent parts of the Union.311 The
308 Article 16, Regulation 2501/2001.
309 For discussion o f early practice see, Kuyper P., “Sanctions against Rhodesia and the European 
Economic Community and the Implementation of General International Legal Rules” (1975) 12 
CMLRev., 231 and “Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and 
International Law” in O’Keeffe, D., and Schermers, H. (eds.), Essays in European Law and 
Integration, (1982) p. 141.
310 Although not all are very clear on this, see for example, Common Position 96/635/CFSP, OJ L 287, 
8/11/1996 p. 1, concerning Myanmar. See more generally, Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra 
note 3, p.296.
311 The visa restrictions for example, stipulated in the Common Position on Myanmar, ibid., were 
outside o f Community competence. Article 2, Council Regulation No. 1081/2000, Prohibiting the
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Community now has express competence under Articles 60 and 301 EC to give effect 
to common positions or joint actions.
The decision on restrictive measures in the CFSP, which are then in part implemented 
by the Community, may be unilaterally adopted by the Council312 or may give effect 
to a resolution adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.313 This is binding on the Member States as UN members.314 Such measures 
can be punitive in order to bring pressure to bear on a third State for its policies or
- l i e
acts. They may also aim to ensure that the Member States, possibly again with 
others, do not provide a State or insurgents with some of the materials and 
instruments needed to engage in practices and policies they do not approve of. For 
example, the Community has adopted a regulation with regard to Indonesia, on the
Sale, Supply and Export to Burma/Myanmar of Equipment Which Might be Used for Internal 
Repression or Terrorism, and Freezing the Funds o f Certain Persons Related to Important 
Governmental Functions in that Country, OJ L 122, 24/5/2000 p. 29, refers to the implementation o f  
aspects o f the Common Position which come within Community competence. It does not include the 
visa provisions o f the Common Position.
312 For example, Common Position 96/63 5/CFSP.
313 For example, Council Regulation No. 2111/1999, Prohibiting the Sale and Supply o f Petroleum and 
Certain Petroleum Products to Certain Parts o f the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia, OJ L 258, 
5/10/1999 p.12 and Council Regulation No. 2151/1999, Imposing a Ban on Flights Between the 
Territories o f the EC and the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia other than the Republic o f Montenegro or 
the Province o f Kosovo, OJ L 264, 12/10/1999 p.3, were both implemented to give effect to common 
positions (Common Position 1999/604/CFSP OJ L 236, 7/9/1999 p. 1 and Common Position 
1999/273/CFSP OJ L 108, 27/4/1999 p .l.) which in turn were adopted to give effect to a series o f  
Security Council Resolutions.
314 Article 103 United Nations Charter and Article 307 EC. For more recent discussion on economic 
sanctions imposed by the UN and their implementation in the Community legal order see, among many 
others, Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 3, p.l 11 and Bethlehem, D., “Regional Interface 
Between Security Council Decisions and Member States Implementation: The Example o f the 
European Union” in Gowlland-Debbas, V.(ed.), United Nations Sanctions and International Law, 
(2001) p.291. Such action is perfectly compatible with the Member States obligations under Article 
48(2) o f the Charter.
315 For example, those imposed against Nigeria - discussed in Chapter Four.
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basis of a common position, which prohibits the sale of equipment which can be used 
for internal repression.316
A Communication published in 2002 attempts to take this further. The Commission 
has proposed a regulation concerning trade in equipment and products which can be 
used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading
 ^i n
treatment. Based upon Article 133 EC, the first part of the regime imposes a ban 
on exports to any third State, of products which have no practical use, other than for 
the purposes of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or capital punishment.318 
The purpose of this is to prevent the violation of human rights and it is aimed at 
giving further effect to the aforementioned specific guidelines on torture and the 
death penalty. In a series of cases, the ECJ has held that the Common Commercial 
Policy can encompass regimes which have a foreign policy aspect.319 This is the first 
attempt specifically to prohibit the export to all States of goods, which have no other 
use but to contribute to human rights violations. This is notwithstanding the fact that 
the imposition of capital punishment in a third State may be legitimate under both 
domestic and international law.
Regulation 1334/2000 which establishes the current Community regime on dual- 
use goods further establishes the link between human rights and the export of such
316 Council Regulation No. 2158/1999, Concerning a Ban on the Supply to Indonesia o f Equipment 
Which Might Be Used In Internal Repression, OJ L 265, 13/10/1999 p. 1.
317 COM (2002) 770.
318 Ibid. Explanatory Memorandum, para.5.
3,9 Case C-83/94, Criminal Proceedings against Peter Leifer, Reinhold Otto Krauskopf and Otto 
Holzer, [1995] ECR 1-3231, paras. 10-13. Also see, among others, Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner 
Industrie-Ausriistungen GmbH v. Germany [1995] ECR I- 3189, Case C-367/89, Aime Richardt [1991] 
ECR 1-4621 and Case C-124/95, R, ex parte Centro-Com Sri v. HM Treasury and the Bank o f  England 
[1997] ECR 1-81, especially Advocate General Jacobs’ Opinion at para.27. The first three cases were 
in the context o f dual-use goods.
320 Council Regulation No. 1334/2000, Setting up a Community Regime for the Control o f Exports of  
Dual-Use Items and Technology, OJ L 159, 30/06/2000 p.l . It has been subsequently amended on a 
number o f occasions, most recently by Council Regulation No. 149/2003, Amending and Updating 
Regulation No. 1334/2000, Setting up a Community Regime for the Control o f Exports o f Dual-Use 
Items and Technology, OJ L 30, 05/02/2003 p. 1.
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goods. The original regime was implemented by Regulation 3381/94.321 It was with 
respect to this regulation that the Court in the Werner and Leifer cases, confirmed that 
restrictions on the export of dual-use goods fell within the exclusive competence of 
the Community. Article 8 of Regulation 3381/94 referred to the Third Annex of 
Council Decision 94/942/CFSP. This set out the considerations the competent 
authorities should take into account when deciding whether or not to grant an export
•  * 'X 'j'yauthorisation. These included obligations under Security Council Resolutions, the 
non-proliferation of sensitive goods and an obscure reference to human rights in 
terms of the June 1991 Luxembourg European Council Resolution. This said that the 
export of conventional arms to States should take its human rights record and internal 
situation into account. Cross-pillar action was thus taken to regulate trade in dual-use 
goods.
In Regulation 1334/2000, which replaced that regime with a purely Community 
system, Article 5 allows a Member State to prohibit or impose an authorisation 
requirement on the export of goods, for public security reasons or due to human rights 
considerations. The Member State in so doing must inform the Commission of its 
reasoning. The State has discretion on the matter and if it decides that it does not 
wish to permit the export of such goods it may legitimately do so, so long as the 
restriction is proportionate to the risk to the protection of human rights in the State of 
destination.
Decision 94/942/CFSP has now been repealed,323 but Annex Three is still
' l 'y Aapplicable. The general regime has also been supplemented by regulations which 
specifically prohibit the exportation of dual-use goods to a named third State because
321 Council Regulation No. 3381/94, Setting up a Community Regime for the Control o f Exports of 
Dual-Use Goods, OJ L 367, 31/12/1994 p. 1.
322 OJL 278, 30/10/1996 p .l.
323 2000/402/CFSP, Council Decision Repealing Decision 94/942/CFSP on the Joint Action 
Concerning the Control o f Exports o f Dual-Use Goods, OJ L 159, 30/06/2000 p. 218.
324 Para. 5, Preamble, Regulation 1334/2000.
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they may be used for the purposes of internal repression.325 All of these measures 
rely on human rights violations in the States in question, among the reasons behind 
their adoption.326
Such considerations are also relevant in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.327 
Arms exports are outside the Community’s competence but not outside the scope of 
the CFSP.328 In the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Criterion Two is based upon 
the respect for human rights in the country of final destination and declares that 
Member States will not issue export licences if there is a clear risk that the proposed 
export will be used for repressive measures. Respect for human rights is, however, 
only one of seven detailed criteria in addition to which the measure is not legally 
binding.329
4. Conclusions.
This chapter has shown that the Community and Union have a wide armoury of 
instruments and strategies at their disposal to pursue their ethical objectives in third 
States. Although the Community and Member States were slow to introduce such 
values into their relations with third States, the end of the Cold War and the lack of a 
rival political ideology and provider of ideologically tied funds strengthened their 
bargaining position. The changing global political climate coinciding with the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty enabled a more proactive approach to be adopted. 
Not only have policies which place an emphasis upon certain values been introduced
325 For example, concerning Indonesia, supra note 316, Burma supra note 311 and Council Regulation 
No. 310/2002, Concerning Certain Restrictive Measures in Respect o f Zimbabwe, OJ L 50, 21/2/2002 
p.4.
326 See, in particular, the preambles to the regulations.
327 Adopted 8/6/1998. See Denza, Intergovernmental Pillars, supra note 3, p. 104.
328 Article 11(1)TEU.
329 An annual report is published on the national measures taken to give effect to the Code -  see for 
example, OJ C 320, 31/12/2003, p .l. The reports indicate that some Member States regularly refuse to 
grant export licences. Amnesty International, Undermining Global Security: The European Union's 
Arms Exports (2004) however, has been very critical o f the Code.
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in relations with most third States, but there has also been a refocusing of approach. 
The transformation in the Community’s competence and attitude has been significant. 
Food Aid, for example, has gone from being a policy concerned with equally 
promoting the interests of Community producers to one primarily, although not 
exclusively, cast in terms of alleviating hunger.
The Union has used the CFSP and cross-pillar action to implement the policies it 
wishes to pursue. Where the Community does not have competence, for example 
arms controls, the CFSP has been used instead. Where Community competence does 
exist its breadth is more than apparent. Projects funded under the two 1999 Human 
Rights Regulations (975 and 976 of 1999), for example, illustrate the scope of the 
Communities activities and ambition. The competence under Articles 177-181 EC is, 
however, expressly limited to development cooperation. The Community has also 
used its development cooperation powers to pursue a global humanitarian aid policy. 
Articles 308, 133 and 310 EC have also been used to pursue ethical values in 
relations with third States. The use of Article 133 EC, where the Community has 
exclusive competence, still does not substantially affect the competence of the 
Member States in their development cooperation policies. Shared competence, as is 
the case with development cooperation, can lead to the Member States being deprived 
of their powers. The AETR principle does not in practice apply in the case of 
development cooperation, however, because the Community is not establishing 
uniform rules. The Court and Member States have allowed a very broad approach to 
development cooperation because it is about coordinated action and providing funds. 
Community policies do not prohibit the Member States from pursuing any policies 
they so wish, so long as they are broadly complementary to and coordinated with 
Community action.
Development aid is most effective when it both supports economic growth and is 
focused on poverty reduction. The Community in line with all other major donors 
now considers poverty reduction to be the major objective of development policy. 
The obstacles all donors face are substantial, especially considering the institutional 
structures in recipient States with which they often have to contend. As the House of 
Lords Committee on the European Union noted, despite these problems, “[tjhere is 
little doubt that EU aid is achieving better results than it has in the past, but is capable
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of achieving even better results.” The Union certainly has the powers, instruments 
and economic influence to pursue an effective ethical foreign policy. The major 
consideration facing the Union and indeed any State in the pursuit of such a policy, 
however, is the balance to be struck, in practice, between their sometimes competing 
foreign policy objectives. The remainder of the thesis deals with this issue.
330 House o f Lords Committee, Twelfth Report, supra note 148, p.8.
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Chapter Four.
Ethical Values and Foreign Policy in Practice: Responses to 
the Denial of Democracy in Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan. 
1. Introduction.
The next three chapters of the thesis deal with specific examples of the practice of 
the Union. In this chapter, relations with Myanmar, Pakistan and Nigeria are 
discussed. In all three democracy has been interrupted at one stage or another and 
all have well documented problems relevant to those ethical values the EU seeks to 
promote and protect in third States. The aim in this chapter is to assess how 
differing approaches and tactics as well as geopolitical considerations have 
influenced the scope and type of legal and diplomatic instruments selected by the 
Union to achieve its objectives.
2. Myanmar.
In 1980 the EC entered into a Cooperation Agreement1 with the then Member States 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).2 The Community has 
subsequently extended relations with those States, with the exception of Myanmar, 
who have joined ASEAN after the Agreement came into force. The Community 
has refused to extend the Agreement to Myanmar due to the current situation there.
1 Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - Member Countries of the Association o f South-East Asian 
Nations, OJ L 144, 10/6/1980 p.2.
2 Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, Vietnam in 
1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. ASEAN is not an international 
organisation, nor does it enjoy international legal personality.
3 This has been through either the adoption of a Protocol to the Agreement with the ASEAN States 
(for example, Brunei) or the adoption of both a separate bilateral Agreement and a Protocol (for 
example, Cambodia and Laos).
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In the absence of a development based treaty relationship with Myanmar, if the 
Union wishes to promote and protect ethical values in that country, the primary 
techniques and instruments will be those of the CFSP as supplemented by various 
projects funded by the Community. Myanmar comes within the scope of the Asian 
and Latin American Regulation (ALA Regulation)4 and is thus eligible for projects 
to be funded under it, as well as under the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR).5 The ALA Regulation states, that in relations with Asian 
and Latin America countries, emphasis should be placed on strengthening the 
cooperation framework and on making an effective contribution, through 
institutional dialogue and economic and financial cooperation, to sustainable 
development, security, stability and democracy.6 The ALA Regulation stipulates 
that indicative multi-annual guidelines should apply to the main partner countries 
and accordingly in the Country Strategy Programmes (CSP) for these countries, the 
promotion of effective democracy and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have been identified as major objectives.7
Before discussing relations between the Union and Myanmar in detail, it is worth
o
briefly discussing the situation there. A highly authoritarian regime has been in 
power since 1962, when an elected civilian government was overthrown. Since 
1988 when the armed forces suppressed a massive pro-democracy movement, a 
junta composed of senior military officers have ruled by decree, without a 
Constitution or legislature. On 27 May 1990 the military permitted relatively free 
elections, by most accounts, for a parliament to which they announced they would
4 Council Regulation No.443/92, Regulation on Financial and Technical Assistance to, and 
Economic Cooperation with, the Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America, OJ L 52, 
27/2/1992 p.l.
5 Council Regulation No.975/1999, OJ L 120, 8/5/1999 p.l and Council Regulation No. 976/1999, 
OJL 120, 8/5/1999 p.8.
6 Articles 4-6, Regulation 443/92.
7 A CSP does not exist for Myanmar. Also see COM (2003) 399/4 with regard specifically to 
ASEAN States.
8 This information is derived from the Reports o f the UN Special Envoy and Special Rapporteur to 
Burma/Myanmar, especially, E/CN.4/2003/41, E/CN.4/2000/38, E/CN.4/1999/35, E/CN.4/1999/129, 
E/CN.4/1997/64, E/CN.4/1996/65, E/CN.4/1994/57 and E/CN.4/1993/37.
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transfer powers. Voters overwhelmingly supported anti-government parties with
the National League for Democracy (NLD) winning 80% of the parliamentary seats.
Since the election, the military has systematically and brutally suppressed the
democracy movement. The reports of the Special Rapporteur appointed by the
Commission on Human Rights and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations,9 as well as submissions made to US courts10 highlight and
document gross and systematic human rights violations. In brief, and the list is not
exhaustive: torture; extra-judicial killings; disappearances; arbitrary arrest and
detention; denial of fair trials; excessive use of force and violations of humanitarian
law; severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression, assembly and movement;
persecution of ethnic groups; and the systematic and widespread use of slavery and
slave-like practices are all well documented and widely verified. The State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC)11 has routinely refused to meet with
representatives of the United Nations and has on numerous occasions denied the
Special Rapporteur entry into the country, although some visits have been permitted
since 1998. In 1998 the ILO in a report on Myanmar referred to the regime
engaging in “clear flagrant violations of a peremptory norm of international law”
1 0(referring to slavery and slave-like practices) and “crimes against humanity”.
Furthermore, Myanmar was suspended from the ILO in 2000, due to its failure to
1 ^ensure compliance with the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930. The SPDC, 
for its part, considers that it is the victim of propaganda and misinformation. 
According to it, those human rights obligations which are culturally applicable to
9 Ibid.
10 See Doe v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. 880. US Dis. Ct.
11 Previously the State Law and Order Restoration Council.
12 Report o f the Commission o f Inquiry Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution o f the ILO 
to Examine the Observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention 1930 (No.29) Geneva, 
2/7/1998, Part V, para. 538.
13 Convention No. 29, Forced Labour Convention, 1930, 39 UNTS 55. Report o f the Governing 
Body o f the ILO, 276th Session, November 1999. Of the ILO’s core conventions, Myanmar is also a 
party to Convention No. 87, Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948, 68 UNTS 17.
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the people of Myanmar are respected.14 Of the major UN human rights 
conventions, Myanmar is a party to those on the rights of women15 and children.16
In 1993, the last year for which data are available, trade between the EU and 
Myanmar amounted to ECU 28 million.17 Myanmar does not control any vital 
resources. It is of negligible importance, relatively speaking, in trade terms to the 
Union and it does not pose a security threat to it. Nor is it likely that a large influx 
of refugees from Myanmar will arrive at the Union’s borders. Thus with little else 
at stake, there are few interests which can impede any decision of the Union and its 
Member States to take punitive action against it or, on the other hand, little tangible 
benefit to the Union in promoting ethical values in Myanmar.
The Union’s relationship and dealings with Myanmar have been conducted on both 
a regional and a bilateral basis. The latter is dealt with in detail in Section 2.2 of 
this chapter. Although it is not possible within the scope of this chapter to discuss 
the regional dialogue between the Union and the ASEAN States in detail, the 
following section provides some context and background to that dialogue and 
discusses the approach to ethical values in it.
2.1. The Role of Ethical Values in Regional Dialogue Involving 
Myanmar and the Union.
The Union was slow to realise the growing importance of South-East Asia in global 
terms. It was not until the Essen European Council of 1994 that a New Asia 
Strategy (NAS) recognised that the existing relationship with the ASEAN States 
had undergone a fundamental shift and was increasingly one of equals. The 
relationship thus required a review of the presumptions upon which it had been 
based. One of the consequences of the NAS was the establishment of the Asia
14 See the SPDC’s webpage http://www.mvanmar-information.net/truth/truth.html.
15 Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f Discrimination Against Women, 1979, 1249 UNTS 
13.
16 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3.
17 See OJC 91, 6/12/1995 p.53.
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Europe Meetings (ASEM)18 which is intended to function outside formal regional 
structures. The political dialogue undertaken in ASEM is in addition to those 
arrangements, which have been established, with a more formal structure. These 
include the Asian Regional Forum (ARF),19 Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) 
and the ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), which is based upon the 
1980 Cooperation Agreement with ASEAN.20 With the exception of the JCC, all 
fora come within the scope of the CFSP.
The Union and its Member States have, in accordance with the objectives of the
CFSP and Community development cooperation provisions, introduced human
rights, democracy and other ethical values to their regional dialogue with these
Asian States. The Union has encountered differing amounts of resistance from
them. Furthermore, the Union has vetoed the admission into the dialogue of certain
States, due to their lack of democratic institutions and the human rights situation 
• 01within them. This approach can in some respects disadvantage the Union, as the 
Asian States may respond by taking their business elsewhere. In the First ASEM 
meeting held in Bangkok in 1996, for example, the different priorities and 
perspectives of the participants was more than apparent. In paragraph five of the 
statement adopted at the conclusion of the meeting, the Asian States managed to 
ensure that the commitment to the dialogue, among the participating countries, was 
being conducted “on the basis of mutual respect, equality, promotion of
18 ASEM is composed o f the ASEAN States, China, Japan, South Korea and the EU.
19 The ARF primarily provides a setting in which members can discuss regional security and political
concerns. All ARF documents are available at: http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/index.html.
20 See further, Mahncke, D., “Relations Between Europe and South East Asia: The Security
Dimension” (1997) 2 EFARev., 291, van Dijk, P., “Meeting Asia and Latin America in a New
Setting” and Kagami, M., “Europe and Asia: Too Faraway” both in van Dijk, P., and Faber, G.(eds.),
The External Economic Dimensions o f  the European Union, (2000) p.292 and p.341 respectively and
McMahon, J., “ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting: Strengthening The European Union's
Relationship with South East Asia?” (1998) 3 EFARev., 233.
21 Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. The Community has subsequently signed Agreements with the 
latter two States which contain an “essential elements” clause. See Cooperation Agreement Between 
the European Community and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, OJ L 334, 5/12/1997 p. 15 and 
Cooperation Agreement Between the European Community and the Kingdom of Cambodia, OJ L 
269, 19/10/1999 p. 18.
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fundamental rights and, in accordance with the rules of international law and
obligations and non-intervention, whether direct or indirect, in each other’s internal
00affairs.” This form of wording was clearly a compromise between the parties.
The Union wished to ensure that some commitment to human rights was agreed
upon whereas the Asian States wanted to ensure that the impact of that commitment
was, as far as possible, diminished. Unlike the approach of the Union, the position
of many Asian States is that matters such as human rights and democracy are within
a State’s domestic jurisdiction and any criticism of them is an interference in its
internal affairs. The wording was thus one both parties could live with, as they took
it to mean completely different things. The description by a leading Commission
official of some of the documents adopted in the Third ASEM summit in Seoul in
2000 as a “breakthrough vis-a-vis human rights”, simply highlights the limited
ambitions and prospects that are now held out for such objectives being effectively
00addressed in this forum. In the light of the attacks in Bali and Jakarta in recent 
years, the Union has now very clearly shifted its focus to cooperating on and 
dealing with terror in the region. This has now been recognised as one the key 
objectives of ASEM.24 With regard to the question of participation in the ASEM, 
the Union has stood its ground on human rights and other such issues. Laos, 
Cambodia and Myanmar, have all become parties to ASEAN, albeit after the ASEM 
process had begun. The EU has therefore, exercised its veto, stating that it did not 
wish to negotiate or engage in dialogue with them due to their human rights records. 
It is only with regard to Myanmar that the Union still adopts this approach. It is, 
however, under increasing pressure to give way and to admit it to ASEM.
The Community, as noted above, also has a Cooperation Agreement with the 
Member States of ASEAN. The Union has continually, although quite selectively 
at times, plugged away at discussions on ethical values with the ASEAN States, 
even though the 2003 Commission Communication on relations with them indicates
22 See (1996) 3 EU Bull, Documents.
23 Rieterer, M., “ASEM-The Third Summit in Seoul 2000: A Roadmap to Consolidate the 
Partnership Between Asia and Europe” (2001) 6 EFARev., 1,13.
24 See the Chair’s Statement at the 5th ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting, 22-24/7/2003.
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a distinct shift of focus from such matters.25 The Union, on the one hand, considers 
that they have problems with such matters and, on the other, maintains a dialogue 
with them encouraging trade cooperation and the greater protection of intellectual 
property among a host of other issues. Mols assertion that an EU-ASEAN human 
rights dialogue has been neglected because it, “would focus attention on a weak 
point in practically all ASEAN countries”26 cannot, however, be sustained.
Major shortcomings in the approach of the Union to the ASEAN States on these 
matters do, however, exist. It has by and large treated them in a homogeneous 
manner. Yet, there is no shared Asian culture or a uniform view on the role of 
human rights and democracy.27 Some of the ASEAN States are Islamic in nature, 
although this is expressed in very different ways, others are Buddhist or Confucian. 
Some, such as Singapore, promote a certain brand of nationalism and national 
identity over and above religion. The Union’s primary concern, however, has been 
to obtain basic commitments to human rights and democracy from all ASEAN 
States. One of the grounds of opposition from some of the ASEAN States to such 
issues, as an agenda item in the dialogue with the Union, has been on the basis of 
what is perceived as the imposition of cultural values by the European States: 
values that some States consider are not relevant to them.28 The Presidency, 
however, has been keen to stress that this is not the imposition of values by one part 
of the world on another but an affirmation of shared values. The framing of ethical 
values in this manner does not cut any ice with some of the ASEAN States. Trade 
and access to markets have been the issues they wish to discuss and while progress 
has been made on these fronts, the Union and its Member States have seen the 
commitment to human rights by all parties as essential for the dialogue to move
25 See COM (2003) 399/4, p. 10.
26 Mols, J., “Cooperation With ASEAN: A Success Story” in Edwards, G., and Regelsberger, 
E.(eds.), Europe’s Global Links: The European Community and Inter-Regional Cooperation, (1990)
p.66.
27 See more generally Bauer, J., and Bell, D.(eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, 
(1999). The ratification o f the major UN human rights conventions by these States and the nature o f
their reservations differ markedly.
28 See especially the speeches o f Yew and Mahathir of Singapore and Malaysia respectively.
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90 •forward. The 2003 Commission Communication, however, very interestingly 
notes that the clearest shared value between the EU and ASEAN States is regional 
integration.30 As noted above, the Communication also places far greater emphasis 
on the fight against terror. This does not necessarily mean the abandonment or 
subordination of a commitment to discussion on ethical matters. In the ASEAN-EU 
Foreign Ministers meeting in January 2003, for example, there was a reaffirmed 
commitment by all parties to respect for the equality of civilizations and to the 
shared values of human rights, including development and fundamental freedoms.31 
The question now is what weight will be attached to such matters, when other 
foreign policy objectives have come into sharper focus?
The Union in pushing ethical values on to the agenda in its dialogue with the 
ASEAN States has adopted a pragmatic view. At the end of 2000 in a joint 
statement the two blocs stated quite clearly that it was economic dialogue and 
cooperation that was to be intensified. ASEAN-EU programmes in intellectual 
property had to be seen as a priority, along with questions of market access.32 
Human rights, democracy and other fundamental freedoms were nowhere to be 
found. The Union has clearly adopted an approach of obtaining basic commitments 
to human rights and democracy, among others, from third States, whenever it is a 
party to dialogue with them. This fact is borne out by the other case-studies. The 
commitments obtained add nothing to the legal obligations States are under. All 
fora where such commitments have been made, no mater how weak they are present 
another opportunity for the Union to discuss them and utilise diplomatic pressure to 
that end. This is valuable in itself as it allows the Union to consistently emphasise 
the importance it attaches to such matters and that any shortcomings in this respect 
will be a legitimate subject of discussion.
29 This has to some extent been achieved. See, Joint Declaration o f the 10th Meeting o f the Foreign 
Ministers o f the ASEAN-EC, Manila, 29-30/10/1992. Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 92/409.
30 COM (2003) 399/4, p. 10.
31 Joint Co-Chairman’s Statement o f the 14th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 27-28/1/2003, para.5.
32 Joint Statement o f the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, October 2000, available at 
http://www.deltha.cec.eu.int/newsroom/releases/2000/ASEAN.
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2.2. Bilateral Dealings With Myanmar.
The nature of the regime in Myanmar and its practices has, as noted above, resulted 
in the Union’s refusal to accept that country as a party to inter-regional dialogue. 
Notwithstanding the general situation in Myanmar since 1961, and some very 
limited punitive measures that the Community adopted in 1993, the relationship 
between it and the Union only took a decisive turn for the worse when the Danish 
Consul in Yangoon, James Leander Nichols, was arrested for the unauthorised use 
of fax machines and telephones and subsequently died in custody in 1996. Nichols 
was the honorary consul of Denmark but also represented Finland, Norway and 
Switzerland. In a declaration issued on 5 July 1996 the EU indicated that it was 
very concerned with the situation in Myanmar and that it expected a full and 
satisfactory explanation of the death from the authorities.33 It also called for an 
investigation into the death by the UN Special Rapporteur. The death of a consular 
official provided impetus for action and led to a very swift response by Denmark, 
which pushed vociferously for the imposition of economic sanctions by the Union.34 
As a consequence of Nichols’ death the Union decided to adopt a parallel approach 
towards Myanmar. Punitive measures would be adopted via the CFSP and 
Community, on the one hand, and, on the other, diplomatic measures would be 
utilised. These will be analysed in turn.
2.2.1. Diplomatic Measures and Myanmar.
Following the death of Nichols, the EU met with Myanmar’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs on three occasions. It insisted that the SPDC must, without delay, respect 
human rights and release immediately and unconditionally all members of the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) and all other political prisoners. It also 
insisted that the ruling junta enter into meaningful dialogue with the pro-democracy
33 See EFPB Doc., 96/221.
34 See EFPB Doc., 96/312 and later OJ C 135, 14/5/1999 p.69.
35 At the margins o f the PMC in July 1996 and Troika meetings at the margins o f the UN General 
Assembly in July and October 1996. The meetings were described as being “most unsatisfactory” 
and “a disappointment” by the EU. See EFPB Docs., 96/270, 96/312 and 97/163.
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movement and all other national minorities to bring about reconciliation and 
democratic reform. It further insisted that Myanmar fully explain the death of 
Nichols. The unrealistic nature of such demands is more than apparent but what 
the death of the Danish consul provided for the Union, was a focal point and reason 
for it to amalgamate all its objectives and press for them collectively.
In response to the lack of what it perceived as satisfactory answers, the EU 
subsequently asked the UN Special Rapporteur (who had already been denied entry 
to the country) and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and Imprisonment to 
visit the country, as well as urging the Commission on Human Rights to take action 
against Myanmar.37 The Union’s deteriorating diplomatic relationship with 
Myanmar, due to the death of the Danish consul, further came to a head when the 
other ASEAN States decided to accept Myanmar’s application to join them. On 26 
June 1997 the General Affairs Council (GAC) confirmed its attachment to the EU- 
ASEAN dialogue, in particular human rights, and expressed the hope that by joining 
ASEAN, Myanmar would also contribute to those values. EU-ASEAN dialogue 
was thus envisaged as an additional forum in which the Union could raise its 
grievances. Due to the common position that had already been adopted by the 
Union, however, it was not possible at this stage to allow Myanmar to accede to the 
EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement or ASEM, unless such measures were 
repealed. This approach caused substantial diplomatic problems in the 
relationship with the other ASEAN States as the Union also attempted to chastise 
them for admitting Myanmar.40
ASEAN now had a Member State against whom the Union had already taken the 
punitive measures prescribed in a number of common positions. The accession of
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid. Myanmar was in fact already an annual topic of debate in the Commission on Human 
Rights.
38 Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 97/151.
39 See EFPB D ocs, 98/171, 98/238, 98/276 and OJ C 134, 30/4/1998 p.20.
40 See the statement on the Accession o f Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar to ASEAN, 
reproduced as EFPB D oc, 97/083. Also see (1997) 1/2 EU Bull 1.3.115 on the 12th EU-ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting.
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Myanmar to ASEAN, however, opened the door for a more critical dialogue with 
Indonesia on the situation in East Timor, something the Portuguese had long been 
pressing for. This consequently pushed human rights further up the agenda of 
priorities. The tactic to be adopted with regard to Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN 
caused problems though between EU Member States themselves. Germany 
advocated Myanmar’s participation in the EU-ASEAN meeting in Berlin in March 
1999, provided human rights were on the agenda. Denmark refused to take part in 
the meeting if Myanmar was a party to the discussion. Eventually a compromise 
position was agreed between ASEAN States and the EU and between the Union 
Member States as well. Myanmar was allowed to be present at the meeting, which 
eventually took place in May 1999 (a deal was negotiated in the meantime) but only 
as a silent observer. Due to the debate over the accession of Myanmar to ASEAN, 
EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meetings were not held for three years.41 The 13th 
ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, held in Vientiane in December 2000, has now 
resolved the position. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar all participated for the first 
time at the meeting as full members.42 As noted above, however, only Laos and 
Cambodia have become parties to the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement of 1980. 
The Union has consistently argued that it is within its prerogative to decide whether 
to extend the Agreement to new ASEAN States and it will refuse to do so with 
regard to Myanmar, until a democratic government with a commitment to human 
rights is installed.
Until recently, however, the Community has not sought to negotiate a third- 
generation Agreement with the ASEAN States, contrary to its practice elsewhere.43 
A historic reason for this has been Portugal’s refusal to consent to a Commission 
mandate to negotiate Agreements with these countries as a group, due to its 
animosity, over East Timor, with Indonesia.44 Rather than agreeing to a mandate
41 See (2000) 12 EU  Bull 1.6.78 and OJ C 297, 15/10/1999 p.153. Other meetings were, however, 
ongoing.
42 (2001) 1/2 EUBull 1.6.112.
43 COM (2003) 399/4. “Third-generation Agreements” not only contain “essential elements” clauses 
but also deal with cooperation in areas which “second-generation Agreements” did not.
44 See COM (1996)314, p.8. Portugal is not named. Although see OJ C 325, 27/10/1997 p. 16, 
para. 17 where the European Parliament names Portugal in this regard.
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with the ASEAN States, except Indonesia, which would have been politically very 
damaging to interests in the region, the Commission has attempted to make do with 
the 1980 Agreement.45 East Timor is now no longer a problem in relations with the 
ASEAN States and consequently the new Communication on the relationship with 
them allows for the negotiation of Agreements with the ASEAN States 
individually.46 As ASEAN does not have international legal personality this is 
necessary. This approach allows the Community to exclude Myanmar but it does 
run the risk of damaging its relations with the ASEAN States as a group.
The Union has on occasion also arranged ad hoc bilateral meetings with the military 
authorities on the fringes of the UN General Assembly. These meetings have been 
set up through a network of contacts at embassy level. Such meetings have not 
been conducive to re-establishing relations.47 Persuading the other ASEAN States, 
who have much more influence in Myanmar than the Union, of the benefits of a 
democratic and free Myanmar may achieve better results. The ASEAN States are 
now beginning to disagree among themselves over how best to deal with Myanmar. 
At the ASEAN Summit in June 2003, for example, the other ASEAN States issued 
a very rare public rebuke to Myanmar over the treatment of Suu Kyi.48 Malaysia 
suggested that Myanmar be expelled unless it reformed, whereas Thailand pressed 
for it to be given more time to allow it to reform 49 The opportunity is now ripe for 
the Union to utilise its leverage and to press the other ASEAN States to use their 
political influence in Myanmar.
45 The GAC on 24/3/1997 approved a package o f measures which were seen as an alternative to a 
third-generation Agreement. Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 97/148.
46 COM (2003)399/4. East Timor is, further to a decision of the ACP-EC Council o f Ministers on 
16/5/2003, now a member of the ACP group of States.
471 am grateful to Commission desk-officers for this insight.
48 International Herald Tribune, “Japan Halts Aid to Burmese Over Democracy Leader’s Detention” 
26/6/2003, internet edition.
49 The Independent “Burma Stays Silent on Suu Kyi’s Fate as Dissidents Are Freed” 24/7/2003 p. 10.
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2.2.2. The Utilisation of Punitive Legal Instruments by the Union 
Against Myanmar.
Under EPC, the Community and its Member States had adopted declarations on the 
situation in Myanmar prior to the 1990 elections.50 Demarches and statements, 
which became more vocal when it was apparent that there would not be a 
restoration to democracy, were also issued on the 1990 elections and their results.51 
In mid-1991 the Community declared itself “appalled” at the failure to respect the 
wishes of the population. It is at this stage that the Community and its Member 
States began to consider downgrading development aid and possibly suspending all 
non-humanitarian aid to Myanmar. The fact that the Community was already 
considering reducing aid to a country, due to the failure of a regime to hand over 
power to a democratically elected body prior to the 1991 June Resolution of the 
Luxembourg Council, is a clear indication that the Resolution was not only 
establishing guidelines for action but was also building upon existing practice. 
Gross and systematic violations of fundamental norms since 1962 had until then not 
prompted any other response from the Community. In the Luxembourg Declaration 
of 4 January 1991 on Myanmar, however, the Community and its Member States 
stated that in the aftermath of the election and the refusal of the military to cede 
power, the Community and Member States had a “legitimate concern for... civil 
and democratic rights” and a call to respect human rights cannot be dismissed as 
“interference in the domestic affairs of other States.”54 As the discussion in Chapter 
Two highlights, this is a controversial statement. Nevertheless the situation in 
Myanmar presented one of the first opportunities for the Community and later 
Union to apply its new and more robust guidelines to the situation in a third State.
As a direct response to the annulled election, the Heads of Mission of the then 
twelve Member States issued statements on the detention of Aung San Suu Kyi in
50 See, for example, EFPB Doc., 88/245.
51 See, for examples, EFPB Docs., 90/223, 90/296 and 92/463.
52 See EFPB Doc., 91/238.
53 See EFPB Doc., 91/189.
54 See EFPB Doc., 91/002.
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November of 1991.55 The Member States also agreed at this time to the withdrawal 
of all military attaches accredited to Myanmar by the Member States.56 While there 
was some downgrading of military cooperation, the lucrative trade between Britain 
and France and Myanmar in armaments, many of which were used in internal 
repression, was not expressly and more comprehensively prohibited until a common 
position was implemented by Community measures in 2000.57 Community 
development aid, however, continued to be supplied, even where projects were 
directly assisting the regime in power. It was not until the 39th session of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) meeting in May 1993 that leading donor 
countries, including Union Member States, decided to minimise support for the 
programme aid provided to the military regime in Myanmar, while attempting to 
maximise humanitarian benefits for ordinary citizens.58 Although there are no 
official declarations to this effect, the Commission accordingly began to prioritise 
work with NGOs to assist the most vulnerable sectors of society.59
The initial response of the Community, i.e., reducing its level of development 
assistance and refocusing its aim, were the only measures taken against Myanmar, 
despite several declarations, Presidency statements, and resolutions of the European 
Parliament on the various consequences of the activities of the regime in
55 See EFPB Doc., 91/408.
56 See EFPB Doc., 91/473.
57 Council Regulation No.1081/2000, OJ L 122, 24/5/2000 p.29. This has been repealed by Council 
Regulation No. 798/2004, Renewing the Restrictive Measures in Respect of Burma/Myanmar and 
Repealing Regulation No.1081/2000, OJ L 125, 28/4/2004 p.4. Common Position 1996/635/CFSP 
(relating to Regulation 1081/2000) did not apply to contracts for such goods, which were already in 
force. See further infra. The 1998 Code o f Conduct on Arms Exports, however, may have been 
used by some Member States to limit sales to Myanmar. Also relevant is Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP, OJ L 9, 15/1/1999 p.l on the Union’s contribution to combating the spread of small 
arms and light weapons.
58 See EFPB Doc., 93/78.
59 See, for example, OJ C 319, 18/10/1997 p.189 which reinforces the view that Community 
development aid to Myanmar changed focus after 1993. Also see the Presidency Statement, 
reproduced as EFPB Doc., 93/110.
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Myanmar.60 In 1996, the death of the Danish consul and the submission of a 
complaint from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) 
concerning the use of forced labour compelled the Union to take further punitive 
action on two fronts.
The death of the Danish consul in 1996, as noted above, led to Denmark pushing 
very strongly for the imposition of full economic sanctions against Myanmar. Aung 
San Suu Kyi, the leader of the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar, whom the 
Union continually asserts it is supporting and assisting, has at various stages urged 
the Union to implement such measures.61 Damrosch has argued that it is legally 
justifiable for third States to impose and maintain punitive measures against a 
regime where local leaders, who are being supported by the international 
community, call for them.62 As Chapter Two highlights, there are limits to the 
legality of such measures. The Union’s rhetoric at times, however, certainly leads 
to the impression that it will implement the measures which have been called for by 
Suu Kyi.
Yet in order to protect the trading interests of their companies, both France and the 
UK have opposed the adoption of such measures. The lack of consensus on the 
imposition of punitive measures exists because companies such as ELF and Total 
are heavily involved in pipe-line projects in Myanmar. Indeed, the European 
Parliament has adopted resolutions on the complicity of Total in human rights 
abuses during the laying down of pipe-lines in Myanmar.63 EU based multi­
national oil companies provide a third of all foreign investment in Myanmar.64 
While trade between the EU and Myanmar may not have been significant in relative 
terms, European investment is far from negligible. The Member States whose
60 The number o f resolutions and declarations adopted by the European Parliament on Myanmar is 
very substantial. See, for examples, OJ C 347, 18/11/1996 p.84 and OJ C 167, 1/6/1998 p.225.
61 See OJ C 200, 30/6/1997 p. 174, para.3.
62 Damrosch, L., “Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures” (1997) 269 RDC, 
19, 149.
63 OJ C 365,4/12/1996 p.80.
64 OJ C 313, 12/10/1998 p. 181, para. G.
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companies would be most affected have only been prepared to agree to relatively 
weak punitive measures.
In October 1996, after a good deal of negotiation, a common position was adopted 
which reaffirmed some of the measures, discussed above, which had been adopted 
after the annulled election of 1991.65 This common position did not distinguish 
between the Community and CFSP aspects, although it should be noted that it did 
not actually require any action on behalf of the Community. The preamble to the 
1996 common position provides clear clues as to the rationale behind it. The EU 
considered itself disappointed “at the result of the meetings in Jakarta and New 
York”, i.e., those diplomatic negotiations over the death of Nichols, which were 
discussed above. Only having highlighted this was the absence of progress towards 
democratisation and the continuing violation of human rights mentioned. What is 
equally interesting about the 1996 common position is the fact that it also calls upon 
Myanmar to act in certain ways, for example, freeing political prisoners and 
entering into meaningful dialogue with pro-democracy groups. The punitive 
measures introduced by the Union aimed to promote progress towards 
democratisation and securing the immediate and unconditional release of detained 
political prisoners.
The new measures introduced by the 1996 common position were limited to 
banning entry visas for certain senior members of the military regime and their 
families as well as the suspension of high-level bilateral governmental visits to 
Myanmar. The continuing “further deterioration in the political situation” in 
Myanmar has led to the original 1996 common position being consistently renewed 
and amended by the Council.66 In practice, the common position has been 
subsequently amended in three significant ways. First, the Council has routinely 
extended the scope of the visa ban and the persons affected by it. Secondly, in the 
common position adopted in April 2000 it agreed to the funds being frozen of those
65 Common Position 96/635/CFSP, OJ L 287, 8/11/1996 p .l.
66 See, for example, the Preamble o f Common Position 2003/297/CFSP, OJ L 106, 29/4/2003 p.36. 
This rationale is routinely cited in the common positions.
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persons affected by the visa ban.67 Finally, the common position of April 2000 also 
prohibited the sale, supply and export of equipment which might be used for
/ o
internal repression or terrorism.
Despite being consistently amended the common positions against Myanmar are far 
from comprehensive. The provisions on the suspension of military aid, in the 
original 1996 common position, for example, did not apply to contracts already 
entered into, thus they continued to be honoured. The common positions have not 
forbidden investment or suspended non-military trade between the Union and 
Myanmar. This is not to say, however, that certain governments do not pressurise 
some of their companies to withdraw from Myanmar.69 The freezing of the 
personal assets and funds of military officials, which are held in Union Member 
States, may make life financially trickier for them but whether it is all the Union can 
do is highly questionable. The freezing of funds concerns individual funds, 
however, rather than those of Burmese companies and institutions operating in the
70Union. They may not be very difficult to circumvent. Where further punitive 
measures have been adopted upon renewal of the common position it is 
questionable what the practical effect on the regime in Myanmar has been? The 
regulation implemented to give effect to those parts of the April 2000 common 
position prohibiting the sale and supply of equipment which might be used for
71internal repression for example, resulted in Myanmar signing a trade deal with
• 77Russia which now allows it to import the equipment it requires from there.
67 Article 1, Common Position 2000/346/CFSP, OJ L 122, 24/5/2000 p.l.
68 Ibid., as implemented by Council Regulation 1081/2000 as amended by Council Regulation 
798/2004.
69 The British government ironically, requested the voluntary withdrawal o f British American 
Tobacco and welcomed it when in November 2003 it did so. See FCO Website Update 6/11/2003. 
“BAT Withdraws from Burma: FCO Minister Delighted”.
70 Article 6, Regulation 798/2004. Also see COM(2000)299 which is the Communication upon 
which Regulation 1081/2000 is based and COM(2004) 226 which is the Communication for 
Regulation 798/2004.
71 Council Regulation 1081/2000 as amended by Regulation 798/2004.
72ICFTU Press Release, 23/7/2001.
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The US, to some extent, has been prepared to take the steps against Myanmar which 
the Union has not. In July 2003 Congress adopted the Burmese Freedom and
73Democracy Act which bans the import into the US of all goods produced in 
Myanmar.74 Furthermore, this act obliges the US to oppose the adoption of any 
loans by International Financial Institutions to Myanmar.75 In a number of other 
respects the act is very similar to the Union’s common positions, requiring the 
freezing of assets and the imposition of a visa ban.
Where both US and EU legislation falls short, is from prohibiting investment by 
European and US companies in Myanmar. The freezing of assets held in the EU 
and US as well as an import ban in the US will only have a limited impact, while 
European and US investment which seeks to exploit Myanmar’s abundant natural 
resources is permitted. It is in the laying of pipe-lines and exploiting other natural 
resources that NGOs routinely cite the worst violations by the military and those 
companies which invest in Myanmar. The campaigns currently mounted against 
Total and ELF, due to their alleged complicity in slave-like practices, are based on 
these allegations. A complete investment ban is the most effective measure that can 
be adopted. Due to a lack of Community competence in such matters, however, this 
has not been discussed in the Council, although it is a possibility under the CFSP.76
The ICFTU complaint, referred to above, related to Myanmar benefiting from the 
GSP.77 This eventually led, as discussed in Chapter Three, to a 1997 regulation 
suspending the GSP in respect of Myanmar. The blatant refusal of the authorities in 
Myanmar to cooperate with the Commission team, which was sent to investigate the 
allegations, played as much of a role in the withdrawal of benefits as the forced
73 117 Stat. 864.
74 Ibid., Section 3.
75 Ibid., Section 4.
761 am grateful to a Commission desk-officer for this insight. If any of the Member States have an 
Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement with Myanmar this will limit the possibilities for 
any joint action in this regard under the CFSP. The UK does not. See the answer by Mr Hain, 
Hansard HC, 600W, 22/3/2000. Article 111-271(1) o f the Draft Constitution on the Common 
Commercial Policy will change this when it comes into force.
77 See OJC 15, 20/1/1996 pi.
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labour practices themselves. The authorities in Myanmar claimed that there was 
nothing to investigate and consequently denied the investigatory team entry to the 
country in November 1996. A number of MEPs, however, visited Myanmar on 
tourist visas and in an individual capacity to try and verify the existence of forced
*70
labour practices there. The Commission also considered evidence from a wide
7Qrange of bodies on the practices of the authorities in Myanmar. With a small 
amount of trade, in relative terms, between the Union and Myanmar the practical 
impact of such a measure is not very great. It is admittedly more important now in 
the context of the Everything But Arms initiative and it does set an important 
precedent. If one considers the seriousness of Myanmar’s legal violations, 
however, the practical consequences and impact of the measures implemented are 
still not particularly significant. The prohibition on forced labour and slavery like 
practices are obligations erga omnes, which entitle the Community and its Member 
States to act. The suspension of the GSP, even for violations of obligations erga 
omnes does not, however, automatically mean that all other development aid is cut-
QA
off; there is no mechanism to that effect.
The Council has offered to open discussions with Myanmar if it restores democracy
o 1
and the situation there improves. In a GAC meeting in 1998, for example, it 
stated that the reconvening of Parliament, the adoption of a new democratic 
constitution and the holding of free and fair elections, would constitute such a 
move.82 The imprisoning of opposition activists has specifically been considered to 
be a move away from democracy. With the exception of opening a dialogue with 
the opposition and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, (who is routinely subsequently
78 See EFPB Doc., 96/334.
79 See OJ C 133, 28/4/1997 p.48, para.3.
80 For confirmation see, OJ C 21, 22/1/1998 p.75.
81 GAC o f 26/4/1999 (1999) 4 EU Bull 1.4.92.
82 GAC o f 5/10/1998 (1998) 10 EU Bull 1.3.11.
83 See (1998) 9 EU Bull 1.3.16. Also see Common Position 2003/461 /CFSP.
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rearrested whenever she is released) the authorities in Myanmar have shown little 
inclination to give effect to any of these measures.
Although the situation in Myanmar has continually deteriorated according to the
Of t
Council, it considers that the removal of the GSP and the various common 
positions are sufficient to have their desired effect,86 even if all of the evidence is 
clearly to the contrary. The death of James Nichols was the primary reason 
behind the first common position, as aggravated by the human rights situation, not 
the other way around. Since the original common position, however, the 
strengthening of the common position has been due to a perceived deterioration in 
the human rights situation in that country. The reports of NGOs do not seem to 
imply that the situation has worsened, merely that it has not improved significantly
oo
and that the regime is still is in power. The steps actually taken bear little 
resemblance to the Union’s rhetoric. The Council in April 2003 considered that the 
best way forward is for it to implement carefully calibrated sanctions and to provide
OQ
significant amounts of humanitarian aid. The Union has become increasingly 
detailed in its demands but does not follow them up in any meaningful way.90 
Measures which would affect the general commercial interests of the Member 
States have not been adopted, despite systematic and gross breaches of the most 
fundamental of international norms.
2.2.3. The Promotion of Ethical Values in Myanmar.
84 The Spanish Presidency welcomed this in a declaration on 8/5/2002 although it did not consider
this alone to be sufficient for the removal of punitive measures. Suu Kyi’s re-arrest led to the
adoption o f Common Position 2003/297/CFSP.
85 See the Preambles to the common positions.
86 See OJ C 187, 16/6/1998 p.38
87 The further extension o f punitive measures under Regulation 798/2004 contradicts the Council’s 
view that the measures it had implemented were sufficient to have the desired effect.
88 See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2000 and Amnesty International, World Report 2000.
89 GAEXREL Council Conclusions on Burma, 14/4/2003.
90 See, for example, the Presidency Declaration o f 21/2/2003.
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Despite the scaling down of development assistance from the Community, it has 
continued to fund projects in Myanmar which are aimed at helping to alleviate the 
suffering of the most vulnerable sections of the population. The original 1996 
common position excluded such measures from its scope and urged the focus of 
development assistance upon such projects and the provision of humanitarian aid.91 
This approach has been maintained in the subsequent common positions. The 
establishing and running of such projects is in practice very difficult for the 
Community. Such projects must be undertaken in the context of decentralised 
cooperation through local civilian authorities and NGOs. Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International have both, for a number of years now in their annual reports, 
considered that non-governmental human rights organisations have not been 
permitted to function in that country. The number of and activities of other NGOs 
has also been severely curtailed by the authorities. In this context it is highly 
difficult for the Community or any other donor to make anything but the most 
marginal of contributions. It is difficult to know how projects which promote 
democracy, for example, are being implemented in the absence of organisations 
with the capacity to do so and indeed what difference, if any, they can make at 
either a local, regional or national level. The Community, however, still funds 
democracy related projects in Myanmar.
Of the other projects the Community has funded, most have been concerned with 
humanitarian aid. The policies of the authorities in Myanmar have caused an 
outpouring of refugees into Bangladesh and Thailand, very few of whom are 
repatriated. Aid has also been provided to finance projects which assist uprooted 
people, thus improving the quality of life of vulnerable sections of the population in 
the State of Rakhine and the refugee populations therein,94 where for example, the 
Commission has provided €1 million of funding to a project for vulnerable 
groups.95 By and large the Community has used Budget-line B7-212, which assists
91 Article 5(ii) 96/635/CFSP.
92 See, for example, (2000) 9 EU Bull 1.2.12.
93 See Crepin, P., Evaluation o f ECHO Actions in Favour o f  Burmese Refugees in Thailand-Final 
Report, (2002).
94 See, for example, (2000) 12 EU Bull 1.6.83.
95 See (1998) 12 EU Bull 1.3.121.
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with aid towards the self sufficiency of refugees, displaced persons and uprooted 
people for these projects. In the alternative, humanitarian aid budget lines have also 
been used to assist certain populations. Beyond this, however, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for the Union to make any other contribution to improving the human 
rights situation in that country by working with NGOs. The Commission has 
adopted a pragmatic approach, however, towards a number of projects, where it has 
was worked with the authorities in Myanmar. The 1993 UNDP decision agreed to 
minimise project aid to the government and to assist the most vulnerable sections of 
society. Where it is impossible for NGOs to function, the Commission must work 
with the regime to achieve a particular objective. Thus, for example, projects 
funded under the HIV/AIDS budget line, have been conducted in conjunction with 
the Health Ministry so that provision for aid can be made to those most in need.96
The regime in Myanmar has shown itself to be insensitive to both positive and 
negative measures. The tactical approach now adopted by the Union towards 
Myanmar is almost entirely negative in nature. Dialogue is infrequent and ad hoc 
and only when it can be agreed upon. The common positions are prohibitive in 
nature and reduce all aspects of dialogue and downgrade the relationship between 
the parties. The death of the Danish consul, not the human rights situation, was the 
spur for more punitive measures to be adopted after the annulled election. The 
measures the Union can adopt in this context are still hostage to the interests of the 
individual Member States. In the circumstances therefore, it is difficult to see what 
else the Union can do.
3. Pakistan.
Pakistan has enjoyed formal bilateral relations with the Community since 1976, 
shortly after its former colonial ruler, the United Kingdom, itself acceded to the
96 See OJC 117, 16/4/1998 p. 160.
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Community in 1973.97 Although the Lome/Cotonou Conventions have now been 
extended to almost all other developing Commonwealth States, the sub-continent 
has been excluded from this trend. The sheer scale in terms of size and population 
is no doubt a major factor in this decision. Relations between the Union and 
Pakistan have recently blossomed, despite all but having broken down in 1999. The 
second-generation Agreement, which had been in force since 1986, had expired98 
and a third-generation Agreement had been negotiated and initialled in April 1998 
but it was not signed due, among other reasons, to the coming to power of the 
military regime of General Musharaff in October 1999." Events in New York and 
Washington in September 2001, however, initialled the complete rehabilitation of 
the military dictatorship and Pakistan was welcomed back into a warm embrace by 
the Union and US. One of the consequences of this was the signing of the initialled 
third-generation Agreement in November 2001. Before discussing the basis for 
relations between the Union and Pakistan, it is worth discussing the prevailing 
political situation in Pakistan.
Civilian rule in Pakistan, since independence in 1947, has routinely been interrupted 
by the military seizing power. The second-generation Agreement with the 
Community, for example, was concluded with the military regime of General Zia- 
ul-Haq. Pakistani governments of all persuasions have always considered that as 
Pakistan is a signatory to the UDHR, this is sufficient evidence of its commitment 
to the idea of human rights as understood in international law. Pakistan is also party 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,100 the Women’s Convention101 and the
97 Commercial Cooperation Agreement Between the EEC and the Islamic Republic o f Pakistan, OJ L 
168, 28/6/1976 p.2. Diplomatic relations between the Community and Pakistan were first 
established in 1962.
98 Agreement for Commercial, Economic and Development Cooperation Between the EEC and the 
Islamic Republic o f Pakistan, OJ L 108, 25/4/1986 p .l. Under Article 10 the Agreement was valid 
for a period o f 5 years, renewable for one year periods on the agreement o f both parties.
99 See, for example, the comments o f Commissioner Patten at OJ C 350 E, 11/12/2001 p. 137.
100 Supra note 16.
101 Supra note 17.
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Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.102 Furthermore, it is party 
to five of the ILO’s core Conventions, including those which deal with bonded 
labour and slavery.103 In terms of human rights issues, it is well documented that in 
Pakistan problems exist with regard to restrictions on the rights to association and 
expression; anti-terrorist legislation; abuse of the laws on blasphemy; minority 
rights; women’s rights; religious persecution; the rule of law; child and bonded 
labour; slavery and slavery-like practices; and the systematic use of torture by 
security forces.104
In terms of trade, the EU is Pakistan’s largest trading partner. Over 30% of 
Pakistani exports, in particular, rice, textiles, leather and sporting goods are destined 
for the Union. Approximately 28% of Pakistan’s imports are from EU countries. It 
is estimated that a third of the population of 140 million live in absolute poverty.105 
Furthermore, due to Pakistan’s relatively low GNP per capita of $470, which places 
it 160th of the 208 economies measured by the World Bank,106 Pakistan has been a 
recipient of around €423 million between 1976 and 2001 and €225 million worth in
102 The International Convention on the Elimination o f all Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 1966, 660 
UNTS 195. It has entered numerous “declarations”, as opposed to reservations, to the UN treaties to 
which it is a party. Although see Article 2(d), Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties, 1969, 
1155 UNTS 33
103 Convention No. 29, supra note 13; Convention No. 87, Freedom o f Association and Protection of  
the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, 68 UNTS 17; Convention No. 98, Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, 96 UNTS 257; Convention No. 105, Abolition o f Forced 
Labour Convention, 1957, 320 UNTS 291 and Convention No. I l l ,  Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation) Convention, 1958, 363 UNTS 31.
104 For extensive and detailed accounts o f the human rights problems in Pakistan see references in 
the Bibliography. Especially noteworthy, however are: HRW, Contemporary Forms o f Slavery in 
Pakistan, (1995); Amnesty International, Women in Pakistan: Disadvantaged and Denied Their 
Rights (1995); the report o f the Special Rapporteur on Torture, E/CN.4/1997/Add.2; and the report 
of the Special Rapporteur on Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 
E/CN.4/1996/95/Add. 1.
105 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2004.
106 Ibid.
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on-going development programmes. It has also received humanitarian aid from the 
Union, which is primarily aimed at the 3 million Afghani refugees in Pakistan.107
3.1. The Legal and Political Structure of EU Dialogue with 
Pakistan.
The Union has maintained political dialogue with Pakistan on a number of levels, 
both regional and bilateral.108 Dialogue exists with Pakistan through Union 
meetings with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)109 
as well as Troika meetings. The scheduling of these meetings is not, however, 
regular. SAARC has not functioned properly since 1998, due to Indian objections 
over the general situation in South-Asia - a euphemism for the Kashmir issue.110 
The Troika has not been meeting Pakistan on an annual basis, as had been the 
intention of the parties, although since 2002 meetings have become more regular as 
have EU-Pakistan Political Directors Meetings. It is at these meetings, when they 
have been held, that the Union has raised its concerns over, among others, 
Pakistan’s (now former) support for the Taliban, the Kashmir issue, nuclear testing, 
drugs, international terrorism and human rights. Other issues have also been raised 
in these meetings, in particular, the restoration of democracy. Furthermore, the 
1986 Agreement between Pakistan and the Community established a Joint 
Cooperation Committee (JCC) which was supposedly to meet on an annual basis.111 
It did not do so, with the last meeting being in 1996. The third-generation 
Agreement between the parties, which was signed in November 2001 and approved
1071 am grateful to the EU Delegation in Pakistan for these figures. Also see OJ C 147 E, 20/6/2002
p.34.
108 Formal political dialogue with Pakistan was established following the Lisbon European Summit 
of June 1992.
109 SAARC’s main aims are economic and social development among its Member States. It was 
established in 1985.
110 Informal summits have been held on the fringe of the General Assembly. A SAARC meeting did 
take place in January 2004 and the current prospects for it being able to function more effectively in 
the future are good.
111 Article 7(1 )(d).
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by the European Parliament on 22 April 2004,112 also establishes a JCC which has
1 n  f t
not to date met. The Union’s discussion with Pakistan on ethical values, in these 
different fora, has tended to concentrate upon a number of key issues. These are 
discussed in turn.
3.2. Democracy, Human Rights, the Union and Pakistan.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the Union has elevated democracy to a level at least 
equivalent to that of fundamental human rights, even though, as Chapter Two 
argues, there is no real legal basis in international law for it to do so. Removing or 
suspending democratic institutions, annulling of free elections, coup d ’etats etc., are 
more tangible in terms of assessment for the suspension of Agreements, than 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In Pakistan, however, the 
situation has not been so straightforward for the Union.
3.2.1. Negotiating the Third-Generation Agreement.
A third-generation Agreement between the Community and Pakistan has, as noted 
above, now been concluded. This is the same Agreement that was initialled in April 
1998 but not signed until November 2001. As also noted above, one of the reasons 
for this delay was the coming to power of General Musharaff in October 1999. The 
coup, which was bloodless, brought to power a regime which in many circles is 
considered to be more committed to economic and social reform and promoting 
human rights, tackling religious extremism and rooting out corruption, than the
112 The delay was caused by a large number of MEPs being opposed to the Agreement entering into 
force. See, for example, (2003) 9(38) European Voice, “Pakistan’s Human Rights Record Delays 
EU Accord” 13/11/2003 p.6. When the European Parliament approved the Association Agreement 
on 22/4/2004 it also adopted a separate resolution expressing concerns about numerous issues, such 
as human rights, nuclear proliferation and the role o f the military in politics. See (2004) 4 EU Bull 
1.2.10. As o f 31 May 2004 the Agreement has not been published in the Official Journal, although 
see (2004) 4 EU Bull 1.6.104.
113 Article 16 establishes a JCC which is required to meet on at least an annual basis.
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government it replaced.114 Due to the government’s military nature and its coming 
to power in a coup, however, which the Supreme Court of Pakistan unsurprisingly 
validated on the basis of the doctrine of necessity,115 the Community initially 
refused to sign the Agreement. Having previously refused to acknowledge the 
validity of the Supreme Court judgment, the Union now uses it to support its 
normalisation of relations with Pakistan.116
The entire process of the negotiation of the Agreement was tied up with human 
rights and other ethical issues. The Union, via the Troika and the Commission, 
were not only concerned with inserting an “essential elements” clause in the 
Agreement but had also identified a number of human rights problems in Pakistan, 
in particular child labour, which needed to be addressed. These human rights 
concerns were integral to the entire negotiation of the Agreement. In 1996 the then 
Commissioner for Development, Manuel Marin, visited the then President and 
Prime Minister of Pakistan (Farooq Leghari and Benazir Bhutto respectively) and 
discussed the negotiation of the Agreement. Particular emphasis was placed by the 
Commission on the preparation of a campaign against child labour in Pakistan. The 
discussion also embraced drug exportation and support for international terrorism, 
both of which were related to Pakistan’s then links with the Taliban regime in
117Afghanistan and to a lesser extent the situation in Kashmir.
The actual Agreement, which is non-preferential and has no budget line associated
1 1 Q
with it, was initialled in April 1998. The discussion at that time primarily centred 
on strengthening economic and political ties between the parties. Although the 
Kashmir issue, the economic and social reforms undertaken by Pakistan and 
Community anti-dumping rules were also discussed, particular attention was once
114 Compare, for example, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Reports prior and 
subsequent to the coup. The Union also now recognises this, although it did not do so publicly 
before September 2001.
ll5See Zafar Ali Shah v. Pervez Musharaff, (2000) 52 PLD 869. The Supreme Court has never failed 
to validate a government which has come to power via a military coup in Pakistan.
116 See infra.
117 (1998) 7/8 EU Bull 1.4.13.
118 (1998) 1 E U  Bull 3.16.
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again paid to the question of child labour. At this stage the Commission proposed 
ECU 71 million to support a programme already launched by the Pakistani 
government, in conjunction with an earlier Commission project, the ILO and 
UNICEF, which aimed to improve the education and health of children and 
eradicate the use of such labour.119
The successful negotiation of the Agreement itself had to overcome a substantial 
number of differences between the parties. Two rounds of negotiations in 
December 1996 and April 1997 had failed due to a lack of agreement on a number 
of issues, namely intellectual property rights, maritime transport, the social clause 
and the declaration on illegal immigrants. Informal talks held in 1998 eventually
10f l  ♦led to a compromise. Differences of opinion are still apparent with regard to, for 
example, illegal immigrants.121 The agreed “essential elements” clause in the 
Agreement reaffirms the importance the Community and Pakistan attach to the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and “democratic 
principles.” 122 The democratic process (whatever the distinction between it and 
democratic principles) and its continued existence are not essential elements. 
Respect for democratic principles, however, is.
One of the main objectives of the Agreement is to “support Pakistan’s efforts for 
comprehensive and sustainable development, including economic and social 
development policies which take account of the poor and disadvantaged sections of 
its population, particularly women in these sections, as well as sustainable 
management of natural resources.” Women’s sectors are now accordingly 
receiving extra funding and have been highlighted as a priority area of funding, 
which is now conducted on an ad hocbasis under the ALA Regulation and EIDHR. 
As the legal basis for the Agreement is Articles 133, 228 and 179 EC, other issues 
can also be addressed. One of the most important provisions of the Agreement, as
119 On the earlier project see OJ C 305, 15/10/1996 p .122.
120 See COM (1998) 357.
121 The joint declaration on the readmission o f illegal immigrants is not considered to be a part o f the 
Agreement and Pakistan also made a unilateral declaration on this point.
122 Article 1.
]23 Article 2(2).
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far as the Community is concerned, is the provision concerning the protection of 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights, in conformity with 
international standards.124 With regard to the promotion and protection of human 
rights Article 4, which outlines the basis for development cooperation, is the most 
important. Projects which promote and emphasise health education, human 
resource development specifically for women, population welfare, environment and 
rural development specifically targeted towards the poorer and disadvantaged 
sections of the population are to be given priority for funding.
While the provisions of the Agreement are not in any way unique, what is worth 
noting is that the Agreement would, in all likelihood, have been ratified in 1999 by 
both parties, if the military coup of October 1999 had not taken place. The 
Community had obtained the inclusion of an “essential elements” clause and the 
Pakistani government was prepared, as the Community insisted, to initiate 
programmes aimed at alleviating child labour. In terms of human rights 
commitments, the Commission was satisfied. This is not withstanding the fact that 
Nawaz Sharif, the democratically elected leader of Pakistan at the time, was during 
his period in office systematically dismantling the country’s democratic 
institutions. His instigating of a constitutional crisis, due to his interference with 
the Supreme Court and compelling the Lahore High Court to dismiss the Chief 
Justice, was widely reported. Alterations to the Constitution and the make-up of the 
courts had ensured that there was no de facto method (in the absence of a coup) by 
which to call or force an election and thus remove Sharif from power. Amnesty 
International, in a report on Pakistan at the time, noted a “very sharp downturn in 
the protection of human rights under the Sharif regime”, with NGOs “routinely 
being harassed and very high levels of corruption”. The EU Presidency, 
however, ignoring the bigger picture limited itself at this time to issuing a statement 
expressing its concern at the problem of “honour killings” which the Sharif
124 Article 3(4)(b).
125 The EU Election Observer Group in the Pakistani election of 1997, which swept Sharif to power, 
considered that although malpractice existed, on the whole the election was fair. OJ C 373, 
9/12/1997 p. 19.
126 See the Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act, 1997.
127 Amnesty International, World Report 2000-Pakistan.
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government had refused to declare as murder.128 The Community was prepared to 
negotiate with the Sharif government and apparently turn a blind eye to some of its 
activities, despite concerns from its delegation in Islamabad, so long as the 
Pakistani government was prepared to make a basic commitment to human rights
10Qand democratic principles.
The initialled Agreement was not signed for three years. The first delay on the part 
of the Community was due to the kidnapping of a prominent Pakistani journalist, 
Najam Sethi, who had been very critical of the government. Sethi was kidnapped 
by a group, who are widely suspected to have been acting on the instructions of 
Sharif. The constitutional crisis, referred to above, which further undermined the 
rule of law and separation of powers, barely raised an eyebrow in the Union.130 The 
kidnapping of a journalist, however, provoked an international response which 
eventually led to his release.131 The resolution of this incident was followed by 
nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan, which are discussed below, and later in 
October 1999 by the military coup. The Community’s original stance was that it 
would simply not countenance signature of the Agreement until a legitimate 
democratic government was installed.
From the perspective of ethical values, the entire episode of negotiating the 
Agreement was fraught with problems. The Community, as far as it was concerned, 
when dealing with the Sharif government, was negotiating with a regime 
legitimately in power. That is certainly true, but the danger signs were more than 
apparent that Sharif was engaging in and behind some very unsavoury practices. 
Extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions were widely being used 
against opposition politicians. The fact that Sharif had come to power via 
Community observed elections seemed to counter that. If ultimately the regime 
engaged in widespread and systematic breaches on a scale beyond those already
128 Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 99/140.
1291 am grateful to the delegation official who disclosed this.
130 There are no Presidency statements or declarations on this issue.
131 The Presidency issued a Declaration on this matter, reproduced as EFPB Doc., 99/073. Sethi 
became part o f a subsequent Amnesty International campaign.
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occurring, then from the Community’s perspective the “essential elements” clause 
which had been agreed upon could be invoked. The Pakistani nuclear tests of May 
1998, however, ensured that they did not have to rely upon the clause.
3.2.1.(a) The Third-Generation Agreement and the Pakistani Nuclear 
Tests.
Further to Pakistan’s six nuclear tests in response to India’s five tests in May 1998,
the Union unequivocally threatened to take negative action against Pakistan.
Signature of the initialled Agreement was completely off the agenda. The
Presidency issued a statement in May 1998 following the nuclear tests and again in 
1 1 0June of that year. The Council also adopted a common position concerning the
EU’s contribution to the promotion of non-proliferation and confidence building in
111 _the South-Asia region. The Presidency statement condemned the tests which it 
considered ran counter to the wishes of the 149 States which had signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).134 The Council felt that India 
undermined stability in the region and that Pakistan had made it worse. It was not 
in the common position, however, that the Union threatened to take negative 
measures but in the Presidency statements it issued. If such commitments had been 
undertaken in common positions this would oblige the Union to take further action 
in accordance with its terms. Presidency statements thus allowed condemnation and 
a threat to be issued without any legal obligation to pursue the matter further. The 
Presidency in its statement of 29 May 1998 assured India and Pakistan that it would 
take all necessary measures, if they did not ratify the CTBT without conditions. 
The statement condemned the nuclear tests as it was felt they posed a “grave threat 
to international peace and security” The Presidency asked the Commission to 
consider review of the GSP following India’s tests and now asked it to open and 
extend this consideration to Pakistan as well. After India’s tests the Presidency
132 98/606/CFSP (1998) 5 EU Bull 1.3.17 and (1998) 6 EU  Bull 1.4.19.
133 OJ L 290, 29/10/1998 p .l. Also see the Conclusions o f the Cardiff European Council, reproduced 
as EFPB Doc., 98/103.
134 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1996, GA Resolution A/RES/50/245. The treaty is not 
yet in force.
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statement had condemned India but did not hint at suspending the Agreement with 
India. The Member States instead worked for a delay in consideration of loans to
IOC
India from the World Bank. As a consequence of the Indian tests, the Council
had attempted to persuade Pakistan not to carry out tests by asking the Commission
to expedite signature of the EC-Pakistan Agreement and to examine the scope for
enhanced development and economic assistance. Other concerns over human
rights, which had already delayed the signing of the Agreement with Pakistan,
would be set aside in an attempt to persuade it not to test such weapons. It is
difficult to see how subsequent nuclear tests by Pakistan would have breached the
Agreement, which had been initialled, if it had already entered into force.
1Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
and the CTBT was always considered by the Union to be an essential political 
prerequisite for the ratification of the Agreement with Pakistan. It had repeatedly 
been raised in Troika meetings and Commission officials were adamant that while it 
was not a legal requirement for Pakistan to ratify those treaties, politically it was
117very desirable, if not essential. The timing for the Community was thus ideal, as 
it could further utilise the Agreement for the purposes of leverage.
There was certainly no attempt on the Community’s behalf to suspend the
Agreement with India, which was already in force, and in which the relevant
provisions are very similar. Following Pakistan’s tests, however, the Presidency
withdrew the request to the Commission to expedite the Agreement with Pakistan
and asked for an examination of the possible suspension of the GSP, as well as
attempting to delay World Bank loans.138 The GSP Regulation clearly does not
110envisage the withdrawal of benefits in the event of nuclear testing. As a 
unilateral instrument, however, the Member States can lawfully withdraw the 
benefit of the GSP to a particular third State, if they so wish. The Commission did 
not re-open the GSP procedure as requested. The reason behind this is unclear. It
135 (1998) 5 EU Bull 1.3.9.
136 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, 1968, 729, UNTS 10485.
137 Interview, 15/4/2001 in Islamabad.
138 (1998) 6 EU Bull 1.4.19.
139 See Article 24, Council Regulation No. 2501/2001, OJ L 346, 31/12/2001 p .l.
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may be that the Commission did not wish to set a precedent, whereby the 
Community withdraws the GSP to express displeasure with a third State, for acts 
not envisaged in the text of the regulation. In any case the effect of such a response 
upon the Pakistani government would have been marginal at best. With regard to 
the Member States delaying World Bank loans to Pakistan, the very real fear of 
Pakistan defaulting on its other loan commitments ensured that any delay was not 
lengthy and it was soon business as usual.140
The reaction of the Union to the nuclear tests is interesting on a number of levels. 
At no stage did the Union consider Pakistan’s legitimate security interests. Its much 
larger, powerful and indeed hostile neighbour India had already tested such 
weapons. Admittedly this was a case of India sabre-rattling with an eye to China, 
rather than to Pakistan, but it was provocative at the very least and Pakistan felt 
exceptionally threatened. The Union has recognised and indeed provided scope for 
exceptions from treaty obligations based on security interests in the Association 
Agreements concluded under the Barcelona Process.141 Yet, no such allowances 
were made with regard to either India or Pakistan. The Union’s reactions and 
responses were far from consistent. The Union had no regard to Pakistan or India’s 
legal obligations in this regard. Neither is a party to the CTBT or NPT. 
Furthermore France, for example, is not party to the NPT either and only became a 
party to the CTBT after it had carried out nuclear tests in 1995. It does seem rather 
rich therefore, for the Union to insist that both India and Pakistan ratify treaties to 
which all of its own Member States are not a party. It is also the case that 
ratification of those treaties was not a central issue in negotiations on the third 
generation Agreement with India but it was with Pakistan. On another level, 
however, the reaction does demonstrate some consistency. The Presidency was as 
harsh on India after its nuclear tests as it was on Pakistan, despite the fact that it has 
far more to lose in trade terms with the former than the latter. In the case of 
Pakistan, the Union was still in a position to withhold the benefits it was about to 
grant under the initialled Cooperation Agreement and did so. Ultimately the GSP
140 In January 1999, the World Bank loaned Pakistan a further $350 million to help improve public 
sector governance. World Bank News Releases, Pakistan, 21/1/1999.
141 See Chapter Five.
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was not suspended and World Bank loans were not delayed with regard to either 
country. It should also not be overlooked that the Union was, for obvious reasons, 
unable to respond after France’s nuclear tests. The Union’s policy can be 
considered to be one of the containment of nuclear weapons i f  it is in a position to 
exert pressure.142
3.2.2. Signature of the Third-Generation Agreement with Pakistan.
Events subsequent to those discussed above display the relativity of ethical policies 
as far as relations between the Union and Pakistan are concerned. Within two 
weeks of the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 an EU 
Troika was in Pakistan. The General Affairs Council, meeting on the 8th and 9th of 
October 2001, completely reformulated policy towards Pakistan, among other 
States.143 The Council essentially wished to reaffirm its commitment to the “global 
coalition against terrorism” and considered global terror to pose a real challenge for 
it, as well as a threat to “our security and stability.”144 No other reason was 
considered necessary. The political decision was taken, regardless of all other 
considerations. Dialogue with Pakistan had to be “continued and developed” in 
particular, by signing the third-generation Agreement.145 In the Special Council 
Meeting of 12 September 2001, it had already been identified that the attack on the 
US was not only an attack on it but also “against humanity itself and the values and 
freedoms we all share.”146 The justification for the change in policy towards 
Pakistan was solely to ensure that the “coalition against terror” was effective.
142 Nuclear non-proliferation has been central to relations with, for example, North Korea, Iran and 
Libya. Nothing has, however, ever been publicly said about Israel’s possession o f such weapons. 
Also see Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP, On Support for IAEA Activities Under its Nuclear 
Safety Programme and in the Framework o f the EU Strategy Against Proliferation o f Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, OJ L 182, 19/5/2004 p.46.
143 The others are Iran and the Central Asian States. Relations with India were also identified as 
needing strengthening.
144 GAC, Conclusions 8-9/10/2001, para. 1.
145 Ibid., para. 8.
146 Declaration o f the Special European Council, 12/9/2001.
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In a Commission Communication of September 2001 concerning the GSP, for 
example, the justification given for including Pakistan among those States which 
benefit under the drugs incentive scheme, was to help “stabilise its economic and 
social structures and thus consolidate the institutions that uphold the rule of law.”147 
The argument is that by further engaging politically with Pakistan and providing 
additional development aid, the Community will help to stabilise the region and 
more specifically Pakistan and pave the way for democratic reforms to be 
effectively implemented. If this is the case, it is difficult to see why this did not 
occur to the Council and Commission prior to September 2001. After all, the 
conflict in Kargil had already taken place and led to exceptionally high tensions 
between Pakistan and India. If they wanted to restore international peace and 
stability to the region this would have been an appropriate step to take earlier.
The turnaround in relations with Pakistan is not, however, as stark as it may at first 
seem. The extent of the Community’s engagement and funding of projects in 
Pakistan during the period between the expiry of the second-generation Agreement 
and the signing of the third, also illustrates a difference of approach towards 
military dictatorships. In Myanmar the Community is, by and large, funding 
humanitarian work. In Pakistan it was still clearly working with the military 
government in development projects. In this sense, the Commission is in practice 
differentiating between military regimes, probably depending on the extent of their 
repressiveness. What they are not prepared to normally do now, however, is to sign 
a bilateral Agreement with a military government. What the Community objected 
to in the case of Pakistan, was not the government in power or its policies per se, 
but the manner in which it came to power. They simply did not wish to be seen to 
be dealing openly with a military regime. This would open a Pandora’s box as it 
would lead to exceptional difficulties in attempting to differentiate why it is 
concluding Agreements with one military regime and not another? The simpler 
approach was not to sign any Agreements with military regimes and in practice to 
cooperate with more moderate ones by implementing and funding programmes
147 See COM (2001)0131, Explanatory Memorandum, p.2. The Communication was published on 
25/9/2001
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which are directed towards the most disadvantaged sectors of society. Thus in 
Pakistan €195 million was primarily being aimed at social sector development, such 
as primary education, eradicating child labour, reproductive health and drug 
rehabilitation. Other projects which included road and school building, 
development programmes concerned with the Social Action Programme aiming to 
improve the quality of elementary education, health, population and sanitation and
1 dfiwater quality were also being funded.
Despite the still widespread violation of the values that the Union wishes to 
promote in Pakistan, many positive moves were made under the military regime 
both prior to and subsequent to the ratification of the third-generation Agreement. 
Extra-judicial executions have declined sharply since 2000, a National Commission 
on the Status of Women has been set up to protect women’s rights and in April 
2000 it was announced that honour crimes were to be tried as murder, something 
the Union and especially the European Parliament has long pushed for. Bonded 
labour remains a major problem, but as Commission officials admit, this has no 
short-term or immediate solutions and is more a case of structural and social 
reform.149 What is most interesting is that independent NGOS have noted 
widespread reforms and a commitment to improve human rights by the military 
regime.150 In some respects it is arguable that the Union prefers to openly deal with 
a democratically elected but despotic and corrupt government, as opposed to a non- 
democratically elected regime which has a commitment to societal and structural 
reform, which is similar in scope to the policies the Union wishes to promote.
The irony, however, is that General Musharaff, with his new found international 
legitimacy, is now engaged in the systematic dismantling of the separation of 
powers and amending the Constitution so that he cannot effectively be removed 
from power. The regime is making the most of its current immunity from US and
148 This information was derived from the external relations web page o f the Commission in June 
2001 .
149 Interview, 15/4/2001 in Islamabad.
150 Human Rights Watch, Annual Report-Pakistan, (2001).
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Union criticism.151 This is more than apparent if one considers the elections held as 
part of the “roadmap to democracy” which the Union has endorsed. The elections 
held in October 2002 were welcomed by the Presidency and considered to be a 
“step in the gradual transition to full democracy” although it did note “some 
concerns about reports of manipulation”.152 The Union’s election observance 
mission (EUEOM) was much more critical. It is worthy of note that a Presidency 
statement was only issued after the Mission’s preliminary report and not after the 
final more comprehensive and critical report was published.153 The judgment of the 
Supreme Court validating the coup of October 1999, which as mentioned above is 
now relied upon by the Union in part to legitimise relations, especially forbade the 
changing of the fundamental features of the Constitution. Musharaff has done so on 
numerous occasions to ensure that he maintains overall political control despite the 
swearing in of Zafarullah Khan Jamali as Prime Minister.154 The EUEOM had 
serious misgivings about the Legal Framework Order 2002155 and considered that it 
had “grave concerns about the process and that “at best Pakistan will be a ‘guided 
democracy’ far short of international standards.”156 Serious concerns were also 
expressed by the Commonwealth Observer Group,157 which stated that “..we have 
observed an incomplete democratic process. We look forward to the restoration of 
democracy in Pakistan.”158 As a consequence Pakistan was not readmitted back to
151 The Council still issue routine statements on relations with India, for example, but has not been 
critical with regard to “internal matters”. The one exception is the Presidency Statement of  
20/4/2004 on the conviction and sentencing to 23 years imprisonment o f Javed Hashmi (an 
opposition politician) for treason and mutiny. The statement is worded in notably muted terms.
152 Presidency Declaration, 16/10/2002.
153 Both reports are available at http://www.eueom.org.pk.
154 Musharaff, for example, declared himself President in June 2001 contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
judgment and has subsequently pushed through the National Security Council Act, 2004, which 
indefinitely institutionalises the role o f the military in civilian politics.
155 The Order essentially manipulated the electoral process to ensure that overall political control was 
maintained by the military. The Order in Section 5(3) forbids any legal challenge to it.
156 EUEOM, Pakistan National and Provincial Assembly Election, 10 October 2002, Final Report, 
P-17
157 Commonwealth Observer Group, Report o f  the Commonwealth Observer Group-Pakistan 
National and Provisional Assembly Elections, (2000).
158 Ibid, p.47
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the Commonwealth after the elections.159 Yet, the EU Presidency subsequently 
welcomed the “transfer of power” to a civilian regime when Jamali was sworn in as 
Prime Minister.160
This sequence of events displays the relativity of an ethical foreign policy. The 
primary purpose of any foreign policy is the defence of the physical and political 
character of the State.161 The exportation of values and the achievement of a stable 
world order will always be subservient to the physical protection of the State. As 
noted above, the Special Council meeting of 12 September 2001 noted that the 
allegiance against terror had to be as effective as possible. Due to the physical 
proximity of Pakistan to Afghanistan and the links between the Pakistani 
government and its former protege the Taliban, Pakistani cooperation was 
imperative if effective action was to be taken against Al-Qaida. Notwithstanding 
their concerns, the Member States of the Union had to upgrade their relations with 
Pakistan and needed enticements to that end. This has consequently placed 
limitations upon the Union’s ability to act against it and is potentially of serious 
detriment to the situation in Pakistan. The Union has, in the past, actually had 
notable success in pursuing its ethical objectives in Pakistan through a combination 
of targeted condemnation, dialogue and further complementing this with the 
funding of appropriate projects. Results have not been achieved across the board 
but with regard to particular situations. The following discussion will look briefly 
at the problems of blasphemy and child labour, as examples of how the Union has
159 See Concluding Statement o f the Twentieth Meeting o f the Commonwealth Ministerial Action 
Group (CMAG) on the Harare Declaration, 1/11/2002. The US State Department did not send its 
own observer mission. Also see Human Rights Watch, Pakistan: Entire Election Process “Deeply 
Flawed” 9/10/2002. The Commonwealth, with reservations, readmitted Pakistan in June 2004 under 
very strong pressure from Australia, the UK and externally the US. This was reward for its role in 
the “war on terror.” This was only made possible though due to the thaw in relations between India 
and Pakistan.
160 Presse 366 P172/02 EU, also see EFPB Doc., 02/375. The military regime has been referred to, 
by the EU, as the “present interim government” see, National Indicative Programme, 2003-2005, 
p.7.
161 See Denza, E., The Intergovernmental Pillars o f  the European Union, (2002) p.85.
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made a noteworthy contribution to the protection of some of the values it wishes to 
protect in Pakistan.
3.3. The Union’s Successes in Promoting Ethical Values in 
Pakistan.
3.3.1. The Pakistani Law on Blasphemy and the Union.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance has considered that the
blasphemy laws in Pakistan are applied in a prejudicial manner so as to persecute
minority religious groups, in particular, Christians and Ahmadhis.162 The European
Parliament, Council and Troika have always expressed disquiet about this issue and
the Union has responded to this situation, in a concerted way, on two occasions:
first in 1995 and then subsequently in 1998. The Union’s earlier intervention led to
a marked improvement in the position of Ahmadhis in Pakistan, although not of the
Christian minority. Ahmadhis are in a more vulnerable position, as compared to
Christians, as they are considered by many to be heretics; something which has
1always been considered to be punishable by execution in orthodox Islam. Early 
in 1995 the Union carried out a series of confidential demarches with the Pakistani 
authorities on the issue of religious persecution and, in particular, the law on 
blasphemy. They were assured at the highest level that adequate steps would be 
taken, if not to repeal the law, then at least to force through amendments and give 
clear instructions, at the administrative level, to prevent any misuse of the law. The 
issue was also debated openly, for example, during the meeting of the EU-Asia 
Directors Troika in late October 1995. The validity of the administrative approach 
to tackle the problem was clear, with many at the time suspected of committing 
such a crime, being acquitted. These steps were duly welcomed by a public 
declaration of the EU which undertook to continue monitoring the law’s
162 See Report o f the Special Rapporteur, supra note 104.
163 For detailed discussion see, Eltayeb, M., A Human Rights Approach to Combating Religious 
Persecution, (2001) p.55.
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application.164 Although the persecution of Ahmadhis had not been eradicated by 
the time of the Union’s 1998 interventions, the situation had improved.
Various resolutions of the European Parliament led in 1998 to the issue being 
reopened, this time with particular focus on the Christian minority in Pakistan. The 
Union Troika again carried out a demarche on the blasphemy laws to the Pakistani 
Minister of Law and expressed a “great deal of discomfort” over the presence of the 
death penalty for the crime.165 The Commission also sent a delegation on a fact­
finding mission to Faisalabad concerning the infamous cases of Ayub Masih and the 
self-immolation of the Archbishop of Faisalabad, John Joseph.166 The Council did 
admit, however, that despite the issuing of several demarches on this issue, which 
had been raised systematically in the institutional political dialogue with the 
Pakistani authorities, little had been achieved despite assurances to the contrary by
t A7the government.
The later intervention did not substantially improve the situation for the Christian 
minority. The failure of the Pakistani authorities to suitably amend the blasphemy 
laws application with regard to the Christian minority, is not, however, due to the 
shortcomings of the Union’s approach. Persecution of all religious minorities in 
Pakistan is a direct consequence of the increasing Islamisation of policies which has 
been pursued, for political reasons, since the 1970s by various governments.168 
What is important is that the Union was in a position of influence, which is why the 
commitment to reform was made by the Pakistani government. In one case reform 
did take place on a practical level, in another it did not. When the European
164 See EFPB Docs., 93/135, 94/041, 94/340 and 96/033. The issue is still raised whenever the 
opportunity presents itself, see, for example, EP 2002/C93 E/69.
165 OJ C 96, 8/4/1999 p. 86.
166 Ayub Masih was falsely accused o f blaspheming Islam (due to a dispute over land) and sentenced 
to death in 1996 by a court in Sahiwal, Punjab. He subsequently became a cause celebre for the 
global campaign concerning the prejudicial application o f Pakistan’s blasphemy laws against it 
Christian minority. He was acquitted in 2002. Archbishop John Joseph set himself alight to gain 
national and international attention for the persecution o f the Christian minority in Pakistan.
167 See OJC 13, 18/1/1999 p.136.
168 See, among others, Eltayeb, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 163, p.55.
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Parliament passed a resolution on the freedom of religion and human rights in 
Pakistan in June 1998169 this was integrated into the discussion between the EC and 
the Pakistani government, as the initialled third-generation Agreement had not then 
been concluded. Dialogue and discussion led to an atmosphere which was 
conducive to a commitment to reform and the undertaking of measures, even 
though satisfactory reform was not eventually forthcoming. What is particularly 
worthy of note, is that the issue of blasphemy has no direct link with any other 
issue. It is a case of rights, which the Union considers to be fundamental, being 
violated. It has thus pursued discussion on that issue with little or no benefit to it 
and the Member States.
3.3.2. Child Labour in Pakistan and the Union.
The situation in Pakistan with regard to child labour, especially bonded child 
labour, is notoriously bad. Some estimates put the figure at 20 million bonded child 
labourers.170 While the international community has been primarily concerned with 
those children working in the carpet, textile and football industries, the 
mistreatment and working conditions of those in mines and brick kilns is equally, if
171not significantly, worse. Adult bonded labour is equally widespread yet has 
received relatively little international attention. When the ICFTU complained to the 
Commission with regard to Myanmar, vis-a-vis the GSP, it simultaneously 
complained about Pakistan. The European Parliament in 1996 also passed a 
resolution on the application of the social clause in the GSP to Pakistan and
177  •Myanmar. This led to the opening of an investigation into practices in Pakistan. 
There was particular concern at the level of forced and bonded child labour, which 
it was considered breached ILO Conventions 29 and 105. The Economic and Social 
Committee (ESC) in its opinion on the Proposal for a Regulation Withdrawing the 
GSP From Burma173 asked for the investigation on Pakistan to be reopened, as it
169 Resolution B4-0614, 18/6/1998.
170 See Contemporary Forms o f  Slavery, supra note 104.
171 Ibid.
172 OJC 17, 22/1/1996 p.201.
173 OJC 133,28/4/1997 p.47.
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was not convinced that adequate measures had been taken.174 While the European 
Parliament and ESC pushed for further measures, the Council, for the reasons 
discussed below, did not proceed with withdrawing the GSP. Such a step would 
have had important consequences for both the Union and Pakistan.
The Union is the largest importer of Pakistani textiles and arrangements exist to 
regulate this trade.175 Furthermore, the Community must tread carefully if it wishes 
to suspend the GSP vis-a-vis Pakistan. Such practices, which are not State-policy 
as is the case in Myanmar, are also widespread outside of Pakistan. Furthermore, a 
ban on products produced by such labour would cause other social problems within 
Pakistan.176 Withdrawing the GSP would also affect industries other than those 
which were being targeted. Dialogue and appropriately targeted projects which 
have in the past produced significant results are therefore the preferred option.
In a Troika meeting in October 1995, for example, the EU strongly expressed its 
concerns regarding child labour and the case of Iqbal Masih to the Pakistani 
authorities.177 The threat of withdrawing the GSP was put off, however, as the 
Pakistani authorities undertook measures in response to earlier criticism. The 
Commission considered that this was, temporarily at least, enough. As with the 
blasphemy laws the situation was kept under review.178 As an issue which has been 
specifically targeted by the Commission, the ILO and UNDP for funding, especially 
in assisting the enforcement of laws which prohibit such activities, the Community 
has achieved significant results. The problem has been far from eradicated, but
174 Ibid, para. 12.
175 Memorandum of Understanding Between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan on Transitional Arrangements in the Field o f Market Access for Textile and Clothing 
Products, OJ L 345, 29/12/2001 p.81.
176 See OJ C 305, 15/10/1996 p.122 where the Commission acknowledges this.
177 See EFPB Doc., 95/336 and OJ C l51, 19/6/1996 p.276. Iqbal Masih was an ex-bonded child 
labourer who escaped and became an international spokesperson for the global campaign against 
child labour. He was assassinated, in 1995, aged 12 in Pakistan. He had been awarded the Reebok 
Human Rights Youth in Action Award, 1994 and was posthumously awarded (alongside Anne 
Frank) in 2000 the first World Children’s Prize.
178 See OJC 21, 22/1/1998 p. 148.
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governments in Pakistan have undertaken steps and some reform due to cajoling by 
the Troika and others, and consistent and systematic discussion on the issue in 
institutional dialogue between Pakistan and the Union.179
In the above examples a sparing use of condemnation, a substantial amount of 
dialogue and funding, where appropriate, have secured some improvement in the 
situation. Commission officials consider that in their discussions, Pakistani officials 
are frank and constructive in their approach. The Pakistanis are also considered to 
be receptive and indeed obliging, when either the Troika or the Commission have 
raised such issues with them. It is generally considered by the Commission, 
however, that while there is usually a will to undertake some reform, the requisite 
capacity to give effect to it does not always exist.180 There is currently, however, 
little need for the Pakistanis to be receptive to the Union’s demands if they do not 
want to. The Community while still funding valuable projects in Pakistan has, for 
the time being at least, lost a substantial amount of its political leverage in relations 
with it. This state of affairs will continue to exist while Pakistan is perceived to be 
a vital partner in the “war against terror”.
4. Nigeria.
As an ACP State, Nigeria’s relationship with the Union has primarily been through 
the Lome/Cotonou Conventions. These are between the ACP States, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the Community and Member States. Nigeria, one of the 
most populous and important African nations, has been subjected to the full range 
o f Community and Union punitive measures. These have subsequently been 
revoked by the Union, as it was felt that enough reforms had taken place for them to 
be no longer appropriate. The following section will look briefly at the political and 
economic situation in Nigeria and provide some background to put the following
179 For example, in May 2000, the military government announced the National Policy and Action 
Plan to Combat Child Labour to which the EU then contributed €990,000.
180 I base this upon several interviews with desk-officers in Brussels and members o f the mission in 
Islamabad.
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analysis into context. This is followed by a discussion of the Lome/Cotonou 
institutions and instruments and the action in that fora as a response to events in 
Nigeria. The discussion finally examines the punitive and positive action taken 
under the CFSP and Community pillars.
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has enjoyed several periods of democracy 
although military rule has been more common.181 In June 1993 Presidential 
Elections, organised by a military government, were held and subsequently 
annulled. In November 1993, as a consequence of the ensuing turmoil and civil 
disturbances, the then Nigerian Defence Minister Sani Abacha assumed power. He 
dissolved all democratic political institutions and replaced elected governors with 
military officers. In late 1994 the military government established the Ogoni Civil 
Disturbances Special Tribunal. This was set up to try prominent Ogoni activists, 
including Ken Saro-Wiwa, for their alleged roles in the killings of four politicians in 
May 1994. In October 1995 the tribunal sentenced Saro-Wiwa and eight others to 
death and they were subsequently executed in November 1995. In 1995 the military 
government also alleged that 40 military officers and civilians, mostly journalists 
and human rights activists were engaged in a coup plot. A secret tribunal convicted 
most of the accused and several death sentences were handed down.
In June 1998 Abacha died and was replaced by General Abubakar who undertook a 
very different course of action from his predecessor. The Provisional Ruling 
Council, (PRC) commuted the death sentences of a number of political opponents 
and also released a substantial number of political prisoners. The government also 
took several steps towards restoring worker’s rights, which had deteriorated 
seriously under previous military regimes. In August 1998 the National Electoral 
Commission (NEC) was ordered to conduct elections which were held in May 1999 
and won by Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who was sworn in as the democratically 
elected President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He was subsequently re­
elected in 2003.182
181 Nigeria was under military rule between 1966 and 1979 and between 1983 and 1999.
182 The account is derived in part from the Reports o f the Special Rapporteurs on Nigeria, A/51538, 
E/CN.4/1997/62/Add. 1 and E/CN.4/1997/62, Skogly, S., “Complexities in Human Rights Protection:
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Nigeria currently has a per capita GNP of $310, placing it 174th out of the 208 
economies measured by the World Bank.183 It is estimated that 70% of the 
population lives below the internationally recognised absolute poverty line of US$ 1
1 Q A
per day. In terms of human rights obligations, it is a party to the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights;186 the Convention Against Torture;187 the Children’s Convention;188 the 
Women’s Convention;189 five of the ILO’s core Conventions;190 and the African 
Charter.191 There have, in the last few years, been widespread breaches of human 
rights in Nigeria, as defined in its international legal obligations. The scale of the 
violations since late 1999, while serious, has been relatively minor compared to the 
situation prior to then. The general view is that the situation has improved 
significantly since the return to democratic government in 1999. The concluding 
comments of the Human Rights Committee,192 Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights,193 Committee on Women’s Rights194 and Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination,195 which relate to the period prior to 1998, 
paint a very different situation. Arbitrary arrest, summary execution and other extra 
judicial killings, torture, restrictions on the freedom of expression and association, 
widespread discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race and gender, executive
Actors and Rights Involved in the Ogoni Conflict in Nigeria” (1997) 15 NQHR, 47 and Osaghae, E., 
Crippled Giant, Nigeria Since Independence, (1998).
183 World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, 2004.
184 Ibid.
185 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
186 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 UNTS 3.
187 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1984, 1465 UNTS 85.
188 Supra note 16.
189 Supra note 15.
190 Convention No. 100, Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951, 165 UNTS 304 and ILO Convention 
Nos., 29, 87, 98 and 105, supra note 102.
191 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, 1520 UNTS No. 26, 363.
192 Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.64, CCPR/C/79/Add.65 and A/51/40 paras. 267-305.
193 Doc.E/C.12/l/Add.23
194 Doc. A/53/3 8/Rev. 1 paras. 138-174. See subsequently, CEDAW/C/2004/I/CRP.3/Add.2.
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control over the judiciary, as well as an ineffective and poorly functioning judiciary 
were among a host of problems identified as being widespread. The situation was 
such that a Special Rapporteur was appointed in 1995 by the Commission on 
Human Rights solely to deal with Nigeria and the reports of the Special Rapporteurs 
on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions and independence of judges and 
lawyers confirm the extent of the problems that existed at the time.196
Nigeria’s largest export in terms of value to the EU is petroleum, a trade which 
since 1990 has been worth at least €2 billion per annum. In 2002 the trade was 
worth just under €4 billion. Petroleum products accounts for over 85% of the value 
of Nigerian exports to the Union. The importance of the EU to Nigeria as a trade 
partner can also be seen from the fact that the Union is the largest importer of, 
among other Nigerian exports, cocoa beans, wood, aluminium, leather and 
crustaceans for human consumption. The Union is thus vital to the sustainability 
and survival of the Nigerian industries involved. The Union between 1990 and 
1998 annually exported over €2 billion worth of goods to Nigeria. Since 1998 the 
amount of trade has steadily increased. In 2000 and 2001 it was worth over €6 and 
in 2002 it was worth over €5 billion. The diversity of products exported to that 
country, however, means that the Nigerian market is unlikely to sustain or be
• 1Q7crucial to any particular industries in the Union.
4.1. Dialogue Between Nigeria and the Union.
Although a number of other fora, such as summits between the European and 
African Unions198 and Union relations with NEPAD199 exist, the most important
195 Doc.A/50/18, paras 598-636.
196 See documents, A/51538, E/CN.4/1997/62/Add. 1 and E/CN.4/1997/62.
197 Statistics derived from http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/stat/extrd99/import/ng.htm, 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/bodv/countrv/countrv statistics en.cfm?CID=ng&lng 
=en&type=csp&status
198 Summits have been held in 2000, 2003 and 2004. See further COM(2003)316.
199 The New African Partnership for Development. See, for example, Presidency Statement, 
25/9/2002.
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fora for dialogue and discussion between the Union Member States and Nigeria are 
the institutions established by the successive Lome/Cotonou Conventions. The 
institutional structure of the Lome/Cotonou Conventions establishes a Council of 
Ministers (ACP-EC Council, formally known as the Lome Council), a Committee 
o f Ambassadors and a Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA).200 The ACP-EC 
Council consists of members of the Council and Commission of the EU, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, a representative of each of the ACP States. The ACP-EC 
Council’s main functions are to conduct political dialogue, adopt policy guidelines
and take the necessary decisions for the implementation of the provisions of the
0 0 1Treaty. The Committee of Ambassadors is composed, on the one hand, of the 
permanent representative of each Member State to the EU and a Commission 
representative and, on the other, the Head of the Mission of each ACP State to the 
EU. The main function of the Committee is to assist the ACP-EC Council in the 
fulfilment of its tasks and carry out any mandate entrusted to it.202 The JPA is 
composed of equal numbers of EU and ACP representatives. It is composed of 
members of the European Parliament, on the one hand, and, on the other, Members 
of Parliament or failing this, representatives designated by the parliament of each 
ACP State. The JPA is a consultative body which aims to promote democratic 
processes through dialogue and consultation. It can and does adopt resolutions and 
make recommendations to the ACP-EC Council with a view to achieving the 
objectives of the Agreement.
As discussed in Chapter Three, Article 366a of Lome IV (bis) established a 
consultation procedure, although it was not always used.204 It was not utilised in the 
case of Nigeria, as the Member States initially through EPC and later the Union’s 
CFSP and Community, decided to implement unilateral punitive measures. The 
discussion will initially deal with the measures that were taken by the Lome
200 Articles 15, 16 and 17, Cotonou Agreement and Articles 30, 31 and 32, Lom6 IV (bis) 
respectively.
201 Article 15 Cotonou.
202 Article 16 Cotonou.
203 Article 17 Cotonou.
204 The equivalent is Article 96 Cotonou. The EU suspended all aid to Niger, for example, within 48 
hours o f a coup in 1996. See (1996) No. 157 The Courier, 7.
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institutions before examining those adopted under EPC, the CFSP and the 
Community.
4.2. Action Under Lome IV.
Lome IV, which was signed at the end of 1989, was concluded for a period of ten 
years, with a Mid-Term Review due in 1994. Human rights and democracy were 
not essential elements of the Agreement (they became so in Lome IV bis) but the 
formula in Article 5, Lome IV leaves little doubt as to the importance of their role 
in the cooperation that had been established between the States party to it. Article 
5, however, was not formulated so as to impose concrete obligations. 
Consequently, it was difficult to determine exactly when a State did not comply 
with the general obligations laid down in it.205
The Article 366a procedure was not yet available to respond to the annulling of the 
elections in Nigeria in 1993. Rather than denounce the Agreement with Nigeria, 
upon six months notice, which was provided for in Lome IV, the Community and 
its Member States simply decided upon unilateral measures. The Member States 
did not engage in any dialogue and discussion, concerning the suspension of 
Nigeria, but reached their own judgment as to what Nigeria had done. Despite 
repeated requests by the ACP States for the establishment of a judicial body to 
determine material breaches of the Convention by either party, the Member States 
and Community have always resisted, preferring to maintain a unilateral power of 
assessment for themselves.207
It is arguable, however, that even if Article 366a had been in place, it would not 
have been used. Article 366a and the decision implemented to give effect to the
^no
procedure is permeated with compromise over questions of competence.
205 Arts, K., Integrating Human Rights into Development Cooperation: The Case o f  the Lome 
Conventions, (2000) p. 197.
206 Article 367, Lome IV. This was invoked in the case o f Haiti.
207 See Holland, M., The European Union and Third World, (2002) p. 123.
208 See Chapter Three.
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Furthermore, it is difficult to consider that the annulling of the elections would have 
constituted a manifest breach of the essential elements of the Convention at the 
time. In the case of Nigeria it had already been negotiated and concluded with a 
military regime. The military’s continued rule of the country did not amount to a 
fundamental change in circumstance as required by Article 62 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. As Lome IV had been concluded in 
1989, the mid-term review obviously could not exclude States already party to it. 
Once changes to the Convention came into force, however, it was a different matter 
for subsequent events, especially as the Union’s approach to non-democratic 
regimes had undergone a transformation in the intervening years.
Other measures were adopted by the Lome institutions. The problem in discussing 
dialogue and action in the ACP institutions, however, is that little tends to enter the 
public domain other than the resolutions and minutes of the meetings of the JPA.209 
It is thus difficult to know the content of the discussion on Nigeria in the then Lome 
Council, although it is likely that confidential measures were adopted.210 Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the debates were heated and intense but few, if any, concrete
O i lmeasures were adopted. The records of the JPA, however, do reveal that there 
was substantial disagreement between EU representatives and those of the ACP 
States.
Since 1996 there has been a tendency to ensure that resolutions are adopted in the
JPA by a procedure which is both secret and split (ACP and EU separately), in
010response apparently to increasingly critical individual country resolutions. This 
has resulted in it becoming more difficult to adopt critical country resolutions in the 
JPA, as it requires a separate majority among both the ACP and the EU members. 
Arts considers that a resolution critical of Nigeria was not adopted because of this
209 The minutes published in the Official Journal do not always provide any real information.
210 Arts, Integrating Human Rights, supra note 205, p.254 notes, that measures on individual country 
situations are not common and usually in non-traceable documents or other confidential settings.
2111 am grateful to a Commission desk-officer for this information.
212 See S.H. “Joint Assembly in Lome, October 27-30: A Harmonious Prelude” (1998) No. 167 The 
Courier, 11, the minutes o f the meeting at OJ C 96, 30/3/1998 p.l and Arts, Integrating Human 
Rights, supra note 205, p.248.
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procedure in the October 1997 JPA in Togo.213 Conversely, however, a resolution 
was adopted in September 1996 in Luxembourg prior to the procedure being used 
and interestingly also in April 1998 at the JPA in Mauritius, where the ACP 
members voted in favour of condemning Nigeria by 24 votes to 23 with 3 
abstentions. The EU members unanimously voted for the measure.214
The resolutions adopted by the JPA are surprisingly condemnatory of the Nigerian 
authorities. Secret procedures have allowed representatives of States who would 
not normally publicly condemn Nigeria, to do so without repercussions. It is clear 
that the secret procedure, which was designed to stop condemnatory resolutions, did 
not achieve that objective, due to opposition to the activities of the Nigerian regime 
by other ACP States.215 The resolution adopted in the Luxembourg ACP-EU 
Meeting of September 1996 is typical of the measures adopted by the JPA. The 
JPA had been unable to agree a resolution condemning Nigeria in 1995, as 
differences between the ACP and EU members had arisen and greater support 
seemed to be forthcoming for the view that this was tantamount to meddling with a 
State’s internal affairs.216 It is likely, however, that the failure to adopt such a 
measure was because the vote was not secret and the “internal affairs” argument 
was relied upon so as to not condemn a fellow ACP member. The other 
distinguishing factor, which may well have been decisive for some ACP States, was 
the execution of the Ogoni leaders. The importance of the 1996 resolution lies not 
in the fact that it insisted that the Nigerian regime respect human rights and restore 
democracy but in making numerous recommendations to the EU institutions. In 
particular, that international sanctions designed to isolate the Nigerian authorities 
economically, diplomatically and politically, if applied effectively could bring 
pressure to establish a democratic constitutional regime and put a halt to its human
“717rights abuses. It also called for a total ban on arms exports to Nigeria from the 
European Union, including exports relating to contracts signed before the then
213 Ibid., p.248, footnote 137.
214 See OJC 24, 2/9/1998 p.12.
215 See, for example, Joint Assembly Resolution on Nigeria, OJ C 62, 27/2/1997 p.25.
216 See OJ C 96, 1/4/1996 p.286.
217 See the Preamble, para. 8.
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embargo came into effect, which was aimed at the lacuna in the common positions 
which had then already been adopted.218
The JPA Resolution further recognised the complicity of EU based multi-nationals 
in the human rights abuses and environmental degradation in Nigeria. Shell, in 
particular, has been highlighted by Greenpeace as being complicit in many
“510atrocities. No other resolution or measure adopted by the EU Member States, m 
any other fora, including the JPA,220 has addressed this issue. The Abacha regime 
may have been brutal and repressive but EU based companies were allegedly 
profiting handsomely from it. The practical results of the resolutions of the JPA, 
which are legally non-binding, however, are negligible. While in psychological 
terms they were important in the context of the discussion of human rights and 
democracy in the JPA, they did not have any real effect. In any case, the first 
adopted resolutions were after the execution of the Ogoni activists when common 
positions had already been adopted by the Council under the CFSP. It is to these 
the discussion turns.
4.3. Action Under the CFSP.
The annulling of the election of June 1993 led to the Presidency issuing a statement 
“deploring” the decision to annul the elections and suspend the National Executive 
Council (NEC).221 In July 1993, a month after the elections, the Community and its 
Member States decided to suspend all military cooperation with Nigeria, as well as 
impose visa restrictions for the members of the military and security forces and 
suspend all visits by members of the military. Furthermore all further cooperation 
aid would be suspended, although allowances were made for projects which 
promoted human rights and democracy.222 The initial action taken by the 
Community and Member States after the annulled election in Nigeria provoked a
218 See infra.
219 See the discussion paper on Shell’s policies at http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/ken/hell.html.
220 See OJ C 308, 9/10/1997 p.37 and OJ C 62, 27/2/1997 p.59.
221 Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 93/272.
222 Presidency Statement on Nigeria, reproduced as EFPB Doc., 93/305.
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stronger response than that which followed the annulled election in Myanmar two 
years earlier. The annulled elections in Nigeria, in many senses, presented an ideal 
opportunity for the then newly created Union to assert its identity on the 
international scene. While common positions and joint actions could have been 
adopted after the TEU came into force in 1993, the first such measures with regard 
to Nigeria were not taken until November 1995. In the meantime, elections had 
been annulled, the trials of the Ogoni leaders had taken place, as had the executions 
of opposition leaders on the basis of an alleged coup. Pressure for action thus 
existed in numerous multilateral fora. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action 
Group (CMAG) meeting in Auckland in November 1995 had suspended Nigeria, 
pending compliance with the 1991 Harare Declaration. In a meeting on 23 April 
1996 it was pushing for further restrictive measures.223
The Union was under considerable pressure to be seen to be acting. The measures 
adopted, however, reflect the disagreement between the Member States as to the 
action to be taken. Britain had already agreed (with its Commonwealth partners) 
that an oil embargo and general economic sanctions would not be imposed, on the 
basis that they would hurt the Nigerian population.224 On the basis of the then 
Article J(2) of the TEU the Council adopted two common positions, 95/515/CFSP 
on 20 November 199 5225 and subsequently 95/544/CFSP on 4 December 1995.226 
The common positions were a direct response to the execution of the Ogoni 
activists as opposed to the annulling of the elections or the executions of the alleged 
coup leaders. The execution of the Ogoni activists was perceived to be a failure by 
Nigeria to comply with its international treaty obligations. While true, the same can 
be said of the execution of the alleged coup leaders as well. The common positions
223 See, Commonwealth Secretariat Press Release-“Commonwealth Talks with Nigeria”, 4/6/1996 
and Statement by the Chairman of the CMAG on the Harare Declaration at the Conclusion o f the 
Group’s Mission to Nigeria, 26/11/1996.
224 The Glasgow Herald, “Countries Agree Nigeria Sanctions” 24/4/1996, p.8. The Vice-Chairman 
of the CMAG is quoted as saying, “We realise an oil embargo is totally impractical. We are trying 
to target members o f the regime and not hurt 100 million Nigerians.”
225 OJ L 298, 11/12/1995 p.l.
226 OJL 309,21/12/1995 p.l
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also strongly hint that one of the primary reasons behind their adoption was the 
failure of the Nigerian authorities to comply with Union requests for clemency.
The first common position adopted what is increasingly becoming a worryingly 
standard formula. Having condemned certain acts in very strong terms, the 
common position, a legally binding document, followed this with a relatively weak 
operative part. There is value in, what were then, relatively new legally binding 
powers being utilised but if such responses are to be anything other than token 
gestures then the operative part of a common position should reflect the sentiments 
expressed in the declaratory part. In this case the operative part simply reiterated 
many of the measures already adopted under EPC. It therefore, gave the impression 
of taking new steps under the CFSP, when many of the measures in question were 
already in place, something surprisingly not picked up by the European Parliament
• 7 7 7in its resolutions. The common position, for example, introduced visa restrictions 
on members of the PRC and the Federal Executive Council and their families, who 
were already covered by the decision adopted under EPC. The common position 
also encompassed an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment which 
also covered spare parts, repairs, maintenance and transfer of military technology. 
Contracts entered into prior to the date of entry into force of the embargo were not
77  Raffected. It is only these measures which may genuinely be seen as additional, as 
under EPC, cooperation with the military had only been suspended. With no 
shortage of countries exporting arms, the gap this may have left was easy enough to 
plug. The all important oil embargo was nowhere to be seen. The common 
position of December 1995 really only added legal force to the existing measures.
The Union had also committed itself to pursue the adoption of a resolution on 
Nigeria at the 50th UN General Assembly and the inclusion of Nigeria on the 
agenda of the Commission on Human Rights. In practical terms there was already 
significant pressure for this and the Union had adopted a practice under EPC to use 
the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly to condemn third
227 The European Parliament has issued various declarations on Nigeria. Among, many others, see, 
OJ C 80, 16/3/1998 p.233 and OJ C 292, 21/9/1998 p.154.
228 For confirmation o f this view see EFPB Doc., 96/034.
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States. The more practical measure to undertake, however, (which was supported 
by the Union in practice) was the adoption of a resolution providing for a UN 
Special Rapporteur on Nigeria.229 While this policy was adopted in practice, the 
common position did not refer to it, yet in many respects it was one of the most 
important measures the Union could have undertaken in a non-EU context.230
Considering the threats and language used by the Council after the Ogoni 
executions, the measures adopted are good example of the EU not following up its 
words with sufficiently strong action. The Council declarations of 9231 and 10232 
November (adopted prior and subsequent to the Ogoni executions) provide a clear 
example. The Council in the latter stated that it “condemns this cruel and callous 
act carried out in contempt of the appeal of the European Union (made on 9 
November) and those of the whole international community. The Council will 
consider the immediate steps it will take in its relations with Nigeria and also asks 
the Commission to make appropriate proposals.” No further proposals were 
forthcoming from the Commission, however, and the Council only adopted the 
common positions discussed above. The view of the Council was that as a 
consequence of the common positions and the measures implemented by it “the 
members of the shameful military regime in Nigeria will take thought and, if they 
cannot bring back to life Ken Saro-Wiwa and the eight others executed with him, at 
least we trust that their sacrifice will not have been in vain.”233 As the majority of 
the measures in question had been in place since 1993, repackaging them into 
common positions was not about to make the Abacha regime reconsider its policies 
and practices. What the Union did significantly do, however, was step up the 
diplomatic crusade. It had made representations through the Troika and Presidency 
to the Nigerian authorities as well as issuing numerous declarations. Member States 
also summoned Nigeria’s ambassadors in their capitals to express the Union’s
229 See Statement in the Third Committee o f the 50th UN General Assembly, reproduced as EFPB 
Doc., 95/387.
230 It is unusual to find punitive common positions which contain undertakings for joint action on an 
item in an international organisation.
231 Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 95/322.
232 Reproduced as EFPB Doc., 95/346.
233 / bid.
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concern at the situation, with explicit reference to the detentions and 
imprisonments.234 Also acting on behalf of the Presidency, the French Ambassador 
to Nigeria made representations to the Nigerian Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
express the Union’s concern at the lack of a precise timetable for a return to a 
constitutional regime and at the human rights situation.235
The limited regime imposed by the common positions did not stand the test of time. 
The European Parliament, for example, regularly condemned the sanctions as not 
being effective enough and asked for an oil embargo.236 This may have been 
discussed in the Council but it is unlikely that agreement could have been reached 
on this issue. The Clinton Presidency in the US March 1996, for example, was 
publicly proposing to ban all foreign investment in Nigeria and freeze all assets 
abroad, belonging to the military regime.237 British Foreign Office officials stated, 
at this time, that any measures agreed upon by the EU would not be effective 
without the US also imposing an oil embargo, as it was buying 60% of Nigeria’s 
output at the time. The Clinton government was not countenancing such a measure, 
due to the impact this would have had on the US economy.238 The then British 
Foreign Office Minister, Baroness Chalker, however, was opposed to even the 
relatively limited measures being proposed by the US. In particular, the Treasury, 
was reluctant to damage London’s position as an international financial centre and 
was thus against the freezing of the Nigerian military’s assets.
The coming to power of General Abubaker in 1997, however, ensured that any 
remaining determination among some Union Member States to impose more 
punitive measures soon became completely implausible. Abubaker undertook 
reforms almost immediately. For whatever reasons, it was clear that Abubaker’s 
regime was much more receptive towards the EU, than his predecessor’s, and
234 See for example, EPC Bulletin, Doc., 93/460 and EFPB Docs., 94/217, 95/197 and 98/077.
235 See EFPB Doc., 95/242.
236 See, for example, OJ C 362, 2/12/1996 p.261 and OJ C 166, 10/6/1996 p.200.
237 The Guardian, “Allies at Odds Over Nigeria” 13/3/1996 p.12.
231 Ibid
239 Ibid. It should also be noted that a Dutch, French, Italian and British consortium had at this time 
signed a $3.8 billion contract with the Nigerian government to build a natural gas plant.
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engaging in dialogue and discourse regarding its internal situation. This allowed for 
much less hostile discussion which proved beneficial to all those involved. The 
Union felt it was now increasingly able to make way with the regime and its 
concerns were being taken on board. This mellowing by the Nigerian authorities 
further weakened the resolve of the less hawkish Member States in the Union. In 
contrast to the French and German governments and the previous British 
Conservative government, Robin Cook, the then Foreign Secretary of the new 
Labour government, stated at this time that human rights would “dominate British 
policy concerning Nigeria” and that strict sanctions should be imposed on Nigeria. 
240 France and Germany, however, had started to call for most of the existing 
measures against Nigeria to be lifted. The common position was designed to be 
renewed every six months to take account of changing circumstances. This is a 
standard formula allowing the imposition of further measures if the situation so 
dictates. Its downside is that it can also be weakened by the intransigence of a 
Member State in the pursuit of a particular interest, especially a short-term one. In 
November 1997 the GAC, pushed by France and Germany had already voted to 
relax existing visa restrictions. Both States had different reasons. France wished to 
ensure that the Nigerian football team could play in the 1998 World Cup and also 
wished to allow exceptions to visa restrictions on “humanitarian grounds” - a 
euphemism for private medical care. Germany was motivated by more altruistic 
reasons. It did not wish for the Nigerian authorities to be further isolated and 
wanted to encourage dialogue and discussion. As Abubaker had displayed 
willingness to engage in dialogue the German approach had more to commend it, 
than that adopted by the British and French governments. The common position 
was thus amended to accommodate France, which was prepared to take a more 
intransigent line than Germany by vetoing its renewal.241
The weakening consensus on Nigeria began to disintegrate further, once the 
promised transition to democracy became a reality under Abubaker. While his 
regime was still engaging in significant breaches of Nigeria’s international treaty
240 Quoted in Human Rights Watch World Report 1998-Nigeria, npg.
241 See Article 1(2), Council Decision 97/820/CFSP, OJ L 338, 9/12/1997 p.l and OJ C 323, 
21/10/1998 p.129.
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commitments, they were not on the scale prevalent under Abacha.242 Once a 
process towards democracy and the holding of elections became apparent, the 
Union was true to its word and involved itself in the election process by sending 
observers. Many of Abubaker’s actions, the release of prisoners, for example, were 
seen in a very positive light by the EU. As a result the Commission was prepared to 
intensify the dialogue between it and the Member States, on the one hand, and 
Nigeria, on the other, including its role in the framework of the Lome 
Convention 243
The announcement of the holding of elections by Abubaker and the transition of 
power led to the Union not only issuing Presidency statements endorsing the 
process but also to the further weakening of the common position and the adoption 
of joint actions, so as to establish election monitoring teams. In a common position 
of 30 October 1998, prior to the elections being held, the Council repealed the 
earlier common position, subject to the proviso that there would be no military 
cooperation, and an arms embargo would stay in place.244 Between the coming into 
force of the new common position and the restoration of democracy, however, 
development cooperation could only continue for actions supporting human rights 
and democracy, which is exactly as it was before.245 The significance of this 
common position cannot be overestimated. In practical terms it removed all 
remaining visa restrictions on the regime and their families, as well as those 
concerning the recall of European military attaches posted to Nigeria. The other 
limited sanctions remained. The basic premise, however, is that steps towards 
democracy, despite continuing concern about human rights problems, were enough 
for the loose consensus that existed to break down. There did not have to be an 
improvement in human rights abuses, although there was one, which the common 
position noted, but democracy had to be in place or measures to give effect to it had 
to be undertaken. Developments which should have led to a civilian government
242Human Rights Watch World Report 1999, npg, noted a substantial improvement in the situation 
under Abubakar.
243 See OJC 188,29/4/1999 p.l.
244 1998/614/CFSP, OJ L 293, 31/10/1998 p.77.
245 Articles 1-4, 1998/614/CFSP.
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coming to power, at some stage in the future, was sufficient for most of the 
restrictive measures in place, as weak as they were, to be lifted. The Union for its 
part considered that “the current democratisation process, should permit the 
normalisation of ....relations and enable Nigeria to regain a place within the 
international community in keeping with its aspirations and capabilities.”246
The Union did consider, however, that any elections must at least be multi-party
947elections with universal suffrage based on democratic principles. To this end the
• 94RUnion established an election monitoring team. The joint action which was the 
basis for this, was the EU’s concrete measure in response to an earlier 
declaration,249 which indicated the EU’s willingness to support the legislative and 
Presidential elections which had been announced. The Commission, acting on 
behalf of the European Community and its Member States, undertook a number of 
activities to provide assistance for the preparation of, and observers for, the 
elections, including support to the functioning of the Nigerian Independent National 
Election Commission. On 3 March 1999 the Presidency issued a declaration on the 
elections considering that they were fair and based upon democratic principles and 
expressed its willingness to cooperate and help with the reforms, as needed, for the
950strengthening of the rule of law, respect of human rights and good governance
951 1Common Position 1999/347/CFSP accordingly repealed the remaining punitive 
measures. In April 2003 President Obasanjo was re-elected as President of Nigeria. 
There were widespread allegations of vote rigging and the Final Report of the EU 
Election Observation Mission, which was invited to observe the elections, referred 
to, “serious inconsistencies in the legal framework, significant evidence of 
malpractice....and...the Presidential elections....being....marred by serious
959irregularities and fraud.” The Union Presidency while expressing some concerns
246 OJL 293, 31/10/1998 p.77.
247 See (1999) 3 EU Bull 1.4.12.
248 Joint Action 98/735/CFSP, OJ L 354, 30/12/98 p.l.
249 Declaration on Nigeria, reproduced as EFPB Doc., 98/277.
250 See EFPB Doc., 99/030.
251 OJL 133,28/5/1999 p.5.
252 Final Report o f the EUEOM to Nigeria at http://www.eueomnigeria.org/media.html.
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about the conduct of the election accepted the outcome.253 In the overall context of 
relations with Nigeria the fact that elections had actually been held, despite their 
shortcomings, and that they were conducted peacefully in most parts of the country 
was more important for the Union. As the Presidency statement noted, the elections 
further consolidated democracy in Nigeria.254 The Union also reiterated its 
willingness to cooperate with the authorities to help improve the quality of 
democracy in Nigeria. It is to such projects we next turn.
4.4. Positive Action, Ethical Values and Nigeria.
Since democratic elections were held in Nigeria in 1999 the Union has taken a far 
less interventionist approach. There has generally speaking been little or no public 
scrutiny of the general situation prevalent in Nigeria, for example, the non­
implementation of the suspended Constitution or the treatment of minority 
groups. The one partial exception to this has been the introduction of very 
orthodox religious laws to some of Nigeria’s Northern States, most importantly 
Zamfara. In October 1999 the Governor of Zamfara signed into law two bills aimed 
at instituting Shari ’a into State legislation. The Parliament256 and Council257 have 
reserved their condemnation to particular incidents. This is part of a more recent 
overall strategy in relations with Nigeria, where the Union has sought to take 
positive action to help consolidate democracy and promote human rights, among 
other values and to use condemnation as sparingly as possible.
The Presidency in a statement issued after the 1999 elections acknowledged that the 
incoming government would face serious problems. It thus expressed a willingness 
to “continue to promote political and economic reforms...to cooperate with the
253 Presidency Statement on Nigerian National Assembly Elections, (2003) 5 EU Bull 1.6.16.
254 Ibid.
255 The 1979 Constitution was suspended and the 1989 Constitution was never implemented. A new 
Constitution, which in Article 45 justifies broadly defined limitations on the rights enunciated, has 
been effective since May 1999.
256 See, for example, (2001) 1/2 EU Bull 1.2.9.
257 See, for example, (2001) 1/2 EU Bull 1.6.30.
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elected authorities towards strengthening the rule of law,....respect of human rights 
and good governance.” As the Community’s powers for positive action were 
fairly limited prior to the TEU coming into force, the extent to which it had 
previously promoted ethical values in Nigeria is highly questionable.259 The only 
activities it had really engaged in since it did obtain the requisite competence in 
1993 were punitive. Since the 1999 election, however, the Union has placed greater 
emphasis on “positive measures” in Nigeria. In 2000, for example, it provided €1.5 
million in funding for a number of projects which contribute to justice being 
accessible to all, information networks on civil society and the promotion of
9 AOinternational human rights. Furthermore, despite tinkering with several budget 
lines which channelled funds to the sophisticated human rights groups which now 
operate freely in Nigeria, substantial funds are now being allocated.261 These 
amounts are intended to support an incentive-based approach. Measures to promote 
human rights and democracy in Nigeria can also be financed from the European 
Development Fund. There is also a “Special Programme for Democracy and Good 
Governance in Nigeria” Budget Line, under which a number EU based 
organisations have been funded to help develop democracy through, for example, 
support for the media or the training of judges.262 Commissioner Patten has stated, 
however, that the quality of most of the submitted projects for Nigeria has been 
disappointing.263 Nigeria has also been a major recipient of Member State funds.264
This positive approach has now been consolidated in a common position adopted by 
the Council regarding the objectives of relations with Nigeria.265 This approach is
258 (1999) 3 EUBull 1.4.12
259 See Common Position 98/350/CFSP, OJ L 158, 2/6/1998 p.l.
260 (2000) 12 EU Bull 1.2.11.
261 Budget-lines for Nigeria include B7-7020 “Democratisation, Human Rights in Developing 
Countries” which amounted to ECU 20 million in 1998, see OJ C 142,21/05/1999 p. 4.
262 This information is derived from the EIDHR Compendiums o f 2000/2001/2002/2003.
263 See OJ Cl 13 E, 18/04/2001 p.244
264 See the webpage of the British Department for International Development at 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk for details o f British funded projects.
265 See Common Positions 2001/373/CFSP, OJ L 132, 15/5/2001 p. 132 as repealed by 
2002/401/CFSP, OJ L 139, 29/5/2002 p.139.
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unique. No other common positions have yet been adopted regarding a single State, 
which is already party to a multilateral treaty with the Community, which further 
establish objectives and priorities to inform the basis of that relationship. While 
most of the objectives overlap with those found in the Community’s development 
cooperation treaties, the emphasis on human rights, civil society, the consolidation 
of democracy and the democratic process is very noticeable.266 While the latest 
common position does not have a budget line, it further establishes institutions and 
fora for bilateral discussion with Nigeria. While it is still too early determine how 
the Commission has responded to the adoption of the common position, this 
approach does display a serious commitment by the Council in its relationship with 
Nigeria.
5. Conclusions.
This chapter set out to investigate the manner in which the Union has, in practice, 
aimed to promote and protect ethical values in its dealings with certain third States. 
The case-studies allow a number of conclusions to be drawn. In the first instance 
the Union has, as an actor promoting such values, an identity closely related to but 
separate to that of its Member States. As a collective, the Union has the capacity to 
address and to tackle or at least contribute to global and regional issues in a manner 
that the individual Member States cannot match. For example, further to the latest 
common position on Myanmar in April 2004, the then 15 Member States were 
joined by a further twenty States, who were either, acceding countries, candidate 
countries, potential candidate countries, countries of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process, or EFTA countries. All of these countries undertook to ensure 
that their domestic legislation was in conformity with the common position.267 The 
impact of joint action by 25, or in this case 35, States is significant by any yardstick. 
The action the Union can take, however, reflects only those elements on which 
views are shared by all of its Member States. Effective policy is hostage to the
266 Article 3, 2002/401/CFSP.
267 Council Common Position 2004/423/CFSP, OJ L 125, 28/4/2004 p. 61. See Declaration by the 
Presidency 30/4/2004, 8946/04 (Presse 128).
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interests of each of and every Member State. This is why it can be argued that 
despite having its own identity, the Union does not have its own dynamic, separate 
from the Member States. It only acts where interests and values shared by all the 
Member States are affected. The foreign policy of the Union is a common one, not 
a single one.
The Union has introduced discussion and dialogue concerning human rights and 
democracy, among other ethical values, into its dealings with all third States. In 
setting out to achieve its objectives the Union has used, among other instruments, 
diplomatic pressure, threats, dialogue, legally binding instruments and financial 
inducements. The “requests” made have included abstention from certain activities, 
i.e., testing nuclear weapons, as well as specific actions, for example, the holding of 
democratic elections. The approach adopted is a multi-faceted one. The problem 
with such an approach is one of coordination and consistency with regard to each 
particular State. The boundaries between Union and Community competence have 
not, on the whole, been problematic.
Although attention has been paid by the Union to those UN obligations which 
require action, there has, in the case-studies at least, been little conscious 
reference to some of the international legal obligations of the Community, Member 
States and the third States in question. Torture and slavery as State policies do not 
by themselves usually provoke a result any different from restrictions on, for 
example, freedom of expression. The Union has been working to its own agenda 
and attempting to promote and protect those values which it considers important. 
The Union has condemned and indeed imposed some punitive measures for 
breaches of democratic principles, the normative status of which is still 
questionable. The Union has, however, contributed to the formation of a customary 
norm in this regard -  self-determination and democracy, for example, are now for 
the Union Member States a part of the discussion on the recognition of a State or 
government. Annulled elections in the case-studies, however, only led to limited 
punitive measures being imposed. More extensive punitive measures have only 
been agreeable when the third State(s) in question have further acted in a way
268 See Chapter Three.
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considered objectionable by the Union; the death of the Danish consul in Myanmar 
and the execution of the Ogoni activists in Nigeria. The extent of cooperation that 
is forthcoming from the third State in question is also clearly an important 
consideration for the Union in determining what punitive action to take. The 
execution of Saro-Wiwa, despite a Union plea for clemency and the failure of the 
authorities in Myanmar to cooperate with the Union over either Nichols’ death or 
the GSP investigation were important considerations in taking punitive measures. 
The willingness of the Pakistani authorities to cooperate and take Union concerns 
aboard ensured that no such measures were adopted against it.
No matter how systematic the human rights abuses in the case-studies, in the 
absence of an annulled election or coup d ’etat, the Union has not downgraded 
development cooperation. Even when it has acted, however, the punitive 
measures have sent out mixed messages. The measures still in force against 
Myanmar and now repealed against Nigeria simply were not and are not strong 
enough to compel a regime to act in a particular way. Any proposed action has to 
consider the legality of such action, including the impact of such measures upon a 
population and the targeted regime, as well as the interests of the Member States 
themselves. A total trade embargo and investment ban by twenty five States would 
clearly have an impact on the regime in Myanmar beyond the measures already in 
place. The Presidency and Member States have in the General Assembly of the 
United Nations and Commission on Human Rights consistently voted against 
resolutions aimed at classifying economic sanctions as a means of political and
77 neconomic coercion against developing countries. It clearly wishes to be able to 
resort to such measures when they are considered appropriate. It is simply a 
question whether the political will exists among all of the Member States and there 
is a perceived need for such measures to be adopted.
269 See OJ C 280 E, 21/11/2003 p.63, where it was stated in answer to a Parliamentary question that 
“as o f today, no Agreement containing a human rights ‘essential elements’ clause has been 
suspended” because o f violations o f such rights.
270 See EFPB Doc., 87/485, for one example among many and the discussion in Chapter Two.
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Although the case-study on relations with Pakistan can be used to criticise the 
inconsistency of the Union’s practice in response to breaches of democracy and to 
illustrate the relativity of ethical values, one overall conclusion at the end of these 
case-studies is inescapable. Ethical considerations are now an established part of 
the equation in the Union’s dealings with third States. The weight they are given in 
determining what action, if any, to take in any given situation will depend on a 
number of other considerations. It is unlikely that any State or organisation will 
prioritise concerns about ethical values in a third State, over its own security and 
well-being. Ethical matters cannot stand alone from, for example, security 
considerations, relations with vital allies and trading links. There are at times 
serious shortcomings with the Union’s approach but there is clearly a concerted and 
at times valuable contribution being made to the promotion of the values it 
considers most important.
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Chapter Five.
Ethical Values and Foreign Policy in Practice: The Role of the 
Union in the Middle East Peace Process and Relations with 
the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
1. Introduction.
It is arguable that one of the reasons for the Union’s somewhat ambivalent responses 
to the violation of certain values in the case-studies examined in Chapter Four, is due 
to the lack of tangible benefits to it in promoting those values at the expense of other 
interests. It is an inescapable fact that abuses of such norms in far off countries, no 
matter how abhorrent, do not usually directly threaten a State’s fundamental interests. 
The Union’s commitment to the Western Balkans, for example, is precisely because 
the detriment to the interests of the Union and its Member States, if further instability 
breaks out on its eastern borders, is obvious.1 A major distinguishing feature 
therefore, between the previous case-studies and those under examination in this 
chapter, is physical proximity. The Union’s direct interest in stability and peace in 
the Middle East and Mediterranean region has been made clear on a number of 
occasions, for example, by the 1996 Florence European Council,2 the Mediterranean 
Common Strategy of June 2000 and in the proposals for an EU Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East.4 Furthermore, the historical 
involvement of some of the Member States has ensured that the Middle East Peace 
Process (MEPP) is a major issue in the foreign policies of the Union and its Member 
States.
1 See Cremona, M., “Creating the New Europe: The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in the 
Context o f EU-SEE Relations” (1999) 2 CYELS, 463 and COM (2003)104 on the Wider Europe 
Neighbourhood.
2 Declaration on the Middle East Peace Process (1996) 6 EU Bull 21/23.
3 Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region, 2000/458/CFSP, OJ L 183, 22/7/2000 p.5.
4 An interim report on the proposed partnership was adopted by the European Council on 22/4/2004. 
The final report is due to be adopted at the European Council meeting in June 2004. MEMO/04/151.
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Relations between the Union, on the one hand, and, on the other, Israel and the 
Palestinian Administered Territories also differ from those with Myanmar, Nigeria 
and Pakistan (described in the previous chapter) in a number of other ways. In the 
first instance, Israel does not have a development cooperation based Agreement with 
the Union, such as exists for the benefit of the Palestinian Administered Territories. 
The 1995 Agreement is mixed in nature.3 The dynamic of relations is thus different. 
Israel is not a developing country and this thesis focuses mainly on relations between 
the Union and such countries. As noted in Chapter One, the primary focus of this 
chapter is the relationship between the Union and the Palestinian Authority and the 
role ethical values play. This cannot be examined in isolation, however, from the 
prevailing political situation in the region and the Union’s relations with Israel. The 
rule of law, good governance, human rights and other ethical values are not only 
discussed within the confines of the institutional structure established by the 
respective bilateral treaties but are also closely tied up with the MEPP and the 
Union’s policy towards the Mediterranean region as a whole. This policy, known as 
the Barcelona Process,6 as well as the Mediterranean Common Strategy and the
n
MEDA Regulation between them complement and support the dialogue and relations 
between the Union and Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The aim of the following 
sections is to discuss the role that ethical values have played in the Union’s 
discussion with the region as a whole and to then focus upon relations with the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel.
5 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Agreement Between the European Communities and 
their Member States, o f the One Part, and the State o f Israel o f the Other Part, OJ L 147, 21/6/2000 p.3.
6 From the Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28/11/1995.
7 Council Regulation No. 1488/96 OJ L 189, 30/7/1996 p.l (MEDA I) now superseded by Council 
Regulation No.2698/2000, OJ L 331, 12/12/2000 p .l. (MEDA II).
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2. Ethical Values and the Middle East Peace and Barcelona 
Processes.
The Union, which perceives itself as a promoter of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East, has essentially sought to make the MEPP and the Barcelona Process
“separate but complementary”.8 The Barcelona Process and the other institutional
aspects to this dimension of Union policy have, however, been affected by the
tensions and problems of the peace process.9 The two are inextricably tied-up,
despite attempts to keep them separate. The Commission, in particular, perceives that
stimulating economic growth and development and enhancing dialogue and
cooperation may lead to a lasting peace.10 It is equally aware that a lasting peace will
lead to economic and social development in the region. Israel is, however, usually
able to withstand pressure of every sort from the EU. It can almost always court and
rely upon economic, political and moral support from the US to counterbalance it.11
It is for this reason that the Union attempts to maintain the separate identities of the
different fora. This is in the hope that if progress is thin on the ground in one area, it
does not adversely affect dialogue in another. The problem is one of maintaining a
consistent approach in the different fora. The timescale of the objectives and
priorities they pursue are different and the emphasis they place on certain facets of the 
10dialogue also differ.
8 See the Preamble to the Barcelona Declaration.
9 See, for example, the Presidency Conclusions o f the Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference o f Foreign 
Ministers, Valencia, 22-23/4/2002.
10 For criticism see Nienhaus, V., “Promoting Development and Stability Through a Euro- 
Mediterranean Free Trade Zone” (1999) 4 EFARev., 501.
11 See Marr, P., “The United States, Europe and the Middle East: Cooperation, Cooptation or 
Confrontation?” in Robertson, B. (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit, (1998) p.74 
and Lesch, D.(ed.), The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 
(1999, 2nd edn.).
12 See Edwards, G., and Philippart, E., “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Fragmentation and 
Reconstruction” (1997) 2 EFARev., 465 and Pierros, F., Meunier, J., and Abrams, S., Bridges and 
Barriers: The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy, (1999).
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2.1. The Union and the MEPP.
2.1.1. Introduction.
While a general discussion of the MEPP is beyond the scope of the chapter it is 
necessary to make a few initial observations, so as to provide some context for the 
discussion below. A number of the Member States, in particular Great Britain, 
France and increasingly Germany, are major players in the MEPP. Domestic politics, 
as can be expected, play a major role in the stance taken. France with its traditional 
ties with the Arab world has, except for a very brief period, adopted a very critical 
approach towards Israel. Germany, on the other hand, has historically felt a moral 
responsibility to support Israel.13 Britain due to its historical connection to the region 
has in some way or other been involved since the end of the First World War. The 
articulation of a coherent policy by the Community and later Union has not been 
straightforward. There are clear differences of approach between some of the 
Member States, as well as the desire of at least three of them also to maintain an 
individual presence. The importance of the issue has meant, however, that the 
Member States of the Community have attempted to formulate a common policy 
since the early 1970s.14 The most important document on the MEPP under EPC is 
the declaration adopted by the Venice European Council of June 1980.15 In this 
declaration, which still largely forms the basis of the Union’s approach, the Heads of 
States and Governments considered that the traditional and common ties between 
them and the other parties obliged them to play a special role and work towards 
peace.16 The position of the Member States with regard to the Israeli occupation of
13 See Gerhard Schroder’s comments, for example, as reported by BBC World Internet News, 
“Germany to Supply Missiles to Israel” 27/11/2002. Germany stopped providing unqualified support 
to Israel in the 1970s and has in recent years occasionally publicly condemned Israel. See, for 
example, IHT, “German Harsh Words for Israel” 10/4/2002, internet edition.
14 For a historical perspective see Soetendorp, B., Foreign Policy in the European Union, (1999) p.99 
and ibid., “The EU’s Involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Building o f a Visible 
International Identity” (2002) 7 EFARev., 283 and Aoun, E., “European Foreign Policy and the Arab- 
Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?” (2003) 8 EFARev., 289.
15 Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/mepp/index.htm.
16 Para. 2.
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certain territories and their practices highlighted, however, that the Community (and 
later Union), despite its internal differences, was generally adopting a more critical 
approach to Israel’s policies and practices than the United States. The Venice 
Declaration, for example, at an early stage supported Palestinian self-rule, considered 
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories to be illegal and has been the basis for 
repeatedly demanding that Israel comply with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338,1' which Israel has consistently failed to implement.
Due to the approach it has adopted, the Community/Union and its representatives 
have, by and large, been treated with a degree of suspicion by both Likud and Labour 
politicians in Israel. More recently some Israeli politicians have become openly 
contemptuous of the Union and the role it plays in the MEPP. It has, for example,
1 ftbeen suggested that the Union should limit itself to funding Palestinian reform. A 
widely held perception in Israel and the US, as expressed by Henry Kissinger, is that 
there is nothing to be gained by engaging “Europe” as it is “keen to preserve its links 
with the Arabs and unlikely to ask them of the sacrifices needed”.19 Ariel Sharon, for
example, has unequivocally stated that Israel will only be prepared to allow the Union
00to play a greater role in the MEPP if it takes a “more even-handed approach”. Due
to the perception of bias, interventions on behalf of the Union are routinely
summarily dismissed by Israeli politicians. Benjamin Netanyahu, while Prime
Minister, for example, in response to Union criticism of Israeli policies argued that
01“the Europeans” simply did not understand the situation that Israel finds itself in.
The promotion and establishment of peace and stability, not only in Europe but 
globally as well, is mentioned as an objective in the preambles to both the EC and EU 
Treaties as well as in the Draft Constitution. Such activities in third States are a part 
of the ethical practice of the Union. The ultimate objective of the role the Union 
seeks to play in the MEPP is the normalisation of relations between Israel and some
17 See, for example, the Conclusions o f the Seville European Council, 21-22/6/2002.
18 Know Europe, “Israel Says EU Should Stay out o f Middle East Peace Process” 18/7/02 p.7.
19 Kissinger, H., Toward a Diplomacy fo r the Twenty-First Century, (2001) p. 184.
20 The Guardian, “Sharon Pours Scorn on European Peace Efforts” 29/1/2003 p.4.
21 See EFPB Doc., 98/426.
22 Article 1-3(4) DC.
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of its Arab neighbours. Helping to broker a solution to the “Palestinian issue” and 
helping to sustain it will lead to a greater degree of stability in that region and should 
have an appreciable effect on the protection and promotion of those values to which 
the Union is committed.
2.1.2. The Union as an Actor in the MEPP.
The Union contributes to the MEPP in various differing ways. The first is as a 
member of the Quartet, an ad hoc arrangement alongside the US, UN and Russia, 
which first met in April 2002. The Quartet was established with two main aims - to 
help to broker a solution to the situation in the Middle East and in the intermediate to 
allow the four partners to take collective action in response to events on the ground. 
It is no secret, however, that the US is the primary member of the Quartet and often 
acts on its own outside of it. Sharon has argued that as far as Israel is concerned the 
“Quartet is nothing....only the US matters.” Sharon’s courting only of President 
Bush in April 2004 to approve Israel’s planned unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, is 
evidence of this.
The ultimate aim of the Quartet is to implement a “roadmap to peace” which will 
lead to a two-State solution, as well as resolution of the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli- 
Lebanese conflicts.24 One of the 14 reservations Israel put forward in accepting the 
roadmap was that it did not accept the legitimacy of the Quartet. Thus when
Sharon received the roadmap in April 2003 he only allowed the US Ambassador, Dan
<%/
Kurtzer, to come and see him, not representatives of all Quartet members. 
Similarly at the meeting in June 2003 at Aqaba of Bush, Sharon and Abu Mazen to
23 The Times, “Sharon Rejects ‘Irrelevant’ Mediators” 20/1/2003 p. 12. Franco Frattini, during the 
Italian Presidency, was candid enough to state that the Union was only a minor partner in the Quartet, 
Le Figaro “Les priorit6s europ^ennes de Franco Frattini”, 17/7/2003, internet edition.
24 The roadmap was formally published on 30 April 2003.
25 See the communique issued by the Israeli government, “Government Meeting About the Prime 
Minister’s Statement on the Roadmap”, 25/5/2003 and “Statement on UN Security Council Roadmap 
Resolution”, 20/11/2003
26 See the interview with Saeb Erekat in Bitter Z,emom-http://www.bitterlemons.com, 17/7/2003.
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implement the roadmap, the EU’s participation was vetoed by Israel as Sharon 
refused to meet Solana for having met Arafat prior to it.27
The Quartet’s effective functioning is also dependent upon agreement between all its 
members, which involves the search for a solution acceptable to and with the support 
of all. This is clearly a difficult condition to meet. The differing approach of the US 
and Union to Arafat, especially after Israel’s attempts to render him irrelevant, is an 
example of major differences between the parties. The Union considers him the 
legitimate interlocutor for the Palestinians. The US and Israel consider him tainted 
by terror. In September 2003 Israel decided, in principle, to “remove” him.29 A 
proposed Security Council Resolution condemning the Israeli threat was vetoed by 
the US, with the UK abstaining. France and Germany, along with nine others, voted
A
in favour of it. Three days later the General Assembly adopted a Resolution
condemning Israel by 133 votes to 4. All 15 EU Member States voted in favour of it
after amendments, inserting stronger language condemning both Israel and the
11
Palestinian Authority, were accepted In October 2003 Sharon stated that Israel 
would not assassinate Arafat, although in April 2004 he reneged on his pledge not to 
harm him. A compromise currently exists, Arafat is still recognised as a legitimate 
representative by the EU but he has had to cede some of his power to a Prime 
Minister, (initially Abu Mazen and subsequently Ahmed Queria) with whom Israel 
and the US nominally deal. Even here, however, the Union’s unified approach to 
Arafat has at times collapsed. The Italian Presidency, for example, refused to
27 Ibid. Similarly, on 1/9/2003, Sharon cancelled a meeting with Solana, due to the EU’s refusal to 
sideline Arafat. See EU Observer, “Sharon Cancels Solana Meeting” 2/9/2003.
28 See, the Statement by the Presidency on the Formation o f the Palestinian Legislative Council, 
29/4/2003.
29 See the Israeli government communique, 11/9/2003. The EU Presidency issued a statement on 
12/09/03, where it expressed a “deep preoccupation over the serious implications” o f expelling him.
30 UN News Centre, “US Vetoes Security Council Resolution Demanding Israel Not Deport Arafat” 
16/9/2003.
31 Press Release GA/10152, 19/09/2003.
32 See BBC World Internet News, “Israel ‘will not kill’ Arafat” 28/10/2003 and The Guardian, 
“Sharon:‘We May Kill Arafat’” 24/4/2004 p .l.
33 The reality is that Israel and the US wish to deal with a Palestinian leadership which has no 
connections with Arafat.
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negotiate and deal with Arafat. Frattini, the Italian Foreign Minister, throughout the 
Presidency insisted upon meeting only Mazen and subsequently Queria, even though 
other Union actors continued to meet Arafat. In retaliation the Palestinians refused to 
meet with representatives of the Italian Presidency.34
The Quartet is not attempting to impose a solution regardless of the context and 
views of the parties involved. It has taken a somewhat different approach to that 
adopted by the Union based upon the 1980 Vienna Declaration. Under the 
Declaration the Member States and later Union formulated their own compromise 
solution and then tried to persuade the parties to implement it. The agreed approach 
of the Quartet, as noted above, is a two-State solution. All parties are publicly at 
least still committed to this process, although how is to be achieved and the details 
are yet to be negotiated. Peace between the parties is the ultimate objective, and it is 
argued that this can be achieved by the creation of a democratic Palestinian State and 
a secure Israel. Despite the public commitment of the Union to the roadmap, France, 
Belgium, and Ireland have increasingly championed an alternative peace plan, known 
either as the “Geneva Accords” or “Geneva Initiative”. These States, much to the 
annoyance of Israel, have attempted to persuade the other Union Member States to 
adopt this alternative plan as their formal policy. They have not yet succeeded. 
Despite these problems, the Union still routinely reaffirms its commitment to the 
Quartet and the Security Council considers it to be the current best mechanism by 
which a solution can be brokered.
34 See Dawn, “Abbas Refuses to Meet Italian PM” 10/6/2003 p.l.
35 Although the Presidency has also welcomed it, see Presidency Statement on the Initiatives by the 
Israeli and Palestinian Civil Societies, 2/12/2003, 15583/03 Presse 358.
36 See Euractiv.com “France, Belgium draw Israeli ire over Geneva Accord” 6/11/03. Colin Powell 
has also been attacked by Israel for his support for the Accord, see The Independent, “Israel Criticised 
Powell for ‘Mistake’ Over Peace Plan” 3/12/03 p.3.
37 See Security Council Resolutions 1397(2002) and 1515(2003).
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The Union is also directly involved in the MEPP outside of the Quartet. The 
Presidency, Troika,38 President of the Commission, Commissioner for External 
Relations, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, High 
Representative of the CFSP and the Special Representative for the Middle East Peace 
process have all made different and at times differing contributions to it.39 The 
Special Representative, who is accountable to the Council,40 acts independently of the 
Troika and High Representative in an attempt to help broker deals, in accordance 
with the terms of his mandate. Solana (who was a part of the Mitchell Commission 
which asked for an unconditional end to Palestinian terror) is treated and seen as 
being more impartial by the Israeli negotiators, whereas Moratinos (the first Special 
Representative) was generally seen as being favourable to the Palestinians although 
not anti-Israeli per se.AX The Israelis have vetoed all contact with the current Special 
Representative, Marc Otte, due to his insistence on meeting Arafat.42 The High 
Representative is and has historically been preferred to the Special Representative, 
whose post was specifically created to increase the Union’s contribution to the 
M EPP43
The post of Special Representative for the MEPP was initially created by the GAC of 
28 October 1996, with Miguel Moratinos being appointed.44 On 14 July 2003 he was 
replaced by Marc Otte.45 The joint actions which establish his mandate use Articles 
14 and 18(5) TEU as their legal bases. Article 14 provides for joint actions, requiring
38 Troika visits have at times been controversial, for example, when Robin Cook during the British 
Presidency visited Orient House. As a consequence a number o f Troika visits were cancelled, see 
EFPB Docs., 96/281 and 97/178.
39 This is also true in the Quartet as well, see the question and answer session o f 10/4/2002 and the 
differing views o f Piqu6 (on behalf o f the Spanish Presidency) and Solana.
40 Article 18(5) TEU. Although see Article 4(1), Joint Action 2003/837/CFSP, OJ L 326, 13/12/2003 
p.46 which states that the Special Representative is accountable to the High Representative.
41 When Moratinos was Special Representative, his webpage confirmed this.
42 See para.2, EU Declaration at the Fourth Meeting o f the EU-Israel Association Council, 17- 
18/11/2003, 14796/03(Presse 328).
43 The envoy was originally appointed by Joint Action 96/676/CFSP, OJ 1996 L 315, 4/12/1996 p .l. 
Joint Action 2000/794/CFSP, OJ L 318, 16/12/2000 p.5 renamed the envoy as a representative.
44 See EFPB Doc., 96/317.
45 Joint Action 2003/537/CFSP, OJ L 184, 23/7/2003 p.45.
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commitments of money, men or both, to be taken by the Union, whereas Article 18(5) 
provides the Council with a specific power to appoint “whenever it deems necessary” 
a Special Representative with a “mandate in relation to particular policy issues”. The 
use of both legal bases is a consequence of the structure and provisions of the TEU.
The mandate of the Special Representative is primarily to work with the various 
parties involved in the peace process and to try and provide good offices and 
contribute to and ensure the smooth implementation of the agreements reached. He 
also works as a conduit between the parties to the peace process and the Council to 
provide information on the initiatives and interventions the Council may wish to 
make.46 With regard to human rights, in particular, the Special Representative has 
two important functions. First, he is required to engage constructively with 
signatories to agreements, within the framework of the peace process, in order to 
promote compliance with the basic norms of democracy, including respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. As he is to contribute to the implementation of 
“agreements reached between the parties” his engagement would seem to link to the 
human rights and fundamental freedom clauses, which have been inserted in the 
various agreements brokered between the parties. It is not a mandate to 
independently promote human rights or the rule of law in the region, as a part of the 
process. As human rights clauses are increasingly a standard feature in 
internationally sponsored peace agreements, the Special Representative potentially 
has a major task on his hands, with regard to this aspect of his mandate.47 This has 
not, however, been a major part of his work. The Special Representative has been far 
more concerned, in practice, with ensuring that the peace process, as a whole, stays 
on track. From the limited information available, it seems that the human rights and
JO
rule of law aspect of his mandate has not received a great deal of attention. The 
other aspect of his mandate is his responsibility to report to the Council on possible 
initiatives it may wish to take in the peace process. In this context he can advise on
46 Article 3, 2003/837/CFSP.
47 See Bell, C., Peace Agreements and Human Rights, (2000) Ch. 4 and Watson, G., The Oslo Accords, 
(2000) Chs. 9 and 13. The roadmap does not envisage such clauses and has been condemned by a 
number o f NGOs for this. See ICG, A Time to Lead: The International Community and the Israeli- 
Palestinian Conflict, (2002).
48 This is based upon the information available on the Special Representative’s webpage.
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which development projects should be pursued or indeed suspended, due to their 
impact or interference with the peace process. Again whether any initiatives 
concerning human rights, democracy or the rule of law, for example, have been taken 
as a result of the Special Representatives work is uncertain.49 What this does further 
prove, however, is the close relationship between the different aspects of the 
dialogue. The Special Representative can potentially have a major influence on the 
development of projects and the objectives and priorities they pursue, which the 
Commission is then likely to redesign or amend accordingly. To date very few, if 
any, such projects have been specifically designed due to recommendations by the 
Special Representative.
2.2. The Union, Ethical Values and the Barcelona Process.
The Barcelona Process, which was a Spanish led initiative seeking a European policy 
towards the Mediterranean region, basically represents the Union’s alternative 
strategy towards peace and stability in the wider Mediterranean region.50 This policy 
aims to create economic prosperity, by establishing a free trade area.51 As noted 
above, peace and stability in the region may stem from peace negotiations or 
economic interdependence. Indeed in many respects they will succeed or fail 
together.52
The Mediterranean region is not homogeneous, from either a political, economic, 
social or cultural perspective. Due to the different relationships and political 
conditions within the wider Mediterranean region, the Union had until the Barcelona
49 This may be incorrect but Commission desk-officers did not recall any such projects and no 
references could be found either.
50 See more generally Hakura, F., “The Euro-Mediterranean Policy: The Implication of the Barcelona 
Declaration” (1997) 34 CMLRev., 337 and Stavridis, S., and Hutchence, J., “Mediterranean Challenges 
to the EU’s Foreign Policy” (2000) 5 EFARev., 35.
51 The Euro-Med Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Regional Indicative Programme 2002-2004, 
both attempt to reinvigorate this.
52 The Presidency Conclusions at the Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference illustrate this very clearly.
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Declaration adopted a very piecemeal approach to these countries. Remnants of this
approach still exist. The individual Association Agreements, for example, differ in 
the legal bases they use and their nature. The Agreement with Israel is mixed and 
does not have a development based focus. The Member States are not parties, 
however, to the Agreement with the Palestinian Authority which does have a 
development based focus.
The main goals of the EU’s Mediterranean policy are now set out in the Barcelona 
Declaration, which develops an earlier Commission Communication,54 as 
supplemented by the Common Strategy adopted at the Feira European Council and 
the Conclusions of the Conferences of Foreign Ministers.55 The most important 
objective of the policy, for our purposes, is to create an area of peace and stability 
based on fundamental principles, including respect for human rights and democracy. 
The Barcelona Declaration identifies a number of principles with regard to both 
internal and external security, which are aimed at promoting and upholding human 
rights and other values. With regard to the internal dimension, each partner is 
committed to the principles in the United Nations Charter and the Universal 
Declaration; the development of the rule of law; good governance; and democracy in 
the form of holding free and regular elections. Furthermore, the parties have 
committed themselves to the fundamental freedoms of expression, association for 
peaceful purposes, thought, conscience, religion, pluralism and tolerance between 
different groups in society, as well as non-discrimination with regard to race, 
nationality, language, religion and sex. With regard to external security, the most 
relevant commitments in the Barcelona Declaration are a commitment by each party 
to respect the sovereign equality of other partners in accordance with international 
law; a commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other partners; respect 
for the territorial integrity of the other partners; and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes.56
53 For a historical perspective see Pierros, Bridges and Barriers, supra note 12.
54 COM (1994)427. Also see COM (1995)72.
55 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/euromed/.
56 These commitments are contained in the Political and Security Pillar o f the Declaration. Also see 
the Presidency Conclusions, Cannes European Council, 26-27/6/1995.
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Although the first pillar of the Barcelona Process contains broad ranging 
commitments to human rights and democracy, the question of cooperation on such 
issues is reserved to a relatively narrowly focused range of activities in the third 
pillar. The third pillar, among its other objectives, aims to “support...democratic 
institutions ... .the rule of law and civil society.” A dialogue on ethical values does 
exist within the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conferences established by the 
Barcelona Process, although it has not been very extensive or indeed pushed 
vigorously by either side. In fact the Ministerial Conferences only seem to have 
reiterated support for those principles espoused in the original Ministerial meeting at 
Barcelona.57
In a number of Mediterranean countries, human rights and democracy are particularly 
sensitive and in an area which comes within the final areas of cooperation, discussion 
has been thin on the ground. As Edwards and Phillipart note, only the European 
Parliament has sought to give human rights a high profile image in the context of the 
Barcelona strategy. The Commission in its 2000 Communication, Reinvigorating 
the Barcelona Process, 59 recognised that the lack of focus on human rights issues had 
been one of the major shortcomings of the process since it came into being. It was 
felt that there had not been a sufficiently frank or serious dialogue on human rights or 
the prevention of terrorism and migration. It also noted that human rights policy in 
the region had lacked consistency and that more needed to be done.60 The Vth 
Conference at Valencia has expressly recognised the failure to pursue and have frank 
and constructive discussions on these issues.61 The Commission has now attempted 
to address this shortcoming, by adopting strategic guidelines to reinvigorate both
f \ 7human rights and democracy in relations with the Mediterranean partners.
57 See, for example, the Conclusions o f the Foreign Ministers Conferences at Malta, Palermo, Stuttgart 
and Marseilles.
58 Edwards and Philippart, “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” supra note 12,465.
59 COM (2000)497.
60 Ibid., p.4.
61 Para. 3, Conclusions o f the Foreign Ministers Conference at Valencia.
62 COM (2003)294.
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The Community has, as noted above, also adopted the MEDA Regulations, which set 
out the details of the Community’s internal competence to fund human rights and 
democracy programmes in the region. These are in addition to the EIDHR and the 
funding available under that initiative. It is the human rights and democracy 
provisions of the MEDA Regulation, based upon Article 308 EC, in conjunction with 
the relevant provisions in the Association Agreements and EIDHR that provide the 
Community with the competence to fund such programmes in the Mediterranean 
region. The Mediterranean Common Strategy, in particular, considers democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law to be one of the fundamental objectives of the 
Union’s policy in the region. Other than stressing the importance the Union attaches 
to human rights, however, the manner in which such rights are to be promoted is 
through the funding of projects which support, among others, judicial reform, 
freedom of expression and institution building.63 The manner in which such 
programmes have been funded in Israel and the Palestinian Administered Territories 
will be described below.
3. Ethical Values and Bilateral Relations With Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority.
3.1. Ethical Values, Israel and Bilateral Relations.
Economic relations between the Community and Israel have grown steadily closer. 
The various Agreements negotiated between the parties have ensured that the Union 
has become Israel’s largest trading partner.64 In 2001, trade with the Union 
represented 27% of all Israeli exports worth, €9.5 billion. The EU is the largest 
importer of Israeli goods, although the US exports more goods to it than the EU.65
63 Article 14, 2000/458/CFSP.
64 In addition to the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement there was an EC-Israel Interim Agreement 
on Trade and Trade Related Matters, which entered into force on 1/1/1996, OJ L 71, 21/3/1996, p. 1. 
This sought to update the 1975 Agreement until the 1995 Agreement with Israel entered into force.
65 Para. 9, EU Declaration o f the Fourth Meeting o f the Association Council.
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Israel imported 43% of all its imports, worth in excess of €15 billion, from the 
Union.66 In the last three years, the volume and value of trade has decreased.
The various financial protocols which have been signed with Israel by the 
Community are, by and large, less favourable than those granted to other States in the 
region. Israel is economically more prosperous, than those other States, with an 
annual per capita income of €15,600.67 For this reason aid is largely limited to 
European Investment Bank (EIB) loans and other loans for cooperation projects. 
Israel, while not entitled to development funding as such, is eligible for regional or 
decentralised cooperation projects. The MEDA Regulations, which provide the legal 
basis for funding such projects, go beyond the framework of traditional development 
assistance and are intended also to apply to countries that are not classifiable as 
developing, so as to enable the implementation of the free trade area.
The current basis for the Union’s bilateral dialogue on ethical values with Israel is a 
part of the general political dialogue that has been established with the coming into 
force of the 1995 Association Agreement.68 For example, in the first meeting of the 
Israel-EU Association Council, human rights was raised in the dialogue alongside 
other political and economic issues. The President of the EU Council especially 
recalled that human rights were an “essential element” of the Agreement and used the 
opportunity to welcome a then recent judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court which 
outlawed the widespread use of “moderate physical pressure” by the Israeli security 
forces.69 The four priorities of the Agreement highlighted, however, were concerned 
with trade issues. What is particularly noteworthy is that the Agreement does not 
make cooperation in human rights or other ethical values a specific field of activity. 
In the Portugal case, one of the reasons why the Court held that Article 177 EC was a 
valid legal basis for the Agreement with India was precisely because human rights
66 Figures derived from http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/israel/intro/index.htm
61 Ibid.
68 See further, Paasivirta, E., “EU Trading with Israel and Palestine: Parallel Legal Frameworks and 
Triangular Issues” (1999) 4 EFARev., 305 and Hirsch, M., “The 1995 Trade Agreement Between the 
European Communities and Israel: Three Unresolved Issues” (1996) 1 EFARev., 87.
69 See (2000) 6 EU Bull 1.6.57. The decision being referred to was Public Committee Against Torture 
in Israel v. State o f  Israel, HCJ 5100/94, Supreme Court of Israel, Sitting as the High Court.
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was not a field of cooperation.70 In this instance, where there is a mixed Agreement, 
the Member States clearly have such a competence and there is no legal reason why it 
has not been specifically addressed.
Extensive and detailed discussion on ethical values with Israel is imperative to
71placate some of the Union’s Member States. Israel is party to the Covenant on Civil
77 77and Political Rights; the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the 
Convention Against Torture;74 the Race Convention;75 the Women’s Convention;76 
and 45 ILO Conventions, including five of the eight core conventions.77 While Israel 
is one of the few functioning democracies in the region, in which most issues bar 
nuclear capabilities are openly discussed, it also engages in systematic and gross 
violations of numerous international norms. The Jewish nature of the State, in
7 0
particular, causes significant problems for non-Jewish minorities. Israel does not 
have any basic laws providing for equality. Both the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) have 
found that Israeli laws systematically discriminate against the Arab minorities, who
70make up 20% of the population. There have recently been attempts to classify some
70 Case C-268/94, Portuguese Republic v. Council o f  the European Union, [1996] ECR1-6177.
71 Belgium, Finland, Sweden, France, Spain, Austria and Ireland tend to adopt a more critical approach 
towards Israel than the other Member States.
72 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
73 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 UNTS 3.
74 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
1984, 1465 UNTSB5.
75 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1966, 660 UNTS 
195.
76 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979, 1249 UNTS 
13.
77 Convention No. 29, Forced Labour Convention, 1930, 39 UNTS 55; Convention No. 87, Freedom of  
Association and Protection o f the Right to Organise Convention, 1948, 68 UNTS 17; Convention No. 
98, Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, 96 UNTS 257; Convention No. 
105, Abolition o f Forced Labour Convention, 1957, 320 UNTS 291; and Convention No. I l l ,  
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958, 363 UNTS 31.
78 See COM (2003) 294 where the Union recognises this.
79 See, Concluding Comments of the CERD: Doc. A/50/18 and Concluding Observations o f the HRC: 
Israel CCPR/C/79/Add.93 and CCPR/CO/78/ISR.
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of Israel’s practices and policies towards its Arab populations as apartheid, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing and the issue of “Zionism as Racism” has been a regular feature 
on the agenda of the General Assembly, as well as causing a major schism at the 
World Conference on Racism held in Durban in September 2001.80 Israeli Arabs are 
also disproportionately subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment under 
the Landau Commission rules.81 Israel is the only democracy where legally 
sanctioned inhuman treatment exists. The Committee on Torture (CAT) has noted 
Israel’s security concerns, but has stated that they cannot be used to justify torture. 
The legality of its continued use of derogations from its commitments under UN 
human rights treaties is also questioned.
Israel’s practices in the Occupied Territories are also a major issue. On a number of 
occasions, bodies such as the HRC have expressed their grave concern at the situation 
there and noted Israel’s responsibility for the implementation of the Covenant in the 
Occupied Territories. The situation has been recognised as being of such gravity 
that the Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on Occupied
Of
Palestine, with whom Israel has consistently refused to cooperate. There are thus 
numerous relevant issues and concerns with regard to ethical values in relations with 
Israel. In practice, the most important has been the application of the “essential 
element” clause in the 1995 Agreement. The clause, however, and the applicability 
and continuance of the Agreement is inextricably tied up with the MEPP and the 
survival of the Palestinian Authority. The discussion thus turns to the relationship
80 See 7//T “Accusation o f Genocide Puts Israel on Defensive” 3/9/2001, internet edition and Bishara, 
M., Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid, (2002).
81 Concluding Comments o f the CERD: Israel CERD 304/Add.45 and Concluding Comments o f the 
CAT: Israel 9/5/1997, A/52/44 paras.253-260.
82 See Concluding Comments o f the CAT: Israel CAT/C/XXVII/Conc.5.
83 See Concluding Comments of the CAT, supra note 81 and Concluding Observations of the HRC: 
CCPR/CO/7 8/ISR.
84 Concluding Observations o f the HRC: Israel, CCPR/C/79/Add.93, para. 10 and CCPR/C/77/L/ISR, 
27/11/2002.
85 See in particular, Update to the Mission Report on Israel’s Violations o f  Human Rights in the 
Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, E/CN.4/2001/30, 21/3/2001.
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between the Union and the Palestinian Authority before examining the relevance of 
the clause and its application.
3.2. Ethical Values, the Palestinian Authority and Bilateral 
Relations.
The Agreement between the Community and the PLO on behalf of the Palestinian 
Authority currently represents the only development cooperation Agreement the 
Community has with a non-State entity.86 Unlike the Agreement with Israel, mainly 
for political and legal reasons, it is not mixed in nature. The Agreement aims to 
establish a free trade area between the Community and the West Bank and Gaza by 
the end of 2001, something that has not been achieved. Article 1 of the Agreement 
states that its objectives shall include providing an appropriate framework for a 
comprehensive dialogue. Article 2 is the “essential elements” clause and Article 70 is 
a suspension clause. In substantive terms these are identical to those in the 
Agreement with Israel. Furthermore, Article 68 articulates the “security interests” 
exception, which is identical to that in the other Agreements negotiated under the 
Barcelona Process.
Relations between the Palestinian Authority, a non-State entity, and Union must take 
account of various special factors. In those territories where the Palestinian Authority 
has control its powers and competence are less than those of a State. Further to the 
outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, those arrangements that were in place after the Oslo 
Peace Accords, have not survived following Israeli incursions and occupation of 
territory that should be under the control of the Palestinian Authority. A Select 
Committee of the House of Commons in 2003 described the Palestinian Authority as
86 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation Between the 
European Community, o f the One Part, and the Palestine Liberation Organization for the Benefit o f the 
Palestinian Authority o f the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, o f the Other Part, OJ LI 87, 16/7/1997 p.3.
87 See Malunczuk, P., “Some Basic Aspects of the Agreements Between Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation From the Perspective of International Law” (1996) 7 EJIL, 485 and Watson, 
The Oslo Accords, supra note 47, passim.
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having no de facto or de jure control over any territory.88 Furthermore, there is no 
geographical continuity between the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians are therefore, 
dependent upon the Israeli authorities for permission to travel between the two or 
indeed between towns and villages within the various zones, as well as to go to Israel 
to work, as many Palestinians do. As and when there is increased tension such 
permission is withdrawn ensuring that severe financial hardship is experienced in the 
Palestinian Administered Territories, due to the block in the flow of goods, services 
and employment.89 In fact the entire economy of the Palestinian Administered 
Territories is highly dependent upon Israel and the Palestinian Authority is reliant 
upon it for its financial survival. 90% of all imports come from Israel and 80% of 
exports go to it.90 Occupation has ensured that there is little or no infrastructure in 
place and thus the economy is small and poorly developed and highly reliant upon 
agriculture, services and some light manufacturing.91 Levels of malnutrition have 
now reached a level commensurate with sub-Saharan Africa.92 Some of these 
considerations make the promotion of ethical values particularly difficult. The 
Community has in place a sophisticated and complex set of programmes which aim to 
both support the infrastructure and the civil society which exists, as well as promoting 
ethical values. These are discussed below.
The Palestinian Authority cannot be a party to multilateral human rights treaties that 
are only open to States. It is bound, however, to respect those rights that have entered 
the corpus of custom and obligations erga omnes. Despite the relatively limited 
scope of these provisions, it is clear that the Palestinian Authority does engage in acts 
that are contrary to them. As in Israel, torture of suspected terrorists is widespread. 
Prolonged detention and lack of due process are also problematic. Arbitrary arrest, 
unfair trials and impunity for those violating rights as well extrajudicial and political
88 House o f Commons Select Committee on International Development, Development Assistance and 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, (2004) p. 10.
89 Referred to as the policy o f “closure”. See further, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, The Israeli 
Policy o f  Closure, (ndg) and HRW, Israel’s Closure o f the West Bank and Gaza, (1996).
90 US Department o f State, Human Rights Reports-The Occupied Territories 1998, p.2.
91 Ibid.
92 Select Committee, Development Assistance, supra note 88, p.65.
93 Ibid.
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killings, as in Israel and the Occupied Territories, are also common.94 Human Rights 
Watch has described the situation as “deplorable” .95 A study commissioned by the 
European Commission to investigate the utility of the MEDA Regulation, found that 
in the areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority: there was no separation of 
powers; the rule of law was fundamentally deficient; censorship was widespread; 
intimidation of journalists and opposition parties was widespread; and rights to 
association were relatively limited.96 Husseini has argued that although political 
developments have hindered the ability of the Palestinian Authority to govern 
effectively, its overall record has been one of substantial improvement.97 Israeli
Q g
action and curfews have allegedly undermined it and exposed its weakness. These 
weaknesses have subsequently been used against it, leading to an international 
consensus that reform must be undertaken, when much of the blame does not lie at its 
door.99 What cannot be denied, however, is that some of the abuses, discussed above, 
have been a direct result of the intense pressure the Palestinian Authority has been put 
under by Israel, the US and the EU to curb and control factions which conduct and 
engage in attacks against Israel. The “essential elements” clause of the Agreement 
has, as is the case with Israel, been crucial to relations between the parties and it is 
these we now turn.
94 See the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Reports for the period 1997-2001 and 
supra note 90.
95 HRW, Palestinian Self-Rule Areas: Human Rights Under the Palestinian Authority, (1997) p .l.
96 Karkutli, N. and Butzler, D., Evaluation o f  the MEDA Democracy Programme 1996-1998, (1998) 
passim.
97 Husseini, H., “Challenges and Reforms in the Palestinian Authority” (2003) 26 Fordham In t’l L.J., 
500, 532.
98 Ibid.
99 Select Committee, Development Assistance, supra note 88, passim. Much o f the reform has been 
funded and supported by the Community, see infra.
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3.3. The Relevance of the Essential Elements Clauses in the 
Agreements with Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
3.3.1. The Essential Elements Clause and Relations With Israel.
The “essential elements” clause in the Agreement with Israel has been considered in 
the context of its practices in both the Occupied Territories and those areas nominally 
under the control of the Palestinian Authority. It has not been particularly significant, 
in practice, with regard to the situation within Israel’s internationally recognised 
boundaries, even though systematic discrimination on the basis of race exists, which 
entitles the Member States to take some action.
Ireland, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark all added Ministerial statements to the 
Agreement underscoring the human rights aspects of the Agreement and the fact that 
persistent abuse of such rights would be a breach of it. The complication with a 
mixed Agreement, however, stems from the difficulty in suspending such a treaty. 
The Agreement with Israel contains the standard “essential elements” clause, which 
needs to be invoked for violations, by either the Member States or Israel, of the norms 
it is concerned with. The preamble to the Agreement refers to economic freedom and 
the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly human rights and 
democracy (which is not mentioned in the Charter) as forming the “very basis of the 
Association.” Article 2 of the Agreement, which is the “essential elements” clause, 
simply notes that “[Relations between the parties, as well as the provisions of the 
Agreement itself, shall be based upon respect for human rights and democratic 
principles which guides their internal and international policy...”
Where human rights concerns have been raised, Israel has consistently invoked its 
security interests. The Council whenever it discusses such issues recognises the 
legitimacy of Israel’s security concerns, meaning that Israel will have to submit 
convincing arguments with regard to the question of proportionality and not 
necessity.100 As that question is a more subjective one, it makes it more difficult for
100 The Union in every almost statement on the MEPP recognises Israel’s legitimate security interests.
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the Member States to come to any agreement on the response to such action. As part 
of the Barcelona Process, the Union and Member States have effectively allowed the 
parties on the other side to take any measures that they consider essential to their own 
security “in the event of internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and 
order, in time of war or serious international tension constituting threat of war.” 101 
This has ensured that Israel is able to rely upon this provision of the Agreement, in an 
attempt to justify its policies and practices. The Commission, in particular, however, 
has attempted to raise the issue of proportionality, which is clearly legitimate. Unless 
the Community and Member States are permitted to send fact-finding missions or 
have observers in place, it is more difficult for them to judge what is or is not 
proportionate. Israel considers that it is for it to determine the measures needed to 
counter the threats and danger it is under.
The disproportionate and illegal nature of some Israeli activities is, however, more 
than apparent. The destruction caused by Israeli troops during the occupation of 
Jenin between March and May 2002 and the on-going building of a security-wall are
i m * • •two examples. In Jenin, widespread international calls for observers and fact­
finding missions to verify events, by among others the Security Council, were 
ignored by the Israelis who subsequently refused access to a team sent by the 
Secretary General of the United Nations to establish what had happened.103 In its 
relations with Myanmar the Union has been very condemnatory of the authorities for 
their refusal to allow access to the Special Rapporteur and the Special Envoy, and 
used this as part of its rationale for restrictive measures. In the case of Israel such 
condemnation, not only with regard to events in Jenin but also of the continuing 
refusal to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur for Occupied Palestine, has not so 
far resulted in such action. As previously discussed, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, 1969 imposes restrictions on the circumstances in which the
101 Wording in, for example, Article 73, Israel-EC Association Agreement and Article 68, Association 
Agreement with the PLO.
102 Others include the occupations and destruction in Nablus, Bethlehem, Rafah and Ramallah since 
2002.
103 Security Council Resolution 1405(2002), 19/4/2001. See further Report o f  the Secretary General 
Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution ES-10/10.A/ES-10/186. (Hereinafter the Jenin 
Report).
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“essential elements” clause can be legitimately used. Events in Jenin, however, give 
a very clear indication of the lack of political agreement with regard to its use among 
the Member States, even where the legal requirements are satisfied. The Secretary 
General’s Report on events in Jenin considered both the Israeli and Palestinian 
authorities to be culpable. Both are considered to have engaged in violations of 
provisions of the relevant Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Report indicates, 
however, that the breaches by Israel were substantially graver with some of the acts 
prima facia amounting to “war crimes” as defined under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.104 In July 2002, 30 aid agencies, in the aftermath of the 
Israeli occupation of Jenin, issued a formal and unprecedented joint statement 
condemning the Israeli action that impeded and hindered their work and further 
worsened a dire humanitarian crisis.105 The Spanish Presidency, at this time not only 
summoned the Israeli ambassador to register its protest at Israeli activities but was 
also very critical of the Israeli action in public meetings of the Security Council, 
specifically with regard to events to Jenin. The Presidency considered that the action 
Israel had taken could in no way be justified.106 In the Security Council it was 
particularly condemnatory of the humiliation of Arafat and destruction of Palestinian 
infrastructure.107 A delegation of MEPs also considered that the situation in Jenin
1ORamounted to war crimes. In the United Nations an EU statement recognised the 
right of Israel to combat terror but its condemnation and its assessment in political, if 
not legal terms, of Israeli practices is more than enough to justify suspension of the 
Association Agreement. The statement noted the building of Israeli walls, illegal 
occupations, “serious human rights violations”, an “alarming humanitarian situation” 
and “extrajudicial killings of Palestinians” as a direct consequence of Israeli action.109
104 Although the statute o f the Court is not binding on Israel, the definition o f war crimes can be argued 
to be representative o f custom. Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3. 
Israel is a party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949 - Convention (IVth) Relative to the Protection 
o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War, 973 UNTS 287 which prohibits many o f those same acts.
105 BBC World Internet News “International Aid Agencies Condemn Israel,” 4/7/2002. Also see The 
Independent, “Israeli Army Warned by UN for Shooting at Aid Workers” 28/11/2003 p.6.
106 On 8/2/02 Spain summoned the Israeli ambassador to explain and justify the attacks in Ramallah.
107 See EFPB Docs., 02/131 and 02/248.
108 EP Press Release 25/4/2002. “EP Delegation Denounces War Crimes Against Palestinians”.
109 Presidency Statement at the General Assembly, 57th session, 21/4/2002.
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A number of widely regarded and respected Israeli and Palestinian human rights 
groups at this stage issued statements calling upon the EU to take action against 
Israel.110 This was particularly important because at the same time the Union had 
begun to introduce restrictive measures against Zimbabwe.111
In response to events in Jenin, the imposition of punitive measures was discussed by 
the Union, especially the suspension of arms sales which was being called for by
WOresolutions of the European Parliament, at the Quartet meeting held in April 
2002.113 No such measures were taken. Prodi had warned, however, that unless 
Israel withdrew from the Palestinian Administered Territories the Agreement would 
be suspended.114 It is likely though that the refusal of the Israelis to allow Pique and 
Prodi to meet Arafat, a few days earlier in Ramallah, played a role in his statement. 
As a day prior to the proposed meeting with Arafat, Prodi had stated that the 
Agreement with Israel could not be suspended as it provided “a forum for dialogue 
and was not there for the purposes of blackmail” .115 After the events in Jenin, the 
Member States could not even agree to call an emergency meeting of the EU-Israel 
Association Council.116
In a similar vein, the Union has occasionally condemned the building of the Israeli 
security-wall but has not yet responded to it in a manner commensurate with the 
seriousness of the situation.117 The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights in his 2003 Report considers that over 210,000 Palestinians are directly 
affected by the security-wall. The subsequent humanitarian emergency that has
110 See, for example, “LAW Tells European Union: No More Words But Decisive Action” 7/2/2002.
1,1 See Common Position 2002/145/CFSP OJ L 50, 21/2/2002 p.l and Council Regulation No. 
310/2002, OJ L50, 21/2/2002, p. 10.
112 Resolution P5 TA (2002) 173.
113 NYT, “Middle East Turmoil; Europeans Press Demands on Israel” 11/4/2002 p .l.
1,4 The Guardian, “Withdrew Now or Face EU Sanctions” 9/4/2002, p.4.
115 Know Europe “Palestinians Seek EU Arms Ban on Israel” 4/4/2002.
116 Due to the lack o f unanimity among the 15, the Euro-Med Conference in Valencia was used instead.
117 See, for example, Statement at the General Assembly, supra note 109.
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resulted in is not, however, the most serious issue. The Special Rapporteur 
considers that the security-wall very clearly amounts to “de facto annexation” of 
Palestinian territory, a fundamental breach of international law and its principles.119 
He also considers that Israel’s arguments (vis-a-vis justifications for the security- 
wall) “are simply not supported by the facts” and that the construction of it violates
the right to self-determination, an obligation erga omnes, and also amounts to the
100forcible acquisition of territory. The Special Rapporteur considers Israel’s actions 
to be disproportionate, even after according it a wide margin of appreciation in 
responding to terror.121 The security-wall is also fundamentally incompatible with 
the roadmap itself. It protects illegal settlements, which Israel is obliged to dismantle 
under the plan, and makes the two-State solution impossible to implement as it 
prejudges the boundaries between them. Notwithstanding this, the Union’s response 
to the security-wall has to date been weak. A proposed resolution in the Security 
Council, condemning it and Israel’s continued settlement activities, was vetoed by the 
US.122 The UK and Germany both abstained whereas France voted in favour of the 
resolution. In the General Assembly, however, the 15 Member States cosponsored 
the resolution condemning the wall which was finally adopted.123 The Member States 
abstained from General Assembly Resolution ES-10/14, however, which requested 
the ICJ for an Advisory Opinion on the legality of the security-wall. This is not 
because the Member States doubt that the security-wall, where it deviates from the 
1949 armistice-line, is unlawful124 but because they feel such an Opinion is not
n c
conducive to relaunching political dialogue.
1,8 Report o f the Special Rapporteur o f the Commission on Human Rights, On the Situation in the 
Palestinian Territories Occupied by Israel Since 1967, E/CN.4/2004/6, 8/9/2003. (Hereinafter Special 
Rapporteur’s 2003 Report). Also see the Special Rapporteur’s 2002 Report, E/CN.4/2002/32, 
6/3/2002. The Special Rapporteur’s 2003 Report, para.21 considers that the humanitarian crisis is 
caused almost entirely by Israel.
119 Ibid., paras. 6-16.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., para.5.
122 Press Release SC/7896, 14/10/2003.
123 Resolution ES/10-13, 21/10/2003.
124 See Presidency Statement at the General Assembly, 58th Session, 8/12/2003.
125 Ibid. Nine of the then 15 Member States, as well as the Irish Presidency, submitted written 
observations to the Court on the request for an Advisory Opinion.
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On 9 July 2004 the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion. This will increase pressure 
on the Union to respond to the security-wall in a manner commensurate to the
19A 197seriousness of the situation. The Court by a majority of 14-1 considered that the 
security-wall, where it enters the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and 
around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law. The Court, in as detailed an 
Opinion as was possible in the circumstances, considered the applicable 
humanitarian and human rights law. It concluded that the security-wall severely 
impedes the Palestinian’s right to self-determination;129 violates a number of 
international human rights and humanitarian law obligations incumbent upon 
Israel;130 was tantamount to de facto annexation;131 and took a route which was not 
essential for security purposes.132 In sum the Court concluded that, “..Israel cannot 
rely on a right to self-defence or on a state of necessity in order to preclude the
1 99wrongfulness of the construction of the wall ” Sharon immediately denounced
the Court’s Opinion.134 The Dutch Presidency, clearly wishing to keep its options 
open for the time being, stated that the Court’s Opinion “will need to be studied
1 9 c
carefully”. The Opinion of the ICJ was delivered nine days after a decision of the 
Israeli Supreme Court which considered that specific parts of the security-wall caused
126 Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 9/7/2004.
127 Judge Buergenthal dissenting.
128 Israel contested the Court’s jurisdiction to give an Advisory Opinion but did not cooperate with the 
Court further. The Court based its understanding o f the facts on the Special Rapporteur’s 2003 Report.
129 Para. 122.
130 Paras. 123-137..............................................................................................................................................
131 Para. 121.
132 Paras. 114-137.
133 Para. 142.
134 See NYT, “Sharon Pledges to Defy Court on Barrier” 12/7/2004 p.l and The Guardian, "Sacred 
Right to Fight Terror Overrides Court, Says Sharon” 12/7/2004 p .l l .  The US State Department 
described the Opinion as “inappropriate”. BBC World Internet News, “US Critical o f UN Barrier 
Ruling” 10/7/2004.
135 Joint Press Statement by the EU Foreign Ministers on the Advisory Opinion o f the International 
Court o f Justice, 12/7/2004. Javier Solana was equally cautious in his response. See Comments by 
Javier Solana on Today’s ICJ Opinion, SOI89/04, Brussels, 9/7/2004.
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unjustifiable harm and suffering to certain Palestinians. As opposed to the Opinion 
of the ICJ, the basis for the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court was violation of
1 37Palestinian rights to property and freedom of movement.
The Union has discussed the issue of the security-wall with Israel in bilateral 
negotiations. It has, as noted above, also occasionally condemned the wall in the UN. 
In bilateral meetings the issue has not been raised consistently. In the third meeting 
of the EU-Israel Association Council held in October 2002, for example, there was no 
mention of it in the EU’s declaration, despite a long list of other concerns, such as 
extrajudicial killings and collective punishments, being raised by the Union.138 In the 
fourth meeting of the Association-Council in November 2003,139 the Union did raise 
the issue, using much of the language it had already adopted in the Presidency 
Conclusions of the October 2003 Brussels European Council. In the declaration of 
the fourth meeting the Union recognised that the wall results in a de facto change of 
the legal status of many Palestinian villages and requests that Israel dismantle the 
wall, something Sharon had repeatedly refused to do.140 Sharon has, however, only in 
the light of the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision agreed to reconsider certain parts of 
the route taken by the security-wall.141 The Israeli Supreme Court does not require 
the security-wall to be dismantled, only partially re-routed. The de facto annexation 
of land referred to by the ICJ was not of central concern to the Israeli Supreme Court.
The building of the security-wall and events in Jenin provide clear examples of the 
type of violations of international law by Israel that are certainly enough to justify 
suspension of the Association Agreement or at the very least the introduction of some 
sort of punitive measures. In the case of Jenin, prima facie grave breaches of the 
principles of international humanitarian law had been committed by Israel.
136 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government o f  Israel and the Commander o f  the IDF Forces in 
the West Bank, HCJ 2056/04, Supreme Court of Israel, Sitting as the High Court, 30/6/2004.
137 Ibid., para. 60.
138 Declaration o f the European Union at the Third Meeting o f the Association Council EU-Israel, 
21/ 10/2002 .
139 EU Declaration of the Fourth Meeting of the Association Council, para. 4.
140 See for example, the Quartet Statement further to the New York meeting, 26/9/2003.
141 The Economist, “The Wall and the Law” 15/7/2004 internet edition.
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Collective punishments, stifling of humanitarian aid, the destruction of 
infrastructure142 and civilian property and extrajudicial killings were all rife and part 
of a systematic policy.143 While the Secretary General’s Report considered the 
Palestinian Authority to also be guilty of seriously violating international 
humanitarian law and human rights, it did make clear that culpability primarily lay 
with the Israelis.144 With regard to the security-wall the violations of international 
law are at least as stark. The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion considered that all States, 
while respecting international law, must try to bring the impediment to the 
Palestinian’s right to self-determination to an end. It further stated that all States 
parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention (which includes all of the Union’s Member 
States) are under a similar obligation with regard to violations of that Convention.145 
In the case of Jenin, the Union has used language which suggests that suspension of 
the Agreement was a very real possibility. This has not yet been the case as far as the 
security-wall is concerned.
Suspending the Agreement with Israel is difficult, as noted above, for the Community 
and its Member States because of its mixed nature. Article 79 of the Agreement 
contains the standard clause that if one party considers that another has failed to fulfil 
its obligations, under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures to that effect. 
Before doing so, however, it must supply the Association Council with sufficient 
information to allow a thorough investigation of the situation. The only exception to 
this is in cases of special urgency. The Association Council, as established by Article 
69, is composed of representatives of the Members of the Council of the European 
Union and Commission, on the one hand, and, on the other, Israel. Thus Israel is able 
to put forward its arguments concerning the alleged breach of the essential elements 
of the Agreement. These will invariably be based upon State security. For the 
Agreement to be suspended, on any basis, the consent of all the Union’s Member
142 The World Bank, Twenty Seven Months-lntifada, Closures and the Palestinian Economic Crisis: An 
Assessment, (2003) p. 19 considers that Israel has destroyed $930 million worth o f Palestinian 
infrastructure.
143 The EU Presidency has asked for an inventory o f the damage done, see the speech by 
Commissioner Patten, No. 68 EuropaWorld, 8/2/2002 p.5.
144 Special Rapporteur’s 2003 Report, supra note 118, para. 55.
145 Advisory Opinion, supra note 126, para. 159.
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States as well as the Commission is required. Despite the fact that the Union has 
taken a more critical line on Israel than the US, this is highly unlikely to happen. 
While provision is made for such an eventuality, the reality of the situation is 
different. There are a number of reasons for this.
First, Commission officials consider Israeli delegations, not only in the Association 
Council but also in Troika meetings, Euro-Med Conferences and any other fora, to 
have a very business-like and professional approach to the issue of human rights and 
other ethical values. Israeli delegations are generally considered to be at least 
prepared to discuss concerns raised by the Member States or Commission in their 
meetings.146 Commitments to keep the “situation under review” and “necessity” have 
so far always been enough to placate some of the Member States and thus any 
consensus to take action which may have existed has broken down. On a number of 
occasions Israel has, to some extent, responded to criticism. For example, Israel 
initially consistently failed to comply with a series of Security Council Resolutions, 
such as Resolution 799 of 1992 on the deportation of 415 Palestinians. The 
deportations were subsequently discussed in the EC/Israel Cooperation Council on 1 
February 1993, where the Community raised its concerns. It was argued by the EC 
Council that the continuance of discussion and non-suspension of that Agreement 
(which did not have an “essential elements” clause) provided the Community and its 
Member States with “another opportunity to exert pressure on the Israelis to take 
immediate action with regard to the deportees.” As a consequence of not only 
European but also global condemnation, the then Israeli Foreign Secretary Shimon 
Peres informed the EC Foreign Ministers that 100 deportees had been allowed to 
return and the duration of the exile period had been halved for the others. The 
Community and its Member States considered this to be an important step forward in 
complying with Security Council Resolution 799, although it fell considerably short 
of what was actually stipulated, and thus felt their approach was vindicated.147 In the 
Cooperation Council the Community had stated that it did not wish to be put in a 
position where it would have to adopt a position on the 415 deported Palestinians
146 Interview with Commission desk-officers, 12/6/2001.
147 See EFPB Docs., 93/096 and 93/167.
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•  * 1 ifiwhile negotiating the 1995 Agreement. The Israelis ensured that they did not have 
to.
Secondly, even in the event that agreement can be reached between the Member 
States that the Agreement should be suspended, the Union is well aware that if this 
were done Israel would be likely to refuse to agree to its further participation in any 
negotiations concerning the MEPP. The tension between the Community and Israel 
was apparent, for example, at the signing of the peace agreements in Madrid in 1991. 
Israel had initially refused to let the Community take part in the negotiations. Only 
once the Community had agreed to and negotiations had taken place over updating 
the 1975 Agreement with Israel, did it consider the Community’s participation to be 
acceptable.149 The difference in the balance of power can be seen in the fact that 
Israel was largely dictating the agenda. The Community’s role was still limited to a 
minor one, working on regional economic development.150 Having obtained a role in 
the MEPP and in an attempt to maintain and promote itself as an international actor, 
the Union has condemned Israel as and when considered necessary but as a 
consequence it is unlikely the Association Agreement will be suspended. In this 
respect the general idea, in practice, seems to be that the peace process and the 
Union’s role in it must take priority.
Thirdly, due to the dependence of the Palestinian Administered Territories upon 
Israel for their economic survival, the Member States consider that suspension of the 
Agreement with Israel is likely to have an adverse economic effect on it.151 While the 
economic and physical well-being of Israel has been a cornerstone of US foreign 
policy in the Middle East since 1948, it can be argued that since it has taken a stand 
on the MEPP in 1980, the Community and later Union has been attempting to give 
effect to the UN Security Council Resolutions that deal with the region. Protecting 
Palestinian rights has been central to the approach adopted by the Union. This has
148 Ibid.
149 See Tovia, A., “The EU’s Mediterranean Policies Under Pressure” in Gillespie, R. (ed.), 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2 (1996) p. 14.
150 See COM (1993)305.
151 See, for example, EFPB Doc., 98/426.
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included attempting to lessen the impact of certain Israeli practices upon those most
affected by them. A punitive approach has not been adopted towards Israel, even
where it has destroyed infrastructure in the Palestinian Authority which the Union has
paid for. Every tension and turn in relations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority has a direct impact on the viability and survival of the area nominally under
the latter’s control. Negotiation and dialogue have thus been maintained at all costs.
A number of Member States generally consider the continuance of the Association
Agreement with Israel to be vital if the peace process is to be kept on track. On
numerous occasions when the suspension of the Agreement has been raised, the
Council has stated that it did not consider the breaking-off of relations to be
conducive to the resolution of the situation. “Discussion not threats” is seen as the
“method” to employ with regard to Israel.152 Commissioner Marin stated, for
example, that ratification of the Agreement ensured that the Community is “..in a
better position to exercise a positive influence regarding all human rights related
1issues in the framework of the political dialogue...” Benjamin Netanyahu, when 
Prime Minister of Israel, adopted a similar approach. He warned the Union against 
imposing sanctions, as they supposedly would have no effect and would lead to 
deteriorating relations between the Union and Israel as a result.154
Fourthly, it is politically increasingly difficult for the Union’s Member States to 
suspend the Agreement. The refusal to suspend it, following events that have already 
occurred, may mean that in future the violations will have to be even more serious 
before the Member States suspend it. In legal terms the position has probably not 
changed although Israel may be able argue that estoppel is now a relevant 
consideration. The Member States have never stated, however, that Israel’s conduct 
in Jenin or its assassinations of Palestinian leaders, for example, do not amount to a 
material breach of the Association Agreement. The “essential elements” clause can 
legally still be used whenever the Member States consider there has been a material 
breach. The political reality is that only graver and more fundamental breaches of
152 See EFPB Doc., 97/357.
153 See OJ C 117, 16/4/1998 p.86.
154 The Daily Telegraph “Israel Urges Blair to Veto Arab Lobby” 21/7/1998 p.7.
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international norms than those which have already occurred will probably lead to 
such action.
In fact until Israel complied with the demands of the Union in November 2003,155 it 
was always much more likely that the Israel-EU Agreement would be suspended over 
a dispute as to whether products from Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories 
are entitled under the Association Agreement to preferential access to the Community 
market.156 Chris Patten at a plenary session of the European Parliament, for example, 
made it very clear that the Israel-EU accord was likely to be suspended due to the
1 ^ 7disagreement. At the Fourth-Meeting of the Association Council, held a week
before the Israeli announcement, the Union continued to express regret that the
1dispute had not been resolved.
Numerous allegations of trade impropriety by Israel exist in this respect. As disputes 
over agriculture were the most difficult in the negotiation of the 1995 Agreement, the
iL
Commission took the issue very seriously indeed and, for example, called the 12 
meeting of the Community-Israel Cooperation Committee specifically to discuss the 
issue.159 The Union’s position over rules of origin is closely tied-up to its overall 
approach to the MEPP. The Union could not publicly declare that the settlements are 
illegal under international law and then accept goods produced in them, which help to 
finance the settlements, as being entitled to preferential access as a part of Israeli 
territory.160 Illegal settlements must be dismantled, as Israel has agreed to (with 
regard to some of them anyway) under the Quartet's roadmap, if the two-State
155 On 25/11/2003, Minster Olmert announced that Israel will geographically label goods produced in 
settlements in the Occupied Territories.
156 Rules o f origin are set out in Articles 2-5, Protocol 4 to the Agreement.
157 See (27) EuromedReport, 17/5/2001 p.l.
158 Para. 15, EU Declaration of the Fourth Meeting o f the Association Council.
159 See OJ C 304, 2/10/1998 p. 106.
160 See Hirsch, M., “Rules o f Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments? The European Union 
Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (2003) 26 
Fordham In t’l L.J., 572 and Hauswaldt, C., “Problems Under the EC-Israel Association Agreement: 
The Export o f Goods Produced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Under the EC-Israel Association 
Agreement” (2003) 14 EJIL, 591.
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solution is to be tenable. Exports to the Union from the settlements are worth
approximately €140 million per year.161 Israeli exports to the Union, as noted above,
are worth over €9.5 billion. Before the House of Commons Select Committee a
Commission representative did argue that suspending the Agreement with Israel may
do more harm to the EU than Israel due to the trade balance being “very very heavily”
1in the Union’s favour. Despite this, suspension of the Agreement due to the 
dispute over goods produced in the settlements was a real possibility. It made sense 
for Israel to agree to pay customs duties on €140 million worth of exports rather than 
risk losing benefits on all of them. The damage to the economic interests of the 
Union would have been shared by the Member States. Israel alone would have 
suffered on the other side. As noted above, trade and economic relations with Israel 
are necessary for the Union if it wishes to maintain political relations with it and a 
role in the MEPP. Although the amounts involved are relatively minor and the issue 
not so fundamental (since Israel does not consider the payment of customs duties 
prejudicial to its sovereignty over the settlements) the settlement of this dispute does 
highlight that by taking a tough approach the Union can compel Israel to 
compromise.
The difference in approach to events in Jenin or the building of the security-wall and 
Israeli exports from the settlements is not due to the priority given to trade over 
ethical values by the Union. If the Union relied upon the “essential elements” clause 
it may find that suspension of the Agreement had little effect upon Israel’s behaviour, 
it would no longer serve any purpose and the Union will have lost any influence it 
had. In the context of trade, countermeasures are not unusual. The suspension of an 
Agreement for human rights violations is far less common. Suspension of the 
Agreement over exports from the settlements would not cause as much collateral 
damage to EU-Israeli relations as the use of the “essential elements” clause for 
violations of international law.
The failure to suspend the Agreement with Israel does not mean that the Union is not 
condemnatory of Israeli practices. There has traditionally been relatively little public
161 Haaretz, Editorial, 26/11/2003.
162 Select Committee, Development Assistance, supra note 88, p.65.
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criticism of Israel’s discriminatory legislation or its legislation allowing 
administrative detention. Prior to 2000 there were relatively few public demarches 
on such issues, with the last in 1989.164 More recently, there was a noticeable shift 
from this approach although it is limited to certain Presidencies. The Swedish 
Presidency, for example, was publicly critical of Israel and its human rights record
thtowards its Arab populations at the 57 session of the Commission on Human 
Rights.165 With regard to Israel’s behaviour in the Occupied Territories the situation 
is, as noted above, quite different and the Union is sometimes very vocal on such 
matters. For example, Israel has, as is well-known, drawn up “hit-lists” of 
Palestinians to be assassinated. After one of the first such incidents the EU almost 
immediately issued a strong statement on extrajudicial killings by Israel of 
Palestinians and a demarche reflecting this concern was made to the Israeli Foreign 
Ministry. The Union described Israel’s activities as unacceptable and contrary to the 
rule of law and international law.166 Each subsequent assassination by Israel has been 
followed by very strongly worded condemnation by the EU, although no further
167demarches have been issued on this matter. In March 2002, however, a demarche 
was also issued to the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office on settler harassment and 
violence.168
The Union’s overall approach towards Israel has been to emphasise dialogue and 
discussion and to resort to condemnation as sparingly as possible. Israeli politicians 
tend to be far more concerned with their domestic constituency and the view of the 
US than with other international pressure. They thus carry out the acts they so wish, 
such as the building of settlements, destruction of property and assassinations, with 
little regard to the views of others, including the Union.
163 See, for example, EFPB Doc., 95/379.
164 Which concerned the expulsion o f 415 Palestinians. See EFPB Doc., 89/181.
165 Available at http://www.eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news read.asp?iInformationID=13758 .
166 (2000) 1-2 EU Bull 1.6.27.
167 For example, see Presidency Statement on Extrajudicial Killings in Gaza, 10/4/2003.
168 The demarche o f 14/3/2002 was published on the Spanish Presidency’s webpage.
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3.3.2. The Essential Elements Clause and the Palestinian Administered 
Territories.
In terms of possible suspension, the Community has far more leverage in the case of 
the Palestinian Authority than it does with Israel. Paasivirta has noted, for example, 
that upon the ratification of the Agreement the President of the EU Council stressed 
“Mr Arafat will do everything possible to promote human rights.” 169 The situation in 
the Palestinian Administered Territories with regard to the rule of law and human 
rights is far from perfect. One of the ironies of the approach adopted by the Union 
and Member States towards Israel, however, is that they are equally unlikely to 
suspend this Agreement, even though it is far easier to do so institutionally, 
procedurally and politically. This is the case notwithstanding the Palestinian 
Authority’s own practices and the activities of certain groups that are based in the 
territory which is nominally under its control, who engage in destructive activities in 
Israel itself or in the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories.
Israeli practices in the Palestinian and Occupied Territories have had a direct and 
detrimental effect on many projects and objectives identified by the Community for
1 70development funding. The Union has poured millions of Euros into the Palestinian 
Administered Territories, in an effort to develop an embryonic Palestinian State, only 
to often find its efforts often thwarted by the Israelis. In the Palestinian Administered 
Territories the Community’s projects face considerable logistical problems. A lack of 
geographical continuity between Gaza and the West Bank also causes Community 
funded projects substantial problems. In Gaza, for example, 30 years of occupation 
have led to problems, such as inadequate healthcare and basic sanitation facilities in 
some areas. Setbacks in the peace process, which often result in the Israeli policy of 
“closure”, directly affect the projects attempting to address these problems. If the 
Community and Member States suspend the Association Agreement with Israel then 
they have less leverage in persuading the Israeli authorities in permitting or at least 
not hindering their work in the Palestinian Administered Territories. Conversely,
169 Europe No. 6922, 29/2/1997, p.4 cited by Paasivirta, supra note 68, note 25.
170 See Court o f Auditors, Special Report No. 19/2000-0n the Management by the Commission o f the 
Programme o f  Assistance to Palestinian Society, p. 16.
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suspending the Agreement with the Palestinian Authority is equally likely to lead to 
the failure of the MEPP and thus is equally unlikely. This is despite the fact that the 
lack of a countervailing power, such as the US, who can nullify the effects of 
suspension makes the Palestinian Authority far more pliable to the demands of the 
Union. Whereas it was argued above that the “essential elements” clause is now of 
negligible real value in relations with Israel, this is not the case in relations with the 
Palestinian Authority.
In June 2001, for example, when the situation between the Palestinians and Israelis 
was extremely dire, with reprisal killings endemic between the parties, rather than put 
huge amounts of pressure on the Israelis, although diplomacy was also at work there, 
it was Arafat who was targeted by the Union. It eventually managed to obtain his 
agreement to a truce. The methodology of “threats” which was seen as being 
inappropriate for Israel was ideal for the Palestinians. It was reported that Arafat only 
agreed to a truce with Israel after a heated debate with Joschka Fischer and the threat
171to cut-off all Union aid if he did not agree. The extent of the Palestinian 
Authority’s basic reliance upon Union aid can also be seen from the fact that the EU 
at this time bailed it out of a financial crisis, due to the implications of the Israeli 
policy of closure, and had to pay the salaries of those providing basic services. In 
return for this aid the Palestinian Authority had to agree, which it did, to a strictly
1 79controlled austerity budget.
The Community has also used simplified versions of “essential elements” clauses in 
some of the specific legislation it is implementing to deal with various issues in the 
Palestinian Administered Territories. One of the major and persistent problems in 
relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has been that of terrorism by 
Palestinians. Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and 
Islamic Jihad, have adopted the tactic of deliberating targeting Jewish settlers in the
171 The Times, “German Threat Forces Arafat to Declare Truce” 4/6/2001 p. 10.
172 The Guardian, “Europe Throws £37m Lifeline to Palestinians” 1/6/2001 p .l l .  For details o f  
reforms funded by the Community see the Commission’s webpage on relations with the West Bank 
and Gaza at http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/gaza/intro/index.htm.
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1 7^Occupied Territories and the Israeli populace at large. One of the methods used 
has been that of suicide bombings. Israel has argued that it is partly in response to 
such acts that it is building the security-wall. The pressure on the Palestinian 
Authority to clampdown upon such activists, who are largely outside of its control, 
has been one of the major factors contributing to unfair trials, arbitrary detention and 
torture in the Palestinian Administered Territories.174 €10 million has been 
specifically granted by the Union to the Palestinian Authority to assist it in countering 
such activities. The current joint action which acts as the legal base for funding such 
activity, specifically states that the EU will suspend the programme if the Palestinian 
Authority either: refuses to cooperate fully with the Union; fails to allow the EU to 
monitor and carry out evaluations of the project; or fails to take appropriate measures 
to ensure respect for human rights in the implementation of the programme.175
The joint action itself is based upon Articles 14 and 18(2) TEU and has been adopted 
to help further the Union’s role in the MEPP and especially to make an important 
contribution to the “objectives pursued by the European Union in supporting the 
Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activity” .176 The basic 
approach adopted is that the Union will only contribute money, if it is satisfied that 
the programme implemented is effective according to a committee established by the 
Union and furthermore, that it respects human rights. Evaluation committees where 
the Union is allocating funds may be part of the parcel but what is unclear is who will 
assess the compatibility of human rights standards with the programme and by whose 
standards? Human rights conditionality in such circumstances is not unreasonable 
but clearly guidelines and standards need to be established. None are articulated or 
provided. In essence the programme will have to be entirely planned and designed in 
consultation with the Union and subject to its scrutiny, otherwise it will not be
173 By 2003/646/EC Council Decision, OJ L 229, 13/09/2003 p.22 the Council has implemented 
restrictions on both the military and political wings o f these organisations.
174 The Palestinian Authority argues that it has little control over these groups, especially Hamas. The 
Israelis regularly contend, however, that they are directly accountable to Arafat.
175 Emphasis added. Article 7, Joint Action on a European Union Assistance Programme to Support 
the Palestinian Authority in its Efforts to Counter Terrorist Activities Emanating From the Territories 
Under its Control, OJ L 97, 19/4/2000 p.4.
176 Article 3, ibid.
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funded. The problem for the Palestinians, however, has been that where they have 
designed counter-terrorism projects, the allocation of funds from the Union has been 
from different budget heads depending on the exact project in question, each having 
its own procedures and financing decisions. This has caused inordinate delay in some 
projects which have had to be cancelled, as they were no longer of relevance and led 
to additional complications in the working of the programme.177 Furthermore, the 
destruction of Palestinian infrastructure by the Israelis has often destroyed those very 
apparatus which are essential for such projects to be effective.178
3.4. The Promotion of Ethical Values.
3.4.1. Positive Measures and Israel.
Civil society in Israel, unlike its Arab neighbours, is relatively well developed. The 
majority of funding made available under the EIDHR and MED A Regulations and 
through the MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) has therefore been to those NGOs 
addressing issues which the Community has identified as its priorities. Twenty 
percent of the projects funded attempt to address discrimination against Arab-Israelis. 
Although the Union rarely condemns Israel publicly for anti-Arab discrimination it is 
well aware of the problem and tries to tackle it through promoting understanding 
between the various communities in Israel.179 As the Member States have a legal 
interest in such discrimination the approach adopted is an interesting one. The Union 
is aware that in the overall context of the MEPP public condemnation of 
discriminatory treatment in Israel will achieve little. Promoting understanding 
between the communities may contribute something. The same is also true of a 
number of projects which are funded by the Community and provide legal aid to 
Palestinian victims of Israeli human rights abuses.180 The funding of such projects by 
the Community again illustrates the extent to which the Community is aware of
177 Special Report 19/2000, supra note 170.
178 Ibid.
179 Under Article XXII, Oslo II both parties agreed to seek to foster mutual understanding and 
tolerance between themselves.
180 See Karkutli and Butzler, Evaluation, supra note 96, p. 144.
267
Israeli abuses but which in reality it can only address by providing funding to 
appropriately designed projects.
What is also very noteworthy is that no project has to date been funded which targets 
the Israeli security forces, the main perpetrators of the abuses that the Union and 
Member States are opposed to. As the Union does not pay for the security services in 
Israel, as it does in the case of the Palestinian Authority, it has no leverage in this 
regard. For this reason, among others, priority has been given to projects which are 
directed towards confidence building and dealing generally with Palestinian-Israeli 
issues on all levels and attempting to improve relations between the different 
groups.181 The amounts spent in Israel under the MDP are comparatively small, 
however, when compared to the funds the Community has pumped into the 
Palestinian Authority. This is both in terms of infrastructure funding and projects 
which promote ethical values, such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
3.4.1. Positive Measures and the Palestinian Authority.
The Oslo Accords of 1993 are considered by the international community to have 
introduced a new phase in the relationship between the Palestinian and Israeli 
communities and prompted promises of huge amounts of assistance. The Community 
has historically provided assistance to Palestinian society through funding to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) although it was not until the 
October 1993 donors’ conference in Washington in which pledged it US$ 2.5 billion 
between 1994 and 1998 that it took on another dimension.182 As a direct consequence
i o r
of this the Community adopted Regulation 1734/94. In total the Community has 
pledged €500 million per year from 1994 until 2003. A Commission document in 
1997 estimated that Palestinians received €258 per head of a population as opposed to 
€23 for the ACP countries and €11 for the other Mediterranean countries.184 The EU
181 Ibid. 65% of all funding is given to such projects.
182 Special Report 19/2000, supra note 170, p. 8.
183 Council Regulation No. 1734/94, On Financial and Technical Cooperation with the Occupied 
Territories, OJ L 182, 16/7/1994 p.4 as subsequently amended.
184 COM (1997)715.
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has now contributed over €5 billion in aid to the Palestinian Authority since 1994,185 
making it by far the largest donor to Palestinian society. The number of budget heads 
used to fund this commitment is hard to pin down. Council Regulation 1734/94, the 
EC-UNWRA Conventions, and Council Regulation 1488/96 form the legal bases for 
some expenditure. Three separate budget heads are used to fund the Palestinian 
commitment, B7-4200 which is concerned with the Israel-PLO Peace Agreement, 
UNWRA is funded through B7-4210 and B7-4100 which also funds all other projects 
to Mediterranean non-member countries.186 The Court of Auditors has identified a 
further twelve different budget headings for projects for the Palestinian Authority.187 
Some of these are concerned with the EIDHR, as this is a more specific budget line in 
terms of the objectives of some projects. The different relevant projects in existence 
have different priorities and objectives, although there is an overlap between them.
In a 1995 Communication the Commission had already adopted an approach 
attempting to set out the future relationship and economic assistance to be provided to 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The European Parliament for its part adopted a 
report which called for “support for an independent and democratic Palestine which is 
respectful of human rights and a free press” a sentiment shared by the Council.189 
The Union’s first major project and concrete measure outside of direct dialogue and 
negotiation concerning the MEPP therefore, was the sending of monitors to elections 
to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1996.
Article 5 of Joint Action 94/267/CFSP in support of the MEPP, based upon Article 13 
TEU, provided for a European contribution to the preparation of the observing of 
elections, if requested, in the Occupied Territories.190 The precise arrangements were
185 Statement by the Swedish Presidency to the Commission on Human Rights, 3/4/2001. Available at 
http://www.eu2001.se/eu2001/news/news read.asp?iInformationID=l 3758. At the time o f the 
statement the figure was over €3 billion.
186 Special Report 19/2000, supra note 170, p 9.
187 Ibid.
188 COM (1995)505.
189 See European Parliament Report A4-0129/96, 24/5/1996 and (2000) 6 EU Bull 1.47.
190 OJ L 119, 7/5/1994 p .l. It was then Article J.3 TEU.
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subject to Council Decision 95/205/CFSP of June 1995,191 which provided for ECU 
10 million to be charged to the general budget of the EC, and Council Decision 
95/403/CFSP of September 1995,192 which established a European Union Electoral 
Unit (EUEU) which was involved with the detailed aspects of the administrative and 
financial procedures for observing the elections. Council Decision 95/403/CFSP set 
out the objectives of the EUEU as well as its composition. The elections themselves 
took place on 20 January 1996. Due to financial irregularities in complying with 
Community procedures, the observation was not as effective as had been hoped. 
There had additionally been a degree of uncertainty over the timing which had 
hindered the observations. There were also problems with logistic support, which 
had gone out to competitive tender. The preferred support was not put in place due to 
cost restrictions. Some of expense of the observations was borne by Member States 
and some by Budget Line B8-103. The wrong budget heads were also used to fund 
some programmes, such as a seminar on the work of the EUEU, due to the 
restrictions imposed by the Council and Parliament on the use of CFSP funds.193
The election itself was won by Yasser Arafat and candidates from his Fatah 
organisation, who won 60% of the seats. In a number of public statements, including 
at the 52nd session of the Commission on Human Rights, the Presidency expressed its 
“deep satisfaction” with the election and on the commitment to human rights in the 
areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority.194 What is most surprising about 
the Union’s involvement in the election is the assessment that an election in which 
the rules had been manipulated to provide for an Arafat victory was deemed 
satisfactory. The EUEU observed an election whose actual conduct was according to 
most accounts free of major malpractice. The mandate of the EUEU did not extend 
to assessing the design of the election. Yet Arafat had himself appointed a 
Commission which designed the election in such a manner that winning 30% of the 
vote gained his party over 60% of the seats. Conversely those who won 60% of the
191 OJL 130, 14/6/1995 p .l.
192O J L 238, 6/10/1995 p.4.
193 See Court o f Auditors, Special Report 4/1996, Concerning the Observation o f the Palestinian 
Elections, OJ C 57, 24/2/1997 p .l.
194 See EFPB Docs., 96/078 and 96/115.
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vote only gained 23 seats out of 88. A significant number of important parties, 
mostly opposed to the Oslo Accords, boycotted the election as it gave them little or 
no chance of winning a seat. The International Commission of Jurists, for example, 
urged that a different electoral system be adopted, to ensure that the election was 
more representative of the views of Palestinians.195 Despite this the Union, no doubt 
with an eye on the MEPP having a greater chance of success if Arafat had a 
semblance of democratic legitimacy and a strong mandate, wholeheartedly approved 
of the election. Arafat, despite all his shortcomings, was and is seen by the Union as 
being vastly preferable to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. At the Laeken 
European Council, for example, it was expressly demanded that Arafat dismantle 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s terror networks as a part of the two-State solution.196 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, among other factions, however, continue to enjoy 
widespread support in the Palestinian Territories due not only to their commitment to 
social reform and welfare programmes but also, in part, their continuous armed 
struggle with the Israelis. Having obtained the semblance of legitimacy it was Arafat 
who was in a position to negotiate with and expect international donors to deliver on 
the promises they had made of assistance as inducements to ease the peace process 
along. The Union, for its part, adopted a multi-headed approach. A lack of relevance 
and appropriateness, however, has been one of its defining features.
In the first instance, projects under the MED A Regulations, even though they go 
beyond the framework of traditional development assistance, cannot extend to public 
authority tasks. In the Palestinian Administered Territories institution building must 
be a key priority to ensure that basic tasks are being performed. The decision-making 
procedure for those projects which have been identified by the Commission for 
funding, however, has tended to be heavily layered and complex, so that decision- 
making is slow, cumbersome and at times unclear. The reorganisation of the 
Commission has led to further fragmentation and complications in the decision­
making process.198 The Commission has furthermore been in the almost unique
195 The representation was made by LAW, an affiliate body o f the ICJ.
196 Declaration on the Situation in the Middle East, (2001) 12 EU Bull 4/54.
197 It is also often duplicitous and not very effective. See COM (1999)494, p.2.
198 See Special Report 19/2000, supra note 170, p. 19 for some of the problems this has caused.
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position of having too many funds on its hands to be able to deal with. In conjunction 
with the cumbersome decision-making procedure this has resulted in the Commission 
not being able to set up a proper and effective scheme to ensure that projects are 
identified and prepared and approved as a continuous process.199 In fact the lack of 
coherence of the projects funded has been a consistent criticism of the 
Commission.200 Many project decisions have been made under intense pressure to 
ensure that the funds allocated are actually being spent. This has resulted in little 
consideration being given to the size of the project portfolio which can be effectively 
managed and the ability of the Palestinian Authority to absorb and use the help that it 
is being given.201
A specific example of Community projects being badly designed and of limited 
utility is the Palestinian Housing Council. This was a project specifically designed to 
provide low cost housing and indeed spun by the Commission as a contribution to 
housing rights. The units, however, became far too expensive due to the extensive 
use of Italian marble in the design (as a consequence of poor design as opposed to 
tied-procurement) which contributed to the increases in price, taking them out of the 
reach of the low-income families they were meant to be helping.
Other projects have been more successful, in that they have been designed and 
properly implemented, although it is difficult to determine their effect. Projects 
which raise awareness of human rights issues, promote harmonious relations with 
Israel and fund NGOs who provide legal assistance to those seeking to use the Courts 
in an effort to gain compensation must all contribute to ensuring that various ethical 
values are being promoted and respected.203 Unlike in the case of Israel, the 
Community is also funding human rights courses for Palestinian security forces to 
ensure they are knowledgeable about the permissible limits on the use of force.204 In 
the case of Israel they are unlikely to be given permission to do so and, even if they
199 / bid, p.47.
200 See COMs (1999)494 and (1998)524.
201 See Special Report 19/2000, supra note 170, p. 18 for examples.
202 Ibid.
203 The information on the projects is from Karkutli and Butzler, Evaluation, supra note 96.
204 (2000) 12 EU Bull 1.2.11.
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are, the rules of engagement will not change. In the case of the Palestinian Authority 
the Community is aware that such projects may make a difference due to the leverage 
it has in the overall political relationship. The Community also continues to regularly 
commit funds to assist in the rehabilitation of torture victims, of both the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel. The Union’s fundamental problem in promoting and 
protecting ethical values in the Palestinian Authority is that events on the ground 
move so quickly. This is especially the case after the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada. In the Palestinian Authority, as a consequence of the approach adopted 
towards Israel, the Union’s efforts are currently overwhelmingly engaged in damage 
limitation exercises, i.e., trying to prevent the situation deteriorating further as
OC\f%opposed to improving it per se. However valuable Community projects may or 
may not be, their impact will only really be tangible once a viable settlement has been 
found to the Palestinian issue.
4. Conclusions.
The basic vulnerability of the Palestinian Authority has ensured that it is pliable to the 
demands of the Union. As its major financial backer and international supporter the 
Union is in a unique position in the Palestinian Administered Territories. 
Considering that the Union is dealing with a small territory and relatively speaking an 
excess of funds, a very substantial contribution could have been made towards the 
economic development of the Palestinian Administered Territories as well as the 
creation of a pluralistic area with human rights respected and the rule of law and 
democracy established and protected. The Union is instead routinely providing the 
Palestinian Authority with emergency financial assistance and its population with 
humanitarian aid. Israel’s policy of “closure”, its incursions into Palestinian territory 
and its refusal to pay tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority has brought it to the 
brink of financial and physical collapse.207 Since 2002 the Union has primarily 
sought to prevent the situation in the Palestinian Territories deteriorating even further.
205 (2000) 10 EU Bull 1.2.7.
206 For examples of the tasks and projects the Community is currently funding see supra note 172.
207 Select Committee, Development Assistance, supra note 88, p.55.
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The Cooperation Agreement and relations with the Palestinian Authority are being 
hindered by Israel, a country which is itself benefiting from its own Agreement with 
the Community and its Member States. It is difficult to envisage such latitude being 
accorded to any other State. The inconsistent approach adopted by the Union towards 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, however, must be assessed holistically. The 
ultimate objective of its policy in the region is to help find a solution to and sustain 
any settlement in the dispute between Israel and some of its Arab neighbours. 
Keeping the MEPP on track is the priority. Such latitude would not be afforded to 
Israel if  this were not the case. There is much to be said in support of the Union’s 
overall approach. It takes a long-term perspective and attempts to tackle the root 
cause of the region’s problems. If the Arab-Israeli dispute is resolved and relations 
normalise between the protagonists, then the approach the Union takes towards both 
the Israelis and Palestinians will also change. This does not mean, however, that the 
current approach is without its problems and shortcomings.
The first is the balance that is currently being struck between the pursuance of other 
ethical values and keeping the peace process on track. Although the two are 
compatible in the long-term this is not always the case in the short-term. The utility 
of the “essential elements” clause in the Agreements with Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority is as an instrument to maintain dialogue on such issues. There is a point, 
however, at which the failure to use the clause will render it meaningless. Promoting 
and protecting the rule of law or civil society in Israel or the Palestinian Administered 
Territories while ignoring systematic violations of fundamental norms by either side 
is laudable only so long as a viable peace is still possible. As and when either side 
makes the achievement of this objective very difficult, if not impossible, then the 
clause must be used with a view to compelling a change of policy.
In relations with Israel, those parts of the security-wall which deviate from the green- 
line have surely reached the point at which the Community and Member States must 
seriously consider taking punitive action by using the “essential elements” clause, 
even if this means relations with Israel deteriorating as a result. The humanitarian 
consequences of the security-wall for some Palestinians are well documented but 
there are, as the ICJ has stated, more fundamental issues at stake - violation of the 
right to self-determination and the forcible acquisition of territory. The continuous
274
building of the security-wall is rendering the objective of a just and viable two-State 
solution increasingly impossible. This is as important as the gross violations of 
international law, if not more so, to the Union’s overall approach to the MEPP. The 
practices of the Palestinian Authority have not quite reached this stage yet. The 
failure to stop suicide bombings, as abhorrent as they are, does not make the two- 
State solution physically impossible. The difference, however, is that Israel has the 
power and friends to help it withstand economic and political pressure from the 
Union. The Palestinian Authority does not. As a consequence the “essential 
elements” clause is effective in relations with the Palestinian Authority, as its 
threatened use is enough for some remedial action to be forthcoming.
The second is that the Union does not have the confidence to implement the steps 
required to give effect to those objectives it can agree. This issue is very closely 
related to the question of the Union’s structure. The contribution of the Union to the 
promotion and protection of ethical values in relations with the Palestinian Authority 
and Israel highlights very clearly that collective action is a double-edged sword. 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the Community’s project portfolio, particularly 
in the Palestinian Administered Territories, the Union has made a far more valuable 
contribution to the MEPP than the Member States would have been able to 
individually. It is because of the Union pushing the roadmap and two-State solution, 
for example, that it is now the preferred international approach. The collective voice 
of the Member States is a powerful one. On the other hand, the need for unanimity 
has also been a hindrance. The Member States sometimes cannot agree how to act 
due to their own historic and domestic considerations. The consequence of having a 
mixed Agreement with Israel means that unanimity is essential. Israel can still 
ultimately rely upon the US not to withdraw support and the Union, due to 
differences between the Member States, not to act to curtail it. It is for this reason 
that on a political level the Union plays a minor role compared to the US. If the 
Member States could agree and took action against Israel then, despite the bravado of 
Netanyahu and Sharon, it would have very serious consequences for Israel. This will 
still be the case if the US tries to mitigate the impact of such measures.
Thirdly, the Union has too many different voices in its relations with Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. This is again closely related to the question of the Union’s
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structure. The position of the Presidency, High Representative, Special 
Representative and External Relations Commissioner can differ. These differing 
voices are especially damaging when they are part of the Union’s contribution to the 
Quartet. Similarly, a number of the Member States, in particular the UK, Germany 
and France, wish to ensure that their separate voices are also heard. Although the 
plethora of views further serves to highlight the complexity and emotive nature of the 
issues involved, for the effectiveness of the Union’s contribution to be enhanced, 
there need to be fewer clearer voices.
Fourthly, having backed Arafat and considered him the democratically elected leader 
of the Palestinians the Union continues to support him, despite pressure to 
marginalise him from the US and Israel. The initial decision to back Arafat, however, 
ignored the quite legitimate concerns expressed by other Palestinians. It was with a 
view to the overall success of the peace process that he was backed. The failure of 
that process has in part been because views held by groups such as Hamas, continue 
to enjoy widespread support amongst many Palestinians. The Union having gained a 
role in the MEPP has been keen to ensure it has maintained it. Accepting that 
Hamas, for example, had legitimate objections to the election of 1996 was not about 
to gain the Union any favours or influence with Israel and the US. Thus the Union, 
for understandable reasons, backed Arafat. It is now living with the consequences of 
that choice.
The Union’s actions in its relations with the Palestinians have largely been reactive 
and not proactive. It has quite rightly placed tremendous pressure on the Palestinian 
Authority to clamp down on “terror” but the pressure put on Israel is not in anyway 
commensurate with the activities it engages in. The Union does not wish to be 
sidelined, even as a member of the Quartet, in the peace process. As things stood 
after Oslo, the Union allowed itself to be marginalised and was expected to pay the 
bill for the agreement reached by others. Israel cannot now effectively veto the 
participation of the Union in the peace process. The Palestinian Authority is simply 
not financially viable without the Union’s backing. There will be no peace and 
solution to the situation in the Middle East without the consent of the Palestinians. 
For this reason the Union can be guaranteed a place at the negotiating table.
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The pursuance of an ethical foreign policy by any State when dealing with Israeli- 
Arab relations will never be straightforward. The Union certainly cannot be blamed 
for the malaise that exists but it has not contributed as positively as it could have. 
Despite the conflicting national perspectives of some of the Member States and its 
shortcomings, the Union’s contribution to the pursuance of ethical values has overall 
been a positive one. Neither the US, UN or Arab League, for example, have managed 
to help broker a lasting peace either. The Union’s contribution has not been as 
effective as it could have been for the reasons outlined above. The test to evaluate its 
role, however, is not to consider its failings but to try to envisage the situation if the 
Union played no role in the region at all. If the same test were to be applied to the 
incumbent US regime, for example, then the value of the Union’s contribution is 
more than apparent.
277
Chapter Six
Ethical Values and Foreign Policy in Practice: Humanitarian 
Aid and the European Union.
1. Introduction.
The final substantive chapter of the thesis aims to assess the role played by the 
humanitarian aid policy of the Union. As noted in Chapter One, humanitarian aid is 
an ideal litmus test to assess the implementation of an ethical foreign policy. For 
example, in a Development Council Statement, it has been stated:
humanitarian aid the sole aim o f which is to prevent or relieve human suffering, is accorded to 
victims without discrimination ...and must not be guided by, or subject to, political 
consideration. ...Decisions must be taken impartially and solely according to the victim’s 
needs and interests.1
For his part, Poul Neilsen, the current Commissioner for Development Cooperation 
and Humanitarian Aid has stated:
“Humanitarian assistance is viewed as a true ‘success story’ o f Community external relations, 
not only by the European institutions but more importantly by the international community. 
Community humanitarian assistance has indeed become the expression o f the values of  
humanity on which the EU is founded.”2
The theory of humanitarian assistance as advocated by not only the Union but also 
organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is one 
based solely upon need. It should not be influenced by any other interests or
1 Development Council Conclusions, 10/12/2000, quoting almost verbatim from the preamble to the 
Humanitarian Aid Regulation, Council Regulation No. 1257/97, OJ L 163,2/07/1996 p .l.
2 WG VH-Working Document 48, Note From Mr. Poul Neilsen, Member o f  the European Commission 
on Humanitarian Assistance.
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geopolitical considerations. This, however, presents problems for the Union, in 
particular, due to the place of humanitarian aid within the overall context of the 
Union’s foreign policy. The first part of the discussion therefore, looks briefly at the 
basic principles of humanitarian aid, namely neutrality and impartiality, to provide a 
framework for discussion. It then goes on to examine the role of humanitarian aid as 
an instrument of the Union and the relationship between differing Union policies. 
The chapter finally looks at practice and the use of humanitarian aid by the Union to 
pursue political objectives, as opposed to adhering to the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality.
2. The Concepts of Neutrality and Impartiality and Their 
Relationship With Humanitarian Aid.
Neutrality is a principle of abstention. In a natural disaster it means that assistance 
must be given solely on the basis of need. In the context of an ongoing conflict, it 
means that humanitarian actors must not act in a way which will assist or hinder the 
belligerents in their military objectives.4 Relieving the warring factions of any 
obligations they may have towards civilian populations, i.e., by feeding them, does 
assist belligerents by releasing resources. It is the non-involvement in hostilities, 
however, that is the issue here.5 Neutrality is both ideological as well as being 
concerned with non-participation in hostilities.6 Maintaining neutrality is 
exceptionally difficult, especially where in civil-war situations the objective of one of
3 See the Statute and Rules o f Procedure o f the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and General Assembly Resolution 46/182, Strengthening of the Coordination o f Humanitarian 
Emergency Assistance o f the United Nations, A/RES/46,182, 19/12/1991. Also see, ECHO, ECHO 
Aid Strategy 2001 and ECHO Aid Strategy 2003 as well as its numerous Mission Statements which 
declare that decisions to grant aid are determined “solely by the assessment o f needs” and are not 
guided by political considerations and Neilsen’s lecture entitled, “World Solidarity and Global 
Stability: The Role o f the EU Development Policy” reproduced in EuropaWorld, 15/11/2002.
4 See Curtis, D., “Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension” HPG Report 10.
5 Ibid. See generally, Pirotte, C., Husson, B., and Grunewald, F., Responding to Emergencies and 
Fostering Development: The Dilemmas o f  Humanitarian Aid, (1999).
6 See, for example, Article 23(c), Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection o f Civilian 
Persons in Time o f War, 1949, 973 UNTS2S1.
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the parties is the eradication of another ethnic or religious group.7 The idea of 
neutrality is not, however, all encompassing. For the ICRC, for example, the 
Taliban’s treatment of women in Afghanistan was not their business. Interference 
with an ICRC male doctor treating a female patient in an ICRC hospital would have
Q Q
been. To be practicable neutrality must have its limits.
Impartiality is a principle of action which must be defined according to an objective 
standard which is applied equally to all parties.10 Impartiality does not mean that the 
same amount of assistance is distributed to all. It requires an assessment of needs and 
aid is distributed accordingly on an objective basis, without any regard to other 
considerations. Non-discrimination, proportionality and the absence of subjective 
distinctions are all essential. Abiding by the principle is exceptionally difficult, 
especially for organisations such as the EU. The European Community Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO), for example, will often fund agencies and NGOs providing aid in a 
conflict and at the same time the EU will be involved in UN or other efforts at 
negotiating an end to the hostilities. International pressure for the end of hostilities 
can lead to less assistance being provided to one side or the other, regardless of need, 
depending on the strength of the legal and moral culpability of the belligerents. This 
ensures that impartiality is difficult to achieve.11 This is especially the case where 
one of the parties has a strong legal claim to being the victim of an act of aggression. 
Neutrality and impartiality do not mean indifference to the plight of groups, they are 
operational principles. Humanitarian action, if impartial and neutral is a political act 
and will have a political effect. It should not, however, have a political intention.12
7 DAC, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, (1997) p.30.
8 Minear, L., “The Theory and Practice of Neutrality: Some Thoughts on the Tensions” 833 IRRC, 63.
9 Ibid.
10 Weller, M., “The Relativity o f Humanitarian Neutrality and Impartiality” The Journal o f  
Humanitarian Assistance, http://www.iha.ac.articles/a029.htm .
11 See Baitenmann, H., “NGOs and the Afghan War: the Politicisation o f Humanitarian Aid” (1990) 12 
Third World Quarterly, 62 and COM (2001) 231.
12 See Macrae, J., and Leander, N., “Shifting Sands: The Search for Coherence Between Political and 
Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies” HPG Report 8 and Middleton, N., and O’Keefe, 
P., Disaster and Development: The Politics o f  Humanitarian Aid, (1998) passim.
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3. Humanitarian Aid as an instrument of the Union.
3.1. The Role of Humanitarian Aid in the Context of the Union’s 
International Relations.
Humanitarian aid in the Union context is, as noted in earlier chapters, clearly linked 
to development cooperation policy. The Community’s development cooperation 
policy is far from impartial or neutral and makes no pretences to that effect. 
Humanitarian aid is often portrayed as being separate and distinct from the politics of 
not only foreign policy but also from development cooperation policy. As 
Macfarlane notes, humanitarian actors, in their most condescending form, consider 
themselves superior to both politics and foreign policy.13 If ECHO’S work is 
considered to be separate from such policies, then it is difficult to perceive it as a 
serious player, or one that can influence the policy debate, except possibly at the 
margins. The geostrategic interests of donor States rarely coincide with those of the 
victims of a humanitarian disaster. ECHO’S mandate may require it not to be swayed 
by any political considerations, yet that does not in any way stop it being used as a 
general foreign policy instrument of the Union. Efforts to make humanitarian aid 
more efficient and to have less recourse to it have led to efforts to coordinate and 
indeed make the “different” policies complementary and coherent.14 
Complementarity requires action at differing levels to improve the effectiveness of 
that action. Coherence must imply that humanitarian aid is part of a set of responses 
to a particular situation. This requires the working out of overall strategies between 
different Union bodies and Directorates General of the Commission and giving effect 
to their different responsibilities. The link between development and humanitarian 
aid in the context of the Community is thus obvious.15
13 MacFarlane, N., “Politics and Humanitarian Action” Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute Occasional 
Paper 41.
14 See infra.
15 See ICEA/DPPC, Development and Humanitarian Assistance o f  the European Union: An 
Evaluation o f  the Instruments and Programme Managed by the European Commission-Final Synthesis 
Report, (1999) and COM (2001)231.
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The relationship between humanitarian aid and development cooperation, however, is 
not the only issue. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM),16 a much broader 
instrument than the provision of emergency assistance, is with regard to some 
activities a potentially competing mechanism. The discussion therefore, turns to the 
relationship between the RRM and humanitarian aid before looking further at the 
relationship between development and humanitarian aid.
3.2. The Relationship Between Humanitarian Aid and the Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism.
The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 called on the Commission to take 
specific measures to set up a “non-military crisis management mechanism ...to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in 
parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States”.17 
This implies that humanitarian aid is perceived to be part and parcel of the non­
military response. The Commission confirmed this view in its Communication on the 
issue, when it stated, “[r]ecent conflicts ...have shown that the EU possesses a wide 
range of humanitarian, economic, financial and civilian resources.”18 While 
Presidency documents gave the impression that humanitarian aid would be a part of 
the RRM, the Commission has subsequently attempted to ensure that a suitable 
distance is maintained between them.19 The aim of the RRM has not been to create 
new instruments per se but to use those that already exist. It is a complementary 
mechanism which aims to improve the capacity for rapid and flexible action. New 
procedures may be needed but new instruments will not be introduced. The overall
16 Council Regulation No. 381/2001, Creating a Rapid Reaction Mechanism, OJ L 57,27/2/2001 p.5.
17 See Annex IV. The Helsinki European Council was further developing the work of the Cologne 
European Council.
18 COM (2000)119.
19 See Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management (2003) p. 10. Neilsen, supra note 2 has also 
expressed the view that humanitarian aid should not be subordinated to or absorbed by crisis 
management.
20 See the Annex to Regulation 381/2001.
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objective is for the RRM and the Commission’s crisis management unit to facilitate
•j i
early intervention and overall coherence.
The distinction drawn by the Commission between humanitarian aid and the RRM is 
that ECHO’S objective is to alleviate the suffering of the individual from man-made 
and natural disasters, while the RRM is intended to provide resources for urgent 
operations of crisis management and conflict prevention linked into the overall 
context of the CFSP and EDSP.22 Contrasting humanitarian aid and the ESDP, the 
aim of the latter is to implement the Petersberg tasks.23 This does raise problems, 
however, for humanitarian aid actors. In particular, it can cause confusion between 
humanitarian and non-humanitarian actors in the delivery of relief. This may result in 
some humanitarian actors withdrawing; as the overlap will compromise or at least 
threaten their neutrality and impartiality. Furthermore there will be fundamental 
problems in obtaining a coherent response to a civilian crisis from the Union.24 
Linking crisis management, for example, in with development cooperation while 
simultaneously maintaining a distinction from humanitarian aid and coordinating with 
aid agencies will not be straightforward. The Commission has proposed providing 
information to the beneficiaries of such assistance, to enable them to demarcate the
9 cdistinction between humanitarian aid and the RRM.
The legal base of Article 308 EC for the RRM does distinguish it, to some extent, 
from humanitarian and development aid but the competing, if not overlapping, 
objectives of the RRM and humanitarian aid cannot be ignored. The RRM must be
21 Ibid.
22 See COM (2000)119.
23 See Opi, S., and Floyd, R., “A Shaky Pillar of Global Security: The Evolution o f the European 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy” (2003) 9 CJEL, 299, 323. The Petersberg tasks are 
listed in Article 17(2) TEU and include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis 
management.
24 See Missiroli, A., “European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence” (2001) 6 EFARev., 177, 
194.
25 See the Preamble to Regulation 381/2001. The European Council has committed itself, since the 
Cologne Council, to developing capacity in the Petersberg tasks. With regard to conflict prevention, 
see COM (2001) 211. Many of these developments are expressly recognised in the Draft Constitution.
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used for projects which have strictly defined time-limits, the funds must not be 
available elsewhere and there must be a financial limit of €12 million. Thus in the 
event of a security-related crisis, it should work as an accelerated decision-making 
mechanism for specific and immediate interventions which act as a precursor, if 
needed, of action under regular Community instruments. The RRM Regulation is 
explicit that activities covered by the ECHO Regulation should not be funded under 
the RRM Regulation. ECHO has, however, in practice, focussed on complex 
emergencies as opposed to natural disasters (which due to their unpredictability make 
long-term planning difficult) and thus the overlap between activities funded under the 
RRM, development and humanitarian aid will at times be clear. To take one 
example, demining operations are funded by ECHO, under development cooperation 
policies and are specifically mentioned by RRM documentation as activities to be 
covered by it.27 The RRM is likely to substitute for ECHO’S work where the EU 
wishes to overtly influence a particular course of events in a security-related crisis but 
maintain the pretence of neutrality or impartiality for humanitarian aid. Although 
there is no other reference in any documentation to the relationship between the RRM 
and ECHO, it is conceivable that the RRM will be used in many instances where 
ECHO previously funded activities. ECHO has been accused of drifting from its core 
mandate.28 The RRM, in this sense, is a welcome development for ECHO if it 
genuinely wishes to ensure its neutrality and concentrate on the core of its mandate. 
The other side of the coin, however, is that RRM intervention will clearly further 
politicise the EU’s intervention in any crisis. The RRM will at the very least confuse 
the role of EU actors in an emergency. Official documentation on the RRM does not 
refer to any necessity to rescue ECHO from the political repercussions of its 
activities. A review of ECHO’S activities reaffirmed the desire of the Member States
90to maintain a distance between humanitarian aid and the political sphere but the 
RRM was not initiated as a response to that desire.
26 See the Preamble and Article 2, Regulation 381/2001.
27 See COM (2000) 119.
28 See COM (1999) 468.
29 / bid.
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The RRM was conceived to allow the EU to respond quickly to emergencies without 
having to engage in cumbersome lengthy bureaucracy. On 13 June 2001, however, a 
new primary emergency operation procedure also came into force for ECHO. The 
Commission decided that ECHO should have an instant response capacity to add to 
its existing capability. ECHO can now arrange with its partners, within hours of the 
onset of an emergency, for the immediate despatch of assistance. As the RRM 
Regulation notes, one of its aims is to “...re-establish in situations of crisis or 
emerging crisis, the conditions of stability essential to the proper implementation and 
success of these aid, assistance and cooperation policies and programmes.”31 Speed 
is of the essence in both cases and in theory the two procedures should be 
complementary. It is precisely because humanitarian aid can be mobilised far more 
quickly, relatively speaking, than normal development cooperation aid that it is so 
often used outside of the “humanitarian ambit”.
Examining the five instances the RRM was used in 2001 - twice in Macedonia and 
once each in Afghanistan, the Congo and one programme which covered Indonesia, 
Nepal and the Pacific, it appears that with the exception of the last programme, 
ECHO could have acted instead. While the RRM budget is relatively small,32 
however, it is unlikely to overlap significantly in practice with humanitarian aid. If 
and when the budget is increased the potential for substantial overlap with such 
activity is very real. In particular, as EU foreign policy evolves, humanitarian aid 
will compete and have to fit in with other EU initiatives. There are already instances 
of NGOs refusing to accept funding or working with ECHO as it has been perceived 
to be too politically loaded and often also a part of the “political” crises management
30 EHCO, ECHO at a Glance 2002, p.4. This enables projects to be financed within a period of 24 to 
72 hours.
31 Article 3, Regulation 381/2001.
32 €25 million per annum, rising to €33 million by 2006, see ICG Issues Briefing, 29/4/2002.
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operation.33 The RRM and a more developed EDSP will accentuate such dangers in 
the future.34
3.3. The Relationship Between Humanitarian Aid and Development 
Cooperation.
3.3.1. Introduction.
The general relationship between development and humanitarian aid is, as noted 
previously, a natural one. In particular, structural approaches to development can 
help to reduce vulnerability in a natural disaster. In the case of complex emergencies, 
development assistance may help to contribute against the slide into conflict and the 
crises that would ensue. There are, however, also drawbacks and dangers to the 
relationship. The end of an emergency and the return to development simply may 
mean disengagement by those providing assistance.35 Projects which are making a 
valuable contribution may be abandoned. The major problem, however, is that of 
politicising humanitarian aid by linking it with the more overtly political objectives of 
development cooperation and foreign policy in general. In the UK, for example, the 
Department for International Development, which also acts in humanitarian 
emergencies, was specifically created to distinguish it from the more politically 
driven Foreign and Commonwealth Office and to avoid its work being compromised 
by it. In the EU context, the current incumbent, Poul Neilsen, is Commissioner for 
both Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid. His predecessor, Emma 
Bonino, was Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid only.
As discussed in Chapter Three, the demarcation between development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid in the Community has, in particular due to the Rehabilitation 
Regulation, been increasingly eroded. It may well be that the end of the Cold War
33 See Jaspers, S., “Solidarity and Soup Kitchens: A Review o f  Principles and Practice for Food 
Distribution in Conflict” HPG Report 7.
34 Although if  Solano has been correctly quoted as saying that the RRM is “only for show” then this 
should not materialise. See “EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict 
Prevention and Management” IGC Issues Report No.2 (2001) p.9.
35 See Smillie, I., “Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy” HWP Occasional Paper 33.
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has ended the myth that humanitarian aid and development cooperation are two 
different concepts. Regardless of this, however, a continuum exists between the two, 
one that increasingly politicises all assistance to third States. This is in particular, due 
to the existence of the “grey-zone”.
3.3.2. The Grey-Zone.
European humanitarian assistance is intrinsically linked with development 
cooperation due to the “grey-zone”. ECHO’S recent strategy papers talk of 
streamlining the grey-zone, i.e., the need for such assistance to be more 
geographically neutral and also to free-up resources.36 This requires a timely exit and 
the need to establish a more coherent and effective linkage between the handover 
phases of assistance as well as coordination. This can be difficult to achieve at the 
practical level for some organisations. The two different types of work tend to be 
specialised, in that most NGOS primarily focus on one and not the other.37 Some 
intergovernmental agencies, as opposed to NGOs, however, have begun to broaden 
their work thus increasingly politicising the allocation of aid. The World Bank and 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, for example, are 
increasingly concerned with conflict situations, while the UNHCR and the Inter- 
Agency Standing Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (IASCHA) are moving into 
development.38 This then compels decisions to be made, which may have been 
avoided in the past, on the desirability of certain practices and policies such as 
organising peace conferences which can drag “humanitarian” actors further into the 
political sphere. Where the dichotomy has been collapsed it is likely that overtly 
political objectives will prevail as the aid operation is, in a conflict situation at least, 
part of the process of moving towards peace and is not just about alleviating 
suffering.
36 See ECHO, ECHO Aid Strategy 2001 and ECHO Aid Strategy 2003.
37 Macrae. J.(ed.), “The New Humanitarianisms: A Review o f Trends in Global Humanitarian Action” 
HPG Report 11.NGOs such as, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE and World Vision are exceptions 
and at a competitive advantage in receiving allocations o f aid.
38 Ibid
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ECHO has in the past tried, and achieved in practice, the collapse of a strict 
dichotomy between development and emergency aid in line with the approach being 
taken by other international actors. The rationale behind this was that humanitarian 
aid created dependency and did little to assist in tackling the root causes of 
emergencies. The blurring of the approaches, while sensible in the context of the 
long-term effectiveness of the policies, was a step backwards as far as the non­
political nature of humanitarian aid, which ECHO still professed, was concerned.
A distinction should be drawn, however, between the effectiveness of such an 
approach in natural disasters and man-made crises. In a natural disaster there is in 
many senses a linear progression. The regime(s) in power are usually not hostile to 
such aid and the key issues are ensuring that the assistance received is not detrimental 
to long term development assistance, while ensuring that urgently needed aid is being 
supplied. Clearly this requires coordination and consistency in operations and a 
close working relationship with those assisting on the ground. Conflicts, however, 
are much more difficult. There is usually no linear change and the intensity of the 
fighting will differ from one part of the country to another and the situation will 
change continuously. Thus any infrastructure put in place can be destroyed. In such 
circumstances it often becomes very difficult to distinguish between humanitarian 
(short-term relief aid supplied to those in desperate need), rehabilitation (assistance 
which aims to stabilise the situation and prepare for development) and development 
aid. The Regulation for Uprooted Persons in the ALA,40 for example, contains 
provisions on better linkage between development, rehabilitation and relief aid but 
others, such as the TACIS Regulation,41 do not allow for rehabilitation and thus other 
budget lines must be used.
39 See United Nations Office for the Coordination o f Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Report 
1997: The Link Between Relief and Development.
40 See Articles 2 and 3, Council Regulation No. 443/97, On Operations to Aid Uprooted People in 
Asian and Latin American Developing Countries, OJ L 68, 08/03/1997 p .l.
41 Council Regulation No. 99/2000, Concerning the Provision o f Assistance to the Partner States in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, OJ L 12, 18/1/2000 p.l.
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The more recent express trend in ECHO and the Commission has been the revival of 
the relief-development continuum.42 Humanitarian aid is separate to but still linked 
with development assistance and the two should work in harmony, although there is 
no collapse of the distinction between the two, as was tried earlier. This conceptually 
ambiguous approach where the two policies merge in a large grey area now seems to 
be the favoured one. This linking of development and relief and the general 
objective, where relevant, of attempting to prevent slippage into conflict, is clear in 
recent policy documents 43 In May 2000 the Commission launched a reform of the 
external assistance program44 to prioritise six areas for aid, of these four were directly 
concerned with ensuring stability and avoiding conflict.45 Defined in the strict sense, 
humanitarian aid is now provided where development cooperation policies have 
failed in their objectives and slippage into “disaster” has occurred. Conversely, 
humanitarian aid, where is it being provided, is also concerned with sustainability and 
long-term needs,46 which may not equate with the immediate needs on the ground. 
Subordinating humanitarian aid to other objectives can in these circumstances cost 
more lives.
Humanitarian aid for ECHO is no longer about simply relieving suffering. It is also 
about ensuring sustainability and is part and parcel of the instruments used to achieve 
long-term development objectives. Macfarlane has noted, that this approach to 
humanitarian aid, i.e., where it is used as a component of an overall strategy to reform 
and create desirable circumstances in third countries, is part of a new 
humanitarianism.47 The end of the Cold War and the absence of competing sources 
of funding and ideologies and consequently less apparent need for impartiality, has 
led to a broad spectrum of views as to what humanitarian aid should be aiming to
42 See COMs (1996) 153, (2001) 153 and SEC (2000) 514.
43 See further on this “EU Crisis Response Capability” supra note 34 and COMs (2001) 211 and 231.
44 European Commission, Report on the Implementation o f European Commission External Assistance, 
(2001) Staff Working Document 32941.
45 The four are: regional integration and cooperation; macroeconomic policies and equitable access to 
social services; aiming to achieve food security; and institutional capacity building.
46 This idea is recognised in Articles 1-3, Humanitarian Aid Regulation.
47 MacFarlane, “Politics and Humanitarian Action” supra note 13.
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achieve.48 ECHO is part of this shift in objectives and, in practice, is funding projects 
which aim to achieve far more than relieving basic suffering in an emergency 
situation. ECHO has increasingly tried to plan and have a strategy in place; global 
plans accordingly now exist, which set out priorities and objectives and budgets for a 
given region.49 The problem, however, is that in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa 
for example, given the enormity of the situation, projects have barely had enough 
funding to focus on basic life-sustaining assistance let alone other objectives. ECHO 
cannot realistically pursue other objectives as well. In Kosovo, for example, 
assistance varied from core humanitarian aid to rehabilitation and resettlement and 
also aimed to help with the effects of the transition to a market economy.50 Given the 
enormity of the situation elsewhere, it is difficult to see how this was a priority for 
ECHO.
The grey-zone is, however, in some respects crucial. It exists due to the absence of 
flexible and rapid instruments in other parts of the Commission and because of the 
awareness of the relationship between development and humanitarian aid. Funding 
under ECHO is, on the whole, easier and quicker than under all other Community 
programs and is often used for that reason, even in the absence of an emergency.51 In 
its 2001 Strategy Document, ECHO identified concentration on its core mandate, i.e., 
to save and preserve lives in emergencies, as a priority. This would leave less scope 
for the grey-zone. A reduction of the grey-zone in ECHO can give a clearer 
indication to agencies and NGOs as to the scale of the EU’s intervention and its form, 
in turn allowing them to plan with greater accuracy. The problem would then be that 
of coordinating activities and programmes with other parts of the Commission and 
ensuring that a vacuum does not exist between relief and development. The aim 
should be to avoid a hiatus in the Union's external action during the different phases.
48 See Leander, N., and Macrae, J.(eds.), “Terms o f Engagement: Conditions and Conditionality in 
Humanitarian Action” HPG Report 6 and Macrae and Leander, “Shifting Sands” supra note 12.
49 See COM (1999) 468.
50 See, Court o f Auditors, Special Report 2/2001, Concerning the Management o f  Emergency 
Humanitarian A idfor the Victims o f  the Kosovo Crisis, OJ C 16, 12/6/2001 p.l.
51 See Court o f Auditors, Special Report 2/91, Concerning Humanitarian Aid From The European 
Union Between 1992 and 1995, OJ C 143, 12/5/1997 p.l and ICEA/DPPC, Development Assistance, 
supra note 15.
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If past practice is anything to go by, the omens for such coordination and 
complementary action are not promising.
3.3.3. Food Aid and Security.
Humanitarian aid, a very blunt instrument, is now the primary form of geopolitical 
intervention in a complex crisis which is of no, or little, strategic importance to the 
EU. The EU can use ECHO’S activities as evidence of foreign policy intervention 
to persuade its political constituencies, if they express concern, that they are active in 
a situation. At times that engagement may actually be quite minimal. There is 
currently no internationally agreed method for determining need in an emergency 
situation.53 However, comparing apparent or estimated need to the commitments 
made and paid by donors, while crude, is a fair indicator of the importance to a donor 
of an emergency, as is the type of aid provided. The discussion addresses this is in 
the context of food aid.
ECHO works through Framework Partnership Agreements (FPA) and thus donates to 
emergency aid oriented agencies and NGOs as well as those concerned with 
development in the broader sense, such as Oxfam and the UNDP.54 One of ECHO’S 
more recent objectives has been to move from food aid to food security.55 Thus 
comparatively less is now spent, by ECHO, on emergency food aid in contrast to
52 Macrae and Leander, “Shifting Sands” supra note 12.
53 The first in-depth study on this issue is Darcy, J., and Hofmann, C., “According to Need? Needs 
Assessment and Decision Making in the Humanitarian Sector”, HPG Report 15.
54 ECHO spending covers more than just the budget for humanitarian aid. For detailed discussion see 
Cox, A., and Chapman, J., The European Community External Cooperation Programmes: Policies, 
Management and Distribution, (1999).
55 This is reflected in Council Regulation No. 1292/96, On Food Aid Policy and Food Aid 
Management, and Special Operations in Support of Food Security, OJ L 166, 5/7/1996, p.l. Also see 
Court o f Auditors, Special Report No. 2/2003, On the Implementation o f  the Food Security Policy in 
Developing Countries Financed by the General Budget o f the European Union, OJ C 93, 17/4/2003 
p.l.
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spending on emergency rehabilitation and temporary shelters.56 In financial terms, 
however, food aid is still the most important item. It is also subject to the most abuse 
and manipulation. While it is possible that statistics as to the payments made may be 
inaccurate, as they reflect the use of ECHO budget lines for rehabilitation as well, it is 
an inescapable fact that ECHO’S Annual Reports illustrate a very heavy bias in the 
assistance provided which is skewed to Europe. This includes not only the Balkans 
but also the Central and Eastern European countries and the CIS. For example, 42% 
of ECHO’S total budget in 1999 of €813 million went to Europe and of this 55% went 
to Kosovo.57
The Kosovo crisis can be invoked to illustrate how ECHO and its activities reflect the 
more general foreign policy objectives, alliances and concerns of the EU and its
ro
Member States. Kosovo in percentage terms has received more aid, from the EU, 
than any other emergency, not only strictly speaking rehabilitation aid but also food 
aid.59 In Kosovo, as far as nutrition levels were concerned, the major problem was 
not malnutrition but obesity. The number of malnourished children was steady at less 
than 2%. Forty percent of women and children were clinically obese or their body 
mass index classified them as substantially overweight.60 Yet the scale of the 
humanitarian response from ECHO was unprecedented in volume and cash terms. 
Kosovo is the only occasion, as far as is known, when the World Food Programme
56 Many States, for example Cuba and Russia, receive aid from ECHO in the absence o f a humanitarian 
situation as such. Sometimes, this is due to the absence o f the rule o f law or because the Community 
does not have a development cooperation Agreement with that State. Any aid is thus classified as 
humanitarian to ensure legitimacy. On the elasticity o f humanitarianism see Macrae. J.(ed.), “The 
New Humanitarianisms: A Review o f Trends in Global Humanitarian Action” HPG No. 11.
57 See COM (2000) 784 which is the 1999 ECHO Annual Report.
58 See more generally, Court o f Auditors, Special Report 2/2001, supra note 50. It should be noted that 
ECHO was part o f a very complex group providing aid, including various Commission Directorates 
such as Development and External Relations, the EU Member States and national agencies from other 
States, as well as NGOS and the UN family. Another good example is assistance to Turkey following 
the Gulf Conflict o f 1991/2 and the subsequent exodus o f Kurds to south-east Turkey and Iran. 
According to MacFarlane, “Politics and Humanitarian Action”, supra note 13, all Turkish claims for 
assistance, as opposed to 10% of those by Iran, were met.
59 See COM (2000) 784.
60 This information is derived from Jaspers, “Solidarity and Soup Kitchens” supra note 33.
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(WFP) and UN more generally received more than their estimates and what they 
needed,61 ECHO actually sent out unsolicited funds for the purchase of fresh fruit
fiOand vegetables, Mars bars, Turkish-delight and cakes. Food rations were, for 
probably the first time in an emergency, based on supply and not need. Much of this 
was in an attempt to display to the population that alliance with the West was 
beneficial to the average person and in an attempt to help stir-up opposition to the 
incumbent regime. Such actions are in clear violation of the obligations owed by all 
the Member States as parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966.63 In General Comment 12 on Article 11 of the Covenant (on 
the Right to Food) the CESCR stated that it is clear that “food should never be used 
as an instrument of political and economic pressure.”64 Yet this is exactly what it was 
used for in Kosovo, as well as in Afghanistan and Sudan among others, by the EU 
through ECHO.65 This is hardly any different from the way in which development 
assistance has been used.
In some other respects, however, the Community’s food security policy displays an 
acute awareness of the priorities and needs of low-income countries, many of which 
desperately need assistance to feed their populations. The picture is thus, to some 
extent, a contradictory and conflicting one. As noted above, the 1996 Regulation on 
Food Aid Policy and Food Aid is very much aimed at pursuing a food security policy 
and not a food aid one. A key aspect of the regulation was that it changed the 
approach of the Community by aiming to increase the purchasing power of vulnerable 
groups. The Court of Auditors considers, however, that the required coordination to 
ensure this approach works properly does not exist in practice.66 Despite this,
61 See COM (2000) 784.
62 Jaspers, “Solidarity and Soup Kitchens” supra note 33. Also see COM (1999) 468 which highlights 
that in a fast changing situation ECHO was unable to deal with the situation at hand. It intended to 
deliver 2kg o f food per person in refugee camps in Kosovo, yet 12kg per person was being delivered to 
spend funds. The allocation in other camps, during the same crises, was less than 0.2kg per person for 
the same period.
63 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993 UNTS 3.
64 General Comment 12 on Article 11 o f the ICESCR, E/C.12/1995/5 CESCR, para.37.
65 See infra.
66 Special Report 2/2003, supra note 55, p. 18.
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however, in some respects food security policy is well designed and thought out 
although not impartial or neutral. It attempts to link together supply, demand and 
crisis prevention. This is designed to pave the way for strengthening the capacities of 
active local and national partners, as well as the development of budget support to 
beneficiary governments. Various instruments are used in this process. The most 
important among them are access to production factors, credit and information, the 
development of non-farming jobs and the diversification of family income.67 The 
1996 Regulation also recognises that priority must be given to targeting the food 
security programme of the most vulnerable populations in the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). Within the Community context, however, Member States approve 
the strategic guidelines of the food security programme and the funding proposals per 
country and partner. This clearly leaves scope for other national interests, objectives 
and priorities to be pursued. Furthermore, there is a constant emphasis on 
coordination with other donors, in particular between the Commission and USAID.68 
This is surprising because the latter is widely perceived in the humanitarian 
community as being totally driven by the political objectives of the incumbent regime 
in Washington. In fact, during the current Iraqi crisis, Neilsen has stated publicly that 
he wants to keep EU aid neutral and away from the US.69
Community intervention under the food security programme has been directed at 34
• 7 nlow-income countries, which are not self-sufficient. These interventions are 
classifiable as structural and the States as crisis or post-crisis countries. Close to half 
(48%) of the food security programme goes to direct aid. This allows the 
Commission to intervene directly either by funding government programmes via 
budget support or by giving direct support to private or public bodies.71 Such 
assistance is only provided, however, if there is a funding agreement between the 
beneficiary government and the Commission, specifying the implementation
77arrangements as well as the conditions to which this aid is subject. Most aid in this
67 Working Document (2001) 32947, supra note 44.
68 See Article 1, Regulation 1292/96.
69 Financial Times, “Keep Aid Neutral Urges EU Relief Chief’ 30/3/2003 p.l.
70 Working Document (2001) 32947, supra note 44.
71 Ibid.
12 Ibid
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context is given to the ACP (57%), followed by Asia (15%), Latin America (8%) and 
the Near and Middle East (6%). Of the ACP’s share, the vast majority (61%) is given 
to East Africa where need has, over a prolonged period of time, been the greatest. A 
further 20% is given to Southern Africa where there has been, more recently, a
n ' i
substantial famine.
In the context of the Community’s “long-term food aid programmes”, i.e., excluding 
those implemented in the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe since the early 
1990s, the programmes display, on the whole, a well designed series of measures and 
instruments which aim to provide support and sustainability. They attempt to ensure 
that emergencies do not worsen in respect of nutrition levels, in particular, in those 34 
identified countries. While there are conditions attached and some degree of bias, the 
programmes are designed and implemented and assistance provided, in practice, 
where the need is widely seen as being the greatest. In this limited context, the policy 
is impartial.
This somewhat inconsistent approach in ECHO’S activities, (i.e., partisan and biased 
in some interventions and based upon need in others) has been confirmed in the 2001 
ECHO Strategy Document. In terms of complex crises, ECHO now has Global 
Plans. These are comprehensive strategic frameworks for action for a particular 
country or region. Coordination with Member States and other donors and agencies 
is an inherent part of the process. An EU Joint Planning and Coordination Group has 
also been established to coordinate the activities of ECHO and other EU divisions 
providing assistance. If this functions, as envisaged, it should ensure that the most 
appropriate instruments are used in each intervention.74 The question is of course, 
appropriate for whom and aiming to achieve what objectives? The 2001 Strategy 
Document does display an acute awareness of certain pertinent issues. Programmes 
are now to be designed using a needs-based assessment and aim to concentrate on
73 Ibid.
74 Court o f Auditors, Special Report 4/2000, On Rehabilitation Actions fo r ACP Countries as An 
Instrument to Prepare fo r  Normal Development Aid, OJ C 113, 19/4/2000 p.l identified, however, that 
much o f the programming has been ad hoc and unsystematic - DG VIII and ECHO have often acted as 
different donors rather than complementary units in the same organisation.
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“forgotten emergencies.” Methodologies have been devised for both.75 For “needs- 
assessments” the main criterion will be the vulnerability of a population. This will be 
based upon the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in a given 
country and the disaster proneness of an area as well as morbidity and mortality 
rates.76 ECHO will also initiate measures to ensure per beneficiary allocation taking 
into account different levels of complexity. This is in some senses a major shift for 
ECHO. The issue, however, is what weight such assessments will be given when 
other geopolitical considerations and objectives are factored in? It is difficult, for 
example, to see the countries defined by ECHO as high priority, such as Chechnya 
and Yemen, as being of the highest priority in terms of needs. This is currently very 
firmly rooted in North-East and Southern Africa. It is still too early to tell whether 
this new approach will refocus ECHO’S activities but, what cannot be denied is that 
there is a concerted effort and awareness that ECHO can perform a more valuable 
function if it concentrates its humanitarian aid and efforts on its core mandate of 
saving and preserving lives. The 2001 Strategy Document attempts to give further 
effect to this approach.
What is generally revealing, is that while there has been a gradual and gentle increase 
in ECHO’S budget no matter what the extent of an emergency outside of Europe and 
the CEE countries, the amount of assistance allocated has not changed greatly over 
the last decade. As and when an emergency breaks out nearer to the Union’s own 
borders, then despite the fact that the nutritional needs are usually far less, with 
malnutrition being as noted above rare, huge amounts of extra funds with little 
reference to need are suddenly found. Here it can be argued that the action taken is 
primarily driven by pragmatism and self-interest and not the humanitarian imperative. 
In ECHO’S Annual Review of 2000, for example, it was noted:
it is not just a matter o f moral duty, it’s a matter of self interest. If the EU wants to avoid 
having thousands o f refugees .... knocking on its door as asylum seekers, it is in its interests to
75 On this issue see European Parliament Committee on Development and Cooperation, Report on 
Commission Communication on the Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid 2000, (2001) and COM 
(2001)307.
76 See ECHO, ECHO A id Strategy 2001.
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help them out on the spot. The cost per head of emergency .. aid is always much lower than, 
and cannot remotely be compared with, the legal and social costs o f an asylum seeker.77
4. Humanitarian Assistance and the Promotion of Human 
Rights and Other Poiitical Objectives.
Most international agencies and NGOs have for some time now been considering the 
human rights implications of their humanitarian activities. Save the Children, Oxfam, 
UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF, among others, now describe their humanitarian work in 
human rights terms.78 A major exception to this trend is the ICRC which does not, 
for fear of compromising its neutrality. In this general recognition of the need for an 
assessment of the relationship between humanitarian activities and human rights, 
ECHO has been very much at the rearguard. Although Commissioners for 
Humanitarian Aid have been very keen on espousing the contribution of ECHO’S 
work to protecting human rights, it was not until a 1999 internal discussion paper was 
circulated by ECHO to the NGO sector, that the link was extensively explored.79 The 
response of the NGO sector to the paper was, on the whole, not unfavourable. 
Considering the lack of conceptual analysis and formulation of concrete policy this is
OA
not surprising. The paper considered that aid had lost its innocence and although it 
wished to ensure its impartiality, it did not address the many inherent biases of 
ECHO’S activities. The basic premise of the paper is that ECHO is “a human rights
O 1
actor as it funds the delivery of rights such as food and shelter.” A major issue not 
directly addressed by it is, how to integrate human rights considerations into
77 ECHO, Humanitarian Crises Out o f  the Spotlight, (2000) p.8.
78 See Frohardt, M., Paul, D., and Minear, L., “Protecting Human Rights: The Challenge to 
Humanitarian Organisations” HWP Occasional Paper 35 and Kenny, K., When Needs Are Rights: An 
Overview o f UN Efforts to Integrate Human Rights into Humanitarian Action” HWP Occasional 
Paper 38.
79 The discussion paper is an internal ECHO document, (hereinafter ECHO discussion paper). I am 
grateful to ECHO for providing me with a copy of it.
80 See, for example, the discussion in the paper issued by Voice, “The Future o f European 
Humanitarian Aid” (1999).
81 ECHO Discussion Paper.
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humanitarian aid activities? This lacuna has, to some extent, been subsequently 
addressed in ECHO’S 2001 and 2003 Aid Strategy papers.82 The approach espoused 
attempts to ensure that the distribution of aid does not lead to any detrimental or
O'!
negative side effects. It also wishes to create respect for the recipient’s human 
rights and international humanitarian law by means of ECHO standard operations 
management instruments. This requires that all non-urgent proposals address two 
fundamental issues. First, does a project proposal consider the human rights situation 
in the field? Second, does it consider if and how it will impact on human rights?84
The basic premise for ECHO therefore, is that any aid provided has to be “human 
rights conscious”. This equates to the idea that assistance should not be provided if it 
will worsen the situation and it must be provided without discrimination. Similarly, 
this means that it should not be pursued at any cost but only if it is the most effective 
way to relieve suffering. Despite methodologies having been adopted for the 
identification of greatest needs and indeed the needs of a population, no methodology 
has been worked out to quantify if providing aid is the most effective way to relieve 
suffering bearing in mind the collateral consequences of that act.85 Humanitarian 
action, if seen through a human rights prism is essentially an attempt to both protect 
and also provide relief from harm. In its documentation ECHO does not tend to 
elaborate on aspects of the former. In practice, it seems to be primarily concerned 
with relief from harm and not protecting even though the latter can be seen to be part
o/ # # 9 9
of its mandate. Assisting in isolation from the commitment to protect is short­
sighted. There is often talk of the “well-fed dead syndrome”. This tries to ensure that 
those who are fed are not simply being kept alive to be killed by a repressive regime 
or belligerents. Yet, this is exactly what the consequence of ECHO’S approach seems 
to be.
82 ECHO, ECHO A id Strategy 2001 and ibid., ECHO Aid Strategy 2003.
83 For example, it is often argued that such aid perpetuates or can even lead to conflict. See Lischer, S., 
“Collateral Damage: Humanitarian Assistance as a Cause o f Conflict” (2003) 28 International 
Security, 79.
84 ECHO Aid Strategy, 2001.
85 I asked three ECHO officials how this determination was made. None were able to provide an 
answer.
86 ECHO Discussion Paper. See further Article 1, Regulation 1257/96.
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Furthermore, there will be a substantial difference in effect depending on whether a 
“rights” or “needs-based” approach is taken to relief activities, although the two are 
not necessarily incompatible. To take an example from practice, the ICRC, UNICEF 
and Save the Children were all active in those parts of Afghanistan under the control 
of the Taliban during the late 1990s. UNICEF and Save the Children, as noted 
above, define their work in terms of human rights, with the latter using the 1989 
Children’s Convention as its normative document. Both UNICEF and Save the 
Children consider that they have regard to all the implications of both acting and not
• 07
acting where there is a humanitarian need. In the Taliban controlled areas of 
Afghanistan both UNICEF and Save the Children stopped their programmes due to 
their objections to Taliban policies concerning females. In their assessment, the 
greater good could be achieved through not acting. Whatever the methodology, their
QQ
approach dictated the winding-up of operations. The fact that the Taliban were not 
concerned in the slightest with the perceptions of such actors (or indeed Western 
governments) and were not susceptible to conditionality was ignored. This action 
may have further highlighted the wholly exceptional nature of the Taliban’s practices 
to the international community but beyond this it is difficult to see how it equated to a 
human rights approach or achieved the greater good. Opposition to the absence of 
female education subsequently led to no schools in certain districts for boys either, 
where they were run by those agencies. Furthermore, food which was previously 
entering the market place no longer did so, which must have led to an inflationary 
effect as demand continued to further outstrip supply. The ICRC, however, which 
adopts a “needs-based” approach, did not pull out.89 The 1999 ECHO discussion 
paper and 2001 Strategy Paper seem to imply that ECHO will adopt a “rights-based” 
approach although the 2003 Strategy Paper refers to a “needs-based” one. 
Notwithstanding this confusion, it is not a case of access at any price. It is a question 
of weighing up the options and taking the approach which is considered to be the 
most effective. If that means withholding assistance from the needy to achieve other 
objectives, then it seems to be the case that this is what will happen. In practice such
87 See Kenny, “When Needs Are Rights” supra note 78.
88 Ibid.
89 See Rashid, A., Taliban: The Story o f the Afghan Warlords, (2000) p.l 13.
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an approach amounts to conditionality.90 This is examined in more detail in the 
following discussion.
4.1. Conditionality, Humanitarian Aid and Human Rights.
In the 1999 discussion paper, ECHO considered that it did not use conditionality as a 
policy, although it did refer to the “incentivisation” of humanitarian aid.91 
“Incentivisation” as understood in Community development cooperation parlance, is 
the idea that a programme is designed to achieve certain objectives, which in 
themselves are seen as intrinsically beneficial and their achievement is further 
rewarded. The nomenclature used is interesting, yet conditionality is an accurate 
description of the approach adopted, even though it has no role to play in the theory
09of such aid. Speaking in 2000 Mikael Barfod, the then Head of Policy Analysis at 
ECHO, argued, however, that ECHO uses three different types of humanitarian 
conditionality - impact conditionality, legal conditionality and political 
conditionality.93 As the discussion above notes, some of these types of conditionality 
have been expressly or implicitly referred to in 1999 discussion paper and the 2001 
and 2003 Strategy Papers. Others are apparent in practice.
Impact conditionality essentially adopts a utilitarian approach to the distribution of 
aid. As the 2001 Strategy Paper notes, aid should not distributed if it results in 
negative consequences.94 Unwelcome side effects, however, such as population 
movements or the possible manipulation of conflict in an effort to gain more aid, are 
common in contemporary complex emergencies. It is therefore, very difficult, if not 
impossible, to balance the benefits to a population in desperate need of aid against the 
collateral effects of such action. In its purest form, the argument can result in the
90 See ECHO, ECHO Aid Strategy 2001.
91 ECHO Discussion Paper.
92 Also see Duffield, M., “Aid Policy and Post Modem Conflict: A Critical Review” International 
Department, School o f  Public Policy, University o f  Birmingham, Discussion Paper 19.
93 Barfod, M., “Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality: ECHO’S Experience and Prospects Under the 
CFSP” conference paper reproduced in Leander and Macrae (eds.), “Terms o f Engagement” supra 
note 48.
94 ECHO, ECHO Aid Strategy 2001.
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conclusion that if the distribution of humanitarian aid is likely to do some harm, then 
no aid is likely to do less. A needs-based approach, as opposed to a rights-based one, 
would clearly reject such an approach. For impact conditionality to be workable a 
“bottom-line” needs to be identified. If that line is reached then any assistance being 
provided must be withdrawn. In a practical context, this is a difficult choice to make. 
The danger of such conditionality becomes most acute where humanitarian aid is seen 
by European policy makers, especially in the Council, as a viable substitute for 
political action.95 In such circumstances, where foreign policy (in)action is 
effectively delegated to ECHO, this particular “human rights approach”, if it is used, 
can become positively detrimental to the population in need. Such an approach is 
also apparently in conflict with the Humanitarian Aid Regulation, which in its 
preamble states:
... people in distress, victims o f natural disasters, wars and outbreaks o f fighting, or other 
comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian assistance 
where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief.....humanitarian aid 
decisions must be taken ... solely according to the victims ’ needs and interests,96
Notwithstanding the apparent conflict between impact conditionality and the 
regulation, such an approach is unlikely to be a violation of the legal obligations of 
the Community Member States under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.97
The conflict in Ethiopia is a classic example of some of the dilemmas involved in
Q O
using impact conditionality. Humanitarian assistance from the international 
community, including ECHO, was perceived to be assisting the war effort. The
95 Although in the Madrid Declaration it is stated quite clearly that it will not be. Declaration o f the 
Humanitarian Summit o f Madrid, 15/12/1995, para.l.
96 Paras.3 and 10, preamble, Regulation 1257/96. Emphasis added.
97 See Chapter Two.
98 See Borton, J., “The Changing Role of NGOs in the Provision o f Relief and Rehabilitation 
Assistance: Case Study 3 - Northern Ethiopia and Eritrea” ODI Working Paper 76 (1994), Tanguy, J., 
and Terry, F., “Humanitarian Responsibility and Committed Action - Response to Principles, Politics, 
and Humanitarian Action” (1999) 13 Ethics and International Affairs - http://www.cceia.org/ and 
Barfod, “Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality” supra note 93.
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international community paid for improvements to ports and transport links to ease 
the movement of such assistance. Those same facilities were also being used by the 
warring factions to move their arms. Aid was also leading to population movements 
and a dependency upon aid." The essential question in such circumstances is, should 
a population in distress be allowed to starve due to the fact that in the short to 
medium-term, the provision of assistance will lead to other negative consequences? 
If a “rights-based” approach was used in conjunction with impact conditionality, this 
would not permit assistance to the affected population. This is despite the fact that 
those suffering were not in any way at fault. Furthermore, their immediate interests 
and needs would not be given priority as the Humanitarian Aid Regulation requires. 
As Barfod notes, however, so far there have been relatively few, if any, examples of 
ECHO adopting this approach in practice.100
ECHO’S 2001 and 2003 Aid Strategies also refer, as noted above, to using 
humanitarian aid in an emergency to create respect for both the individual recipient’s 
human rights and international humanitarian law. Barfod refers to this as “legal 
conditionality”.101 According to this approach, violations of international 
humanitarian law or international human rights law will lead to any humanitarian 
assistance, to those in need, being withdrawn (if it is already being distributed) or not 
being granted until such norms are respected. This type of conditionality is only 
relevant in a man-made emergency, in particular conflict, although the situation can 
be compounded by natural factors, such as drought, as well. In contrast to the 
relationship between impact conditionality and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation, 
legal conditionality is arguably in accordance with the terms of the regulation. The 
preamble states:
...civilian operations to protect the victims o f fighting or o f comparable exceptional 
circumstances are governed by international humanitarian law and should accordingly be 
considered part o f humanitarian action... ,102
99 Barfod, “Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality” supra note 93.
m Ibid.
m Ibid.
102 Para.3, preamble, Regulation 1257/96.
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Furthermore, the Community Member States as parties to the Four Geneva 
Conventions, 1949, are obliged, in accordance with Common Article 1, to “undertake 
to respect and to ensure respect for the ... Convention in all circumstances”.103 
Distinctions can be made between how such conditionality is used in practice. Under 
the first approach, where the conditions to work in a principled way do not exist, (for 
example, humanitarian workers are being attacked) no aid will be supplied until a 
secure environment is allowed to exist.104 This occurred in Iraq in August 2003 when 
the ICRC, Oxfam and Save the Children, among others, pulled out after the attack on 
the UN headquarters in Baghdad. The ICRC returned when guarantees for their 
safety were forthcoming. The second approach is that assistance will be provided 
only if the State or militia in question comply with certain conditions, such as 
stopping certain human rights abuses.105
It is difficult, however, to ascertain the exact relevance of violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law for this type of conditionality. In a conflict 
between ethnic groups, for example, that in Rwanda after 1994 and the former 
Yugoslavia after 1992, genocide may be an inherent purpose of the conflict. Yet the 
withholding of aid in either situation would on a practical level have been untenable 
for the Union. In practice, however, there are examples of the imposition of this type 
of conditionality but only where the violations have been not central to the situation 
and the emergency of relatively little importance to the Union. For example, ECHO 
withdrew assistance to South Sudan due to attacks on projects funded by ECHO. As 
Commissioner Neilsen noted, the reason for withdrawal is due to a “serious breach of 
International Humanitarian Law.”106 Yet in the Palestinian Administered Territories, 
serious attacks by both Palestinian groups and the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) upon 
the ICRC and other humanitarian workers funded by ECHO, during the occupation of
103 See on this point, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences o f  the Construction o f  a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9/7/2004, as discussed in Chapter Five.
104 Barfod, “Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality” supra note 93.
105 Ibid.
106 Quoted by Barfod, “Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality” supra note 93.
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Jenin, did not lead to such a withdrawal.107 It is difficult to argue that subjective 
factors do not creep into these determinations.
One of the limitations of legal conditionality is that where the destruction and 
eradication of other ethnic groups is an objective of the conflict, guarantees with 
regard to the security of humanitarian workers (who are assisting both sides) and 
human rights are unlikely to be forthcoming or, if they are, to be respected. Securing 
or attempting to secure such commitments can, however, further highlight the 
conduct of the warring parties to the international community. ECHO, as noted 
above, suspended all operations in Taliban controlled areas of Afghanistan. The 
1998 ECHO Annual Report notes that aid to Afghanistan was suspended due to 
“continued violations of fundamental humanitarian principles” in the sense of 
targeting and threatening aid workers. This, however, was not the reason. 
Violations, in the sense of targeting aid workers were rare, although they did exist.109 
The Taliban had no problems with aid agencies, so long as they respected their 
interpretation of Islam. It was due to the opposition to Talibani policies, in particular, 
from women’s groups in the US and in Europe, that ECHO suspended all 
operations.110 ECHO used legal conditionality in humanitarian aid as part of an 
approach where aid of every kind was used as an instrument to isolate the Taliban.
The Taliban's treatment of women is closely related to a more fundamental issue in 
the relationship between legal conditionality in humanitarian aid and human rights. It 
was not the well-documented genocide of the Hazaras, a breach of an obligation erga 
omnes but discrimination against women, which for the Union was important. The 
then Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid, Emma Bonino, argued that the approach
107 See Chapter Five.
108 ECHO, Annual Report on Humanitarian Aid 1998, p. 18.
109 It is important to note that both the US and UK are widely acknowledged as having used emergency 
aid as a cover for security operations. This consequently resulted in some attacks on aid conveys by 
the Taliban. See further Atmar, M., “The Politicisation o f Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for 
Afghans” Humanitarian Exchange, (September 2001) and MacFarlane, “Politics and Humanitarian 
Action” supra note 13.
110 See the discussion in Rashid, Taliban, supra note 89, p.l 13.
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taken in Afghanistan over women’s rights was a principled one.111 To argue that such 
a course of action would improve the human rights situation in Afghanistan is at best 
naive, especially as the on-going genocide was not being addressed. The politics of 
the Taliban are such that their entire ideological foundation relies upon resorting to 
selected aspects of society as it existed in 7th Century Arabia, regardless of the 
sociological context. The suppression of women is part of the puritanical trend in 
Wahabbi/Deobandi traditions. The demonisation of women, who are considered to 
provide a distraction from committing “God’s work”, and the complete merging of 
theology and politics is fundamental to Talibani ideology. Conditionality, sanctions 
or any other external action would under no circumstances lead to a change in that 
attitude. A “needs-based” perspective would have allowed the continuation of aid 
supplies to those Afghanis in desperate need, no matter how repugnant Talibani 
practices were, not only towards women but also religious and ethnic minorities.
The final type of conditionality identified by Barfod is political conditionality.112 In 
this case assistance is used solely to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. The 
aim, for example, may be to put pressure on a government or faction to end hostilities 
or to start peace negotiations.113 Traditionally it was thought that European 
humanitarian aid would not have a role to play in such matters, and this was 
confirmed by the Development Council.114 The occupation of the grey-zone, as 
discussed above, has made such objectives an issue. Again such conditionality sits 
uneasily with the Humanitarian Aid Regulation, which in its preamble makes clear 
that:
111 In a speech entitled, “Principled Aid in an Unprincipled World” available at 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/spp/rapid.htmlDonald. Also see Brandt, P., “Relief as Development, but 
Development as Relief?” http://www.iha.ac/articles/a024.htm.
112 Barfod, “Humanitarian Aid and Conditionality” supra note 93.
113 Ibid. For a critical analysis o f such efforts in general see Scholms, M., “On the (im-)possible 
Inclusion o f Humanitarian Assistance into Peace building Efforts” The Journal o f  Humanitarian 
Assistance, http://www.iha.ac.articles/a072.htm
114 Supra note 1.
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....humanitarian aid .. is accorded to victims without discrimination on the grounds o f race, 
ethnic group, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation and must not be guided by, or 
subject to, political considerations,.115
The Member States in the evaluation of ECHO’S activities have confirmed that they 
wish to maintain a distance between humanitarian aid and political considerations.116 
The real danger of humanitarian aid being sucked into a political vacuum exists when 
no other Union intervention exists. There are clear examples of this.
In Cambodia in the 1990s, the EU was financing a number of NGOs who had a very 
determined mandate to support opposition parties. The ICRC and Medecins Sans 
Frontieres sought to maximise their distance from all factions. USAID and ECHO, 
however, worked mostly in the north and outside of the public health system and 
were part and parcel of a political policy and strategy to boost the opposition parties 
in the run-up to the elections. The intervention was not to boost the general 
sustainability of the health sector but rather to boost the legitimacy and capacity of 
the opposition.117
The 1999 evaluation of ECHO’S activities considered that humanitarian aid was
1 1 0
largely untainted by foreign policy considerations. As the above example 
illustrates, this is certainly not the case as far as all of ECHO’S activities are 
concerned. Furthermore, it is difficult to consider this is an important achievement 
when there has been, vis-a-vis many geographic regions, little articulate common 
foreign policy. ECHO has, however, on other occasions resisted being overtly used 
as a foreign policy instrument, in particular in the Balkans. In Serbia, for example, 
before the fall of the nationalist government, ECHO provided aid through the ICRC. 
Member States, however, wanted to support the opposition and specifically 
strengthen them. The ECHO programme was thus halted and an “Energy for 
Democracy” (EfD) programme was started instead, funded by the Directorate General
115 Para. 9, preamble, Regulation 1257/96. Emphasis added.
116 COM (1999) 468.
117 See further Macrae, J., Aiding Recovery? The Crisis o f  A id in Chronic Political Emergencies, 
(2001) p.85.
118 COM (1999) 468.
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for External Relations.119 Aside from whether the average Serb was able to 
distinguish between the different administrative divisions of the Commission, the 
hijack of ECHO programmes by EXREL does nothing to maintain their neutrality, 
other than allowing the Commission to argue that humanitarian aid is not biased or 
tainted.120
The difference between the situation in Cambodia and Serbia is that in the latter other 
Union bodies were active and thus could take over a pre-existing project. In 
Cambodia, where there was no other foreign policy action, ECHO was used for 
political purposes, as it was the only Union actor active at the time that could support 
the opposition.
It is also possible to find examples of conditionality in humanitarian aid being used 
by the EU to achieve both legal and political ends in one set of measures. Since the 
fall of the Taliban, the Union’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Klaus Peter Klaiber, 
has stated on numerous occasions that its payment of promised reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, but not expressly humanitarian aid, is dependent upon Hamid Karzai’s
191regime adhering to the Bonn Agreement. Aid will be halted if, for example, 
soldiers are not satisfactorily demobilised of if legal measures which provide for
199greater ethnic equality are not adopted. The Union’s record on the distribution of 
aid in post -Taliban Afghanistan has been one where it has classified a substantial 
amount of its aid as humanitarian, regardless of the objective of the programme. In 
the absence of a development cooperation policy and Agreement it has used it 
flexibly.123 Conditionality is widely being applied.
119 On the EfD programme see Commission MEMO/99/65, 3/12/1999. Also see, House of Commons 
Select Committee on International Development, The Effectiveness o f  EC Development Aid, 9th Report, 
(2000).
120 Macrae, Aiding Recovery, supra note 117, p.42 notes it is significant that the DFID resisted FCO 
pressure to provide funds to the EfD programme.
121 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan, Pending the Reestablishment of 
Permanent Government Institutions, 5/12/2001.
122 See, for example, the Statement by the European Union at the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering 
Group, Washington, 26/9/2002.
123 See EuropaWorld, 26/06/2002
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The use of these types of conditionality in humanitarian aid by ECHO and the Union 
more generally sits somewhat uneasily with the underlying principles of humanitarian 
assistance. The use of impact and political conditionality in humanitarian aid does 
not correlate with the 1996 Humanitarian Aid Regulation. The human rights 
implications of (in)action may be a consideration in whether or not, or indeed how 
and to whom to provide aid, but they are far from the most important factor when 
weighing up options. Studies suggest that conditionality is of limited use and 
influence in such circumstances and is ineffective in forcing factions to respect rights 
and cajole them towards a political outcome.124 Furthermore, in many instances the 
power and legitimacy a group seeks internationally may have little to do with their 
relationship with their subject population.
A human rights awareness or approach to humanitarian assistance does not, however, 
require the use of conditionality. If ECHO requested those bodies it funds to 
integrate human rights considerations into their work, then this, for some agencies, 
may be acceptable. Others, such as the ICRC, may resist on the basis that such an 
approach is of a political nature and thus counterproductive. It would also 
compromise their mandate. There are a significant number of stipulations/requests, 
however, that ECHO can make of its partners to try and further integrate human 
rights considerations in its work. Asking them to investigate and engage in fact­
finding in cases of abuse or promoting the return of refugees, if appropriate, would 
assist in protecting a population from harm. Requests of this sort are not overtly 
political and can be seen to be part and parcel of effective humanitarianism and would 
not be objected to, on ethical grounds, by most agencies either.
124 See Uvin, P., The Influence o f A id in Situations o f Violent Conflict, (1999) and Scholms, “On the 
(im-)possible Inclusion” supra note 113.
125 See McClintock, M., “Tensions Between Assistance and Protection: A Human Rights Perspective” 
in Minear, L. and Weiss, T. (eds.), Humanitarian Action: A Transatlantic Agenda for Operations and 
Research, BHWP Occasional Paper 39 and Holleuffer, G., “Images o f Humanitarian Crises: Ethical 
Implications” http://www.oneworld.org.eurofic/icirc/artl.htm
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5. Conclusions.
In a panel discussion in 1998 Emma Bonino the then Commissioner for Humanitarian
Aid observed “ I have my doubts, looking at the array of conflicts in which
humanitarian relief is called for today... that being neutral is still at all possible or
indeed ethically just.” It is clear that in many situations ECHO has compromised
its neutrality and impartiality, in principle and in practice. It is for this reason
arguable, that rather than continue to claim it is impartial and neutral ECHO should
expressly adopt an approach which is usually referred to as “third-way 
1 ")1humanitarianism.”
This would be a far more honest approach to the policies implemented by ECHO in 
practice. In third-way humanitarianism neutrality is not expressly abandoned.128 
Where neutrality is expressly abandoned, humanitarianism is subordinate to foreign 
policy objectives, as is the case with USAID. Third-way humanitarianism is also 
distinguishable from where neutrality is a pre-eminent principle,129 as in the case of 
the ICRC. Third-way humanitarianism allows humanitarian assistance to have other 
objectives, such as peace building and tackling root causes, but is not biased per se 
between the parties to a conflict.130 Although this approach is very unclear about the 
nature and politics of humanitarian aid and merges increasingly into development 
assistance, it does provide significant flexibility and in any case accords with the 
Community’s practice.
Although the ICRC continues to adhere to the principles of neutrality, impartiality 
and independence, it cannot but escape the political implications of its actions.
126 Cited by Minear, “The Theory and Practice” supra note 8, footnote 12. Bonino was a member o f a 
panel discussion entitled “Is Neutrality Still Possible?”
127 See, for example, Leander, N., “The Politics of Principle: The Principles o f Humanitarian Action in 
Practice” HPG Report 2, Scholms, “On the (im-)possible Inclusion” supra note 113 and Hilhorst, D., 
“Being Good at Doing Good?” International Working Conference on Enhancing the Quality o f  
Humanitarian Assistance, 12/10/2001.
128 Leander, “The Politics of Principle” supra note 127.
129 Ibid.
m Ibid.
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Pictet’s well-known reference to the ICRC as a swimmer up to its neck in politics, but 
one who needs to keep his head above water to survive, sums up the position well.131 
This approach is not really possible for ECHO. Its role and function in the overall 
context of Union foreign policy means that the biases in the approach the Union has 
adopted towards third States in general have seeped into ECHO. The temptation to 
use humanitarian aid as an instrument amongst a myriad of other measures and 
policies has proved overwhelming for the Union. To abuse Pictet’s analogy, the 
swimmer must very occasionally submerge his or her head into the water to see what 
is going on and possibly influence events in the undercurrents. Third-way 
humanitarianism would allow and importantly recognise the necessity of this. It 
emphasises capacity building and the continuum between development and 
humanitarian aid.132 ECHO already adopts this approach in practice. The danger of 
such an approach, however, is that “forgotten emergencies” (which ECHO has 
identified as a priority) and those which are of little significance to the Union will be 
moved further out of focus. Third-way humanitarianism, if adopted, is likely to be 
used in situations where the Union has some interest. The Council, in particular, 
already has a reputation of throwing money as a token gesture in situations which are 
of little importance to it. As need is not currently the Union’s primary factor for the 
allocation of such aid, some emergencies would simply slide further down the scale 
of priorities and importance.
Community humanitarian aid policies are driven by pragmatism, which is the 
overriding principle and practice. ECHO’S practices and policies are defined by their 
fluidity and ambiguous nature. A lack of conceptualisation of the issues is 
symptomatic of the approach to its activities. There is little, if any, reference to the 
legal obligations of the Member States but this is not surprising. Notwithstanding 
this, the Community can make a very significant contribution to alleviating suffering, 
especially with regard to short-term emergency food aid. This is where a needs-based 
approach can be of the greatest value. At other times, however, Community 
humanitarian aid is overwhelmed by the more politically driven of the Union’s 
objectives and instruments. The contribution of Community humanitarian aid to the
131 Pictet, J., The Fundamental Principles o f  the Red Cross, (1979) p.56.
132 Leander, “The Politics of Principle” supra note 127.
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promotion and protection of ethical values in third States is not consistent. This does 
not mean, however, that such considerations are not a part of the equation. They 
clearly are, but the weight given to them differs according to the Union’s more 
general political objectives.
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Chapter Seven.
Conclusions.
The Union has set itself the objective of promoting ethical values in all third States. 
This thesis has primarily been concerned with the Union’s relations with developing 
countries. The aims of the thesis were to examine the legal basis for the Union’s 
ethical foreign policy and its implementation through a series of case-studies.
The initiatives the Union can implement to promote ethical values in a third State and 
the responses available to it to protect them, are determined by the nature of its 
relationship with that State. As the Union, like other international actors, has no 
uniform approach either to developing or to developed States or between them, the 
basis for its relations with each State differs fundamentally. The nature and basis of 
relations with, for example, Myanmar and the other ASEAN countries, the countries 
of the Sub-Continent and the ACP States all differ. There may be a bilateral, 
multilateral or mixed treaty in force to regulate relations, or there may be no treaty 
relationship at all. Furthermore the various unilateral instruments the Union has 
adopted have different objectives and priorities. Therefore, the instruments, 
mechanisms and institutions which can be used to conduct relations with Nigeria, for 
example, will differ from those that can be used with Pakistan, as will the parties to 
the dialogue. The Union has attempted to forge an ethical foreign policy by 
implanting it into the existing frameworks for relations with third States. The 
transformation in both competence and approach over a period of time has, at times, 
been significant, for example, in food aid policy. Existing policies, however, on the 
whole, have not been fundamentally reviewed but mutated or adapted.
Not only will the role played by ethical values in the Union’s relationships with third 
States differ but there will also be variable degrees of success, depending on the 
State(s) in question. The instruments and mechanisms that are used in relations with 
different third States vary greatly in their usefulness in pursuing such a policy. In its 
relations with developed countries the balance of power is also different and, if 
confronted with resistance, the Union has more to lose if it pushes these issues too
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hard. In the case of developing countries the Union has more leverage which, as all 
donors do, it uses to pursue its objectives. Classic instruments of diplomacy, such as 
dialogue and condemnation, as well as positive and punitive measures are part of the 
arsenal in relations with all States. There is, however, no coherent set of overall 
guidelines as to which instruments and mechanisms should be used by the Union. 
Nor are there any guidelines as to when or how it should act or react to the situation 
in a third State. The Union’s ethical foreign policy is still being formulated on an ad 
hoc basis.
The Union has at its disposal an impressively broad array of powers by which to give 
effect to an ethical foreign policy. The competence derived from the development 
cooperation provisions of the EC Treaty, for example, ensures that if the Community 
wishes to inform journalists in third States about the virtues of freedom of expression, 
if elections are to be monitored or water purified, then a legal base exists. 
Competence to pursue an ethical foreign policy can also be derived from, among 
others, Articles 310, 308, 133 EC or under the CFSP. There are, however, sometimes 
problems of consistency in the exercise of different policies. Development 
cooperation, on the one hand, and, on the other, trade policy and general foreign 
policy objectives, do not always coincide.
The structure and nature of the Union also makes it significantly more difficult for it, 
compared to a nation State, to implement an ethical foreign policy. Although the 
interests and views of the Member States largely coincide, there are invariably issues 
where they have differences of opinion, priorities and interests. The recent expansion 
of the Union will serve to further exacerbate these differences, which are sometimes a 
major factor in inhibiting the ability of the Union to take a principled and effective 
stance. States rarely publicly acknowledge their order of priorities. These priorities 
and the emphasis to be given to them are a product of each State’s history, as well as 
its political, economic and security considerations. Denmark and Sweden, for 
example, are considered, especially when holding the Presidency of the Council, to be 
more vociferous and determined in the pursuance of ethical values than some of the 
other Member States. At times, this can adversely affect other aspects of the 
relationship with a third State.
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For any policy aimed at promoting and protecting ethical values in all third countries, 
to be credible and principled, it should be coherent and consistent with little regard to 
the strategic or economic importance of a third State or the historical alliances that 
exist. Inconsistency in application, in particular, between developing and developed 
States and the use of conditionality in relations with the latter, exposes the Union to 
the accusation of cultural imperialism. As far as Cooperation Agreements with third 
States are concerned, where they exist, reference is usually made to those 
international conferences, treaties and declarations which all parties to the Agreement 
have accepted. Thus reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is 
common place, even though the scope and content of the rights it contains is 
uncertain. The Union, however, also attempts to directly transplant and promote the 
principles and values it considers relevant to third States, sometimes without enough 
regard to their appropriateness or the difficulty those States will face in giving effect 
to them. The rule of law and good governance are examples, in particular, as the 
legal content of these principles is unclear in international law and the Union rarely 
articulates what it means by them.
In the Union’s actions and responses in both promoting and protecting ethical values 
in third States, there is rarely any reference to the legal obligations the Member States 
and Community are under, with the notable exception of the implementation of UN 
sanctions. Union practice is, however, undeniably influencing the content of 
international law. Responses to the annulment of elections, for example, are part of a 
trend where non-democratic regimes are increasingly perceived as being illegitimate. 
Community Agreements require “democratic principles” to be respected. Yet 
deficiencies in that regard in third States are routinely overlooked by the Union, if it 
is politically expedient. Inconsistencies by those advocating the illegitimacy of non- 
democratic governments in their approach towards such regimes undermine that 
development. The Union has failed to scrutinise the behaviour of, for example, many 
oil rich Middle-Eastern States. It can be argued that the principle being developed by 
the Union only relates to where the expressed will of a population in multi-party 
elections is ignored and it is not concerned with the (il)legitimacy of regimes, where 
there has not been a plebiscite in the first place. Even if this distinction is a valid one, 
the disregard of the outcome of democratic elections in Algeria in 1991 serves to 
undermine that argument. The continuation of relations with Algeria is an aberration
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and difficult to justify. The Union’s apparent turnaround in relations with Pakistan is 
distinguishable. “Exceptional circumstances” are seen to exist and although the 
Union is open to accusations of double-standards, the promotion and protection of 
ethical values in a third State will never trump the vital security interests of the 
promoting polity. Relations with Pakistan simply serve to highlight the relative 
importance of ethical values in the hierarchy of the Union’s interests and priorities.
There are, as cited in Chapter Two, numerous statements which place ethical 
considerations at the heart of the Union’s foreign policy. From the case-studies it is 
clear that, in practice, this is not the case. As many Realists contend, it would be 
naive to think it is. But whereas some Realists reject any role for such considerations 
in policy formulation, in the case of the Union, the pursuit of ethical values is an 
objective alongside others. The constitutive treaties imply this, even if the Court took 
a somewhat different approach to development cooperation in the Portugal case. A 
1994 Communication on relations with Asia, for example, stated quite clearly that 
human rights will be a “major objective” of policy with Asia. Ethical considerations 
are now undeniably an established part of the equation in the Union’s dealings with 
all third States.
The case-studies illustrate the role and weight given by the Union to differing 
considerations and factors while it attempts to promote and protect ethical values. In 
its relations with Myanmar, the Community displayed an initial unwillingness to take 
punitive measures. When the elections were annulled in 1991 the formulation of 
Community policy was in its infancy. The maintenance of dialogue and possibly 
influence as well as trade interests, even though relatively unimportant, initially only 
led to the downgrading of development assistance and the withdrawal of military 
attaches. The death of the Danish consul and the consequent Danish outrage 
compelled the Union to take some action. There are no security considerations or 
major quantities of vital natural resources at stake and an isolationist and repressive 
regime, which is engaging in gross and systemic violations of human rights, should 
make the formulation of policy relatively straightforward. It is clear, however, that 
the Community usually only downgrades development cooperation and assistance if 
there has, at some stage, been an effective suspension of the democratic process. 
Human rights violations are usually not the primary reason for such a reaction
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although they are often the aggravating factor, which can lead to further punitive 
measures being adopted. The studies on both Nigeria and Myanmar illustrate this. In 
many senses, if the Union takes punitive action in response to gross and systematic 
violations of certain human rights, as opposed violations of democratic principles, it 
is on much sounder legal ground. Due to the approach it has adopted to the 
relationship between human rights, development and democracy, however, it tends to 
see them as inseparable.
The Union is reluctant to unilaterally impose sweeping punitive measures which will 
have a negative impact on the population of a State at large. It attempts to refocus 
programmes to ensure that any punitive measures against a State have a limited 
impact upon the population at large and primarily target those in power. The 
commercial interests and perspectives of the Member States are also relevant. The 
legal obligations of the Member States and Community in this regard, as noted above, 
are rarely, if ever, publicly referred to but they too are a consideration. For these 
reasons, vociferous condemnation in the case of both Nigeria and Myanmar has not 
been followed by punitive measures commensurate with the outrage expressed. 
Condemning a third State for whatever reason does not, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
amount to interference in legal terms. Assuming the political will and capacity exists, 
taking action which will effectively curtail a regime in a third State, however, may 
not be legally permissible. Striking the correct balance, bearing in mind all the 
different factors referred to above, is difficult. As a consequence many of the 
measures implemented by the Union have a limited impact upon the regime(s) in 
question. This leads to routine accusations of, for example, the Union placing trade 
interests above ethics, which are not always justifiable.
The Union also sometimes fails to strike the correct balance in the promotion of 
values. Countless studies and reports criticise the relevance and effectiveness of 
some of the development projects funded by the Community in third States. To a 
large extent the Community via Europe Aid is reliant on appropriate projects being 
proposed by NGOs and other bodies. It does not design them itself, even if it does 
highlight the types of projects it wishes to fund. Some of its projects, however, do 
make a substantial and valuable contribution. The projects which aim to tackle child 
labour in Pakistan, as discussed in Chapter Four, are one example. Yet, even these
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sorts of projects can suffer from problems, the continuity of funding being one. In a 
number of instances, much of the good work achieved in the short-term is later 
undone by the Community’s lack of planning and foresight.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the Union has contributed to global and regional 
issues in a manner that the individual Member States simply cannot match. The 
impact of collective action by 25 States will always be significant. For example, as 
Chapter Five highlights, it is because the Union has pushed the roadmap and the two- 
State solution to the conflict in the Middle East that it is now the preferred 
international approach. In the MEPP, however, the Union has failed to take 
advantage of its own importance due to the Member States’ differing opinions and 
perspectives. The Union and its Member States have not fully used the instruments 
available to them, especially the “essential elements” clause to put pressure on Israel 
to rein in its practices in the Occupied and Palestinian Administered Territories. The 
failure to respond to fundamental, systematic and gross violations of international law 
raises questions about the credibility of such clauses, where they exist, and the 
Union’s ethical foreign policy in relations with all third States.
With regard to humanitarian aid, the contribution of the Union is again uneven. Its 
practice is conceptually ambiguous and there is little or no reference to legal 
obligations. The Union has struggled to find an appropriate role for humanitarian aid 
in its foreign policy instruments. It is not always clear, in practice, if it sees it as a 
part of the political process or apart from it. Due to the nature of the activity it cannot 
but help make a positive contribution to the survival of those in need but, as discussed 
in Chapter Six, the provision of such aid is intrinsically bound up with many other 
ethical problems and political considerations to which the Union has no clear 
approach. Funds are not usually spent where the absolute need is greatest and it is 
questionable whether sufficient coordination exists between humanitarian aid and 
development cooperation. Yet despite all of this, some of its contributions, in 
particular with regard to food-aid and food-security, are again exceptionally valuable.
It is important not to overlook the fact that any foreign policy, whether it is ethical or 
not, will always be limited in what it can achieve. Regardless of how well designed 
or coherent a policy is, it is usually difficult, while respecting international legal
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obligations, to influence the situation in a third State so that the desired outcome is 
attained. Many such matters are simply outside of the control of a State or in our case 
the Union. For example, as noted in Chapter Four, the refusal of the Union and its 
Member States to sell arms and instruments of oppression to Myanmar has simply 
resulted in the military regime sourcing those goods from elsewhere. In practice, the 
impact of these measures in Myanmar has been negligible but it has not been without 
cost to manufacturers of those goods in the Union Member States. Furthermore, the 
Union has pumped billions of Euros into the Palestinian Territories to try and build a 
viable entity. The ongoing conflict has resulted in the Union, however, having to 
make damage limitation, as opposed to supporting civil society, building an 
infrastructure and developing the economy, its primary objective.
Even allowing for matters outside of its control, the Union, bearing in mind its wealth 
and political power, currently makes a less positive contribution in this regard than it 
should. This is not to deny the value of the contribution it does make. Simply put, it 
can make a more significant one. The promotion of ethical values in third States is 
not a purely altruistic endeavour. The Union promotes these values and norms 
because it believes in their inherent value and it also considers that it will in turn 
derive benefits from them. Foreign policies which emphasise certain values can 
make an important contribution to protecting the interests of the promoting entity and 
strengthening the pillars of the international legal order. The Union and its Member 
States will be more successful in “exporting” their own political philosophy if their 
actions are perceived to be both principled and consistent. This needs to be 
supplemented by creating or supporting conditions and institutions which provide the 
target States with the capacity to “import” the values in question. It is therefore, in 
the Union’s interests to consider reform of its policies and practice.
The fundamental problems that currently stand in the way of a more articulate, 
coherent and effective policy are the structure of the Union and its approach to 
relations with third States. The organisation of the Commission, the structure and 
mechanics of the Union and the use of differing competences, to name a few, make 
such issues very difficult to work out in a consistent and credible manner. The Union 
usually has too many voices for its position in foreign policy matters to be clear and 
authoritative. Solana, Patten, Nielson, Prodi, the Commission, the Presidency, the
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Member States and, in the context of their mandates, the Special Representatives can 
all legitimately comment on the same issue. They do not all sing from the same 
hymn sheet. The creation of a European Foreign Minister is seen as a partial solution 
to this problem. This will still not deprive the others, in particular the Member States, 
of their prerogative to comment on issues of concern to them. The formulation of 
policy also requires clearer guidelines, as to when to act and which responses are 
appropriate. Such reforms and steps, however, are unlikely to be undertaken solely 
for the sake of a pursuing a more effective ethical foreign policy.
A number of different aspects of the policy, however, can be improved without the 
need for major reform. In terms of positive action, there must be a clearer 
identification of where development needs are the greatest and what contribution can 
be made by funding a project? Although this approach has been adopted in policy 
terms it has not been properly implemented. There are many instances in which 
projects are funded and where a more substantial contribution could have been made 
elsewhere. Where the greatest contribution can be made is with regard to poverty 
reduction. Poverty reduction is considered to be the major human rights challenge of 
this century. The most concrete contribution that the Union can make is by targeting 
those populations most in need, regardless of the strategic and political importance of 
the States they are in. Humanitarian and food aid as well as development aid and 
cooperation should be targeted at these populations, depending on the circumstances, 
to alleviate their suffering. Subject to scrutiny, projects designed by the State in 
question, international organisations and NGOS on the ground, as well as on the 
initiative of the Union delegation should all work towards that end. Furthermore, the 
EBA initiative can be amended to take account of any produce that is exported, by 
such populations, regardless of its sensitivity. If there is no such produce, then 
projects can work towards establishing either an agricultural base or an industrial one 
so that goods can be exported to the Union. The Union should complement this 
initiative by targeting any adverse effects such a policy has on other populations, in 
particular those who export competing produce, by providing them with additional 
support and benefits. This approach has the advantage of not only assisting those in 
most need but is clearly where funds can be most effectively spent. It requires a long­
term commitment which is not sacrificed to short-term objectives and priorities. The
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food aid and security programme, discussed in Chapter Six, displays exactly what can 
be achieved.
Poverty reduction is considered to be the overwhelming priority of Community 
development cooperation but many projects have been poorly designed and poverty 
reduction policies have been all too easily compromised when political considerations 
have come to the fore. The “war against terror” and security are increasingly taking 
priority. While emphasis on the “war against terror” is understandable, the Union 
should not relegate the importance of poverty reduction. Effective poverty reduction 
strategies can help break the cycle of dependency, create wealth and contribute to 
better governance and development. All of these are explicit objectives of the Union 
and in any case poverty reduction should contribute to a safer world and a securer 
global environment.
Aspects of the “essential elements” clause should also be reconsidered. The failure to 
use it against Israel, as noted above, means that the Union will lose further credibility 
if the clause is invoked for similar or lesser violations by other States. Accusations of 
double-standards are particularly harmful to credibility, which is essential. This does 
not mean, however, that “essential elements” clauses are of little or no use. Some 
ACP States have long advocated the creation of a “court” under the terms of the 
Lome/Cotonou Conventions to determine breaches of its provisions. In a different 
form, such an institution provides a way forward. An independent advisory body, 
which can determine whether the clause has been breached, would be a very welcome 
step forward. The opinion of the advisory body does not have to be legally binding. 
The expectation, however, would be that its opinions are be taken into consideration 
by the institutional bodies established under each treaty containing such a clause. 
The Community must also articulate more clearly what each principle in the 
“essential elements” clause means. The function of the advisory body would then be 
to consider the issues which arise under any treaty relationship between the 
Community and a third State(s) and determine whether it has been breached or not. It 
would also determine the best course of action for the Union to take in response to 
events in that State. It would be concerned with the legal obligations of the 
Community and its Member States, the legality of any proposed action and the legal 
obligations the third State in question is under. Furthermore, political considerations,
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such as the willingness and capacity of the State to take action, should be taken into 
account. Accordingly, the advisory body could recommend a number of responses. 
These include the suspension of an Agreement; the downgrading of development 
assistance; the refocusing of existing programmes; new initiatives to assist sections of 
the population; that the Council adopt certain measures under the CFSP; or a 
combination of these. The opinions of the advisory body should be public, as this 
will help to provide transparency and allow scrutiny of the responses of the Union to 
events in third States.
If the advisory body considers that an Agreement should be suspended then it should 
also automatically follow that the GSP and EBA initiative, if appropriate for the State 
in question, are also suspended. In third generation Agreements there is currently no 
link with suspension of these benefits. As many third generation Agreements do not 
have a separate budget line attached to them, the automatic suspension of the GSP 
and EBA are an effective tool, along with dialogue, to achieve a change in the 
situation which is objected to. Both the EBA and GSP Regulations can be amended 
to this effect. Such action should be complemented with programmes and funding at 
the grass roots level to ensure that the impact of these measures on the general 
population is mitigated and, as far as is possible, only affects those in power. This 
should ensure, in case of any doubt, that by withdrawing unilateral benefits the 
Community is not violating any international legal obligations.
Numerous shortcomings in the Union’s approach in practice have been highlighted in 
the various chapters of this thesis. The overall picture of the promotion of ethical 
values in third States is, however, a positive one. On occasions it is difficult not to 
see the futility of the course of action adopted but, on the whole, these are outweighed 
by the positive aspects of the policy. Reform is required on a number of different 
levels to make the Union’s contribution more valuable in the promotion and 
protection of those values the Union considers are at its own core. Without reform 
and reassessment of what it is attempting to achieve and how it should do so, the 
Union’s contribution will continue to be less meaningful than it can be. The question 
for the Union is to what extent is it really committed to those values and what price it 
is prepared to pay in pursuing them? Analysis of practice does display a commitment 
to these values but not an overriding one. It also highlights some shortcomings. The
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fact that the Union does not always get things right, however, does not mean that it 
should not continue with its efforts.
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